

THE VĀKYAPADĪYA OF BHARTRHARI

CHAPTER III, Pt ii

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER

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**THE
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BHARTṚHARI**

**MOTILAL
BANARSIDASS**

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OF BHARTRIHARI

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
Bhartrhari stands peerless in the galaxy of Sanskrit grammarians of the Pāṇinian School. His *Vākyapadīya* has earned a world-wide acclaim for the philosophical and scientific exposition of Sanskrit grammar.

Among the modern Sanskrit grammarians Prof. K. A. Subramania Iyer is well known for his clear and comprehensive analysis of Bhartrhari's ideas. Six volumes of his work have already been published by the Deccan College Research Institute, Poona.

The present Volume is an English translation of the *Kārikās* of the last seven *samuddeśas* of the third *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, namely, those relating to *kriyā*, *kāla*, *puruṣa*, *saṁkhyā*, *upagraha*, *liṅga* and *vr̥tti*. It follows the same pattern as adopted for the translation of the *Kārikās* of the first seven *samuddeśas* of the *Kāṇḍa* III, Part I.

The translation of each *Kārikā* is followed by exegetical notes which expound the notions that Bhartrhari following Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* considered to be the basis of the forms of the Sanskrit language. The notes provide the gist of what Helārāja says in his *Prakīrṇaparakāśa*. They also contain references to the *Sūtras*, *Vārttikas* and the *Mahābhāṣya* passages involved in the treatment.

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THE VĀKYAPADĪYA OF BHARTṚHARI

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- (2) *Vākyapadiya* of Bhartṛhari, Kāṇḍa II. English translation with exegetical notes based on the *Vṛtti* and Puṇyarāja's *Prakāśa*, by K.A. Subramania Iyer.

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- (1) *Vākyapadiya* of Bhartṛhari, with the *Vṛtti* and the *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabha Deva, Kāṇḍa I. Critical edition. Deccan College Monograph Series, 32, Poona, 1966.
- (2) *Vākyapadiya* of Bhartṛhari with the commentary *Prakīrṇakaprakāśa* of Helārāja. Kāṇḍa III, pt i. Critical edition. Deccan College Monograph Series, 21. Poona, 1963.
- (3) *Vākyapadiya* of Bhartṛhari with the *Prakīrṇakaprakāśa* of Helārāja on Kāṇḍa III. pt ii. Critical edition. Deccan College, 1973.
- (4) *Vākyapadiya* of Bhartṛhari, Kāṇḍa I, with the *Vṛtti*. English translation with Introduction and critical and exegetical notes. Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series, 26, Poona, 1965.
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- (6) *Bhartṛhari*, a study of the *Vākyapadiya*, in the light of the ancient commentaries. Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series, 68, Poona, 1969.
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THE VĀKYAPADĪYA OF BHARTRHARI

CHAPTER III. pt. ii

English Translation

with

Exegetical Notes

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PREFACE

This is a translation of the *Kārikās* of the remaining seven *Samuddeśas* of the third *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, namely, those relating to *kriyā*, *kāla*, *puruṣa*, *saṃkhyā*, *upagraha*, *liṅga* and *vytti*, included in my critical edition of the *Vākyapadīya*, *Kāṇḍa* III, pt ii, published by the Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute in 1973. It follows the pattern already adopted for the translation of the *kārikās* of the first seven *samuddeśas* of *Kāṇḍa* III, pt i, published as no. 71 of the Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series in 1971. The translation of each *kārikā* is followed by a brief note printed within square brackets ([]) in which an attempt is made to give the gist of what Helārāja says in his *Prakīrṇakaprakāśa*. As in the first part, all that relates to the purely *prakriyā* part of Sanskrit Grammar has been omitted as the purpose of this work is to study the notions which Bhartṛhari, following Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, considers to be the basis of the forms of the Sanskrit language. This second part begins with the notion of *kriyā* = action or process, the central idea in every sentence according to Sanskrit Grammarians, expressed mainly by the verb in it, with the other words conveying the *sādhana*s or objects which help in the accomplishment of the action. In each of the seven sections (*samuddeśas*) included in this second part, there is a main topic, obvious from its very name. Within that topic are brought many minor topics which are arranged in a somewhat logical sequence. The main topics also follow one another logically. It is natural, for instance, that, after having dealt with all those things which are recognised by Sanskrit Grammar as the means (*sādhana*) in the accomplishment of an action in the last section of part i, the author should take up the notion of action itself and that is what he does in section 8 of this part ii. In section 6, verse 1, Bhartṛhari mentions Time after Action. Also, it is Time that determines and differentiates Action. So the next section is devoted to a consideration of Time. The verb conveys action, not only as qualified by Time but also as

qualified by Person. The Sanskrit language presents action as performed by the first (*uttama*), second (*madhyama*) or third (*prathama*) Person. So the author considers Person after Time. As the Sanskrit verb conveys also the number of the agents or of the objects of action, number is dealt with in section 11. Certain aspects of action, symbolised by the expressions *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada* are also conveyed by the verb. Section 12, therefore, considers aspect (*upagraha*). So much for notions connected with the verb. The notion of gender affects only the formation of nouns in Sanskrit, but as it plays a big part there, the next section is devoted to a consideration of it. After dealing with notions which lie behind simple formations, Bhartṛhari comes to complex formations (*Vṛtti*) Sanskrit Grammar recognises five *Vṛttis* or complex integrated formations made up of simpler elements. They are primary formations (*Kṛt*), secondary formations (*taddhita*) compound words (*samāsa*), retention of one (*ekakṣeṣa*) and nominal verbs (*nāmadhātu*). When the different elements combine to make up an integrated unit, various questions arise. For instance, when two words combine to form a compound word, what is the nature of the number expressed by the secondary word in the compound? What is the difference between a compound word and the corresponding sentence? The last section, the biggest, discusses a large number of such points and the discussion, when taken with the commentary of Helārāja, is really a kind of commentary of Bhartṛhari on the relevant passages of the *Mahābhāṣya* on which his treatment is based. In my notes, I have given references to the *sūtras*, *vārttikas* and the *Mahābhāṣya* passages involved.

As in my translation of *Kāṇḍa* III, pt i, here also I have pointed out, here and there, emendations required in the text of the *kārikās* as found in my edition of *Kāṇḍa* III, pt ii, published in 1973.

It only remains for me to thank the publishers Messrs. Motilal Banarsidass for having completed the printing and the other arrangements for publishing this volume in a very short time, in a little more than one year after the press copy was handed over to them. This volume has benefited by their vast experience in publishing works dealing with Sanskrit and

Indology. Their interest and enthusiasm can be seen in the fact that when, after having published six out of the nine projected volumes of my work on Bhartṛhari and the *Vākya-padīya*, the Deccan College Post Graduate and Research Institute found itself unable, due to shortage of funds, to complete the project, Sri Sunderlal Jain, the Proprietor of Messrs Motilal Banarsidass, promptly offered to publish the remaining three parts and one of them is already here before the public. Their promptness is very clear when one remembers that the publication of my translation of *Kāṇḍa* III, pt i by the Deccan College Post Graduate and Research Institute took nearly five years and it was only half the size of the present volume.

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Lucknow
4.2.1974

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- Bra. Sū. *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa.
- Br. up. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*.
- Ch. up. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.
- He. Helārājas commentary on *Vāk. III*.
- J.O.R.M. Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.
- Kā. *Kārikās* of the *Vākyapadīya*.
- M. Bhā. *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, Vols I, II, III, edited by Kielhorn.
- Mi. Sū. *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* of Jaimini.
- Ni. *Nirukta* of Yāska.
- P. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini.
- Ś.B. *Śatapatha-Bṛāhmaṇa*.
- ŚYV. *Śukla Yajurveda*.
- Śve. up. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*.
- Tai. Ā. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*.
- Tai. Saṃ. *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*.
- Vāk. a. *Vākyapadīya* (Banares Sanskrit Series 1887 onwards).
- Vāk. b. *Vākyapadīya* I and II (incomplete) (Ram Lal Kapoor Trust, Lahore, 1934 onwards, edited by Pt. Charu Deva Shastri).
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Varanasi-Patna, 1972.

Jā (जा)	Jāṭisamuddeśa
Dra (द्र)	Dravya.....
Sam (सं)	Sambandha.....
Bhū. dr. (भू.द्र)	Bhūyodravya.....
Gu (गु)	Guṇa.....
Dik (दिक्)	Dik.....
Sā (सा)	Sādhana.....
Kri (क्रि)	Kriyā.....
Kā (का)	Kāla.....
Pu (पु)	Puruṣa.....
Śamk (संख्य)	Samkhyā.....
Up (उप)	Upagraha.....
Liṅ (लि)	Liṅga.....
Vṛ (वृ)	Vṛtti.....

SECTION 8

ON ACTION

The means or accessory (*sādhana*) has been explained. As it depends upon the end or what is to be accomplished (*sādhya*), the definition of action accepted in the *śāstra*, is now being given.

1. Whenever something, finished or unfinished, is presented as something to be accomplished, it is called 'action', because of its having assumed the form of sequence.

[In connection with the ancient's definition of a root as that which denotes action, the objection is raised that in that case 'as', *bhū* and *vid* should be especially declared to be roots because they do not denote action (M. Bhā, I. p. 255, 1.1). We know that *pac* denotes action because in reply to the question : 'what is he doing?' we can say 'he is cooking' (*pacati*). We cannot give *bhavati* as an answer to the same question. Thus *as*, *bhū* and *vid* would not be expressive of action and they would not be called roots. Moreover all action is known to consist of movements but the meanings of *as*, *bhū*, and *vid* do not consist of movements. Therefore such a definition of action has to be found as will fit in with the meaning of all roots. That is just what the Bhāṣyakāra has done in his statement : *kāraṇāṇaṃ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ kriyā* (M. Bhā, I.p. 258, L. 11) = 'Action is the special mode of behaviour of the accessories.' This has been interpreted differently by different scholars. Either all the accessories have the same activity or each has its own. Even if all the accessories have the same activity, it may be identical with the fruit or it may be different from it. All the accessories cannot have the same activity. That of the instrument (*karana*), for instance, cannot be identical with that of the agent (*kartā*), nor that of the abode (*adhikarana*) with that of the

recipient (*sampradāna*). There is no action resting upon many things. Therefore, action is an activity differing with each accessory. To say that the root is what denotes action is to say that the root expresses the activity of every accessory. *Objection* :—The result would be that the verbal suffix (*lakāra*) would express each and every accessory. It is only natural that the suffix which is added to the root should denote the accessory of the activity for which the root stands and it has been stated that the root stands for the activity of all the accessories. *Answer*:—This is not really the case. Pāṇini teaches that the verbal suffixes are added in the sense of the agent and the object only. (P. 3.4.69) Therefore a word ending in a verbal suffix should denote only the activities of these two accessories. Secondly, as a matter of fact, we understand only the activities of the agent and the object from the verbal suffixes and it is only natural that Pāṇini's teaching should follow facts. It is true that according to this, a root would not stand for the activities of any accessory. Agreement (*anvaya*) and difference (*vyatireka*) are the only two methods which we have for determining what the meaning of the base and what the meaning of the suffix is and these two methods lead us to think that the root does not stand for the activities of all the accessories. Though in a sentence like : *Devadattaḥ kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyām odanam pacati*, the root does seem to stand for the activities of all the accessories, primarily it stands for those of the agent and the object. Hence they are understood from the verbal suffixes (*la*) at the end of a verb.

Others believe that the statement *kāraṇāṁ pravṛtṭiviśeṣaḥ kriyā* is meant to explain the nature of action and not to explain the meaning of a root. They argue as follows—The root cannot express the activity of the recipient etc. but it does express that of the instrument etc. That is why an instrument can be presented as independent (*svatantra*), as the agent, as in the sentence : *asiś chinatti* but not the recipient (*sampradāna*) or the starting point (*apādāna*). The activities of all the accessories are action but of these only some are expressed by the root and the verbal suffixes are added to the root in order to denote those accessories the activities of which are expressed by the root.

Others, while explaining this definition of action, put all the

emphasis on the word *viśeṣa*. They say that *pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ* means *pravṛttinām viśeṣaḥ*. They mean that action is a *viśeṣa*, a peculiarity or rather a distinct result of the activities of the accessories. The softness of the *rice*, after cooking, is the result achieved by the activities of all the accessories. Thus, to them action is the result.

For others still, by *kāraṇāṇām* only the *kartā* is meant. The plural number is used keeping in mind the different agents of the different possible actions. There is a *M. Bhā.* sentence which may be taken as a proof that only the *kartā* is meant. It is this : *Anyathā śuṣkaudane kāraṇāṇi pravartante anyathā māṃśaudane* (*M. Bhā.* I. p. 258, l. II) = "Agents act in one way when there is only plain rice before them and act quite differently towards rice with meat". Here there is talk of the agents acting with excitement in the presence of rice with meat and with indifference towards plain rice. Only a sentient being like the agent is capable of excitement or indifference. So *kāraṇāṇi* here means the agents. The *karma*, object may also be meant. In one passage, the *M. Bhā* says that *viklitti* = 'becoming soft', is the chief meaning of the root *pac*. This cannot be the activity of the agent. His activity is *vikledanam* = 'making something soft' and not becoming soft. The conclusion seems to be that in this passage it is not the meaning of words which is explained but what is called action. Considered apart from words, *viklitti*—'becoming soft' may be the real nature of the action called cooking but the root *pac* denotes primarily the activity of the agent, that is, *vikledana* = making something soft. The activity of the object can be expressed by the root when the suffix is added to it in the sense of the object.

Others still explain the whole thing differently. For them, *kriyā* is just activity in general and not any particular activity. Thus it would be found in every accessory. The bringing about of the ultimate result is the common thing found in the activity of every accessory. It is this common thing which is called *pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ*. The *viśeṣa* consists in bringing about the ultimate result. This is their common feature. Each does it in its own way and hence gets a special name. If action had been defined as just *pravṛtti*, it would have meant movement because that is the

accepted meaning of the word in the world. By adding the word *viśeṣa*, it now stands for something other than just movement. All *pravṛtti* differs from other *pravṛttis* and that constitutes its distinctiveness (*viśeṣa*). Thus, in the behaviour of every *kāraka*, there can be a distinctiveness. This can be from things of the same kind or from totally different things. When the M. Bhā. speaks about difference in the reaction to plain rice and to rice with meat, it has distinction from things of the same class in mind. The action of eating differs from person to person. Agents act indifferently towards plain rice but enthusiastically towards rice with meat. If acting enthusiastically alone makes something fit to be called action, then eating plain rice could not be called action at all. The lack of enthusiasm in eating plain rice is also a peculiar behaviour and so that is also *kriyā*. Distinction from things belonging to another class is quite clear in such examples as *pacati*, *paṭhati* and so on.

It is clear from all this that *kriyā* is different from *dravya*. All the accessories which are *dravyas* may be present and yet there may be no action. Sometimes, however, the idea of action arises in our mind when the accessories are present. The fact that the idea of action sometimes arises and sometimes not shows that action is something different from the accessories. Somebody might object that even when it does arise, it might be an error. Therefore, some other proof must be given to show that action is different from the accessories. We find that Devadatta is now here and later in Pāṭaliputra. Something is responsible for it. That is action. Reaching Pāṭaliputra is the result and it can't come from substance only. It leads us to postulate the existence of some activity which produces this result. That is action and that is inferable only. It cannot be directly perceived. Some people object to this view that action is something to be inferred. We get the notion that somebody is cooking. From this can we infer the action called cooking? This notion itself may be an error and we can infer nothing from an error. If it is not an error then we are perceiving action directly. It is not a case of inference. One might infer action from its effect, but how can the word express it? The answer to this objection is that in Grammar, we are not dealing with things as they are but as presented by

words. The thing which is fixed as the meaning of the root by the method of agreement and difference cannot be directly perceived. That notion having sequence within it and which is understood from a verb is called action. That which is presented by the word as a process is called action and that which is a finished thing is a substance. Even things that are in the process of formation can be presented by words as finished things. In the sentence *ghaṭaḥ kriyate*, the jar is presented as a thing in the process of formation. The jar, before it is produced, goes through many stages, but this process is not understood from the word *ghaṭa*. It is understood from the verb *kriyate*. The meaning of a word is that which is understood from it without the help of another word. From the word *ghaṭa* alone, we understand the meaning of being (*sattā*). That is why that meaning has been declared to be the meaning of a stem (*prātipadika*). When a verb is used, sequence is understood and that is why things in a process of formation are said to be the meaning of verbs. From the sentence *ghaṭaḥ kriyate*, what we understand is this : The jar which is mentally conceived is being brought about. Thus action is something which is inferred from things.

But some say that even this conception of action does not cover the meaning of roots like *as*. One of the characteristics of action mentioned above was that when all the accessories are present, sometimes the notion of action arises and sometimes it does not. But the idea denoted by the root *as* always arises when the accessories are present. Therefore the meaning of the root *as* is not action. Secondly, the meaning of this root does not admit of degree as the meanings of other roots do. We cannot say *astitarām* as we can say *pacatitarām*. Nor can we give *asti* as an answer to the question : what is he doing? But we can give *pacati* as an answer. 'Being' is the ultimate meaning of a verb also and it does not admit of degree. This objection is answered as follows : Action was defined as *kāraṇāṁ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ* = a distinctive mode of behaviour of the accessories. The behaviour of the accessories in the case of *asti* is not the same as in the case of *mrīyate*. In *asti*, they act with a view to the preservation of the body and in *mrīyate*, they act for its destruction. Thus there is distinctiveness in the mode of behaviour (*Pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ*).

There is also a reason why the notion denoted by the root *as* always arises when the accessories are present and not only sometimes. Being (*Sattā*), brought about by unexcited (*asaṃrabdha*) accessories, always persists. That is why the notion expressed by *as* always arises when the accessories are present. There can also be degree in the meaning of *as* or *vid*. We do say : *vidyate-tarāmayamiha* when somebody is always present. The suffix *tarā* expresses degree. *Asti* can sometimes become the answer to the question : what is he doing ? For instance, in regard to someone who is about to die. As other actions, the action in *as* also produces its result, that of 'not giving up oneself'. From Yāska's treatment of the six *bhāvavikāras*, *bhāva* or *sattā* is the basis of all action. One cannot therefore question whether the meaning of *as* is action or not. Staying (*tiṣṭhati*) is not mentioned as one of the six, but it has all the characteristics of action. For example, one action cancels others. When one hears *tiṣṭhati*, it cancels such actions as growth and decay. Therefore, it is also a distinctive mode of the accessories (*kāraṇāṇaṃ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ*). Secondly, it can be connected with different accessories, another proof that it is action. We can say : *bhūmau tiṣṭhati balena tiṣṭhati* and so on. Similarly, in *upa vasati*, *vinaśyati*, *apakṣīyate* etc., the meanings would come under the definition of action, because they represent a special activity of the accessories having sequence. They are different from the accessories themselves and they are the meanings of roots. Something which is a finished thing cannot be the meaning of a root. Nor is *bhāvanā* the meaning of a root, because there is no such thing apart from *kriyā*. The meaning of the root *kr* is common to the meanings of all the roots. That is why it can be in apposition to all roots. The idea of cooking is understood from both *pacati* and *pāka*, but in one case, it is understood as a thing while, in the other, it is understood as a process. *Pacati* and *pākaṃ karoti* mean this : he causes to soften the rice which softens by itself. *Vikledana* = 'making soft' is the activity of the agent and *viklitti* = 'becoming soft' is that of the object and both are included in the meaning of the root *pac*. Therefore there is no such thing as *bhāvanā*, apart from *kriyā*. *Yajeta* does not mean : *Yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet* = 'One should bring about heaven through sacrifice.' It means a process by accomplishing which the result comes spontaneously].

The definition of action, given above, is made clear by means of an illustration.

2. In 'it sounds' (*dhvanati*), sound is presented as having inner sequence (*krama*) on the basis of the relation of causality; when there is no more sequence, it is just called 'sound'.

[In the sentence 'the bell rings' (*ghaṇṭā dhvanati*) sound is presented by the verb as an action or a process, the parts of which have temporal sequence. The bell is the cause of the sound and the sound is the object. The bell whose activity leads to the result called sound is said to ring. Or we may look upon it like this : Sound is something which happens in a series like waves and the earlier wave is the cause and the later wave is the effect. When the activity of the bell ceases, there is no question of earlier and later waves. Then we simply say : *ghaṇṭāyā dhvaniḥ* = the sound of the bell. We do not then say : 'the bell rings'. In other words, sound is now presented as a thing and not as a process. In the sentence '*dhvaniṃ karoti*' = 'he makes a sound', if we understand a process, it is due to the presence of the word '*karoti*'. The process is the meaning of the sentence and not of the individual word. A meaning which is understood through the presence of another word is sentence meaning and not word-meaning. A word is authority only in regard to the meaning which it denotes. It has been pointed out again and again that, in Grammar, things as presented by words count and not things as they are.]

Another illustration is now given.

3. In regard to the quality 'white' the verb *śvetate* presents it as having sequence and it means that it shines as something white.

[The verb *śvetate* presents the quality white as a process. The noun *śveta*, on the other hand, presents it as a thing. *Śvetate* is explained in the *kārikā* itself as *śvetatvena prakāśate*.]

Thus action is something which is presented by words as a

process having parts arranged in a sequence. How the idea of a single action arises from parts or moments which cannot co-exist is now explained.

4. What is called action is a collection of parts produced in a sequence and mentally conceived as one and identical with the parts which are subordinate to it.

[The moments or parts come into existence to serve one single purpose and they are unified in one unifying act of cognition. And that is called action. The parts exist for the whole and, therefore, they are identified with it. Action is one and is conveyed by the root. On the basis of its parts, one speaks of its inner sequence. Oneness is attributed to it on the basis of the whole which is not real, because the parts, produced in a sequence, cannot co-exist. Therefore, verbs like *pacati* stand for that collection of parts like *adhiśrayaṇa* = putting the vessel on the fire and so on, conceived by the mind as a unity. The result comes from the whole and not from any particular part, as, otherwise, the other parts would be useless. The result depends upon all the parts, not merely on the one which immediately precedes it. The result is one and, therefore, the parts lead to the idea of one action.]

If the whole is called action, a part cannot be so called. How then can one account for the use of the different tenses when some parts are over and others are yet to come?

5. Such a whole is attributed to each one of the parts. Thus differentiation takes place and difference of tense becomes possible.

[At the very first moment of the act of cooking, the cook has the ultimate result in view. Therefore, the name 'cooking' is applied to the very first moment. That is why the present tense is also used for it. When that moment is over, one can say: 'he cooked' using the past tense. The whole is thus superim-

posed on each part. We know this because the idea of cooking arises in the presence of each part. One can also explain how each part appears as a process. Strictly speaking, it should not so appear. The whole is superimposed on each part and there is no other part to be yet accomplished. A process is something in which some parts are already over and others are not. But if the perception of the whole has already taken place, there cannot be any question of anything else yet to be accomplished. But that is not how it works. The whole, as consisting of parts arranged in a sequence, is superimposed on the parts.]

If the whole is superimposed on each part or moment, as the latter is directly perceptible how is action said to be inferable?

6. The parts which occur in a sequence and are partly existent and partly not so cannot enter into contact with the senses like the eyes whose objects are always the existent.

[On the part which is present at a particular moment before the eyes, the whole is superimposed. Action should then be directly perceptible. And yet the *M. Bhā*, has declared that action is only inferable. That is because the whole which is superimposed on the part has parts arranged in a sequence and as such it is not directly perceptible. And it is that which is called action.]

7. Just as the whole word 'cow' is not perceptible to the senses but, after its parts are perceived, is understood as a whole by the mind.

8. In the same way, after actions are differently (that is, in parts) perceived, they are understood as a unity like the fire-wheel.

[Words like *gauḥ*, *aśvaḥ* etc. have sounds as their parts and these parts cannot co-exist. They are perceived by the senses

through the parts which exist at particular moments. They are fully perceived at the time of the perception of the last sound with the help of the impressions left in the mind by the perceptions of the previous sounds. Similarly, action which is an aggregate of different moments is directly perceptible as far as particular moments are concerned. The resemblance between the perception of action and that of the word (*sphoṭa*) is only partial. *Sphoṭa* is directly perceptible. It is not inferred at all. Nor is it something which is gradually revealed part by part. Therefore it is better to compare the perception of action to that of the word considered as a collection of sounds and not as the *sphoṭa*. That is why the author has mentioned the torch-wheel (*alātacakra*) as the illustration. The revolving series of torches (*bhrāmyamāṇolmukarājīnāṃ cakrākāratayā*) is wrongly perceived as a wheel and the perception appears to be direct. Similarly, the moments of action appear to be a unity and directly perceptible. The verb expresses action conceived of as directly perceptible. Action may be looked upon as one, even as the meaning of a root and not merely as a thing. The root expresses action as one and the suffixes added to the root express any variation that there may be in it. Where a suffix not expressive of a *kāraka* is added to a root, the latter expresses action as one as in *āsyate bhavadbhiḥ*].

If parts of an action are directly perceptible, action would also become so, because they are also actions. This point is now clarified.

9. Just as pouring water (*udakāsecana*) etc. are parts of the action of cooking, in the same way, pouring water etc. have also parts of their own.

[It is not only main actions which are thus inferable and not directly perceptible. Each moment or part may be looked upon as action in which case it will also be inferable and not directly perceptible. A part of the action of cooking, namely, placing the vessel on the fire, has also parts arranged in a temporal sequence, and as such, it is also inferable only.]

What about the stage beyond which one cannot divide it?

10. The name action cannot be applied to the solitary point reached by extreme sub-division.

[There comes a stage when the part cannot be further sub-divided. It will be atomic in character, it cannot then be called action at all. Such an atomic point may be *pratyakṣa*, 'directly perceptible,' but that will not make action so because that is not action at all. Action is the name of something which has parts arranged in a sequence. The root cannot express something which has no parts. Action is something having parts, a process denoted by verbs. The question is not whether action has actually parts or not but whether the verb presents it as such or not. The answer is that the verb does present action, however short in nature, as something having parts which cannot co-exist. Therefore, it is not directly perceptible. It can only be inferred.]

11. That attains sequence through the earlier and later parts and the non-present (*asad*) action being superimposed upon it, it can also be expressed by the verbs.

[Yāska, the author of the *Nirukta* has also defined what the verb expresses in a similar manner. His statement is: *Pūrvāparībhūtam bhāvam ākhyātenācaṣṭe vrajati pacati ityupakramaprabhṛtyapavargaparyantam* = 'One expresses Being which has inner sequence, from its beginning till its completion, by means of the verb, as for example, the verbs *vrajati* = he goes, *pacati* = he cooks, (Ni., 1.1.11.). In *pūrvāparībhūta*, YĀSKA has used the suffix *cvi* which implies that something has been transformed into another (*abhātadabhāva*). That is because the whole is superimposed on the part, the part is transformed into the whole, as it were.]

There is the root *as*. It is supposed to express *sattā* = 'being', 'existence'. *Sattā* is conceived of as *nityā* = eternal *akramā* = 'without inner sequence', *asādhyā* = not to be brought about. How then can it be the meaning of a verb?

12. Its form, as connected with Time, is expressed

by the verb *asti*. When it has a completely finished form, it is just said to be *bhāva* Being.

[*Sattā* = 'Being' is presented as a process (*sādhya*) by the verb. When presented by a verb, *sattā* has distinctions of time and that is why we say: *abhūt, asti, bhaviṣyati* etc. A thing, as presented by nouns, has no association with time. When we hear the word *ghaṭa*, we understand something which is not associated with time. It was objected before that *as* does not express action because the word *asti* cannot be an answer to the question: *Kiṃ karoti*? The truth is that once the existence of something has already been ascertained one might ask that question and then the answer *asti* is impossible, not because *asti* does not express action or process. When there is a possibility of Devadatta dying, one can ask the same question and then the answer *asti* in the sense that he is still alive, still exists, is possible. The roots *kṛ*, *bhū* and *as* denote action in general. Roots like *pac* denote particular actions. They can be used in apposition to *karoti*. Hence we conclude that they denote particular actions. Sometimes, however, in answer to the question *kiṃ karoti*, one answers: *na karoti, āste* = 'he does not do anything, he just exists.' Here there seems to be a contradiction between the meanings of *karoti* and *āste*. How to explain this according to the view that *karoti* denotes action in general and that other verbs denote particular actions. Between the general and the particular, there cannot be any contradiction. This difficulty can be resolved as follows: The question *kiṃ karoti* does not refer to action in general. It refers to a particular action. In the world, by action, one means a particular action, and not action in general. Where there is no particular action, there is no action at all. Where the question relates to any action, general or particular, the answer *āste* or *śete* is admissible. Action does not always involve movement (*parispanda*). It has already been defined as *kāraṇaṇi pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ*. This conception of action holds good everywhere. Even in the sentence *parvatas tiṣṭhati*, we understand a process from *tiṣṭhati*. Not all agents behave in the same manner. The mountain is understood as behaving in a particular way in the above sentence, namely that of not giving up its location. Therefore, from a verb we do understand *sattā* as associated with time. This very *sattā* is understood as a thing from a noun. But it might be

objected that both in a noun and in a verb, the root is the same and action as a process is supposed to be the meaning of a root. How is one to explain the difference between a verb and a noun coming from the same root? The difference is this: In a verb, the meaning of the root, namely, the process, is the main thing. But in a noun the meaning of the root is subordinate to that of the suffix. In the sentence *odanasya pākaḥ* = the cooking of rice, *odana* is the accessory (*sādhana*) called *karma* of the action of cooking. (*Sādhana* presupposes *sādhya*. In the word *pāka*, the root *pac* must express the *sādhya* in relation to which *odana* is the *sādhana* called *karma*.)]

If the whole, with inner sequence and superimposed on the part, is action, the latter would become something secondary. This objection is answered as follows :

13. As this is the only established usage in regard to action, this is not secondary usage. Where there is a distinct primary usage, there it is that another can be secondary (in relation to it).

[The word 'cow' primarily denotes a particular kind of animal. When it is applied to a human being having the qualities of a cow, it is said to be used secondarily. As far as action is concerned, the question is whether there is a primary conception of it as distinct from a secondary conception. No such distinction is possible because there is no conception of action in which the parts are contemporaneous and have no sequence. Everywhere, action is the result of the superimposition of sequence of non-contemporaneous parts. There is no other conception of action. That is why a single moment or part, with this sequence superimposed on it, becomes action.]

This sequence can be explained in another way.

14. Each one of the parts, really without sequence appears as many and having sequence because the characteristics (*śakti*) of the following parts are attributed to it.

[Before, it was said that the whole, with inner sequence is superimposed on each part. But the matter can be looked at in another way. The moments, taken by themselves, have no sequence. But each moment is taken as many having sequence because the multiplicity and the sequence of the moments that follow are superimposed upon it.]

Another view is now stated.

15. That moment immediately after which the result is produced has been said to be action primarily: The others are also so called because they are intended to produce that very result (*tādarthyāt*).

[That is action immediately after which the result is seen and which is performed as a means of bringing about the result. Taking the action called cooking as an example, if rice is what is cooked, softening of the grains is the result of the action of cooking and it happens after the separation of the grains (*vicaṭana*). That is, therefore, the action of cooking. It is this which is superimposed on such moments as putting the vessel on the fire. Everything which precedes *vicaṭana* can only lead to the fruit indirectly and is, therefore, not action. They are the means of action and, by superimposition, they are also said to be action. As *vicaṭana* is only one moment without sequence, how can it be called action? It happens this way. As the preceding subordinate moments have sequence and *vicaṭana* is superimposed on them, the latter also acquires sequence. Others think that *vicaṭana* itself appears as the subordinate moments. From words, such moments as putting the vessel on the fire are understood as cooking which is essentially *vicaṭana*. The previous moments are only *vicaṭana* in different forms. This is the essence of the *M. Bhā.* statement : *Atha kaḥ paceḥ pradhānarthah? yāsau taṇḍulānām viklittiḥ* = 'what is the main meaning of the root *pac*? It is the softening of the grains of rice' (*M. Bhā.* II p. 32. l. 24-25). In the expression : *pacyate odanaḥ svayameva* = 'the rice cooks by itself, the root *pac* has this meaning of *vicaṭana* = separation of the grain or *viklittiḥ* = softening of the grains. The root *pac* is sometimes said to be *dvyartha* = having two meanings. The main meaning

would then be *vicaṭana* and the preceding subordinate moments would be the secondary meaning.

What has been said of the root *pac* is meant to apply to all the roots. It was only an illustration.]

Even if sequence is superimposed on 'Being', how does it become *sādhya*, something to be brought about, considering that Being is supposed to be eternal?

16. When the causes are present, the object exists, in the form of cause (*pratyaya*), till it is born. Till then, it exists in the form of others. Being something to be accomplished in its own form, it is conveyed (by the verb).

[When the causes are present, an object is present in the form of cause, until it is born, that is, until it assumes the form of effect. Till then, it exists in the form of other things, that is, its causes. In that form, it is something accomplished (*siddha*) like the agent. In its own form, it is something to be brought about (*sādhya*) and that is expressed by the verb. The state before something has come into existence is expressed by the verb *jāyate*, as will be explained in stanza 28. The state after that is expressed by the verb *asti*. What is called birth is the state of going towards the acquisition of existence. An object engaged in that attains existence and is described by the verb *asti*=it is=it sustains itself. So when a thing depends upon the activity of the accessories, it becomes *sādhya*=something to be brought about.]

17. Once a thing is accomplished, the purpose being fulfilled, there is no more requirement of an accessory. There is, therefore, no use of verbs in such cases.

[In regard to a thing which is already accomplished, verbs cannot be used. It is nouns which express such things.]

18. Thus action which is one and without sequ-

ence is presented as having the property of the parts with sequence and which is meant for it.

[The conclusion is that all action is in the nature of a process. It is really one and without sequence. But the sequence belonging to the moments which are different from it and which exist for it is attributed to it.]

It is now stated that, as all the moments lead to the same result, they are looked upon as one.

19. Therefore, the moment (part) which is one is non-existent and what is present is perceived. It (action) is understood as the soul of the existent and the non-existent.

[Of these moments which have a common purpose, the preceding one is gone and that which is still there is the present one. Action is the common soul or essence of these two moments. The two moments are looked upon as one and that is action which, being one, has really no sequence but the sequence of the moments is attributed to it.]

So far action has been explained from the point of view of those who hold that a word denotes the particular or the substance (*vyaktivādinah*).

Now it is going to be explained from the point of view of those who hold that the word denotes the universal.

20. Others have declared that which inheres in the many moments to be action. Being eternal, it is not *sādhya*=to be brought about, but in its individual aspect, it appears to be *sādhya*.

[*Jātivādin* is one who believes that all words denote the universal. A universal is something the existence of which is proved by a certain uniformity in our cognition. The idea of cooking

persists even when the person who cooks and the thing cooked etc. vary. We must, therefore, admit that the universal called action inheres in the different kinds of actions. It is this universal which is denoted by the root. Like the *sphoṭa*, this universal can be manifested by moments which do not co-exist. What is conveyed here by the word 'moment' is the same as what is meant by *vyakti*=the particular. The universal called action is really eternal but it appears to be *sādhya*=something to be brought about and to have sequence, through its substratum, namely, individual actions, the different moments of an action. If action requires *sādhana* or accessory, it is the *vyakti* aspect of it that requires it and not the *jāti* aspect of it.]

Within the *jātivāda*, another way of looking at it is now stated.

21. It has been declared that the universal which inheres in the last part is action. When its substratum, the *vyakti* is brought about, it is also understood as being brought about.

[The universal inhering in the last part after which the result comes is action. The preceding ones are also action because they exist for it.]

The universal referred to in the two previous stanzas is the lower one. The Grand Universal called *sattā* is also *kriyā*.

22. Action is Being inhering in the agent and the object qualified by their activities or Being inherent in their activities.

[According to some, action is the grand universal or *sattā*=Being, as associated or determined by the activities of the agent and the object. Mutually different objects do condition Being. Action is Being as conditioned by the subject (agent) or the object which are qualified by their activities or Being as conditioned by these activities. Both these alternatives are within the view that action is the Grand Universal called *Sattā*-Being.]

23. Some are of the view that the Being which inheres in the last moment or part is action. The uninterrupted tradition is that Being is the meaning of the root.

[A third alternative within the same view is that the Being which inheres in the moment immediately preceding the fruit is action. That Being is the meaning of the root is the uninterrupted tradition which has come down to us. This was the view of Vārṣyāyaṇi, quoted by Yāska in his *Nirukta* (Ni. 1. 2. 8.) and followed by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya*. Being is the meaning of the noun-stem as well as of the root. It is sometimes called *sattā* and sometimes *bhāva*. It is the meaning of all words and it assumes variety on account of association with limiting conditions. But these limiting conditions are nothing more than developments of *sattā*. This is what is called *sattādvaita*, the view that all words denote *sattā*. See stanza 35 below.]

Now the view of those who follow mental entities is going to be referred to.

24. Others declare that the form which figures in the mind or the universal in it or Being which figures in the mind, superimposed on the objects, is what is called action.

[Those who follow mental entities (Buddhists) give their own interpretation of action. According to them, the form which figures in the mind is action. It is that which is superimposed on things because there takes place perception of identity between what is seen and what is constructed by the mind (*dr̥śyavikalpayorabhedādhyavasāyāt*). Either the individual form is action or the universal which inheres in it. Or the grand universal, Being is action. This is according to the view that the meaning of every word has *upacārasattā* = secondary Being (See *Sambandha Samuddeśa* 39 ff.), the fact of figuring in the mind. That action is nothing more than *sattā* has already been explained in the *Jāti-samuddeśa*. The six transformations of *sattā* mentioned by Yāska are the basis of all action. But the number six is not final].

25. Among the six transformations of Being, two, manifestation and hiding or birth and destruction according to others, are attributed to it for practical purposes.

[According to the *Satkāryavāda* of the *Sāṅkhya*s, what is called the origin of objects is their revelation or manifestation and destruction is nothing more than their hiding. According to the *asatkāryavāda* of the *Vaiśeṣika*s, origin is birth, the coming into being of something new and destruction is its complete dissolution. Among the six transformations of Being, these two are thus differently conceived by different thinkers. They are attributed to Being (*sattā*) which, being eternal, cannot have birth and destruction. It is always of one form and therefore, cannot be manifested or hidden. Origin and destruction of Being are thus fictitious.]

It is now stated that these two include action.

26. These two include all activity as identical with themselves; what is called staying (*sthitih*) is nothing more than birth in a continuous stream of similar moments.

[All action is really birth or death, origin or destruction. All transformation in things is either increase or decrease. Increase and decrease are really nothing more than manifestation and disappearance of some property or other. Manifestation or appearance with some attribute is birth. Something which is about to assume its own form and stands between the previous and the following states is said to be born. A thing which has assumed its form is referred to by the verb *asti*, *Ātmalābha* = assuming one's own form is the second stage of what is called birth (*janma*). The author of the *Nirukta* says: The verb *jāyate* expresses the first stage of the previous condition, (Ni.1.2.) what is called birth is the first stage of existence which precedes change etc. The verb *asti* expresses the certainty of the thing which has come to be. As long as there is a stream of similar moments, the thing is the same and is said to exist. As soon as there is another stream of moments, it is said to change, without losing its iden-

tity. As the author of the *Nirukta* puts it; the verb *vipariṇamate* expresses the idea that something changes without losing its identity (*Nirukta* I.2.). Change may be increase or decrease and so the verbs *varddhate* and *apakṣiyate* respectively are used. Thus all the six states of Being can really come under these two, namely, birth and death or appearance and disappearance. Even the meaning of the root *sthā*=to stay would come under birth. What is called staying or persisting is nothing more than birth in a continuous stream of similar moments. Another proof that the meaning of the root *sthā* is action is that when it is used, it keeps out other verbs.]

It is now stated that birth and destruction are not really different from Being which is the meaning of all roots.

27. Birth is not different from what is born and destruction also is not something really different. Therefore in all transformations of Being, it is *sattā* alone that persists.

[Even these two states of Being are not really different from Being. That which already is cannot really come to be and that which is not cannot come to be and that which is cannot totally disappear. Birth and death are, therefore, only two ways in which Being manifests itself to us. They are not really different from Being. From all this, we can conclude that in all the six transformations of Being, it is Being which persists. It is eternal and when it is expressed by a verb, it assumes sequence and is called action. When it is expressed by a noun, it appears as a thing, an accessory, a means of action.]

28. The state preceding what is already born is called birth, if its causes are meant to be expressed as having sequence.

[A thing which has attained its full and final form is said to have been born. The stage previous to this is called birth. It is a process and is expressed by the word *jāyate*. When this word is used, it is implied that the accessories are active.]

29. Verbs express things in that condition, (that is, as having sequence.) Nouns, on the other hand, operate as though suppressing this sequence.

[The stage called birth which precedes the one called born is the causal stage. It has really no sequence within it but when expressed by a verb like *jāyate*, it assumes sequence. Hence this stage has the characteristic of action. But when this very stage is expressed by a noun like *janma*, it appears as a thing without any sequence within. What is expressed by the noun is identified by us with what is expressed by the verb and that is why it appears to us that the noun suppresses the sequence which we experience in a verb. This is the force of *iva* in *saṃharanta iva kramam*.]

According to some, destruction is the later stage of what is, just as birth is its earlier stage.

30. Its fruit or what is regarded as such or an object that is its opposite is designated by the ancients as something different, its destruction.

[Just as the causal stage was called birth, in the same way, the stage called fruit or effect is called destruction or death. Contact is the effect of movement. Hence, it represents the destruction of that movement. One cognition may be the result of another; hence it is its destruction. Not only the real fruit but also what is regarded as such may be said to be the death or destruction of the cause. The two halves of a jar produced by a blow, represent the death of the jar. The threads which remain out of an old piece of cloth are the fruit of that cloth and hence its destruction. Even disjunction can be looked upon as the death of conjunction, pain as that of pleasure. Thus it is seen that death or destruction is not something non-existent, something negative. It is something positive. A verb expresses it as a process and a noun expresses it as a thing.]

How one thing can be the destruction of another is now explained.

31. Neither the expression that something exists nor that it does not exist is possible unless something is actually cognised. A thing is cognised in terms of something else.

[Like the judgment of existence, that of non-existence is also based on a positive cognition. It is when the result is produced that we say that the previous state has ceased to be. When we cognise destruction, it cannot be mere emptiness. It is cognised. Therefore, there must be something to be cognised.]

But one does ascertain the non-existence of a thing in the dark by means of the sense of touch. This is answered as follows:—

32. One does ascertain, in the dark as in the light, without touching with the hand, the existence or non-existence of objects like a jar.

[It is true that we seem to cognise non-existence when we see nothing in the dark and feel nothing with our hand. But that is not how it happens. When we feel with our hand in the dark and do not touch something, we are guided in doing so by our memory of what we have seen there in the light. Here also, it is through our perception of something positive that we ascertain non-existence.]

Birth and destruction are now explained differently.

33. The all-pervading matter attains subtlety (*saukṣmya*) in some place and time and solidifies at others. Without doing any thing, it manifests itself thus by its own inner power.

[The all-pervading primordial matter (*pradhāna*) attains a subtle state in some place at sometime. It is then imperceptible. This state is called *tirobhāva*=disappearance, hiding and it can be expressed by the noun *nāśa* or by the verb *naśyati*. At another time and in another place, this stuff becomes solidified and perceptible. This is called *āvirbhāva*=manifestation. These two

states of *pradhāna* are due to its constituent called *rajas* which is ever active and is the basis of all action. Thus the six transformations of Being according to the author of the *Nirukta* have been explained.]

Another view is now stated.

34. The manifestation of the All-inclusive principle, as though with a sequence and as though with parts, this has been said to be action by others.

[Brahman which is beyond all diversity and differentiation has all powers within it and can manifest itself in all forms. Under the influence of its *svātantrya-śakti* or *kāla*, it presents itself in a sequence and that is action. Under the influence of *Dikśakti*, it brings about divisions of space. Thus though it is indivisible, it appears to have temporal and spatial divisions. Birth and death are temporal divisions and are the basis of all action. Thus *kriyā* is a *vivarta* of Brahman. In the previous stanza, it was presented as a *pariṇāma* of the *pradhāna*.]

Now, the *sattādvaita* of the author of *Nirukta* is concluded (see stanza 23).

35. Being, due to its own power, attains all forms: it is what is to be brought about, the means of doing so, the fruit and the enjoyer of the fruit.

[It has already been shown in the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* that *sattā*, *mahāsāmanya* or Being is the meaning of all words, because it is the characteristic of everything. It is this Being which manifests itself as things and processes (*siddha* and *sādhya*), expressed by nouns and verbs respectively. It also manifests itself as the things to be experienced and as the experiencers. These things which are manifestations of its powers constitute the whole universe.]

Another view of action, already mentioned in the *sādhana-samuddeśa* (33, 34) is now referred to.

36. Others look upon as action the eternal creative force not existing in anything in particular

which produces the result together with the accessories.

[According to this view, *pravṛtti* is action. It is eternal and does not reside in anything in particular. Together with the powers of the accessories, it brings about the result.]

How something eternal can be something to be brought about is now stated.

37. At first it is something very general, then diversified. When it becomes activity, it appears as something to be brought about.

[In its first stage, this force may be looked upon as *apūrva* and is of a very general nature. Later, it assumes variety on account of the activity of the accessories, then becomes a process and is called action. While still in the undiversified state, it sets in motion the powers of the accessories. At this stage, it is called *pravṛtti*. It resides nowhere in particular. When it becomes particularised, it resides in the accessories, becomes a process and gets the name of particular actions like cooking etc. That is why action has been defined as *kāraṇānāṃ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ kṛiyā*: a general creative force becoming particularised and residing in the accessories.]

38. It is the source of all the accessories and it is the first among the accessories. Others have declared that all activities are different from it.

[The eternal creative force (*pravṛtti* is called *prakṛti* because it gives to the accessories their powers. It sets the accessories in motion. It carries them along in its flow. That is why it has been compared to a stream. According to some, it is this very *pravṛtti* which, when associated with particular accessories, becomes particular actions. Others think that particular actions are different from it.]

The verb expresses the accessory, number, tense, person and *upagraha* (aspect) also, why then has it been said to be expressive of action?

39. Where many meanings are possible, there is a relation between them and some are only secondary. One of them is understood as the primary one.

[It is true that a verb expresses not only action, but also accessory, number, time, person and aspect. But they are not all expressed in the same manner. One of them is more important than the others. It is the *aṅgi* (primary) and the others are its *aṅga*. It is action that verbs primarily express because it is that which is *sādhya*, something to be brought about.]

40. Being something to be brought about, verbs express primarily actions, the accessories of which are all finished things, even though the actions are prompted by the ultimate result.

[It is action which a verb primarily expresses because it is that which is to be brought about (*sādhya*). The accessories are all *siddha* (finished things). What is *sādhya* is more important. Of course, the fruit is also something to be brought about but that is expressed by another word altogether and we are now considering the relation of primary and secondary between meanings conveyed by the same word. Even when the verb is in the passive voice, it is action which is understood as the main *sādhya*. No doubt, this action brings about the fruit in reality. But as far as the verb is concerned, it conveys action as the main thing and not the fruit. The *Vedas* also command actions and not the fruit. That is why grammarians look upon action as the main meaning of the sentence. Number and person help action through qualifying the accessories. Time and aspects are directly subordinate to action. Where the verb is impersonally used (*bhāva*), there the importance of action is in regard to number etc. No accessory expressed by the same word exists. Therefore, number cannot be subordinate to any accessory. Action is really undiversified and being *asattva*, it has no number at all.]

If it has no number, how to explain the adding of suffixes like *kṛtvasuc* in the sense of counting action?

41. Because of its oneness and of the possibility of repetition, it is connected with both differentiation and identity. Therefore, numbers are found used with it when the parts (of the group of repetitions) are counted.

[When the agent is the same and the result is the same, the action is one and the same, but it can be repeated. There cannot be repetition if there is absolute difference nor can there be any if there is absolute identity. It is possible only if there is *bhedābheda*. Action becomes associated with number only when it is repeated. The suffix *kṛtvāṣuc* is expressive of the number of repetitions of all action and not of the number of the action which is, in itself, without any number. The suffixes in a verb express the number of the agent or of the object and not of the action. A word ending in a primary suffix like *ghaṇ* expresses action as a thing and not as a process. A thing is always expressed as associated with number.]

Here a doubt is expressed.

42. The meaning of a word like *pāka* being a thing, how can it require accessories? If its meaning is a process (*sādhyaiva*), there would be no difference between the meanings of verbs and that of words ending in primary suffixes.

[If a word ending in a primary suffix presents action as a thing, how can it become connected with accessories? It is action which requires accessories and not a thing. If a word ending in a primary suffix also presents action as a process then the distinction between nominal and verbal suffixes, pointed out by Patañjali, would become untenable. According to him, one can say *pañcakṛtvāḥ pacati*— 'he cooks five times' but not *pañcakṛtvāḥ pākaḥ* because the suffix *kṛtvāṣuc* expresses the repetition of action as a process and not as a thing.]

43. If it is argued that the sixth case affix expressive of an accessory is used in connection with a

verb, it must be remembered that, in association with a verb (*lena*) such a case-affix has been prohibited.

44. The meaning of the same word cannot have two contradictory attributes at the same time. If it is *siddha* (a finished thing), how can it be *sādhya* (something to be brought about).

[It cannot be maintained that when the word *pāka* becomes connected with a word expressive of accessory as in *odanasya pākaḥ* it expresses a process (*sādhya*) and when it becomes connected with a verbal element expressive of number, it denotes a thing (*siddha*). The meaning expressed by a word cannot have two contradictory attributes, both coming from the same word.]

It is now pointed out that it is not the same verbal element which expresses both the attributes.

45. That so much of it is a thing and so much of it a process is spoken of only in the Science of Grammar. There is in reality, no such division in the sentence.

[To talk of a word as ending in a primary suffix or in a verbal suffix is itself something artificial. Such a distinction exists in the *śāstra* only and not in the real language where it is the indivisible word (sentence) which is expressive.]

46. Just as Grammar divides a verb into two parts, one expressive of a process (*sādhya*) and the other of a thing (*sādhana*), the same can be done to a word ending in a primary suffix like *ghaṇ*.

[The word *pacati* has two parts, root and suffix. The root expresses action and the suffix expresses the accessory. The same thing can be said of nouns like *pāka*. The position, therefore, is this: The same root can be found in a noun or a verb

and in both it expresses a process. Processes depend upon accessories which are expressed by the case-endings. Suffixes like *ghañ* coming after roots show that the meaning of the root is presented as a thing. Once it is presented as a thing, it becomes susceptible to take gender and number.]

This point is now clarified.

47. The expression of action as a process depends upon the root and its aspect as a thing depends for its expression on suffixes like *ghañ*.

[Thus the distinction between words ending in primary suffixes and those ending in verbal suffixes pointed out by Patañjali holds good (M.Bhā.II,p.57,1-7).]

The author now gives an illustration to show that one and the same word can express two different things.

48. In the word *bandhutā*, the fact of being kinsmen is expressed as something distinct by the element *bandhu* but the kinsmen's state of being a collection is expressed (in terms of identity) by the suffix.

[In the word *bandhutā*, the suffix *tal* expresses the idea of collection (*samūha*) and the stem that of being kinsmen. And yet the collection is not something apart from the kinsmen. It is a collection of kinsmen. The stem and the suffix express the same meaning in terms of distinction and identity respectively.]

49. That in relation to which action is a process, it is not a thing in relation to that, that in relation to which it is a thing, it is not a process in relation to that.

[As action is a process in relation to the accessories, it is not accomplished and is expressed by the root. In relation to the meaning of a primary suffix, it is a thing and not a process. Therefore, there is no association with accessories.]

All illustration of something having two characteristics in relation to two different things is now given.

50. In the sentence: *rājñāḥ putrasya naptā*=a grandson of the king's son, the meaning of the word son is not secondary (*na vyatiricyate*) in regard to that of the word king nor is its importance in any way affected.

[In the sentence *rājñāḥ putrasya naptā*=grandson of the king's son, the meaning of son is secondary in regard to that of grandson but primary in regard to that of king. In the same way, the meaning of the word *pāka* is both *siddha* and *sādhya* in regard to two different words.]

A better example is now given:—

51. In the sentence: 'See! the deer runs' it is quite appropriate that the act of running should be both *sādhya* and *sādhana* in regard to two different things (*viśayabhedena*).

[In the sentence: *paśya mṛgo dhāvati*, the verbal suffix expresses the notion of agent and in regard to that, the act of running is *sādhya* but in regard to the act of seeing, it is an object (*Karma*), that is, it is *siddha*. It is not the deer which is the object of the action of seeing but the act of running is the object. As *sādhya*, the act of running cannot be *karma*. But as *siddha*, it can become the accessory of another action. When the stem and the suffix express two different ideas, they must be somehow coordinated. The root everywhere expresses an idea which is *sādhya*, a process, something to be brought about. *Kṛtya*-suffixes, like verbal suffixes, naturally express processes. The only difference between them and verbs is that in their case, the accessories are expressed by a different word. Therefore, a word ending in a *kṛtya*-suffix can be associated with a word ending in a suffix expressive of repetition of actions. We can say : *dviḥ śayitavyam bhavatā*= 'you have to lie down twice', *trir bhuktam bhavatā*= 'you have eaten three times', *dvir bhuktvā gataḥ*= 'he went away after eating twice' and so on.]

52. In words ending in verbal suffixes, *kṛtya* suffixes, *kta*, *khal*, primary suffixes forming indeclinables, *niṣṭhā*, *ghañ* etc. the root is expressive of something to be brought about.

[By agreement and difference, we can conclude that the root everywhere expresses a process. This remains the predominant notion when a *tiñ* suffix is added to the root. The same is true when a *kṛtya* suffix, *kta* and suffixes having the meaning of *khal* are added. So the meaning of the root stands in need of accessories. It is when the association with accessories takes place that we realise the *sādhyaiva* = 'the fact of being a process' of the meaning of roots. When the inflectional suffixes come after a stem, we realise that its meaning is a thing and not a process, because these suffixes denote genders and number and only things can be associated with gender and number.]

53. As a process is something unfinished there cannot be identification in the form, 'it is that' with the meanings of verbs without the word *iva*. Therefore, there cannot be comparison with them.

[The meaning of a verb is a process. It cannot, therefore be identified with another process or thing without the use of the word *iva* as two things can be identified as in the sentence: *siṃho māṇavakaḥ* = 'the boy is a lion'. When the word *iva* is used as in *krandatīva gāyati* = 'he sings as though he screams', it is not identification, but comparison based on difference. Hence the comparison does not relate to the action but to the accessories. In *limpatīva tamo'ṅgāni* = 'the darkness seems to smear the body', 'it is a case of *utprekṣā* and not *upamā*, because the object of comparison is not mentioned.]

Can there be comparison with an action through its accessories?

54. As what are connected with actions are known to be accessories, therefore there can only be superimposition and not comparison.

[Where there appears to be comparison through the accessories, there is superimposition and not comparison. What are connected with actions are their accessories. Otherwise, there would be no relation between them. In the sentence: *parvataś calati* = 'the mountain moves', from the words we understand that the mountain is an accessory (agent) in the action of moving. If that is not possible in reality, the capacity to move is superimposed on the mountain which thus becomes the agent. We do not understand from the sentence that the mountain does something resembling movement. No comparison is understood. It is something like such sentences as *parvataṃ bhinatti* = 'he breaks the mountain' where no comparison is understood. Thus through the accessory also, there cannot be comparison with the meaning of a verb.]

Another reason why there cannot be comparison between two actions is now given.

55. A standard of comparison (*upamāna*) with all qualities complete, is used in regard to the object of comparison where they are found in a lesser degree. All action, on the other hand, is found in a complete form in its substratum.

[A thing becomes a standard of comparison when it has the same qualities as the object of comparison but in a greater degree. All actions, on the other hand, rest completely in their substrata the accessories, they are all equal in this respect and so there is no comparison between them.]

56. The reason why one uses the expression 'it flies' in regard to a swan is found completely in an *āti* (sparrow?) also. Therefore there is no scope for comparison.

[When a swan moves with its wings, one says that it flies. The same is true in the case of an *āti* (sparrow?). The movement of each is complete in its own way. To compare the two movements would be like saying that a cow is like a cow. In the sentence: 'the sparrow flies like a swan', it is the two agents which

are compared and not their actions.]

Can there be comparison between two different kinds of actions ?

57. No resemblance is seen in actions of different kinds. If an action is presented as a thing, it cannot be compared with another which is a process.

[The totally different actions like cooking and going cannot be compared because comparison is based on resemblance and there cannot be any between these two. An action, presented as a thing by a noun cannot be compared with an action presented as a process by a verb.]

Something is now going to be said about Being, external and internal, mentioned in the *Mahābhāṣya*.

58. Just as the essence of the same object differs according as one says : 'forest' or 'trees' on the basis of unity or difference, so is the case with Being, external and internal.

[The word *bhāva* has been used in the *śāstra* to express the meaning of a root, of primary suffixes like *ghañ* and of verbal suffixes. How do these notions, expressed by the same word, differ from one another? The *bhāva* which is the meaning of a root, is the internal one. It is characterised by unity and it cannot be differentiated by gender and number. The *bhāva* which is conveyed by suffixes like *ghañ* is the external one. It has the aspect of a thing. It can be differentiated by gender and number. The former has time as its attribute and not the latter. It can also be qualified by attributes of the accessory (agent) such as oneself and so on and of the result such as being for oneself and so on. Such is the difference between internal Being and external Being conveyed by the root and the suffix respectively. As to the Being which is conveyed by the verbal suffix in such words as *śayyate*, *sthiyate* it closely follows the meaning of the root and not of suffixes like *ghañ*. The Being which it conveys rests on itself (*svātmāvasthaḥ*) and is not connected with an accessory nor

with the fact of being a mere thing. But the Being conveyed by a root is definitely a process and so the verbal suffix in *śayyate* is not added merely in the sense of the root (*svārthika*), just as the first case-ending added to a stem (*prātipadika*) is not considered to be merely *svārthika*. As it follows the meaning of the root, it has association with time. It is always associated with an agent, so that it is external. Thus external *bhāva* is of two kinds: (1) That which is conveyed by a verbal suffix (2) that which is conveyed by a primary suffix. The *bhāva* expressed by a suffix like *tumun* is neither a thing nor a process. Repetition is not possible in the case of *bhāva* conveyed by a primary suffix, because it is an attribute of a process and not of a thing.]

The author now points out that the gender and number of the word '*bhāve*' in P. 3.3.18 are not to be taken seriously.

59. The gender which is found in the general teaching '*bhāve*' (in P. 3.3.18) is not meant to be taken seriously as the variations can be inferred.

[The meaning which is mentioned in the word *bhāve* can be expressed by primary suffixes coming at the end of nouns in no matter what gender. Pāṇini has used a word in masculine gender and singular number to teach this point. A noun has to have some gender and some number before it is used in a *sūtra* but it may not always be significant. That is the case in the word *bhāve*.]

60. In the word *bhāve* the gender is not significant as its purpose is only to help in the teaching (*nirdeśe caritārthatvāt*). As comparison is involved in it, the meaning of roots like *pac* is somewhat different from *bhāva* (Being, Action).

[The meaning of a stem (*prātipadika*) is in the nature of a thing and it can only be expressed by a word having some gender or other. At the time of the application of the *sūtra* P.3.3.18., the meaning of the word *bhāve* must be taken shorn of its gender. It also implies comparison, so that it means that

the notion expressed by the suffixes in question added to the different roots is like the notion conveyed by the word *bhāva*, formed from the root *bhū*. It means: Just as *bhāva* is the meaning of *bhū*, so is *pāka* that of *pac* and *tyāga* that of *tyaj* and this is the meaning of the suffix *ghaṇ*.]

Another way of looking at it is now being given.

61. The Being (or Existence) which is included in the meanings of roots like *pac* is all that is taught here (that is in P. 3. 3. 18) and it is not associated with any particular gender.

[It was said before that as all the particulars or individuals are included in the general which is actually taught, the gender and number used in the teaching are not significant. Here it is pointed out that the general persists even in the particulars and so it does not abandon its unity. Otherwise, it would not be the general at all. The general is not associated with a particular gender or number.]

62. The same notion, namely, Being is expressed differently by different words. Sometimes the genders of these words differ as in the case of the forms derived from the root *pac*.

[The notion for which the word *bhāva* stands is of a very general nature. The meaning of all roots, conceived of as a thing inheres in it. It is expressed by suffixes like *ghaṇ* each in its own way. So we get very general words like *bhāva*, *sattā* and so on. More particular words like *pāka*, *tyāga* and so on also express it in a more particularised way. Just as the general notion Being is diversified by particularised notions denoted by words like *pāka*, *tyāga* etc., in the same way, a particular notion is also diversified by the different words which can express it. For example, the notion expressed by the word *pāka* is diversified by the words *paktiḥ* and *pacanam* which are derived from the same root and have the same meaning but have different genders. In spite of these two different kinds of differentiation, the common

element persists in all of them and includes all the particulars within it. But the particular cannot appropriate the whole of the universal for itself. As the *Mahabhāṣya* puts it: *bhavati* includes the whole of *pacati* but *pacati* does not appropriate *bhavati* to itself. (*yaccātra pacater bhavatir bhavati na tad bhavateḥ pacatir bhavati*) (*M. Bhā.* II, p. 144, 1.21).]

How the same thing appears in different forms in regard to different things is now explained by an illustration.

63. Just as the same person is a teacher or a maternal uncle in regard to different related persons, so is the case with the notions expressed by the words *pakti* and *bhāva*.

[The same thing can be *sāmānya* (the universal) in regard to one thing and *viśeṣa* (particular) in regard to another thing. In regard to different kinds of cooking, cooking in general is the universal. In regard to *bhāva*, cooking is the particular. Just as the same person is maternal uncle to one and teacher to another.]

SECTION 9

ON TIME

Time has been enumerated after action (section 6.1.). It determines action. Its nature has been declared by others as follows :

1. Some have declared Time to be a substance (*dravya*) one, different from action, eternal, all-pervasive, something which measures things in action.

[The *Vaiśeṣikas* think of Time as an eternal entity, one and all-pervasive. It is different from action and it measures action.]

2. *Diṣṭi*, *prastha*, *suvarṇa* etc. serve to differentiate (measure) concrete objects. Time differentiates action and number differentiates everything.

[*Diṣṭi*, *vitasti* etc. are measurements of length; *prastha* *droṇa* are measurements of volume; *suvarṇa*, *niṣka* and *pala* are measurements of weight. Time is the means of measuring such immaterial things as action. It is Time which measures the course of the sun and we get such expressions as *māsa* (month), *samvatsara* (year) etc. Number measures material as well as immaterial things. We say 'two jars' 'many souls' 'two actions', one *vitasti*, two hands (*hasta*). Number can measure number also. That is why we can say: 'two twenties' 'five fifties' etc.]

3. It is Time, differentiated (though one) which has been declared to be the cause of the origin, existence and destruction of objects which go through these states.

[Time is the cause of the birth, existence and decay of everything, according to its own nature. Some things are born

in Spring, others in autumn, and others in the rainy season. The same thing can be said about existence and death.]

4. Time has been called the wire-puller of the world Machine. It regulates the universe through prevention and permission.

[Time may be likened to the wire-puller (*sūtradhāra*) who pulls the wires of the machine-man, namely, the universe. It is due to Time that there is sequence of things in this universe. Some things appear at a particular time while other things do not appear at that time.]

5. If it does not prevent and if it does not lift the prohibition, there would be confusion in the states of things, being devoid of sequence.

[If Time does not prevent some things from appearing at a particular time, if all things were born at the same time, there would be confusion and the whole edifice of causality would crumble.]

6. Due to association with divisions of other things, it is differentiated in many ways. Nothing is one or differentiated in itself.

[Time is one, but it is differentiated due to association with the different actions of the objects of the universe. The actions of objects are the associates of Time and it assumes distinctions due to this association. All differentiation in objects is due to external factors.]

7. Nothing is one or many, nothing is white or non-white in itself. It is due to association with other things that substance appears in this way or that.

[Pure substance, devoid of any association, cannot enter into worldly transaction. When properties like unity inhere in

it, it is spoken of as one etc. When qualities like white and black inhere in it, it is described as white or black. If universals like cowness inhere in it, it is said to be a cow etc. In the same way, due to association with actions like being born and so on, Time is differentiated and one speaks about birth-time, existence-time, destruction-time and so on.]

8. Divisions in its associates are thought of as its own divisions. Being thus differentiated, Time leads to divisions in conventional measurements (*vyavasthānam*).

[Movements of the Sun, of the planets and the stars are the associates of Time. Due to differentiation in them, different measurements of Time result. Day and night, fortnight, month, season, age, era are the conventional measurements. The interval between the rising and the setting of the sun is a day. Night, fortnight, moment etc. are similarly conventionally defined.]

9. Due to association with particular times, realisation takes place. So it (Time) becomes the cause of the operation of powers.

[It is due to the march of Time that potentialities are realised. The potentialities produce their effects when they are urged on by Time. That is why Time is said to be the *nimitta-kāraṇa* (efficient cause) of all effects.]

10. The regulation of birth or manifestation depends upon the operation of the powers. The sustenance of an object is also regulated because that also depends upon the eternal (Time).

[The powers of the causes, when permitted by Time, either produce or manifest their effects. Once produced, the effect lasts a certain period of time. Sustenance is also regulated. Destruction also depends upon Time.]

11. The object which stays is influenced by others

associated with it. It is either prevented (from producing its effect.) or is hidden or is destroyed.

[While an object is sustained, it is influenced by other objects, some of which develop it while others cause its decay. An object is prevented from producing its effect at some times, sometimes it is hidden and sometimes it is destroyed.]

12. At every stage the activity of Time is discernible. Time is the very soul of the universe. Hence it is identified with activity itself.

[In the well regulated stages of birth, sustenance and destruction, the activity of Time is inevitable. So it runs like a thread right through everything in the universe. Being the cause of all activity, it is sometimes identified with Time itself.]

13. By it (Time), differentiated through its associates, the increase and decrease of all objects (*mūrtinām*) are distinctly observed as transformations.

[Through Time, all objects, animate or inanimate, undergo transformations in the form of increase or decrease, in a certain order. It is association with the actions of objects which differentiates Time which is really one. Eternal things are not affected by Time.]

It is now stated that the name *kāla* (Time) corresponds to its nature.

14. By means of activities similar to the turning of the water-wheel, the eternal and all-pervasive Time turns out (*kalayati*) all the fragments (*kalāḥ*=objects) and thus acquires the name of *kāla* (Time).

[The cyclic activities of Time resemble the turning of the water-wheel which is meant to draw water. That is why the seasons recur in a definite order and all objects emerge from their causes. What is really meant here is that the only true Being is *Parabrahman*. He has infinite powers through which he

produces all kinds of effects. He creates the effects in cycles (*kalayati*) and hence he is called *kāla*.]

15. He himself releases the various activities of the universe which he had previously restrained, as the hunter's string does to the bird-baits.

[Objects are attached to the string of Time, just as bird-baits are attached to the string of the hunter and are controlled by him.]

16. When the powers become mature due to association with a particular time, eternal activity is produced in them due to an inner urge.

17. In it, urged on by the universal, the manifestation of the particular takes place. By some wonderful activity, it is regulated by the powers.

[The world is created for the experience of the creatures. At the time of Dissolution, the seeds of the next creation are already sown. Certain forces leading to the next creation become manifest in the atoms, according to the *Vaiśeṣikas* or in the *prakṛti* according to the *Sāṅkhyas*. When the eternal causes of products thus become endowed with the Powers leading to creation, there takes place in them a certain urge for mutual contact. It is this urge which is called *pravṛtti*. It is eternal action *nityā kriyā*. It is through this urge that the causes become active, enter into contact with one another and produce the effects. When this primitive urge becomes manifest, it is guided by the universals which seek an abode for themselves. Thus it is that particular effects are produced, possessing some universal or other. That is why the universal is said to be the prompter (*prajojaka*) of the primitive urge.]

What happens next is now stated.

18. Then the power called Inherence hides the difference. It brings about identity, as it were, between the objects and their causes.

[Thus the effects or^r objects are produced and though they are different from^r their causes, they are unified through Inherence (*samavāya*). That is why some thinkers do not accept that the effect is quite different from the cause.]

19. Further, after the determination of the effect all the prompting universals, manifest themselves in it, like reflections in clear water.

[The prompting universals inhere in the effects at the time of their birth. They appear to be identical with the effect in which they inhere. By *sarvāḥ*, what is meant is that in an object like, say, a jar, it is not only *ghaṭatva* which inheres but also the universals *sattā*, *dravyatva* and *prthivītva*.]

20. Then the qualities, being preceded by their causes and closely following them, become perceptible in the effects and become the cause of the manifestation of their own universals.

[As the qualities are the effects of the substances, their production takes place at the next moment. For one moment, therefore, the effect is devoid of any quality. Once the qualities are produced, they manifest their own universals. Thus all objects are created and all this is due to the power called Time, the essence of which is that it is temporal order.]

21. The eternality of the substrata and that of what inheres in them helps the particulars (the individuals) and thus their continuity results.

[The causes of the individuals, the particulars, are their eternal substrata. As the latter do not perish, the former have continuity. Thus the eternality of causes like atoms helps the particulars by giving them continuity. Otherwise, if their substrata perish, they cannot continue.]

Like its birth, its continuity also depends on others.

22. As the transitory depends upon others for its birth, so does it for its continuity. Otherwise, it

would be born only to perish. That is why it has been declared that, depending upon something else, it continues to exist.

[Just as the effect depends upon its causes for its birth, in the same way, it depends upon them for its continued existence. But for their support, it would perish at once. It is not enough for a thing to be born. It must also continue to exist for some-time if it is at all to fulfil its purpose.]

23. The object which continues to exist becomes capable of fulfilling various purposes with the help of cooperating objects. Without accepting the existence of these objects, things born cannot perform any activity.

[An object which continues to exist is capable of fulfilling some purpose with the help of other cooperating objects. Nothing does anything by itself. It does so only on the basis of the existence of cooperating objects. As it comes into contact with different cooperating objects, it fulfils various purposes and this is what is meant by continuity. The function of Time called 'permission' (*abhyanuñā*) extends up to the continuity of an object.]

The function of Time called 'Prevention' is now going to be explained.

24. The power of Time called 'old age' opposed to its other powers, prevents the capacity of objects to fulfil various purposes. Then arise properties which are opposed to that capacity.

[When objects are no longer able to fulfil their purposes, that is also due to Time. It is due to its other function called 'prevention' (*pratibandha*). By it, the capacities of objects are obstructed. Opposite attributes like dullness in the case of sentient beings, make their appearance.]

25. Those cooperating or prompting objects

which were the causes of continuity now disappear. Hence its essence comes to an end.

[All the helping objects which formerly enabled it to fulfil its purposes now disappear like ungrateful friends and it loses its essential nature. That is, it perishes.]

26. Just as, in some wonderful way, it is the sequenceless, the causeless and the ineffable which is born, the same is true of its destruction.

[It has already been said at the time of the explanation of the doctrine of *vivarta* (*sambandhasamuddeśa*, 81 with Helārāja's commentary) that it is the sequenceless, the causeless and the ineffable which is born. The same is true of destruction also.]

Thus, the birth, continued existence and the decay of objects are due to Time.

Another circumstance which enables us to infer Time is now going to be mentioned.

27. How can two actions, resting on two different things and coming to an end after being initiated be similarly determined without their being connected with a common entity?

[There is another circumstance which enables us to infer the existence of Time. Action is something which is composed of parts arranged in a sequence. All sequence is an attribute of Time. We can say of a piece of cloth or of a jar that it was made slowly. The epithet 'slow' is thus applied to the making of both these things. The productions of these two things are, two different actions and yet we apply the same epithet 'slow' to both of them. The things made are not the same, the makers are not the same and the actions are not the same because they rest on two different things. And yet the epithet 'slow' is applied to both, which shows that there is something which enables us

to apply the same epithet to both. That something is Time. It is in relation to that that actions are slow or quick.]

28. Just as the weight of different objects is measured by the balance or by the hand of experts. so is action measured by Time.

[Time is the means of measuring actions, just as the weight of objects is measured in a balance or in the hand of experts.]

29. It passes (*jahāti*) the actions associated with it just as rice seeds abandon water. Hence it is called *hāyana* (year).

[Time is One. As it passes various actions during a certain period, it is called *hāyana*=that which passes or abandons. (See P. 3.1.148) The rice seed is also called *hāyana* because it abandons the water which was associated with it.]

30. Through its eternal activity consisting of prevention and permission, it is differentiated and it assumes the form of sequence.

[When the powers of the accessories of an action are suspended, there is prevention. The opposite of that is permission. The activity of Time in regard to objects is characterised by these two states. As objects are constantly changing something is always being produced and something else is always perishing. This sequence which really belongs to the objects is attributed to Time. Sequence is primarily a property of actions but it is attributed to something else.]

31. Time which is one becomes good or bad (*sama* or *viṣama*) when it attains excellence or degeneracy due to difference in the agents of the different modes of behaviour.

[When human beings act according to the injunctions of *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, then that period of time attains excellence and

it is called the *Kṛta* age. When human beings indulge in licentious conduct, then that period of time attains degeneracy and it is differentiated because of difference in the behaviour of human beings.]

32. Just as the same individual is called carpenter etc. according to the work which he does, in the same way, due to difference in activity, Time which is One gets the names of the different seasons.

[Because of difference in activity consisting in the production of different kinds of flowers and so on, Time, which is One, is called by different names such as Spring, Summer and so on.]

The author now speaks of other artificial divisions.

33. Of the object which is and which is not, by the superimposition of different attributes, one speaks about conception, execution and completion.

[Before its birth, a thing is not. Once it is conceived as one mentally, different times are attributed to it because of different attributes. Having conceived of a thing, to collect the necessary material for bringing it about is to be in the beginning-time. The actual making of that for which the material has been collected is to be in the execution-time. The finishing of it takes place in the completion-time.]

34. This is the same for a binary etc. as for the Himālaya. The object, as a whole, has neither differentiation nor increase.

[As the whole is indivisible, these different times are the same for all objects. Parts are different from the whole. Magnitude is a quality and is different from the whole. Because of difference in quality, the whole cannot increase or decrease. As the whole remains the same, it cannot bring about any difference in the three times of big or small objects.]

35. Increase is attributed to the whole on account

of the parts which are different from it. Thus one whole is understood as having been made quickly and another whole slowly.

[Because of a larger or a smaller number of parts, a thing is said to be big or small. That, which has a larger number of parts is made more slowly than one which has a smaller number of them. Therefore, the beginning time etc. of these different wholes appear to differ. As the relation called inherence (*samavāya*) hides the difference between the parts and the whole, the latter is named after the attributes of the former. In reality, the three times of the different wholes remain the same.]

36. That which is not has no sequence, it cannot be differentiated. The essence of that which is remains always the same.

[Before a thing was born, it was not. It had no being. It had, therefore, no sequence in it. No distinction could be made within it. And the essence of a thing that is always remains the same.]

Not only the distinction of the seasons, that of the past, present etc. also is due to difference in action.

37. Conditioned by action, Time attains the states of past, future and present, divided into eleven forms.

[Time, conditioned by an action which, after having been initiated, is over, is called the past. When conditioned by actions whose accessories are present and which are expected to be initiated soon, it is called the future. When conditioned by actions, which have been initiated but not finished, it is called the present. These three, when subdivided, become eleven in number.]

38. The past is of five kinds, the future of four kinds and the present of two kinds. Thus there are eleven varieties.

[Past in general, *adyatana*=immediate (lit. 'of today'), *anadyatana*=not immediate, including *parokṣa*=distant, *adyatanānadyatanasamudāya*=combination of the two previous ones and secondary (*gaṇa*) past, that is, future treated as past—these make up the five kinds of past. Future in general, *adyatana*=immediate future, *anadyatana*=not immediate future and *adyatanānadyatanasamudāya*=combination of the two previous kinds, these make up the four kinds of future. Primary present, and secondary present (that is, past and future treated as present, these are the two kinds of present. These divisions of time have been mentioned only to explain the tense distinctions mentioned in the Science of grammar.]

How can action which is past give Time its name ?

39. Objects, after having deposited in Time their particular form determined by Intelligence, after having transferred their powers to it, disappear.

[The objects produced by the action, which is past are preserved in memory. The objects preserved in memory are called past objects, and it is they which give the name 'past' to the time when they were produced. The objects deposit in eternal time the form which they **had** when they were present. They are then said to be remembered. The very fact that things are remembered is a proof of the existence of Time.]

How then to explain the name future ?

40. The form of objects to come and their reflection in the mind as on a well-polished mirror can be explained only on assuming the existence of Time.

[The fact that we can conceive of objects yet to come is also a proof of Time. Objects yet to come are reflected in Time as in a well-polished mirror. Thus Time is the background or the cause of everything in the universe.]

41. Just as the current of a river tosses about

grass, leaves and creepers, in the same way, Time brings about changes in objects.

[Just as the current of a river displaces some things and puts others back in their place, in the same way, the ever active Time creates objects and brings about changes in the created objects.]

42. Just as the force called 'Air' (*vāyu*) after having entered, as it were (the joints of the body) regulates the function (*gatiḥ*) of all organs (*gatimatām*), in the same way, Time brings about sequence in things.

[Just as the air called *Prāṇa* enters as it were the joints of the body and regulates movements like coming and going, in the same way, Time, by means of its two functions namely, prevention and permission brings about sequence.]

43. Therefore the division of the year into the two courses of the Sun (*ayana*), the fixed movement of the celestial bodies and the origin and destruction of all beings are due to Time.

[The two courses of the Sun are called *Uttarāyana* and *Dakṣiṇāyana*, the northward course lasting six months and the southward course lasting the remaining six months. The creation and destruction of objects, denoted by the two words *sarga* and *pralaya*, are also due to Time.]

44. The transformations of objects following the operation of Time are really what the constellations are. The celestial bodies are only their symbols.

45. Time, the abode of the seasons, is also determined by the noises made by animals and birds, by the condition of the inanimate world and by the changes in light and shade.

[It is determined by various signs. What are called constellations or stars are only symbols of changes in objects, taking place due to Time. The seasons may be looked upon as the abode of Time, because it appears as the seasons. The power called 'Freedom' of the Brahman is really Time and it appears diversified as the different seasons like Spring etc. It is through this Freedom that Time appears diversified as the seasons with their different special features.]

Now the place of Time in Monism is pointed out.

46. This appearance of the Universe which is really without sequence as something with sequence is the work of Time.

[It was said in the section on *Sambandha* [that the universe is a *vivarta*, an unreal manifestation of Brahman which, in reality, is without any sequence. It is due to the power called *Kāla* that the universe appears to have sequence.]

It is now pointed out that other distinctions of Time are also only contingent divisions.

47. Just as the distinction of far (long) and near (short) relates to time, in the same way, that of fast and slow relates to Time.

[It is like one and the same stretch of road appearing as long or short to two different people or one and the same span of time appearing as slow or quick to two different people.]

48. Of this Time which is One, three divisions as it were, are brought about in actual practice by actions, three divisions which the world cannot ignore.

[Just as the Universe is without sequence but appears to have it, in the same way, Time is One but appears to have three divisions, namely, past, present and future.]

49. Time which is One has three powers on account of which the appearance and disappearance of objects takes place.

[These are really three powers of Time and it is due to these three powers that things appear and disappear. If diversity of effects can be explained by diversity of powers of the cause, there is no need to postulate a plurality of causes.]

50. Time hides objects with the help of two of these powers and it is the power called Present which manifests objects.

[Of these three powers, Past and Future hide objects whereas the Present reveals them.]

51. The power called Future does not stand in the way of birth but the power called Past does stand in the way of it.

[The power called Future does not stand in the way of the power called Present which is associated with the birth of objects. What is called Future is something which in time, will become present. But the power called Past does stand in the way of the power called Present. What is past is past. It does not become present whereas it is what was future which, in time, becomes present.]

52. These three paths are like light and shade and they are without sequence. In them objects acquire sequence.

[The three divisions of Time, namely, Past, Future and Present are like three paths. Just as walkers are constantly going on paths, in the same way, objects are seen operating and undergoing transformations on these paths. That is what is stated in the *Vyāsaśāstra* on *Yogasūtra* III.13. Even though these three powers exist in Time at the same time without any sequence, still they operate on objects like light and shade, hiding them or manifesting them according to necessity and thus bring about their sequence. In this respect, they are like the three *guṇas*, *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* of *Prakṛti* which are always present but operate through coordination.]

53. Of these three, two are like darkness and one like light. According to some, that which is past does come back.

[The Past and the Future hide objects and so they are called 'darkness'. It is the function of darkness to hide, as the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* 13 says. The Present enables us to see the objects and so it is like light or the *sattva guṇa* of the Sāṅkhyas as the same *Kārikā* declares. *Rajas* which stands for activity is Time itself, in general. In the *Brahmadarśana*, there is no contradiction in looking upon Time which is a power as a transformation of the three *guṇas*.]

54. The qualified (*taddharma*), according to some, becomes the present at the same time. Having become present, it similarly becomes the past also.

[So far, the *dharmī* and the *dharmas* have been assumed to be different. It was pointed out that the *dharmī* is something which persists and that the *dharmas* come and go or follow the three divisions of Time. But it is possible to look upon the two as identical and regard the same *dharmī* as acquiring three different names through its *dharmas*. In other words, the same thing can be looked upon as past, present and future at the same time in relation to this *dharma* or that, which may be past, present or future.]

The past and the present being opposites, how can both of them be present in the same thing ?

55. When its causes are active and functioning, a thing becomes present and when its causes have stopped functioning, it is not visible any more.

[When the causes are all ready and mature and produce their effect, then the object becomes manifest, does its work and is said to be present. When the causes cease to function and the object has also fulfilled its work, it becomes invisible and is said to be past. When the causes of an object are not yet ready

to produce it, it is said to be in the future. Thus one and the same thing acquires different names on the basis of external circumstances according to the presence or absence of purposeful activity. If what does purposeful activity only really exists, how can what is past be said to exist, considering that it cannot perform purposeful activity? The answer is that the fulfilment or purposeful activity is not the test of existence.]

It is now stated that some thinkers accept only two powers of Time and not three.

56. According to some, all-pervasive Time has only two powers or paths by means of which it brings about the emergence or disappearance of objects.

[The invisibility of objects is common to both previous non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) and destruction (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*). In both cases, it is the same power which brings it about and that power is called prevention (*pratibandha*). The second power is that which makes objects visible and that is called *abhyānujñā* (permission). Those who hold this view do so because they think that it is simpler to postulate two powers instead of three. *Pratibandha* results in the future and the past and *abhyānujñā* results in the present.]

The following *karikā* No.57 should read as follows and not as printed in my edition.

Kalābhikṣ prthagarthābhikṣ pravibhaktam svabhāvataḥ |
kecid buddhyanusaṃhāralakṣaṇam taṃ pracakṣate ||

57. Some think that the parts of an action are naturally separated from one another and that Time is their unification by the mind.

[So far Time has been declared to be really One and indivisible but acquiring divisions through its associates of which action is the chief one. In fact, it is from its associates that we get the notion of Time. We cannot see it directly. It is its associates and its effects which we can see. But some people point

out that this postulate called Time may be dispensed with and that everything may be explained with the help of these associates. Time is only a construction of the mind. The different points of an action are united by the mind and this mental unification becomes the cause of such expressions as 'quick' and 'slow'. There is nothing corresponding to quick and slow outside the mind.]

58. Whether it is only something having an existence in the mind or whether it has an existence outside the mind, expression in words is not possible without recourse to the notion of Time.

[Whether Time is only a mental construction or whether it has an existence outside the mind, speech, that is, expression in words is not possible without the help of the notion of Time. Bhartṛhari is not concerned with the determination of Time philosophically. He is only concerned with the notion which is the basis of tense distinctions in the Sanskrit language as in the verbs : *abhūt*, *asti*, *bhaviṣyati*.]

59. According to some, every object has three powers. Through these powers, every object always is or is not.

[Different thinkers explain this notion differently. According to some, all objects being made up of the three *guṇas*, namely, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, have three powers and what is called Time is not different from these powers. Things are said to exist or not to exist as these powers become manifest or do not.]

60. These three powers are really not different from existence. They are also sequence. Existence and non-existence, being not different from these powers, do not differ from each other.

[What is called sequence is nothing more than these three powers of objects. Through these powers, things appear or disappear. Manifestation of objects and their withdrawal,

these are the two functions of these powers. In fact, non-existence is nothing more than non-manifestation. There is really no difference between existence and non-existence. They are only two states of the same thing.]

61. It is the same thing which, through manifestation and non-manifestation, is seen or not seen. The paths are not the same. Nothing is really destroyed.

[Through the power called the Present, there is manifestation, perception and experience. Through the powers called Past and Future, there is hiding, non-perception and absence of experience. These two paths of perception and non-perception remain distinct, without any confusion. The thing which is now seen and now not seen remains the same. It is its attributes which come and go. As a thing is never completely destroyed but only hidden, there is, really speaking, no difference between existence and non-existence.]

62. The doctrine regarding Time differs according as it is looked upon as the power (of causality), the Self, or as a Deity, it is the first to appear in Nescience and it does not exist in true knowledge.

[According to Bhartṛhari, Time is the *Svātantryaśakti* of Brahman. His commentators explain that Time is nothing more than causality. The power called seed allows the emergence of the sprout and prevents the emergence of the stalk. So it is called *kāla*. Similarly the power called 'sprout' allows the emergence of the next stage but not the one next to that. So it is called *kāla* and so on. But this is not correct. Objects have their special causes and they are produced when these special causes are present, otherwise not. So the production of effects certainly depends upon the capacity of the causes. But the effect comes only at particular times and not at other times and so it is different from the causes. The objects which are produced appear in a certain sequence. *Kālaśakti* which is essentially sequence is a condition of all objects. The Lord who manifests

the objects also manifests them in a sequence. So what is called Time is a *śakti* of Brahman. Others think of *kāla* as a Deity, having a form and great power. But this view is in conformity with the view that it is the *svātantryaśakti* of Brahman. Thus the accepted view of the grammarians in regard to Time may be stated as follows: Due to *avidyā*, there is, first of all, appearance of diversity. Diversity is temporal and spatial. The former comes first. Consciousness, at the stage called *paśyanti* is without any sequence. When it becomes associated, with *prāṇavṛtti*, it appears to have sequence due to Time. Brahman is without sequence and is not affected by Time as long as there is true knowledge (*vidyā*). Through *avidyā*, it assumes sequence and appears as many for the *jīvātmā*, objects appear in a sequence due to Time. All diversity is due to *avidyā*. Once *vidyā* dawns, all diversity disappears and Time also disappears.]

How can the conception of Time explained above and meant to account for diversity and sequence in transitory things be adequate to explain difference in eternal things?

63-64. If the Time being one, differences, which appear in short long and protracted vowels are like those in cognitions of quick and slow, how can the increase in the flow of liquid etc. which takes place in the utterance of the short, long and protracted be due to mere attribution through courtesy?

[Articulate words are really eternal but distinctions of Time are attributed to them. Short, long and protracted vowels do not really differ from one another in Time, but temporal distinctions in the suggestive elements are attributed to them, just as there is no distinction based on Time between the two cognitions which find expression in the words: *kṣīpram idaṃ kṛtam*, *ciram idaṃ kṛtam* = 'this was done quickly,' 'this was done slowly.' They differ in their objects only and not in themselves. This is the accepted view. But here a difficulty arises. It is well-known that when a short vowel is repeated, there is only a little flow of liquid from the tube and that when a long vowel is repeated, there is 33½% more flow of liquid and that when a pro-

tracted vowel is repeated, there is another $33\frac{1}{3}\%$ more flow. How is this possible, if there is no real distinction of Time between the three? Greater flow of water means greater lapse of time. If the distinction is wrongly attributed, it cannot explain a real difference in the quantity of water which flows. A wrongly attributed distinction cannot lead to a real difference in activity. Therefore short, long and protracted vowels seem to have real, temporal distinction.]

The above objection is answered as follows:

65,66,67. By increase in the manifesting elements, an increase in the essence of the word is imagined (*pratīyate*) though it is essentially incapable of increase.

Similarly, as articulate words, there is no difference between $1/4$ of a *mātrā* and the collection of Rks consisting of ten parts (*daśataya*), on the basis of their difference in their duration.

The sounds which are found in the interval as a sort of reverberation are the means whereby listeners perceive (distinctions in the speed of utterance.)

[The word has differentiations like short, long etc. and yet it is said to be eternal and, therefore, devoid of differentiation based on Time. The fact is that the suggestive or manifesting elements of the word, namely, the *dhvanis*, have distinctions based on Time. They can be of greater or lesser quantity. As the listener does not cognise the manifested word as distinct from the manifesting elements, distinctions based on Time are attributed to the word also. The primary sounds (*prākṛtadhvani*) heard as identical with the word, presents the latter as having distinctions based on time which really belong to themselves. The suggestive and the suggested, the manifesting and the manifested elements are not separately cognised. It has already been said that the word is most clearly cognised together with the last sound. As the cognition of the word depends on that of the manifesting elements, the properties of the latter are attributed to the former and that explains the difference in the flow of the

water from the tube. In P.1.1.70, there is superimposition of the property of the sound on the word. Difference in speed caused by the secondary sounds makes no difference to the word itself. Not only difference based on time such as short, long etc. but also such distinctions as nasal and non-nasal really belong to the manifesting elements. Even a wrongly attributed difference can explain the difference in the flow of water because the manifesting and the manifested elements are not separately cognised. The analogy of the cognitions 'quickly done' and 'slowly done' does not hold good here because the relation between a cognition and its object is not the same as the relation between the manifesting sounds and the phoneme. The form of the object and that of cognition are distinctly perceived but the manifesting sounds and the phoneme are cognised as one.]

Now the author continues to explain the merely contingent division of Time.

68. Taking this or that particular thing as the limit, the one Time is divided into moment, month, season etc. in order to measure things.

[As was explained above, Time is One and eternal. It has no divisions of its own. But divisions in its associates are attributed to it. Taking this thing or that as the limit, it is divided into moment, month, season and so on.]

69. Moment, era and age are divisions of particular lengths of the one Time, made at the worldly level, by different constructions of the mind.

[Mentally, we unify a certain number of points and give it a particular name such as month, day, year and so on. But this is purely mental.]

70. The flow of water, through the hole of the tube (*nālikā*) by means of prevention and permission, is itself the work of Time.

[According to some, Time is nothing more than these

mental constructions. For some, the flow of water in the machine for measuring Time is itself Time. But there is something which makes some of the water flow and not all at a particular time and that is Time which is, therefore, different from the flow. Time measures the flow.]

71. Whether the hole is big or small the function of Time is not diversified through contact with it. And yet the essence (of Time) follows it.

[Whether the hole through which the water escapes is small or big does not affect the activity of Time, namely, prevention and permission. Time is One and yet it has variations based upon the size of the particular hole through which water passes. If the hole is small, the water takes naturally a longer time to pass through. Prevention and permission are functions of Time but they are conditioned by other factors also. Whether the sprout should come out of the seed or not depends upon Time but not on Time only. Also on the soil manure etc. Similarly, that only a certain amount of water can go through the hole in the jar is determined by Time, but not by Time only. It is also determined by the size of the hole etc. Cause and Time together produce the effect. There is no use, therefore, of trying to eliminate either of them.]

72. It is through the play of Time, having many powers, among the objects that it becomes diversified.

[As objects depend upon Time, the latter plays with them as with toys, manifests them or suppresses them according to its will and in the process, assumes diversity such as present time, past time etc.]

73. By bringing about the growth of the bamboo (in a short time) and that of the palm (very slowly), Time, by association with such diversity, becomes diversified.

[Bamboo attains maturity quickly while the palm tree takes a long time to do so. We can speak about bamboo growth time and palm growth time. In this way Time becomes diversified.]

74. The passing-away of objects does not bring about the passing away of Time. The road is not affected by any difference in the movement of the people who walk on it.

[Time is the substratum on which objects and their conditions play. The latter may come and go but the substratum remains the same. The path remains the same even though walkers and their movements pass away. When we speak about the end of seasons, what we mean is the end of the activities associated with the seasons. The period which is the substratum of these activities remains the same because Time is eternal.]

75. Though Time is not affected by the well-known rising and setting of the celestial bodies, it appears to be so affected.

[Sometimes we speak as if Time is affected by these changes but that is only a way of speaking. We say that the day is over, the night is past, the summer is over and so on, but all these changes do not really affect Time.]

76. Some knowers of Time declare that Time is nothing more than the different movements of the celestial bodies such as the Sun, the planets, the stars, etc.

[Some declare that what is called the day is the course of the Sun beginning from its rise till its setting. From its setting till its rise again is what is called night. These two repeated fifteen times, make up a fortnight (*pakṣa*) when repeated thirty times, they make up a month. The passing of all the *nakṣatras* by the moon constitutes a month. When *Br̥haspati* crosses one *rāśi*, it is equal to a year. Similar movements of other celestial

bodies, described in *Jyautiṣa* constitute such divisions as *lūga*, *Manvantara*, *Kalpa*, *Mahākalpa*, etc.]

77. An action whose measurement is known, when used for measuring some other action, becomes Time in relation to that action.

[The known movement of any of the celestial bodies taken as the standard for measuring the movements of other objects, becomes Time. Thus Time is a standard of measurement. It helps to measure other things.]

78. The forms of some actions enter into cognition. These forms are unified by some other cognition. In the absence of any other action, this action is called Time.

[Even one whose gaze is turned inward or who is within a closed room and cannot, therefore, watch the course of the Sun or the flow of water, can measure Time. One whose gaze is turned inward cognises some movements like those of his breathing as reflected in cognition. He unifies these cognitions by means of another. That unified cognition is action. Even though nothing external is cognised, this unified cognition becomes Time for him. When many such cognitions take place, through them, he measures outward events as having lasted a long time. When only a few of them take place, he measures outward events as having lasted a short time. When only a few of them take place, he measures outside events as having taken place quickly. It is well-known that Yogis can measure events through the movements of their *Prāṇa*.]

79. In the expression, 'the jar is past' (*bhūto ghaṭaḥ*) it is the existence of the jar which is said to be past. In the expression 'the existence is past' (*bhūtā sattā*) the existence of existence is expressed as past.

[When we say *bhūto ghaṭaḥ*, using a suffix expressive of the past tense, what is really past? Not the jar, because it is a sub-

stance and so it has no connection with time. Actions are *sādhya*, that is, processes and so they are connected with time. The action called 'existence' or 'being', expressed by the root, is connected with the meaning of the suffix *kta*. The *sattā* exists in the jar. Thus it is indirectly connected with the jar and not directly with substance and time. Even according to the view that Time is different from action, there is connection between time and substance through action. In the sentence *bhūtā sattā*, the *sattā* expressed by the root is in the form of action and the *sattā* expressed by the word *sattā* is in the form of a substance. Therefore, the pastness of the latter is understood through the pastness of the former. Even though *sattā* is eternal, it assumes diversity through its substrata and becomes associated with the three aspects of time through its substrata.]

80. Everything acquires distinction through other things. In itself, nothing has distinction. The existence of mountains etc. is therefore, diversified through other things.

[Everything in the world is measured by other things. Nothing in itself has distinction. All distinction in things is in relation to other things. Even the existence of things like mountains can be spoken of in relation to time. We can say: Mountains existed, exist and will exist. For bringing distinctions in the existence of mountains, we make use of the actions of past, present and future Kings as the basis. The actions of Kings are well-known and so they are used as the basis for diversifying the action of mountains etc.]

81. Well-known actions (like actions of Kings, cooking, cutting etc.) have dissimilar parts. Through association with them, actions having similar parts are diversified.

[Actions like cooking, cutting etc. have dissimilar parts. Therefore, they have distinctions of Time. Putting the vessel on the fire etc. are the dissimilar parts of the action called cooking.

Lifting the axe etc. are the dissimilar parts of the action called cutting. The action of a mountain, expressed by the root *sthā* in *parvatas tiṣṭhati* has no dissimilar parts. Its parts are similar to one another. Because they are similar, it is difficult to have distinctions of time in them, to regard some parts as past and others as present. Therefore, distinctions of time are attributed to them on the basis of the distinctions which are clearly visible in such actions having dissimilar parts as the actions of contemporary kings or the movements of celestial bodies. The *Mahābhāṣya* mentions actions of Kings because they are more famous. Such actions which become the measurements of other actions are here looked upon as *ādhāra*—basis. The action of a mountain expressed by the root *sthā*, though an eternal one and therefore, really free from distinctions of time, seems to have sequence because of its association with other contemporary actions having real sequence. If, from the verb '*tiṣṭhati*' used in connection with a mountain, a meaning involving sequence is somehow understood, that meaning becomes action, because for Grammarians, it is the meaning of a word which is *artha* and nothing which is beyond it.]

82. A combination of various acts like eating appears to be interrupted or stopped by other actions coming in between.

83. Though interrupted, it is not yet finished because the ultimate result is not there. All action appears to be mixed with other actions.

84. All intervening action may also be looked upon as part of the original action, because of resemblance to the other parts.

[Actions like eating consist of many parts arranged in a sequence and these parts seem to be interrupted by totally different actions such as laughing and talking. Up to satisfaction, the action of eating is one and though other actions may come in between the parts of eating, the action of eating taken as a whole

is considered uninterrupted. Only the parts are interrupted and not the whole. The whole seems to be interrupted too because one ignores the parts which are yet to come. Really speaking, the action of eating goes on till one is satisfied. Not only eating, laughing and talking can also be similarly interrupted. Even winking can be interrupted by breathing. Thus all actions seem to be mixed up with and interrupted by others, but in reality they are not, because they go on till the attainment of the fruit. Laughing and talking which come in between the parts of the act of eating must also be looked upon as parts of eating, just as sipping water etc. are so looked upon.]

85. A thing either is or is not. There is no third possibility. Therefore, excepting past and future, there is no middle course.

86. A thing, being free from distinctions cannot be in the nature of a sequence. How can one thing, whether it be existent or non-existent, be in the nature of sequence?

87. As many cannot co-exist, only one is perceived. And remembrance can only be according to perception.

88. If action is regarded as one, everything would be one, consisting of partly existent and partly non-existent elements.

Now follows the answer.

89. When it is perceived in its own form, that is, that which enables it to produce the fruit, that is its present time.

90. When the series of momentary acts is cognised within and is reflected in one act of cognition, that is said to be its one-ness and its present-ness.

[Action has been declared to be a process, a series of moments. The moment that is past is something which has been accomplished. As far as that moment is concerned, action is past. As far as the moment that is coming is concerned, action is still in the future. There cannot be a moment which is both past and future, existent and non-existent at the same time. Therefore action cannot be anything else than past or future. It cannot be present. Therefore, the meaning of a root cannot have present-ness as its attribute. How can a suffix expressive of the present also denote action which is not directly perceptible, but is to be inferred? What is called being present cannot be the same as the fact of being a sequence, a process. That which is can have no sequence and that which is not cannot have it either. And there is no third category. Therefore, there is no such thing as action consisting of sequence, much less what is called present action. Nor would it do to say that a large number of moments, arranged in a sequence, is action and that it would be called present till the production of the ultimate result. Because these moments cannot be simultaneous. Only one of them can be perceived at a time and that cannot have any sequence. Nor can we remember simultaneously a large number of moments perceived separately in a sequence. Because we never perceive the sequence and we cannot, therefore, remember it. We can only remember what we perceive. Nor would it do to look upon many moments as one action. Some of the moments are past, others are yet to come, that is, some are non-existent and others exist. How can one thing be composed of opposite elements? One is thus compelled to take another position, namely, that in the different moments, there is some common feature, which is action. This common feature can only be *nirvṛtti*, the fact or the fitness of being produced. Action would thus become a common feature existing in each moment and not a unity of a series of moments. There would be no *kriyā-vyakti* at all. Each moment would not be action.]

The above objection is answered as follows:

Action is One, a unification of moments. A sequence of moments, all having one purpose, is action. It is one, because it has only one purpose. Actions vary with purposes. Even though some moments are existent and the others are not, action can be said to be present also. The present should be defined as *prārabdhāparisamāptatvam*—‘the fact of having been begun but not yet finished. A sequence of moments, all leading to the same result, if looked upon as One, even before the result is produced, can be said to be present. It is this unity which can produce the result. Every moment in the sequence can be said to be present. The whole thing can also be looked upon as follows: When a series of moments is reflected in one cognition, it appears as one and as being present. There can be a mental unification of things which have been experienced in succession, because the impressions of what was experienced are still fresh. It is only in this way that one can explain the cognition of collections. That what is remembered must have been experienced before is accepted by all. What has been experienced in succession can, however, be remembered simultaneously.)

An objection is now raised to what is taught in P.3.3.139

91. The non-accomplishment of an action is its absolute non-production. Such a thing cannot be past or future.

[The author has so far explained how an action is sometimes spoken of as being ‘present’ in the *śāstra*. In P.3.3.139, non-accomplishment of an action is spoken of in relation to the past or the future. *lṛi* is taught instead of *lin* if there is past or future non-accomplishment of action to be expressed. For example: *suṃṣṭiś ced abhaviṣyat subhikṣam abhaviṣyat*—‘if there had been good rain, there would have been plenty of food’ or ‘if there would be good rain, there would be plenty of food.’ It is implied here that there was no good rain and, therefore, no abundance of food or that there would probably be no good rain and, therefore, no abundance of food either. It is objected here that what never took place is thought of as ‘past’ or that what might not take place at all is thought of as future. This is not logical.]

The objection is answered.

92. Before the happening of the opposite action or after the opposite has taken place, the matter is diversified according to difference in the limit.

[The answer is that their opposites which are positive actions do have reference to the past and the future and so these are also thought of as referring to the same. *Yadi kamalakam āhvāṣyaṇ na śakaṭaṃ paryābhaviṣyat*—‘if Kamalaka could be called, the cart would not be upset’. Somebody says this, knowing that the calling of Kamalaka and the cart not being upset will not be possible. Kamalaka cannot be called because he has gone elsewhere and the cart cannot but be upset because it is overloaded. The upsetting of the cart can take place because Kamalaka is not called; he cannot be called because he has gone elsewhere. If he is called, the cart will not be upset. In this situation, the calling is in the future. So its opposite, the not-calling is also thought of as being in the future.]

Now something is going to be said about P.3.4.1 which seems to teach a verbal suffix for expressing a tense, which, normally, is not its own.

93. When the particular circumstance (in which a suffix is taught) is absent, its use would not be correct. Therefore, the *sūtra* in question makes it expressive of another point of time also in the sentence *bhāvy āsīt*.

94. If a suffix is correct only when it expresses the particular point of time for which it is taught, how can it express another? When the suffixes are incapable of expressing other points of time, how can a single meaning with parts related by the relation of qualifier and qualified be understood from the sentence?

(Certain suffixes are taught as expressive of some points of

time. Sometimes, words ending in these suffixes are associated with words ending in suffixes expressive of other points of time. For instance, *gomān āsīt*. In *gomān*, the suffix *matuḥ* expresses the present time, the word *āsīt* expresses past time. How can the two words come together? Pāṇini gives the answer to this question in the *sūtra*—*dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ* (P.3.4.1.)—‘Suffixes express points of time other than their own when they are connected with (the meaning of) the roots with which they are associated.’ The author of the *vārttikas* does not think this *sūtra* necessary. According to him, suffixes can express other points of time when they enter into a sentence and become related as *viśeṣaṇa*=qualifiers to other suffixes expressive of other times. By writing this *sūtra*, Pāṇini has made matters rather difficult.]

95. The idea that which was future is no longer so would not be understood if (according to the *sūtra*) the suffix in *bhāvi* expresses the same point of time as in *āsīt*. Only the absolute past would be understood.

[On account of this *sūtra*, *bhāvi* also would express the past. The idea that what was future is no longer so would not be conveyed. That is conveyed only through the relation of qualifier and qualified, coming out of the sentence.]

96. Before (entering into a sentence), a suffix expresses the particular time for which it is taught. It continues to do so when it enters into relation with another word as a qualifier. The particular time which is the basis of the suffix is its inner circumstance. It will always express it.

[This does not mean that a suffix gives up its meaning when it enters into a sentence. Without ceasing to express its own time it follows the suffix of the verb by expressing the time of the latter. Its original tense is its basic, its inner circumstance. The suffix never gives it up. It is the original tense which is understood as going through a modification.]

97. The meaning of the individual word is already qualified (by those of other words). That is how it is taught. Meaning being eternal, it would not be right to believe that the unqualified word becomes qualified later.

[Grammar explains the word as it is actually used and it is the sentence which is actually used in daily transactions. Therefore, the sentence has to be explained. When the individual words are explained by grammar, the meaning which is taken as the basis of the explanation is one which is obtained by analysis of the meaning of the sentence. But it is a meaning which is fit to enter into relation with the meanings of other words in the sentence. This way of explaining the individual word is called *vākyāvadhikam anvākhyānam*—‘explanation which keeps in view the use to which the word will be put in the sentence.’ In this explanation the meaning of every word is already potentially mixed or connected with the meanings of the other words in the sentence. If the word is explained without any reference to its connection with the meanings of other words, then its meaning becomes modified when it actually enters into the sentence and that affects the eternality of the relation between the word and the meaning.]

98. That which is taught as expressive of a simple tense would not be correct if made to express a complex one. Therefore the *sūtra* teaches the correctness of the suffix when it expresses a different tense.

[In the word *bhāvi*, the suffix *ṇini* is taught in the sense of the future. It cannot, therefore, express the future qualified by the past. P.3.4.1. makes this possible. That is why we can have sentences like *bhāvy āsīt*. Here the suffix in *bhāvi* expresses the future as qualified by the past.]

But why not say that the suffix in *āsīt* expresses the past as qualified by the future?

99. The idea expressed by the verb is the main one because it is a process. That which it calls forth is subordinate and follows its tense.

[Because, in a sentence, the meaning of the verb is more important than that of the noun. It is the former which is the *viśeṣya*—the qualified and the latter which is the *viśeṣaṇa*. Thus, in the sentence in question, the word *bhāvī*, without ceasing to express its own original meaning follows the meaning of the verb. The subordinate word was already capable of expressing the new meaning. That power became manifest only when it came into contact with the other word in the sentence.]

100. The form of the cognition or the power of the word is transferred to the future time which is the opposite. Therefore, there is no contradiction.

[Words express a meaning according to their *svabhāva*—‘their inner nature’ and no rule can change it. If a suffix, according to its *svabhāva*, expresses the past, it cannot express the future by a mere rule. But when a word enters into a sentence, its meaning is modified according to that of the other words in the sentence. What happens in a sentence like *agniṣṭomayājī aya putro bhavitā*=‘his son will become a performer of *agniṣṭoma* sacrifice’ is that our cognition relating to past time is superimposed on the future or the power of the words to convey their meaning is transferred to the future. The sentence would then mean: ‘the son who will be born, will, when he grows up, become fit to be called by the name : *agniṣṭomayājī*=a performer of *agniṣṭoma*. Thus there would be no contradiction.]

101. The two cognitions : ‘This is past’, and ‘that is future’, themselves present, assume the opposite forms of their objects without giving up their own form.

[The two cognitions: ‘this is past’ and ‘that is future’ are both present but their content is opposed to the present and yet it figures in them. In the same way, a word expressive of one

time can be coordinated with another time when it enters into a sentence as in *agniṣṭomayājī asya putro janitā*. What is superimposed on another does not lose its own form.]

102. The residual trace of the present or the resolution to begin, this is what is called 'nearness to the present'. It is mentioned separately in the *śāstra*.

[The author now explains what is meant by *vartamānasāmīpya* = 'nearness to the present' in P.3.3.131. The residual traces in the mind of what is just finished or the resolution to start something is what is called 'nearness to the present'. The 'present' itself is the fact of something, having been begun but not yet finished. When there is only a residual trace or a mere resolution there is no bodily activity. Therefore, it is like the past or the future. The suffix expressive of the present can come only by special teaching and that is done in the *sūtra* : P.3.3.131.]

103. Even though hope is present, it is called future in the *Mahābhāṣya* for the purpose of grammar because of its future object.

[Another mental thing is hope (*āśaṃsā*). While it is there, it is present, though its object is in the future. The desire expressed by the suffix *san* in *cikīrṣati* is present though its object is in the future. The word is in the present tense because *san* is the more important element in the word. The hope is not expressed by the suffix. It expresses the object of hope.]

104. In the word *cikīrṣati*, 'desire' follows its own time. Even though the meaning of the base relates to the future, desire is not expressed by the future tense.

[The desire expressed by the suffix *san* in *cikīrṣati* is in the present though its object, namely, the act of doing is in the future. The word is in the present tense because *san* is the more important element in the word and desire is expressed by *san*.]

105. Just the opposite happens in the case of hope because it depends on its object. The words themselves impose a property of the speaker on the meaning of words.

[P.3.3.132 teaches the use of *laḥ* or *luḥ* instead of the future tense when hope is expressed. In the examples of the *sūtra*, hope is not expressed by the suffix. The suffix expresses the object of hope.]

106. When the meaning of *niṣpad* is the contact of water, plant and seed, this being only a part of the whole process, the future tense is prohibited.

[Another case of the use of a suffix to express a point of time other than its own is found in the sentence—*devaś ced vṛṣṭaḥ sampannāḥ śālayaḥ*—‘if it has rained, the grains are there.’ The grains have yet to grow but the past tense is used in the sense of the future. It is justified in many ways. Production of grain is nothing more than the contact of water, plant, and seed and that has taken place once the rain has fallen. The cause itself is looked upon as the effect and as the cause is already there, the past tense is used.]

107. When *niṣpad* has its real meaning of production of fruit, then it is attributed to the special properties (brought about by contact of water etc.) and the past tense is used (because these properties are already there.)

[If *niṣpad* is used in its full meaning, even then the past tense can be justified. The contact of water etc. produces some special properties in the causes, making them fit to produce the result. The result is attributed to, that is, superimposed on these special properties which being already there, the past tense is used.]

108. The function of the cause in the production

of the fruit is superimposed on the fruit. Therefore the latter is understood as having the former's time.

[Another way of justifying the past tense is this. Instead of the cause being looked upon as the effect, the cause and the effect are looked upon as one, just to bring out the great efficiency of the causes. So the time of the cause is used instead of that of the effect.]

109. Everyone has his own idea of the cause of production and the production of the fruit depends upon that of the cause.

[Every one has his own idea of what the cause is and everybody wants to emphasise what he considers to be the cause. Somebody thinks that the production of the grain depends only upon the contact between the seed and water. Another thinks that it depends upon sunshine etc. which take place later. Whatever it might be, it is past and, therefore, the fruit is also thought of as past. All this presupposes some kind of superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the cause on the effect.]

110. When it is meant to be conveyed that the production of the result does not depend upon any external cause, it is declared to be already produced, just to exclude the necessity of other causes.

[It is usual in the world, when the inner essential cause is present, to disregard the need for external cause and to talk of the effect which is yet to be as though it is already there. Thus according to the speaker's intention, all the three tenses are used.]

111. As the idea of the cause differs, the past tense is used in its primary meaning. So are the future and the present tenses, according as this or that aspect of the cause is considered.

The author now says something about *vā.5* on P. 3.3.133.

112. The Being of things is differentiated according to sense-contact. It is due to other factors that the same thing is spoken of differently.

118. The mere existence of a thing is cognised by the mind. Any difference due to the contact of the senses is not then meant to be conveyed.

114. Or, due to association with masculinity and femininity, nothing remains the same. Past and future are, therefore, different (from such variations).

[The above three stanzas relate to a point which has been raised in the following *vārttika*—*astyarthānāṃ bhavanṭy arthe sarva-vibhaktayaḥ kartur vidyamānatvāt*. (vā. 5 on P.3.3.133, *M.Bhā* II. p.160, 1.10)—“all the tense-suffixes should be taught in the sense of the present after roots expressive of existence, because the agent is present.” The indication of the cause in ‘because the agent is present’ is to show that by ‘existence’ what is meant is the existence of the object at the time of the use of the word and as understood from the word and not real existence outside. In the expressions, *kūpo* ’bhūt, *abhavat*, *babhūva*, *bhaviṣyati*, *bhavitā*, the well which is the agent is present at the time of their use. By “being present” the fact of figuring in the mind now is meant.

This extension by the *vārttika* of the use of all the tense-affixes has been rejected on the ground that the use of all of them would in any case be possible and so there is no need to teach its extension. Each suffix is, however, used to express its own time and not to express the present. A proof of it is that they have no alternatives. If all of them have been used to express the present, it should be possible to use them as alternatives. But that cannot be done. Nor does one come across any misuse of them. Nobody says *kūpo bhaviṣyati* instead of *kūpo* ’bhūt.

What is meant here is this: It has already been said that everything enters into usage on the basis of connected attribut-

es. The existence of the well becomes the basis of verbal usage only after it is perceived. Perception depends upon contact between the senses and the object. When contact between the sense of vision and the well is going to take place, then its existence is in the future. When it has already taken place, then it is past. When it is actually taking place, then it is present. In this way, the use of verbal suffixes, expressive of future, past and present are explained. When the contact between the sense and the object is distant, in the past, then special past tenses like *lañ* are used. When the contact is distant in the future, then the special future is used.

Objection. Just as the past and the future suffixes do not express the present, in the same way, the suffix of the present would not express the past and the future.

Answer. Differences like the past and the future, based on the presence or the absence of sense-contact may not be meant to be expressed and yet one may grasp mentally the existence of the well and one may say *kūpo 'sti* in a general way, by ignoring distinctions.

In any case, why bother about contingent variations of existence? There are the permanent and certain variations of it. Change consisting of increase and decrease are constantly taking place in everything. Increase is masculinity and decrease in femininity. Everything has these two processes always. So everything is always associated with this past, present and future. The past present and future, based on the presence and absence of sense contact, is different from this.]

SECTION 10:

ON PERSON

With Being as Process as expressed by a verb, Time, Person Aspect and Number are also conveyed. Therefore, after dealing with Time, something is going to be said about Person.

1. The fact of being co-inherent with the ego-sense or being different from that, are attributes of the agent or of the object. The first and second person suffixes are the special morphemes which give expression to them.

[One of the characteristics of action or process as expressed by a verb is that it is associated with certain notions. Time is one of them and it has been dealt with in the previous chapter. Person is another notion so associated. There are three persons, the First, Second and the Third or the Best, the Medium and the First, according to Sanskrit terminology. The First and the Second Person, as notions, are properties of the agent or the object. The First and the Second person suffixes are the special morphemes which give expression to these notions. The First person, as a notion, means the fact of the action co-existing with the ego-sense in the Self. It is a property of the agent or the object as expressed by the verbal suffix and it is understood from both kinds of suffixes : *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada*. From the words *pace* and *pacāmi*, we understand that the speaker is the person who cooks and this is due to the presence of the first person suffixes. Thus, the fact of the act of cooking being associated with the speaker himself is the notion of the first person and the suffix is the morpheme which expresses this notion. The notion of the second person is explained as *paratvam*, to distinguish it from the first person which is *pratyaktā*. *Paratvam* means the fact of being different from the speaker. It is also *caitanya*, conscious Self. The second person as a notion can also be a property of

the agent or the object as in *pacasi*, *pacyase*. The second person suffix is its special expression. *Pratyaktā*, the fact of being co-inherent with the ego-sense, and *parabhāva*, the fact of being different from that are both possible only in sentient beings, normally.]

But we sometimes find the first and second person suffixes even when the agent of the action is something insentient as in the sentence: O! Stones!, listen! (*śṛṇota grāvāṇaḥ*) How to explain this?

2. Whether sentiency be real or attributed, it is understood from these. The third person suffix cannot be expressive as far as the sentiency part is concerned.

[The answer is that sentiency as associated with the ego or with the other (*para*) may be real or attributed and the suffixes in question can express both. The fact is that we are not here considering whether any particular agent has sentiency or not. We are here concerned only with notions as presented by words. In *śṛṇota grāvāṇaḥ*, the words present stones as sentient. The Third person suffix cannot even express unreal or attributed sentiency. From the word *pacati*, we understand the agent of the action of cooking, but whether the agent is sentient or not cannot be understood from the Third person suffix 'ti'. Sometimes, the agent of an action which is put in the Third person is a sentient Being but that fact cannot be understood from the Third person suffix. That must be understood from some other word in the sentence. In *āsyate twayā*, the person who sits is a sentient Being but that cannot be understood from *āsyate*. It is understood from *twayā*.]

3. Even when roots having the meaning of knowledge as *budh*, *jñā* and *cit* are associated with the Third person suffix, the latter cannot express sentiency.

[In words like *jānāti*, we do understand that the agent is a conscious Being. That is again not because of the Third person suffix. The meaning of the root itself can only be the attribute

of a sentient Being. When the root itself does not mean something which is the property of a sentient Being, the Third person suffix can do nothing as in *kūlam patati*.]

4. According to some, wherever there is the second person suffix, the idea of the vocative is understood. The nominative case (*prathamā*) coming after *yusmad* has always the meaning of the vocative.

[It was said above that the Second person suffix expresses something sentient, different from that sentient thing which has the ego-sense. It does something more than that, according to some. It always draws the attention of the person spoken to, even when no command is expressed. This is the effect of the nominative case coming after *yusmad* when the verb is in the Second person as in *tvam pacasi*.]

5. Attention is never drawn in this world with the predicative portion of a sentence as in *svāhā indraśatrur vardhasva* 'Hail! as Indraśatru prosper !' or in *rājā bhava* = Become King!

[Wherever, however, the word ending in the nominative case is part of the predicative portion of a sentence, it cannot express the idea of the vocative as in *svāhā indraśatrur vardhasva* and *rājā bhava*. Here *indraśatruḥ* and *rājā*, though ending in the nominative case, belong to the predicative portion of the sentence. Therefore, they cannot express the vocative idea. Drawing the attention of something which is already there is the vocative idea. The predicative portion of a sentence, on the other hand, is something which is not known to the hearer and, therefore, not taken for granted by him. Therefore, in these two sentences, though there is command, there is no *sambodhana*, the vocative idea.]

6. If the word *yusmad*, ending in the nominative case, does not come after another word then its meaning being something settled, it becomes vocative and its first syllable invariably gets *udātta* accent.

7. Meaning being eternal, there is no harm in changing the relation of what is important and what is secondary or the personal suffixes of what is presented in the *śāstra*.

[Thus the meanings of the suffixes expressive of Person are fixed. But this must not lead to any misunderstanding. In teaching the suffix *thak* after words expressive of means of gambling, Pāṇini uses the Third Person suffix: *tena dīvyati* (P.4.4.2). This does not mean that the word so formed can be associated only with the third person. We can also say: *āksiko'smi* = 'I play with dice' just as we can say *āksiko'sti* = 'he plays with dice.' The fact is that the different meanings in which Pāṇini teaches the different suffixes are not the eternal meanings which, according to the *śāstra*, are the real meanings of words, but the abstracted meanings (*apoddhārthaḥ*). These abstracted meanings have to be presented in some garb or other in the *śāstra*. That is what Pāṇini has done but it must not be taken seriously. They are valid not only for the particular garb presented but for all garbs. Words and meanings are eternal and the *śāstra* has to teach both. It must take something as the basis of teaching. It takes a meaning which is nearest to the real meaning as the basis of exposition.]

8. If the *śāstra* were to create words, meaning would be as given in the *śāstra*. But in it, there is only exposition on the basis of something general.

9. Just as the settled things the horse and the seat, in the sentences 'the one who sits on a horse' and 'the one who sits on a seat' are only meant to be indications, so is the case with the abstracted meanings used for teaching.

[But that must not be taken too seriously. It is something like this: Somebody asks "who among these is Devadatta?" He is told: 'the one who is sitting on a horse' or 'the one who is sitting on a seat.' The fact of sitting on a horse or on a chair is only used here as a means of pointing out who Devadatta is. That must not be taken as part of Devadatta.]

SECTION 11

ON NUMBER

Now number is going to be considered.

1. Anything which is a thing (*sattva*) is said to have number. In the world, distinctions such as unity and diversity are based on number.

[Things are characterised by difference and number expresses this difference. The number one expresses their unity or identity and the other numbers express their diversity. According to the *sāṃsargavādins* (the *Vaiśeṣikas*), things are said to be distinct if there is separation between them and they are said to be one, two and so on, on the basis of number. Even in complex formations, the meaning of the secondary word, being a thing is cognised as something having number, as distinct from the meaning of an indeclinable which has no number. That number is called *abhedaiikatvasaṃkhyā* = 'the number one in general,' which will be explained later in the section devoted to *vṛtti* (complex formation)].

2. Let it be a property different from the things where it resides or let it be part of their essence. Number (*saṃkhyā*) is so called because it is the cause of the presentation of difference.

[According to the *Vaiśeṣikas*, number is a quality residing in substance. Some people argue that when a thing is by itself it is one and when it is with others, we talk about them as two, three and so on. It is a question of whether a thing is in company or not. Number is nothing different from things themselves. This is not right. Our cognitions differ in the two cases. It is not the same thing to perceive a thing as being in company or to perceive it as one of two or more objects. Numbers like hundred

etc. exist in several things together. They are *vyāsajyati* (inhering in more than one) and they are perceived by *apekṣābuddhi*. So argue the *Vaiśeṣikas*. Others maintain that number is not different from where it is found. They say that number can never be perceived apart from the things where it is found. Things are perceived as qualified by number and this can never be if number were absolutely different from its abode. But grammarians are not concerned with what things really are. They are concerned with the notions which help in the explanation of the forms of words. The question now is : what is the nature of the meaning which numerals present ? From these numerals, we understand some property which helps us to distinguish things. Things can never be talked about except through their properties. Number is one such property. It helps us to speak about things (*samcaṣṭe*). Hence it is called *saṃkhyā*.]

If it is something which exists in a substance, how is it that we sometimes speak about qualities etc. through it ?

3. It inheres in that which is to be differentiated. Sometimes, it is found elsewhere and brings about differences in things as well as in itself.

[It really belongs to substance, but language sometimes presents it as existing in other things such as qualities, universals and non-existence. That is why we can speak about hundreds, twenty-four qualities, two universals and four non-existences. But number is only attributed to these things. It really belongs to substances. Language deals not only with real things but also with attributed things. As far as language is concerned, numerals present distinctions in qualities etc. and that is all that we are concerned with.]

4. Just as the same words (*para*) and (*apara*) are used in regard to distinctions of priority and posteriority (in qualities etc.) in the same way, number which is the cause of distinction with qualities also.

How numbers, while inhering in substances, help to differentiate qualities etc. is explained by means of an analogy.

[It is with number as with the notions of prior and posterior. Through association with *dik*, things are talked of as 'prior' or 'posterior' or as 'far' or 'near', Priority and posteriority are thus two qualities in connection with qualities also. But that is a secondary usage. Similarly, distinctions of number in qualities, universals etc. are secondary distinctions.]

5. Just as independence which is a property of substance is attributed to quality which is not independent, in the same way the property of being differentiated which belongs to substance is attributed to quality which is not so.

[Elsewhere also one sees that the properties of the substance are attributed to the qualities which reside in them. When we say *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*='white cloth' language presents cloth as the main thing and white as a quality residing in it. This also corresponds to fact. But when we say *paṭasya śuklaḥ*='the white of the cloth', language does not present white as a subordinate thing. It presents it as an independent thing. But independence is really a property of substances and not of qualities. Similarly, when we say *paṭasya rūpam ekam, dve, bahūni* etc. we are differentiating in language a quality by a number. To be differentiated by number is really a property of substance.]

6. Following the *āgama*, the ordinary man, by separating quality by a process of abstraction, presents it as having a property different from its own for instructing others.

[In this, the ordinary man is following in the footsteps of the expert *Vaiśeṣika* who was the first to attribute the properties of a substance to a quality by the process of abstraction.]

7. The word which conveys as being independent of all things whose nature is determined by extraneous things is removed from its own function.

[Words express things only in terms of some property which

exists in them and not distinctly. This is as true of substances as of qualities. Things do not enter into the field of communication in their own nature. When colour is presented as something independent as in *paṭasya śuklaḥ*, it is presented as being served by number etc. which exist in it, just as substance would be. In other words, a word is not directly expressive of anything. It is expressive of it only in terms of some property which exists in it. When a thing is called 'cow', the word describes it in terms of the universal *gotva* which exists in it. Everywhere the word refers to what is pointed out by something extraneous. In the case of all words, there is a little falling off from its own capacity to express an object directly.]

8. Just as there is no cognition without an object in the same way, there is no object which is unconnected (with its attributes.)

[It is like cognition which can be described only with reference to the object which figures in it. To talk about something as separate when it is always found united to something else is a practice common to the ordinary man and the expert.]

9. When, following tradition, the ordinary man speaks about something as separate when it is really not so, it is a usage similar to what is found in the *śāstra*.

[Universality and particularity are always found in other things. They are never found in isolation and yet the *śāstra* sometimes talks about them as though they were independent.]

10. Nor is it extraordinary to attribute properties to what has been abstracted by the mind. The existence or non-existence of the property attributed is really immaterial.

[Once that is done, other characteristics of independence naturally follow. Whether these characteristics really exist or not is immaterial.]

11. That is how universal in universal, particular in a particular, number in a number and gender in gender are admissible.

[There is nothing impossible in thinking of another universal in the different universals brought to the mind by perception or by words. The different universals brought to the mind become things (*dravya*) as it were. This applies also to the different particularities. We can think of a common feature in all of them, because they also produce within us a uniformity of cognition and make up apply the same word to all of them. Number can also be thought of as a thing, in which case, it can also have a number. That is why we can say *śaṭam*, *śaṭe*, *śaṭāni*. Gender can also be thought of as a thing when it is conveyed by a word and it can then take another gender. That is why we can say *pauṃsnam*, *pumān*, *pumstā*.]

12. That is why those who believe that everything inheres in a substance (*saṃsargavādināḥ*) declare that number inheres in substance and that it brings about identity and difference in things which are beyond both.

[As it is due to the number inhering in a substance that one can speak about numeral distinction in qualities also, the followers of Kaṇāda believe that all attributes and properties inhere in substances. That is why they are called *saṃsargavādināḥ*. Number helps to introduce distinction in things which are beyond all distinction and identity.]

13. When, through inherence, something appears to have the form of another, it is only an identification through circumstance.

[How is this possible? It is like substance appearing in the form of quality through the relation called inherence, even though it is really different from it. Things are really mixed up in actual life. But each one is perceived by its own *pramāṇa* and

each has its own function to perform. Therefore, there is confusion.]

14. Just as purposeful activity of the elements or of the three *guṇas* which are always found mixed up, is quite distinct in each case, so is it cognised in the case of all objects.

[The elements are all found together but each has its own function. The three *guṇas* are all mixed up but each has its own function. In the same way, the objects are all mixed up, but each has its own function.]

Now something is going to be said about the nature of number.

15. Unity is the source of duality etc. because all distinctions are preceded by it. Without it, there is no possibility of the other numbers coming into existence.

[The author now raises the question whether duality etc. are the source or different from unity or one-ness. The doctrine is that one-ness or unity is the source of duality etc. All distinctions are preceded by one-ness. Without it, the other numbers cannot come into existence.]

16. The two unities, together with *apekṣābuddhi*, are the source of duality or the two unities (without it) are the cause of it.

[This stanza gives two views about the origin of the numbers from two onwards. The first view, that of the *Vaiśeṣikas*, is as follows. When two things are seen, we see a unity in each of them. We also cognise the common feature of these two unities by means of *saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya*, that is, the eye is in contact (*saṃyukta*) with the two things, unity inheres in each of them (*samaveta*) and the common feature inheres (*samavāya*) in each of the two entities. The two unities are thus cognised as qualified

by their common feature. Thus two unities, depending upon this cognition, produce the duality which inheres in the two things which are their substratum. The two things are the intimate material cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) of the duality. The two unities are its non-intimate cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) because unless the two unities are cognised, the cognition of duality cannot take place. Therefore, through agreement and difference, the related cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*) must also be looked upon as a cause. It cannot be the intimate cause because only substance can be so. As there is no proximity or contact, it cannot be the non-intimate cause either. So it must be looked upon as the efficient cause. According to the *Vaiśeṣikas*, the process is as follows: First of all, duality in general is cognised, that is, it is cognised as an attribute of the two things and lastly, the two things are cognised as qualified by it. According to them, unless the qualifier is cognised, one cannot cognise anything as qualified. Some think that there is no need to bring in this related knowledge in the middle. They argue that the function of the two unities is to cause the cognition of duality. So, without depending upon the related knowledge, they produce duality. Helārāja here points out that he has spoken about this matter in his commentary on the first *Kāṇḍa*. That is not now available. It is possible that he has done so in his commentary on *Kārikā* No. 87. of that *Kāṇḍā*.]

17. (Another view is) that duality is a collection of two unities related to each other. But if duality is nothing more than two unities, there should be dual number whenever duality is spoken of.

[Others again believe that duality is really not something different from the unities. The forest is really not different from the trees. Two is only a name for the collection of two units. Three is a name of a collection of three units. But if duality is not a separate entity, but stands for two unities, one cannot account for the dual number in *dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane* (P. 1.4.22) because there are altogether three units here and the plural is called for. Therefore, duality must be looked upon as a new unit produced by the two unities. This applies to trinity etc. up to ten. But, if duality is a new unit, a unit, being one,

why even use the dual or the plural in connection with duality and the higher units? This is answered in the next stanza.]

18. Even though a collection is one, difference is brought about by its constituent parts. It is due to differences in the *āśraya* (constituents) that there is a difference in the *āśrayi* (the new unit which is created).

[The answer is that even though a new unit is formed, the unities which created the new unit are kept in mind and the dual and the plural are used on account of them.]

But numerals up to ten express number only, *Vimśati*, on the other hand, expresses not only number but also what is numbered. The author now says something about such words.

19. In *Vimśati* etc. the number is a collection of numbers measuring the things to be measured and it differentiates another collection of things.

[They are also derived from the unities with the help of *apekṣābuddhi*. But they denote number as well as the thing numbered. We can say *gavām vimśatiḥ* where *vimśati* = 'twenty' stands for number only or *vimśatir gāvaḥ* where twenty stands for the cattle which are numbered. If, in the word *vimśati*, the suffix is deemed to have been added in the sense of *svārtha*, there would be two disadvantages: (1) it would not be possible to form the compound *vimśatigavām*, because *vimśati* would have the meaning of the *prakṛti*, that is, pure number, two tens, (2) the word *vimśati* cannot have the singular number because the meaning of the *prakṛti* is two things. The second defect is removed if the suffix is considered to have been added in the sense of the *pariṇāmin* but not the first defect. Secondly, we cannot have the expression *vimśako gosamghaḥ* unless a special rule is made saying that *dvau* is added in *svārtha*, because *vimśati* already stands for *saṃgha*. Thirdly, the sixth case affix as in *gavām vimśatiḥ*, would have to be taught because *vimśati* really means so many cattle

and not their collection. And yet the expression is quite correct. Thus derivation becomes difficult in the case of the word *viṃśatiḥ*. Nor would it do to say that the word has no derivation. It has one. According to the *Mahābhāṣya*, the suffix in *viṃśati* is added in the sense of *saṃgha* or *samudāya*. This does not make it necessary to say that *ḍvun* is added in the sense of *svārtha* because the suffix *stip* is taught in the sense of a collection of numbers, while *ḍvun* would mean a collection of cattle. *Viṃśako gosamghaḥ* would mean a collection of cattle of the size of a collection of two decades. There is really no difference here between a collection of cattle and a collection of decades. Words present them as though they were different. That is a characteristic of words. Thus in *viṃśatiḥ*, the suffix is added in the sense of collection and the word stands for number or *dharma* and it can be used in a double manner.]

20. In *ekaviṃśati* which is a single number, there is only an artificial separation of two parts looking like two other numbers, because there is no cognition of parts.

[Words like *ekaviṃśati* are in a similar position. The word is not a compound of two words, each expressive of number. It has really no parts. It is an indivisible word, expressive of number and it is a *dvandva compound*. If it is looked upon as number made up of two other numbers, there would be certain disadvantages. There are certain grammatical operations to be performed on a numeral and they cannot be performed on a word which is only a compound of two numerals.]

21. Grammatical operations to be performed on a numeral are taught because the word is not a mere collection of numerals. If it were only that, they could not be performed, just as grammatical operations to be performed on a word expressive of *svāṅga* etc. cannot be performed on words which are merely collections of words expressive of *svāṅga*.

[These grammatical operations are taught in P. 5. 2. 46 ; 5. 2. 56 ; 5. 4. 17 ; 5. 2. 47 ; 5. 1. 22 ; 2. 2. 25 and so on. Just as a collection of *svāṅga* is not *svāṅga* nor a collection of *janapada* a *janapada* in the same way, a collection of numerals is not a numeral.]

22. A numeral which enters into relation with another which is subordinate to the thing to be numbered has, as its *saṃkhyeya* either the repetition of the latter numeral or what the latter numeral stands for.

[Here a question arises : There is such thing as a compound word made up of numerals. Here the parts are numerals and the whole is a numeral, What is the difference between such words as *dvi-daśāḥ* and *ekaviṃśatiḥ*? Words like *dvi-daśāḥ* are peculiar because, in them, the first numeral qualifies not another numeral but its repetition and the things measured by that numeral. Thus, it is not composed of two numerals at all. The numeral *daśa* does not deserve to be compounded with *dvi* because it is dependent upon what it stands for. *Dvi-daśāḥ* is not a compound of *dvau* and *daśa*, but of *dviḥ* and *daśa*. The thing to be numbered in this case is *Kriyābhyāvr̥tti* repetition of an act and not a numeral nor the things numbered.]

23. The analysis *dvau daśa* is not possible because neither the number nor the numbered can be two. Number cannot be two because there is only one ten and the numbered cannot be two because there are ten of them.

24. Therefore, it is decades which are counted here by the compound *dvi-daśāḥ*. Or it is the repetition of the decade which is counted here.

The author now says why the suffix '*taṃ*' is not added to the word *bahu*.

25. There is no number which is expressed by the word *saṃkhyā*, just as the word *rūpa* does not denote

any particular colour. It is the common name for the different colours like white etc.

26. Number (*saṃkhyā*) is so called because it stands for the universal in the different numbers. *Rūpa* is so called because it stands for the universal found in the different colours.

[One cannot say *bahutayī saṃkhyā* by adding the suffix *tayap* to the word *bahu*. The suffix is taught in P. 5. 2. 42 in the sense of the whole having as many parts as are denoted by the numeral to which it is added. Thus *pañcatayam* means a whole having five parts. The word *bahutayī* cannot be formed because the word *saṃkhyā* does not denote a whole having many parts. It is only a name. It is not a numeral, it does not denote any particular number. It only expresses the general idea of number. It is like the word *rūpa* which does not denote any particular colour but stands for the general idea of colour.]

Another point relating to number is now going to be stated.

27. In *ekam* the number which is the meaning of the stem is not expressed by the case-ending. The case-ending expresses the one-ness of the object which has the number expressed by the stem.

[Even when *Karma* and other *Kāraṅkas* are the meanings of the case-endings, their number must also be taken as the occasion to use a particular case-ending. The meaning of the word *Karmaṇi* in P. 2. 3. 2 is : 'In the sense of the number which inheres in the *Karma*' or in the sense of the *Karma* qualified by a particular number. Thus the case-endings are added in the sense of the numbers inhering in *Karma* etc. not already expressed. How can the case-ending be added to express something already expressed ? The answer is that when the case-ending is added to a numeral, it does not express the number which is the meaning of the stem itself at it has already been expressed by the stem. The case-ending expresses another number, namely. that of the thing which is qualified by the number of the stem.]

The above explanation assumes that from the stem one number is understood and another from the case-ending. But does one really understand two numbers from the same word ?

28. One does see accumulation of one and a collection (or identity) of two. Therefore, there is another number, apart from the cause of application (that is, the meaning) of the stem which particularises it.

[This question is answered as follows :—Accumulation and identity do take place. It is by accumulation that numbers from two onwards are produced. It is because accumulation and identity can take place that there is, in addition to the number denoted by the stem in *ekam*, another number expressed by the case-ending. The latter particularises what is conveyed generally by the stem. From the stem *eka*, 'one-ness' in general common to what is *pracita* and *apacita* is understood. In *ekaśca ekasca*, once the meaning of the single word is understood, accumulation is understood through the force of *ca*.]

29. The one-ness though the same is not understood by the word (the stem) when the suffix is not heard. With the suffix, it is expressed.

[The expression of a meaning by the word is something natural. The stem expresses its meaning together with the suffix which comes after it. This fact of expressing the meaning together exists everywhere. In a compound word, the suffix is elided but the elision is expressive of the meaning of what is elided. Words develop a peculiar power when they are combined in compounds. Even after the elision of something, the meaning continues to be expressed by what remains. Even after the elision of the vocative affix, what remains expresses the meaning of the vocative.]

30. If a case-ending expressive of some other number could come after, then the positive and

negative arguments could be applied. That being not possible, the meaning of the stem is not clearly defined.

[In expressions like *vykṣaḥ*, *vykṣau*, *vykṣāḥ*, both the stem and the case-ending can be found without each other and so the positive and negative reasoning can be applied to determine the meaning of each according to the principle laid down in Vāk. III sã. 43. Here that is not possible because only the singular suffix comes after *eka*, only the dual after *dvi* and only the plural after *bahu*. Therefore, the meaning of the stem cannot be clearly determined. So it cannot qualify or particularise the object having number (*saṃkhyeya*). So the number that is understood comes from the stem and the case-ending taken together and that qualifies the object having number. In a compound word like *rājapuruṣa*, the meaning of the secondary term is understood, from the same stem, as mixed up with that of the main term and as, in that way, the meaning of the case-ending coming after the secondary term is also understood, the case-ending is elided. Thus, in the earlier explanation, it was said that the meaning of the case-ending confirms that of the stem. In the present explanation, on the other hand, it is stated that the number which is understood is that of the stem and the case-ending taken together and qualifies or particularises the object numbered.]

Another explanation is now given.

31. In *ekaḥ*, the one-ness denoted by the stem is the qualifier of the pure substance. The meaning of the stem with its qualifier is specified by the meaning of the suffix.

[The stem in *ekaḥ* denotes the one-ness which has become the qualifier of the pure substance already understood mentally. The word *ekaḥ* denotes substance qualified by the number one and not mere number also like the word *viṃśatiḥ*. That is why the *M. Bhā.* speaks about *ubhayaavacana* (I, p. 441, l. 10.) = expressive of both, the qualifier and what is qualified. It does not,

like the word *śukla*, denote quality only. The qualified substance denoted by the stem is further qualified, that is, specified by the number one denoted by the suffix. It tells us that it is qualified by the number one and not by anything else. Others explain the compound '*śuddhadraavyaviśeṣaṇam* as a *samāhāra-dvandva*, so that it means that the stem denotes both the *śuddha*, the pure number and the *draavyaviśeṣaṇa*, the number that qualifies the substance.]

32. Because of the use of *dvyekayoḥ* (in P. 1. 4. 22.) words like *eka* can denote pure number also. It is on the basis of worldly usage (*prasiddhyā*) that they are said to denote what is counted.

Remark. In this *Kārikā* the word *prasiddhā* in my edition should be changed into *prasiddhyā*, as I have done in the translation.

[As the stem with the case-ending denotes what is numbered and as the pure stem cannot be used, how can one say that words like *eka* denote pure number? It is like this: In P. 1.4.22. the dual number *dvyekayoḥ* is used. It is all right because duality and unity, abstracted from the substance, are meant here. Otherwise, what are counted, the substances, would be more important and as two and one make three, the plural number would have to be used. Worldly usage tells us that up to ten, numerals denote primarily what is counted (*saṃkheya*), not pure number. In the world, it is the word ending in the case-affix which is used and such a word denotes number as secondary to the meaning of the stem. It denotes primarily what is counted. The *śāstra* speaks about a numeral denoting pure number but that is only by a process of abstraction (*apoddhārabuddhyā*).]

SECTION 12

ON ASPECT (UPGRAHA)

In order to consider 'Aspect', one of the meanings of a verb, its nature is going to be expounded.

1. That difference in meaning which is understood from the *ātmanepada* substitute of *la* (verbal suffix) or the other substitute (*parasmaipada*) is called Aspect (*upagraha*).

[The term *upagraha* has come down from earlier grammarians. It stands for a certain peculiarity in the action or the means such as the fact of being meant for the agent or otherwise and is expressed by the *ātmanepada* or *parasmaipada* suffixes.]

The same idea is now further clarified.

2. Sometimes, it is nothing more than the 'means' itself and sometimes it is a qualification of it. By 'means' the object (*karma*) etc. are meant and articulate utterers are the qualification.

[In expressions like *pacyate*, *gamyate*, it is the 'means' called *karma* expressed by the *ātmanepada* suffix which is the *upagraha*. By 'etc.', agent and action (*bhāva*) are meant. The agent can be expressed by both the substitutes of *la*, the *ātmanepada* and the *parasmaipada* suffixes. Action (*bhāva*), on the other hand, can be conveyed only by the *ātmanepada*, as in *āsyate* and *śasyate*. In these two examples, the *bhāva* or action conveyed by the suffix is looked upon as a means because it is external (*bhāva*) being conveyed by the suffix and it makes clear that the internal action conveyed by the root remains within itself as it is not connected with another means conveyed by the same word. When the

speakers are articulate, it qualifies their utterance which is the meaning of the root, as in *sampravādante brāhmaṇāḥ*, but ultimately, it qualifies the utterer also.]

3. The substitutes of *la* express a difference in action on the basis of difference in aim such as livelihood etc. This difference in action is sometimes expressed by some special word in the sentence.

[The action expressed by a root is sometimes differentiated on the basis of the aim (*viśaya*) in doing it and this difference is expressed by different substitutes of *la* such as *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada*. When the action is done by someone as a means of livelihood, it is the *parasmaipada* which expresses it, as in *pacanti, yajanti*. Here the main fruit of the action does not go to agents, their only reward being their wages or fees. That the *Yajamāna* does something in order to attain the main fruit is understood from the *ātmanepada* as in *yajate*. Sometimes this idea is understood from some special word in the sentence like *sva*. The *ātmanepada* then becomes optional according to P. 1.3.77. One can say *svaṃ yajñam yajate* or *svaṃ yajñam yajati*.]

4. A special action denoted by the root or a peculiarity in the action denoted by it is sometimes called *upagraha*. *Gandhana* (hinting, indication) etc. are special actions whereas reciprocity is a peculiarity.

[Hinting, indication etc. mentioned in P. 1.3.32 are really special actions expressed by the root but can be understood only when the *ātmanepada* is added to it and hence they are called *upagraha*. For example, *utkurute* 'he gives a hint.' Reciprocity is a peculiarity in the action and that is also called *upagraha* when expressed by the *ātmanepada* as in *vyatīpacante* = 'they cook for each other'.]

5. In the performance of the action, some have made a distinction between one's own purpose and another's purpose. Whether it is real or not it depends upon the speaker's intention.

[To act for one's own benefit is normal for man. When one acts for somebody else's benefit, the root takes *parasmaipada* and not *ātmanepada*. The main fruit may go to somebody else and the secondary fruit such as wages may come to the agent. When it is intended to be conveyed that the main fruit goes to the agent, then *ātmanepada* is added to the root as in *yajate* when it is meant to be conveyed that the agent acts in order that the main fruit may go to one who prompts him to act, then it is the *parasmaipada* which is added to the root.]

6. According to some, when the result of the action comes to the agent, *ātmanepada* would alternate with *ñic* (the causative suffix). According to others, it would not any more than the base of *ñic* would alternate with *ñic*.

[Some hold the view that the meaning of the causative suffix is that of somebody prompting another to act which involves making arrangements (*saṃvidhāna*) for him to act. Making arrangements for an action to be done is also the meaning of the *ātmanepada*. In this way, *ñic* and *ātmanepada* become alternative ways of expressing the same idea. One can say *yajate* and *yājayati*, *pacate* or *pācayati*. Really speaking they only look like alternatives. There is a difference between the two. The idea of making arrangements is understood from the *ātmanepada* as well as the idea that the fruit of the action goes to the agent. But the idea of somebody prompting another to act is not understood from it. What is directly understood from the word (*śābdi pratītiḥ*) differs in the two cases. *Yajate* means that somebody, desirous of the main fruit and being independent, causes the sacrifice to be performed. He makes arrangements for it. That he prompts another to do something is not understood from it. From *Yājayati*, on the other hand, one understands directly that one prompts another to do something. Indirectly, the idea of making arrangements is also understood. Unless one emphasises what is directly understood from words, there would be no difference between the two. As there is a difference they are not alternate ways of saying the same thing.]

7. There are expressions used by men who know such as *Krīṇīṣva*, *vapate*, *dhatte*, *cinoti*, *cinute*. In these, the meaning of *ṇic* is understood (that is, inferred.)

[How the illusion arises that the *ātmanepada* and the causative are alternate ways of saying the same thing is now explained. Kadrū tells Vinatā who has been enslaved: *ātmānam krīṇīṣva*=‘buy yourself’. Vinatā, not being able to do so by herself, tells her sons: *Krīṇīta mām*: ‘purchase me’. Here Kadrū prompts Vinatā to do something. So there is prompting (*praiṣa*) and yet the *ātmanepada* is used in *Krīṇīṣva*. So the illusion arises that *ṇic* and *ātmanepada* have the same scope. But it is only an illusion because the idea that Vinatā has to make her sons purchase her freedom (*Krāpaya*) is understood not from the word used but from the context. Similarly, the expression *Keśaśmaśru Vapate*=‘he shaves his head and beard’ is a cause of illusion because ‘he shaves’ means that he prompts the barber to shave. So there is prompting and yet the *ātmanepada* is used. But here also, really speaking, the *ātmanepada* comes because the result of the shaving goes to the person shaved, namely, the agent of the verb *vapate*. It is from the context or from the nature of things that one understands that one gets the barber to do the shaving. So the scope of the two is not the same.]

8. Sometimes, from the root *pac*, we understand the idea of making arrangements, just as one understands other acts like putting the pot on the fire etc. from it.

[It has been said that the meaning of the root *pac* is the softening of the material to be cooked. How then can the *ātmanepada*, the meaning of which is to make arrangements, come after the root *pac*? The *M. Bhā.* has said that the function of one who makes arrangements can be expressed by the root as in *pacate devadattaḥ*=Devadatta makes arrangements for the cooking. *Pacati devadattaḥ*, on the other hand, means that Devadatta performs various acts like lighting the fire, placing the pot on it and so on in connection with cooking. When the activity of the prompter is meant to be expressed, one has to use the causative

suffix *ṇic* and say *pācayati devadattaḥ* = 'Devadatta prompts somebody to cook'. Making arrangements may involve prompting, but the verb does not directly express it, unless *ṇic* is used.]

9. The mention in the *sūtra* (P. 1.3.72.) of the fruit coming to the agent implies a difference in the action, because it is only when the action is accompanied by the making of arrangements by the agent that the latter enjoys the fruit.

[In P.1.3.72 the *ātmanepada* is taught after a root the meaning of which involves the idea of the agent making arrangements for the performance of the action. It is only when he makes such arrangements that he enjoys the fruit of the action.]

10. Just as the sight of stars stands for a particular point of time, in the same way, by the mention of the fruit of the action, a difference in action is implied.

[In the sentence *nakṣatram dr̥ṣṭvā vācam visrjet* = 'one should speak after seeing the stars', the seeing of stars stands for a point of time, namely, when the evening is over. Sometimes, on account of the sky being covered with cloud, the stars cannot be seen. But the point of time can be ascertained in some other way and then one can speak. In the same way, the *ātmanepada* comes when the agent makes arrangements apart from the enjoyment of the fruit.]

11. Some roots have not got the capacity to convey a meaning which is susceptible of arrangements being made for it. Others have been marked with the *svarita* accent or *ñ* indicators.

[P. 1.3.72 has been declared unnecessary in the *M. Bhā.* Why then does the *ātmanepada* suffix not come after other roots also like *yā*? The reason is that the meaning of words is fixed. Those roots the meanings of which are capable of arrangements

being made for them are marked with the *svarita* accent or with *ñ* in the *Dhātupāṭha*.

12. Indicatory letters (*anubandhas*) are indicative of facts and they have been added only to aid memory. Even roots which have the same meaning have not the same properties.

[If that is the case, why has P. 1.3.72 been declared to be unnecessary? The position is this. Even though all roots are, generally speaking, expressive of action, still there is difference between them, because such is the nature of words. Two roots may be looked upon as synonyms and yet the meaning of one may be susceptible of *saṃvidhāna* while the meaning of the other may not be so. For example, *yā* and *ñīñ* have both been declared to mean *prāpaṇa* in the *Dhātupāṭha*. But there is a difference between the two. *Yā* means 'reaching' whereas *ñīñ* means 'causing to reach' and so the latter is susceptible to *saṃvidhāna* which fact is indicated by the letter *ñ*, attached to it. The addition of indicatory letters is only for those who cannot understand everything from usage. For those who can do so (*prayogadarśin*) no indicatory letter is needed and for them, P. 1. 3.72 has been declared to be unnecessary.]

13. Even though *dṛś* and *īkṣi* have the same meaning, they are not the same when preceded by *prati*. Those roots which are associated with the meaning of *ñic* are not equal in meaning to *pac* etc. expressive of *saṃvidhāna*.

[Even though the meanings of the roots *dṛśi* and *īkṣi*, as given in the *Dhātupāṭha* are the same, when the preposition *prati* is prefixed to them, they do not mean the same thing. *Pratipaśyati* means 'he sees' whereas *pratikṣate* means 'he waits'. Similarly, *pratirakṣati* and *pratipālayati* do not mean the same thing even though *rakṣati* and *pālayati* are synonyms. That the meaning of all roots can be combined with that of *ñic* does not mean that they are all susceptible of *saṃvidhāna*.]

14. The root which takes on the meaning of *umbh* has the capacity of being associated with the meaning of *ñic*. Therefore, the powers of words are fixed.

[It is not that roots which have not *svārīta* or *ñ* as indicatory elements cannot be associated with *saṃvidhāna*. Even when so associated, they are not capable of expressing it. In *udumbhāṃcakāra*, the root *kṛ* has been added to the root *umbh* ending in *ām* in order that the root may become expressive. The root *kṛ* expresses the meaning of *umbh*. When it thus expresses a particular action, it conveys the idea of *saṃvidhāna* or making arrangements, implied in the meaning of the causative. That is why it has been taught with the indicatory letter *ñ*. Powers of words are fixed. Even though *umbh* and *kṛñ* have here the same meaning, the former cannot express *saṃvidhāna* while the latter can, *Umbh* is also associated with the idea of *saṃvidhāna* but that is brought out only when the root *kṛñ* is joined to it.]

15. And when the *ātmanepada* is due to come after *kṛñ* when it is to be used after *umbh*, the word *pūrvavat* (from the *sūtra* “*pūrvavat sanah*” (P. 1.3.62) with its *svārīta* accent is used (to prevent it).

[How does one know that the meaning of the root *kṛñ* here includes *saṃvidhāna*, considering that the *ātmanepada* suffix is not visible here. P. 1.3.63 tells us that the root *kṛñ*, used after another root, takes *ātmanepada* even if the fruit of the action does not go to the agent, provided that the other root is otherwise eligible for it. When the fruit goes to the agent, the root takes *ātmanepada* according to P. 1.3.72.]

16. Even though action is one it is diversified by the number of the substratum of the means when it is expressed by a verb but not by the gender of the means.

[The author now shows by an example that, even when a root expresses a meaning capable of being qualified by that of the suffix *ñic*, it is not necessarily susceptible to *saṃvidhāna*. The

verb expresses action which is a process and that is one and is not diversified by number. But it can be diversified by the number of the means such as the agent and the object, also expressed by the same verb. In *pacanti* and *pacyante*, the action of cooking is diversified by the plural number of the agent and the object respectively. One understands that the cooking is done by many or that many things are cooked. While it is diversified by the number of the means, it is not diversified by their gender. Such is the nature of the capacity of words to convey their meaning. One cannot argue about it. The verb expresses action as qualified by the number of the substrata of the means which is a power and not by the number of the power only. That is why the word *āśraya* (substratum) has been used after *sādhana*.]

17. Therefore, even when a meaning is there, the power of a word to express it is obstructed. This (restriction) is explained in the *śāstra* (this is P. 1.3.72.).

[As expression of meaning by words is dependent upon variation in the power of words, roots like *yā* are not capable in fact of conveying the means of *saṃvidhāna*, or making arrangements, though theoretically, they can do so. This idea is implied in P. 1.3.72.]

18. That fruit for the accomplishment of which actions like cooking are begun is their main fruit and not profit etc.

[The author here explains the distinction between the main fruit and the incidental fruit of an action mentioned in the *M. Bhā* on P. 1.3.72. When the fruit of the action goes to the agent, it implies making of arrangements on his part. That is why the *ātmanepada* suffix is added to a root expressive of the idea of making arrangements. That fruit to attain which arrangements are made and the material collected is the main fruit, as for example, heaven, in the case of the performance of a sacrificial rite. The honorarium or the wages that may be paid to agents employed by the one who makes the arrangements is only

a secondary fruit. The one who makes arrangements may himself not do much but he gives many directions and as he has the main fruit in mind, it is he who sets the action in motion.]

19. Where master and servant do a work jointly, their function being different, the root would not be able to express them.

[According to the view that the *ātmanepada* comes after a root expressive of *saṃvidhāna*, what would happen when the root is to express the actions of both the master who makes the arrangements and the servant who actually does the work? This doubt has been raised in the *M. Bhā.* The master and the servant may jointly do an action but the function of each would be different and a root would be incapable of expressing both of them at the same time. The master makes the arrangements, that is, he collects the materials and the servant does the actual work. The master's function requires that the *ātmanepada* suffix should come after the root whereas the servant's function requires that the *parasmaipada* suffix should be added to it. But both cannot be added at the same time.]

20. When the root *pac*='to cook' stands for making arrangements, it would take the *ātmanepada* and when it stands for bringing about an improvement (*saṃskāra*) in the thing to be cooked, it would take the *parasmaipada*.

[A root may be able to express two different ideas but the verb formed from it cannot take the suffixes expressive of both of them at the same time.]

21. On account of the presence of the master, his property is attributed to the servant also. Just as, due to proximity, *plakṣatā*=the tact of being a *plakṣa* tree is attributed to the *nyagrodha* tree.

[The question is whether to use the *ātmanepada* or the *parasmaipada* after the root '*pac*'='to cook' when both the agents,

master and servant, are expressed by the same noun in the form of the *dvandva* compound : *svāmidāsau*. According to grammatical tradition, the *dvandva*-compound is taught in the sense of *yugapad-adhikaraṇa-vacana*tā = 'the fact of each term of the compound expressing the group in which the parts are manifest. So the term *dāsa* also expresses the idea of *saṃvidhāna* which is the meaning of the term *svāmī*. Thus both the terms express *saṃvidhāna* and so the *ātmanepada* is added to the root and we get the expression *svāmidāsau pacete* = 'the master and servant cook (together)'. It is like what happens in the compound *plakṣa-nyagrodhau*, the *plakṣa* and *nyagrodha* trees. As they are both intended to be talked about at the same time, one is imposed on the other. The compound expresses the collection in which the parts also figure and so the dual number is added to the compound.]

22. It is like giving the name *puroḍāśa* to *dhānāḥ* etc. or giving the name *chatrin* = "umbrella-bearer" to somebody due to association with one.

[Elsewhere also, due to proximity or association, things get the name of others. For example, in the morning libation (*prātaḥsavana*) five oblations are offered, namely *puroḍāśa* = 'sacrificial cake', *dhānāḥ* = "fried rice or barley", *karambha* = 'gruel,' *parivāpa* = 'coagulated milk' and *payasya* = 'curds.' They are called the five *puroḍāśas* because of association with the first one which is *puroḍāśa*. Similarly, because of association with umbrella bearers, others are also so called. In the present case, due to association, the quality of the master is attributed to the servant and so the compound takes the *ātmanepada*.]

23. Some think that the particular function of each which was understood before is really not meant to be expressed. Thus it comes within the scope of *śeṣa*.

[Others think that the *parasmaipada* should be added here to the root and they argue as follows : Here the particular function of the master or of the servant is not meant to be expressed.

The root *pac* expresses the action of cooking in general and so comes within the scope of *śeṣa* in P. 1.3.78 and takes the *parasmaipada* and we get the expression : *śvāmidāsau pacataḥ*.

24. Where the managing owner (*pratividhātā*) cultivates his field with five ploughs, the *ātmanepada* should come after the root *kṛṣ*. Why is this not given as an example in the *Mahābhāṣya* ?

[There is the expression : *pañcabhir halaiḥ kṛṣati* = "he cultivates with five ploughs". This can be said only of the owner of the land who makes arrangements for ploughing and not of the labourer who cannot plough with five ploughs at the same time. In other words, the root here expresses *saṃvidhāna*. Why did *M. Bhā.* not give this as a case for adding the *ātmanepada* suffix ?]

25. If it is considered to be a case of *śeṣa* because the idea of *saṃvidhāna* (making arrangements) is only understood, there would be no case of possible option (*prāptavibhāṣā*) setting aside *ātmanepada* alternatively in P.1.3.77.

[Somebody might try to answer this question by saying that the labourer cannot plough with five ploughs at the same time and so it is understood that only the master can cultivate with five ploughs as he can make arrangement therefor. Thus there is no need to add the *ātmanepada* suffix here and so it comes within the scope of *śeṣa* and takes *parasmaipada*. But this would create difficulty elsewhere. Therefore, how can the *ātmanepada* be prevented ?]

26. Some think that the root *kṛṣ* denotes pure management or making arrangements. But then the root *yaj* also would be in the same position and would not take *ātmanepada*.

[Those who believe that the *ātmanepada* and the causative have the same scope hold that the root *kṛṣ* means only making

arrangements for cultivation and so the *ātmanepada* is not added to the root as the causative is. It has been stated in the *M. Bhā.* that the root *kṛṣ* stands for many things and not for ploughing only. The *ātmanepada* comes after the root *kṛṣ* when it stands for a meaning qualified by the making of arrangements and not for making arrangements only. It is true that the root means to plough, but it really expresses making arrangements for ploughing. If it is so then the root *yaj* also would be like the root *kṛṣ* and would not take *ātmanepada*. The root *yaj* does not mean only the throwing of the oblation into the fire but for the relinquishing of ownership also (*tyāga*) as explained in the *M. Bhā* on P. 3.1.26. Therefore, there would be no *ātmanepada* after it.]

Why the *ātmanepada* does not come after the root *kṛṣ* is now explained.

27. Here the difference in meaning is understood through the neighbouring word (*upapada*). The *parasmaipada* comes as an alternative. Therefore there is no *ātmanepada*.

[In *pañcabhir halaiḥ kṛṣati*, one understands that the root *kṛṣ* means making arrangements because of the neighbouring words (*upapada*) *pañcachir halaiḥ*. Therefore though the *ātmanepada* is due to be added (*prāpta*) according to P. 1.3.77, it is not added because the *sūtra* says that it is optionally not added. Therefore the *Parasmaipada* is added and it is correct.]

ON GENDER (LIṄGA)

So far the meanings expressed by verbs have been considered. Among them, number and the means are common to nouns. Action, time, person and aspect are expressed by verbs only. Gender is an additional notion expressed by nouns. Its different definitions are now stated.

1-2. Those who know the truth concerning gender have set forth seven views concerning it : (1) that it is the relation of a thing with sex signs such as breast and hair, (2) that it is the sex-signs themselves characterised by that relation, (3) that it is the universal manifested by the sex-signs, (4) that it is the three conditions of the three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*), (5) that it is the three *guṇas* themselves in these conditions, (6) that it is an attribute created in objects by words, (7) that it is an attribute of the words themselves.

[Of the above seven views, the first two identify the sex signs with gender. This view is mentioned in the *M. Bhā* on P. 4.1.3. These two views cannot explain the gender of words denoting inanimate things like *khaṭvā* = 'bed', as they have no signs of sex. Therefore, the other views are given. The third view says that gender is a universal manifested by the signs of sex. Even inanimate things have some signs which manifest the universal of gender. But if inanimate things have some signs, the first two views would have covered them too. The view that gender is a universal can explain better the fact that the same thing can be referred to by three different words, having three different genders. For example : *arthaḥ*, *vyaktiḥ*, *vastu*. The

universals are everywhere and many universals can exist in the same thing. But if gender is nothing more than sex signs, mutually contradictory sex-signs cannot exist in the same thing and the above three words for the same thing cannot be explained. The Bhāṣyakara's view is the fourth one, namely, that the three conditions, development, decay and neutrality of the three *guṇas* *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* constitute gender. Everything is composed of three *guṇas* which are always going through these three states. A speech community may choose to express one particular condition of a thing through a word or all the three conditions through separate words for the same thing. For example : *taṭaḥ taṭī taṭam*. The fifth view that the three *guṇas* in these conditions constitute gender is only a variation of the above view. Others hold the sixth view that gender is an attribute imposed on things by words because we see the same thing referred to by three different words having three different genders as in *arthaḥ*, *vyaktiḥ*, *vastu*. Finally, there is the seventh view that gender is only a property of words because we see the same thing expressed by the same word in three different genders. It is not a property of words like accent because it is understood as something external whereas accent is understood as something intimately connected with words. It is just a *śabdānvākhyānamittam* = 'a circumstance for the derivation of forms'.]

3. Seven different ways in which gender is conveyed by words have been described and they are associated with words as alternatives or as restrictions.

[Words have their own special capacity to convey meanings and gender is understood as attributes of these meanings. That is done in seven ways. Even though the genders are nothing more than the conditions of the three *guṇas* which are everywhere, still no confusion takes place because of the regulation of the power of the words which manifest gender. Of the seven ways, four give alternatives and the remaining three are restrictions : (1) Some words are masculine or neuter : *śaṅkhaḥ*, *padmaḥ*, *śaṅkham*, *padmam*, (2) Others are feminine or neuter : *bhāgadheyī*, *bhāgadeyam*, *bheṣajī*, *bheṣajam*, (3) Others are masculine or feminine,

iṣuḥ, *aśaniḥ*, (4) Others have all the three *taṭaḥ*, *taṭi*, *taam*, (5) Some are masculine only : *vrkṣaḥ*, *prakāśaḥ*, (6) Others are feminine only *khaṭvā*, *strī* and (7) Others are neuter only : *dadhi*, *vanam*.]

4. According to some, these are three universals, co-existing in things, without contradiction, with the universals cow-ness, buffalo-ness etc. which are exclusive of one another.

[The universals masculinity, femininity and neuter can co-exist with the universals cow-ness etc. in the same thing. But these latter cannot co-exist in the same thing. About a cow, we can get the cognition that it is a cow as well as a female but not that it is also a buffalo.]

5. In regard to a female elephant and a mare, we have the cognition that it is feminine. So they look upon it as a universal inhering in a substance etc.

[Even in objects belonging to totally different classes such as a female elephant and a mare, we have the same cognition of femininity. So we conclude that universals like femininity can co-exist in the same object with other universals like elephant-ness etc. For grammarians, the object is what the words convey and from words, different objects belonging to different classes are cognised as having sex-gender (*liṅga*). Therefore, one concludes that the universal of gender exists in objects belonging to all categories such as substance, quality, action, generality and so on. An object, conveyed by a word having a fixed gender, is understood as having the universal of that gender. Conveyed by another word having another gender the same object is understood as having the universal of that other gender. Mere 'Being' is understood as being masculine from the word *bhāva*, as feminine from the word *sattā* and as neuter from the word *sāmānya*. Even a universal like *gotva* (cow-ness) is presented by the words *bhāva*, *jāti* and *sāmānya* as qualified by three different genders. So everywhere the universal of gender is regulated by

the power of words. When words express things as a substance, they always do so as qualified by gender which is an attribute of it. Even a particular sex-gender can be presented by words as having the other sex-genders as we can see in the expressions : *strītvam*, *strītā*, *strībhāvaḥ*.]

6. When the sentence dissolving the compound is intended to be made, the gender of the subordinate word is only the attribute of the word and belongs only to the word.

[A noun expresses a thing (*sattva*) and when it enters into a compound as the secondary word and it is intended to analyse the compound, the secondary word is put in some gender or other. But that gender must not be taken seriously. It is there only because a noun must have some gender or other. In the compound *kukkuṭāṇḍam kukkuṭasya aṇḍam*, should one understand *kukkuṭasya* as the result of the masculinisation (*pumvadbhāva*) of *kukkuṭyāḥ*=‘of the hen’ or was it masculine from the beginning? Kātyāyana on P. 6. 3. 42 teaches masculinisation. But the *M. Bhā* is of the view that there is no need for it because it was never feminine. It is not the intention of the word to say that the egg is from a hen, the female. Its only intention is to exclude other birds as the source of the egg and for that the masculine form is just as effective. The secondary word which comes first in the compound does not convey the notion of femininity but only that of a particular class of bird. From the context and from the nature of things, one would, of course, understand that the egg is from the hen.]

7. Even where the sex is clearly understood by the mind, it is possible to have all the genders like femininity. It is the word having different genders which bring about this state of things.

[Even in regard to external objects whose sex is understood by the mind, it is possible to have the cognition of the other genders. This is due to words having different genders that present these objects. For example, objects like femininity are

presented by words like *strītvam*, *strītā* and *strībhāvaḥ* as having all the three genders. That is how any gender can have the other genders.]

8. Just as a cognition in which water figures takes place in mirages even though there is no water there, through the former impression which is favourable to the perception of water.

9. In the same way, distinctions of gender (*liṅga*) are understood from the words *tāraka* etc. even though the things which they denote have no distinction of sex as from words denoting things having distinction of sex.

[Mirages or illusory appearances of water in a desert are well-known. They make deer and other such innocent animals thirsty. They are nothing more than shimmering rays of the sun which produce the illusion of water. As the illusion is produced by the thirst for water, it is called (*mṛga*) *tṛṣṇā*. In the same way, even though the stars have no sex, the words *tāraka*, *nakṣatram* etc. present them as having *liṅga*, just as words like *gauḥ* present other objects which really have sex. In the former case, water really experienced elsewhere, is projected on to the desert and in the latter case, *liṅga* really experienced elsewhere, is attributed to the stars. Words can express valid and invalid cognitions equally well. To see water in a mirage is the effect of the remembrance of the previous experience of water elsewhere. When the word *khaṭvā* presents that object as having femininity, there is no help from memory. The word itself creates the illusion.]

10. Because one can see signs of sex like breasts in living things, one cannot therefore, assume the existence of the universal of sex in objects which have no such signs because it is never manifested by them.

[One can see in living things signs like breasts etc. which manifest the sex which exists in them. In inanimate things, we see no such signs at any time. So nothing manifests sex in them at any time. So one cannot infer its existence in them. To infer something one must have some proof. One can infer that the sun moves when one sees it occupying another point of space. One may not see an object hidden by a piece of cloth but one does see it when the cloth is removed. That is not the case with *liṅga* in objects like *khaṭvā*. But the word *khaṭvā* has the power of presenting it as having *liṅga*.]

11. To put forward the existence of something and to declare that it can never be seen would destroy one's certainty in the non-existence of anything.

[To declare that *liṅga* exists in objects like a bed (*khaṭvā*) and to say that it can never be perceived because of the absence of manifesting signs would amount to saying that the non-perception ever of what can be perceived is not a proof of its non-existence. One would then be led to believe in the existence of even a hare's horn. To assume the existence of something which is never seen though it can be seen is against all common sense.]

12. The feminine gender of a word, not preceded by the observation of sex signs in the object, cannot lead to the inference of the sex. If it has already been observed, inference (from the word) would serve no purpose.

[It would not do to say that we infer the female sex of *khaṭvā* by seeing its effect namely, the feminine gender of the word. The gender of the word can only be an indication of what has already been established by other evidence. The gender of the word cannot be the cause of the sex of an object, because gender itself is the effect of sex. To infer the sex of an object not otherwise proved, from the gender of its word would result in the defect called *anyonyāśraya*=‘mutual dependence’. All this only shows that sex does not correspond to gender. Gram-

marians have, therefore, to understand gender differently, as the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* has done, by saying—*Samstyānaprasavau liṅgamāstheyau* (*M. Bhā.* II. p. 197, l. 27.)

The feminine gender is *saṁstyāna* which Helārāja explains as follows :—*saṁstyānaṁ saṁhananaṁ pratilayastirobhāvo 'pacayo rūpādīnāṁ sattvādīmayānāṁ guṇānāṁ strī*. Similarly, the masculine gender is : *prasavaḥ pravṛttir āvirbhāvo guṇānāṁ śāstre pumān*. Lastly, the neuter gender is : *ubhayadharmasāmānyarūpā tu sthitir naṇuṁsakam arthād uktam bhavati*. (Helārāja on *Liṅ.* 12.) The definitions are based on the following notions. All things are combinations of the five qualities *śabda*, *rasa*, *rūpa*, *sparsa* and *gandha* which again are made up of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Everything has, therefore, the properties of these qualities and their properties are : *prakāśaḥ*, *prasavaḥ*, *āvirbhāvaḥ* for *sattva*, *pravṛttiḥ*, *kriyā* for *rajas* and *varaṇam*, *tirobhāva*, *sthiṭiḥ* for *tamas*. These three properties are the three genders. All the time qualities *rūpa* etc. are constantly changing. But these changes are not perceptible to all. We see only their final result. Patañjali himself has declared that nothing remains as it is even for a moment. Everything is constantly changing like boiling water. Everything is constantly appearing and disappearing (*āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva*) and these are the main characteristics of the two main genders.]

13. Manifestation, disappearance and continuity are eternal properties found in all things and they are what is called gender.

[As objects are constantly changing these properties are always there and that is why they are said to be eternal.]

(4. Of the qualities *śabda* etc. which constitute the essence of everything, in each one are found the qualities *sattva* etc.

[All objects in the world consist of the qualities *śabda* etc. At least three of them are everywhere. *Rasa* and *gandha* are not found everywhere (*M. Bhā* II, p. 198, l. 5.). The properties of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* can be found in each one of these five *guṇas*.

The properties of *sattva* are: *prakāśaḥ*=light, *prasavaḥ*=birth, coming into being, appearance, *āvirbhāvaḥ*=manifestation. The properties of *rajas* are: *pravṛttiḥ*=Activity, *kriyā*=Action. The properties of *tamas* are: *varaṇam*=hiding, covering, *tirobhāvaḥ*=disappearance, *sthitiḥ*=‘standing still’. It is these properties which constitute gender.]

One can understand that objects which consist of combinations of *rūpa* etc. should undergo the effects of these three properties. But any one of the five qualities, taken by itself, cannot have the other four in it and yet the word expressive of any one of them, say, *rūpa* has also gender. How can these three properties operate when there is only one of them ?

15. Of the different varieties of colour like white etc., something, at every moment, is destroyed and something else comes into being.

[The above doubt is answered as follows : colour is constantly assuming different forms because the three principles *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* exist in it also. So in this process something comes into being and something else is destroyed all the time. *Āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva*, the basis of the masculine and the feminine genders are therefore, present. But this can be seen only by the initiated and not by ordinary people. From the result which ultimately becomes perceptible, one can infer that subtle changes had been taking place. The colour which a ripe fruit ultimately develops is an example. What is true of colour is also true of the other qualities like taste, sound and so on.]

It is now stated that the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* is also of this view.

16. The ever-changing character of all things like boiling water has been described in the *Bhāṣya* itself.

[The *M. Bhā* says—*Neha kaścit svasminnātmani muhūrta-maḥyavatiṣṭhate vardhate yāvad anena vardhitavyam apāyena vā yujyate.* (*M. Bhā* II, p. 198, 1.8.) “Nothing stays as it is in

this world even for a moment. It goes on developing as much as it can or it begins to decay.”

Here the ever-changing character of all things like boiling water is described. Thus, manifestation and disappearance are very all-pervading principles and so the masculine and the feminine are everywhere.]

If so, what is the scope of *sthiti*, the basis of the neuter ?

17. What is called *sthiti* (rest) is the uniform character of change or the similarity of change or the non-finality of appearance and disappearance.

[What is called *sthiti* = ‘rest’, the basis of the neuter, is understood in three ways : (1) when there is a stream of development, there is increase at every moment and when the increases of many moments are looked upon as one whole, there is what is called *sthiti*. Similarly the decreases of many moments are looked upon as one and that is also *sthiti*. (2) Increase and decrease or development and decay are both changes. Change, then, is the common point in both and this common point is looked upon as *sthiti*. (3) When something disappears, something else comes at once in its place. Thus disappearance is never final. The non-finality of disappearance (*tirobhāvāparyavasānam*) is the third view.]

18. Or what is called *sthiti* is that thing by virtue of which the *guṇas* are recognised as *guṇas* and it is the common name of the other two genders.

[Here a fourth way of looking at *sthiti* or the neuter is mentioned. It is that thing by virtue of which we perceive the *guṇas*, even when they are constantly changing in their identity. The cause of this perception of identity is *sthiti*, the neuter gender. It is the universal of which the other two genders are the variations. Looked at in this way, the neuter is a common gender which includes the other two within itself. That is why one can use it when one is not sure about the gender in a certain situation or when one does not want to convey either of the other two.]

If the properties of the *guṇas* constitute gender, how to choose a particular one considering that all the three are everywhere ?

19. While all the genders are present everywhere only one of them is applied, in any particular case, for the correct formation of the word.

[All the three *guṇas* exist in everything with all their three properties but they cannot be perceived by us ordinary mortals. Only the words can give us a knowledge of them. Each word conveys to us one of these three properties according to its gender. If it is a masculine word, it conveys manifestation, if feminine, it conveys disappearance and if neuter, it conveys rest (*sthiti*). The fixed power of words regulates what gender should be conveyed. This restriction or regulation is what is called *vivakṣā* by Patañjali (*M. Bhā* II. p. 198, 1.10.) It is the *vivakṣā* (intention) of the speech community and not of the individual.]

20. Just as, in the case of words like *takṣan* (carpenter) only one of the many existing properties is the cause of its application, the same is the case with genders.

[It is not only in regard to gender that words express only one among the many properties which exist, according to the will or intention of the speech-community. A potter makes other things than pots. And yet his name expresses only one of his many activities. Carpenter cuts, chisels, planes and performs other activities but the name of the trade expresses only one of these activities, that of chiselling. In the same way, a word denotes only one of the three genders, all of which exist in everything. The power of a word is fixed.]

21. Cultured people who can see the truth and who know the words and meanings adopt whatever gender leads to merit (*dharma*).

[It has been stated in the *M. Bhā* that it is from usage in

the world that we can understand the fixed gender of words. By 'world', it is cultured people who are meant here. The ability to see the truth of things is the mark of cultured people. They are able to point out the particular gender in an object which is capable of leading to spiritual merit, so that the word for that object may express that gender. It is only when the word has got that gender that its use can lead to spiritual merit. Therefore when the *M. Bhā.* speaks about *vivakṣā*, it does not mean the desire or will of an individual speaker. It refers to this choice of the cultured as to which particular gender should be adopted in order to secure spiritual merit. That is why the author of the *M. Bhā* has declared that it is not the business of the *śāstra* to teach the gender of words.]

22. Just as words with particular accents are correct for the expression of particular things, in the same way, a word with a particular gender which is already settled (by the usage of the cultured) is correct in a particular case.

[The same is true of accent also. A word with a particular accent is correct for the expression of a particular object. The same word, with a different accent, is correct for the expression of another thing. In the same way, a word with one gender is correct for expressing one thing and with another gender for expressing another thing. The word *ardha* when neuter, means exactly half and it means a part (not necessarily half) when it is in the masculine gender.]

The *śāstra* teaches accent and the *M. Bhā.* has not declared it improper. Why then does it consider the teaching of gender improper ?

23. When correct and incorrect usages are seen in the world, the *śāstra* intervenes and not when no incorrect usage is seen in the world.

[In the world, one hears expressions like *akṣīṇi me darśanīyāni* 'my eyes are beautiful' in which the plural number is used even though there are only two eyes, calling for the use of the dual

number. That is why the *śāstra* says : *bahuṣu bahuvacanam* (P. 1. 4. 21) the plural number should be used when there are many (that is, three or more.) Where no wrong usage is seen and yet the *śāstra* intervenes, there the *M. Bhā* declares it unnecessary. That is why P. 1.4.80 and 2.2.30 have been declared unnecessary by Vā. 2 on P. 2.2.30 as follows :

na vāniṣṭādarśanāt = "the *sūtra* need not have been given at all, because no usage contrary to it is seen."

It is for the same reason that the *M. Bhā* has declared that gender need not be taught.]

24. According to differences in limiting conditions, a particular property of the *guṇas* becomes the cause of correctness and the object of *vivakṣā* (the will of the cultured.)

[The properties of the qualities *śabda* etc. consisting of *sattva* etc. constitute gender. The subtle qualities *sattva* etc. of Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) do not directly enter into worldly usage. That is why the *M. Bhā* has declared the manifestation etc. of colour etc. which are their transformations to be gender. It is something which exists in the object (*vastu*) and it becomes the basis of the formation of words. In other words, gender is a property of things to start with. This seems to go against two *vārttikas* on P. 4.1.92. According to them, gender seems to be a property of words. They state that different words or the same word with slight sound changes denote the same thing but have different genders. This shows that gender is a property of words and not of things because here the thing is the same but the different words expressive of them have different genders. But this is only apparently so. What the *vārttikas* mean is that genders are properties of things and a word with a particular gender expresses one of them.]

25. Snow (*hima*) and forest (*araṇya*) when associated with magnitude have feminine gender. A house qualified by smallness, has masculine gender.

[Snow and forest, associated with magnitude, have *saṁstyāna*, the principle of the feminine inhering in them. A big heap of snow is called *himānī* and a big forest is called *aranyānī*. A house usually expressed by the feminine word *kuṭī*, is changed into the masculine word *kuṭīra* when smallness is intended to be conveyed. A change in a part of the word results in the change of the gender of the whole word.]

26. When the meaning is different, the words are also different, but they are considered to be one for the sake of convenience and they are given as means of comprehension.

[Strictly speaking, it is not the word *hima* which becomes *himānī* when magnitude has to be expressed. They are two quite different words, meaning two quite different things. To treat one as a modification of the other is only a way of presenting facts for the sake of convenience (*lāghavārtham*)

27. According to some, birth is *prasava*, death is *saṁstyāna* and the existence of things in their own form is *sthiti*.

[So far, gender was explained on the basis of the *Sāṅkhya* conception of the three principles *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Now it is explained according to the *Vaiśeṣikas* and others. For them what is called *prasava* is production or birth, the coming into being of new parts, whereas for the *Sāṅkhyas*, it was just manifestation (*āvīrbhāva*). What is called *Samstyānam* is the decay of parts, destruction without a trace and that is the feminine gender. Before it was said to be disappearance or hiding (*tirobhāva*). The own nature of eternal and transitory things is *sthiti* and that is the neuter gender. In the former view, one spoke of manifestation and disappearance in the case of eternal things like consciousness and *ākāśa* when they are in association with transitory things like body etc. A similar explanation has to be adopted in this view also. As for transitory things, the fact of their being recognised as the same things in the midst of change shows that something persists that is the basis of the neuter gender.]

28. The required sign, like the universal etc. is actually seen in some things. Elsewhere, it is superimposed as though it were seen and is nothing more than part of the correctness of the word.

[In the case of some living beings, beasts, etc, the cause of the cognition of the feminine principles, actually inheres in them. Just as the universal is found inhering in them, in the same way, beasts etc., which manifest gender are also found inhering in them. Due to this habit of seeing gender in some things, it is imagined in others from the nouns expressive of them such as *tārakā*, *puṣya*, *nakṣatra*. On inanimate objects, gender understood from the words is superimposed. It is nothing more than what helps in the formation of words, it is not real.]

29. Just as even where singularity is well-established, words expressive of plurality produce the cognition of plurality, such is the case with gender.

[The point mentioned in the previous verse is now explained by means of an illustration. Gender is like number in some cases. Water is one, but the word *āpaḥ* brings to us a cognition in which plurality figures. The words *dārāḥ*, *sikatāḥ*, *grhāḥ*, are examples of words which cause the cognition of plurality even when the objects in question may be only one. In the same way, the words *tārakā*, *nakṣatram* cause the cognition of a gender which does not exist in the corresponding object.]

30. In the expressions *idam* (*vastu*), *iyam* (*vyaktiḥ*) *ayam* (*arthaḥ*), gender is only a factor in the formation of words. As this is seen in the case of words expressive of a mere thing the principle is extended to all words.

[As words having three different genders are applied to a mere thing irrespective of the presence of any external factors, it is concluded that gender is nothing more than an element in the formation of words. Nothing corresponding to them is seen in the outside world. It is merely something which gives a word

a particular form. It is something derived by grammarians from words only and it is meant to explain the formation of words. It is not only here that something which does not exist outside is seen to be a factor in the formation of words. We say *rāhoḥ śiraḥ* 'the head of Rāhu'. The words present *rāhu* and *śiraḥ* as two different things because that is the function of the sixth case-ending in *rāhoḥ*. And yet outside there is no difference between *rāhu* and *śiraḥ*. In this seventh view of gender, it is everywhere something derived from words themselves and used by grammarians to explain the formation of these words. In the previous or sixth view, the gender of some words is based on something corresponding to it, existing in outside reality and the distinctions thus observed in some cases are imposed upon all words. The words *kaiścit* in the stanza shows that according to Bhartṛhari, this last view is held by those who are not able to understand the true doctrine, namely, that gender is a property of things and that they represent the condition of the three *guṇas-sattva, rajas* and *tamas*.]

31. That which is a cause of the determination of other things need not itself become an object of cognition. Senses etc. are themselves not perceived but they are the cause of the demarcation of other things.

[In this last view, the chief point is: that which is itself not observed can be a factor in determining the form of other things. The senses themselves are not perceived. Nevertheless, they help in determining the form of objects. A cause, even if not seen, determines the effect. Therefore there is no harm in accepting the view that gender, even if not perceptible, can become a factor in the formation of words. In compound words like *rājapuruṣa, nilotpalam*, some relation or other is supposed to be the basis of their formation, even though that relation is not perceptible. According to the view that the word conveys the individual, even though the universal is not cognised, it does determine its substratum, so that from a word like *gauḥ* a particular individual is understood. In the same way, even an unperceived gender in the outside world, can determine the form of

a word. Thus many possible views regarding gender have been expounded. But the doctrine accepted among grammarians is, as has been explained in the *Vārttikonmeṣa*—a lost work of Helārāja—is that it represents a condition or state of the *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.]

This brings to a close the consideration of the notions which determine the inner form of the word.

ON COMPLEX FORMATION

[After a consideration of the meanings expressed by the simple uncompound word, the author proceeds to consider the meanings expressed by complex formations (*vytti*). They are of five kinds : primary derivatives (*kṛdanta*), secondary derivatives (*taddhitānta*), compound words (*samāsa*), retention of one (*ekaśeṣa*) and nominal verbs (*nāmadhātu*). Of these the consideration of secondary derivatives in which the two constituents are in apposition to each other is taken up first.

1. It is only a word with all its meanings complete that can be associated with suffixes expressive of contempt, praise or degree, because it is one of the meanings *svārtha* etc. which forms the basis of contempt etc.

[The observations made in this and the following *kārikās* relate to the secondary derivative taught in P. 5.3.74. A word, first of all, denotes its *svārtha* which is either *jāti*=the universal, or *guṇa*=a quality, or *kriyā*=an action, *sambandha*=a relation, or *svarūpa*=its own form. Then it denotes the object in which any one of them exists as a *viśeṣaṇa*. Anything looked upon as a thing, as a *viśeṣya* is called *dravya* (*idaṃ tad iti pratyavamarśayogyam*.) The word which denotes a thing as qualified by one of the above things also expresses gender, number and case-relation, *liṅga*, *vacana* and *kāraka*. It is only when a word expresses these five things that it fully comes into its own. It is only afterwards that the word expresses contempt or praise or degree associated with one of its five meanings and, for that, it takes on the suffix *ka*. This suffix can come after the word *kutsita* itself as will be shown. In *devadattaka*, the *jāti* expressed by the word *devadatta* is regarded with contempt. In *idam ekakam eva śatam*, it is the number one in *eka* which is regarded with contempt. Thus the

suffix *ka(n)* denotes the idea of contempt as associated with one of the meanings of the word. That is why it is only when the word is complete in meaning that the suffix *ka* is added in order to express contempt as associated with one of its meanings. See M. Bhā on P. 5.3.74 and the *Pradīpa* of Kaiyaṭa thereon.]

If *ka* or *kan* is added when contempt or sympathy is to be expressed, how to explain the addition of the suffix to stems which themselves express contempt or sympathy, as in the word *kutsitaka*, *anukampitaka* ?

2. The word *kutsitaka*, (in P.5.3.74) stands for the meaning of a stem like Devadatta when held in contempt. The suffix *ka* is also taught in order to express the contempt relating to the idea of contempt denoted by the word *kutsita* itself.

[The suffix *ka* can also be added to the word *kutsita* itself even though the stem itself denotes contempt. In that case, the suffix would convey the idea of contempt associated with the meaning of *kutsita* itself. To say that somebody is wrongly held in contempt one could say that he is *kutsitaka*. Here one has to make a distinction between the idea of 'contemptible' which is the meaning of the stem itself and its being held in contempt for some reason or other, as when somebody is wrongly held in contempt. The latter is called *bāhyā kutsā* = external contempt.]

Another example of a suffix expressing an idea similar to that of the stem is now given.

3. The word *prakṛṣṭa* (excellent) expresses the excellence of qualities like white. When a higher degree in what is excellent is to be expressed, a suffix like *tarap* is taught. (P.5.3.57.)

[What is particularly white (*śukla*) is called *śuklatara* = whiter or *prakṛṣṭaḥ śuklaḥ* = particularly white. Here the same idea is expressed either through the suffix '*tarap*' or the word *prakṛṣṭa*. Both are not used at the same time. But when excellence among

the excellent is to be expressed, the suffix 'tarap' has to be added to the word *prakṛṣṭa* itself and then we would get the form *prakṛṣṭatara*. Another example is the word *jyeṣṭhatama* where a suffix of degree is added to a word already ending in such a suffix.]

What is meant by contempt of the contempt is now explained.

4. Somebody may be held in contempt because he is contemptible or he may be wrongly held in contempt. The suffix *ka* specifies what is conveyed by its own word (that is, the stem).

[From the generic meaning conveyed by the word *kutsita*, nothing specific is understood. One does not know whether somebody is held in contempt because of his misdeeds or whether, even though good, he is wrongly accused of misdeed by his enemy. Once the suffix is added, something specific is understood. From the word *kutsitaka*, one understands that his being held in contempt is itself contemptible, because he is not guilty. Guilt has been attributed to him by his enemy. To hold an innocent man in contempt is itself contemptible. Or, it might be looked upon differently. The word *kutsita* only means contemptible in general and not for any particular offence. When the particular offence is known, the suffix *ka* is added. In whichever way one understands it, one must make a distinction between the contempt expressed by the stem and that expressed by the suffix *ka*.]

It is now stated that the suffix expresses the same idea of contempt as the stem and not a different one.

5. (From the word *kutsita*, it is not understood that the contempt relates to the present time, because there is no difference in the form of the word. Something can be praiseworthy while being contemptible and something else can be despicable while being praiseworthy.

[Others do not see here two kinds of contempt. Anything is

susceptible to both approval and contempt. The word *kutsita* presents a thing as object of contempt but from the word one does not understand whether the contempt is related to the present time. Besides there are other possible variations also. Even as an object of contempt, a thing may be praised, leading to the use of an expression like *kutsitarūpa* which ends in the suffix *rūpaḥ* expressive of praise (P. 5.3.66.). We can have expressions like *vr̥ṣalarūpa* and *dasyurūpa* where a suffix denoting praise is added to a stem denoting something to be disapproved. Similarly what is praiseworthy may be held in contempt, leading to the expression *praśastaka* which expresses disapproval of the praise as being incomplete or unjustifiable. Because of these possible variations, one does not understand from the bare word *kutsita* that the contempt is related to the present time. [That is why the suffix *ka* is added.]

Thus something has been said about secondary derivatives in which the two constituents, stem and suffix, are in apposition to each other (*samānādhikaraṇataddhitavṛtti*).]

Now something is going to be said about words ending in case-suffixes and which are in apposition to each other.

6. The relation of qualifier and qualified arises between the meanings of fully-formed words. The meaning of the stem is not thereby affected.

[The question here is this. In the sentence *vīraḥ puruṣaḥ*, how to account for the nominative case-ending after the stem *vīra* ? The word *vīraḥ* is the *viśeṣaṇa* in this sentence and *viśeṣaṇatva* is not one of the circumstances under which the *prathamā* is added to a stem according to P. 2.3.46. It is added to the stem *vīra* in the sense of the stem itself (*prātipadikārtha*), without taking into consideration the fact that it qualifies the other word *puruṣaḥ* in the sentence. The fact of being a qualifier is not part of the meaning of the stem *vīra*. The fact that there is the relation of qualifier and qualified between the meanings of the two words arises only when the two words form a sentence. The *prathamā* is not added because of that.]

Something is now going to be said about the qualifier or the secondary word and the qualified or the primary word.

7. The qualified (*viśeṣya*) is what is not known and the qualifier is what is known. All things which serve others are secondary (*śeṣa*) because they exist for others.

[The very words *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* tell us that the former is what differentiates and the latter is the differentiated. This stanza speaks about the distinction between the primary and the secondary. What is primary and what is secondary (*pradhāna* and *guṇa*) can be settled by various considerations. When the connection of a thing in its general form with action is known, something must be done to specify the particular form in which it is connected with action. That is what the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) does. Thus, the word which is a *viśeṣaṇa* brings new information. What is already known, the general form of a thing is the *viśeṣya* or the *pradhāna* (primary) and the new thing is the *viśeṣaṇa* or *guṇa* (secondary). A substance, a thing (*dravya*) can enter into relation with action independently. A quality can do so only through a substance. A quality is, therefore, secondary compared to substance. Once the basis of the relation of primary and secondary is understood, we can tell which is *upasarjana* in a compound of words ending in the same case-endings or in different case-endings.]

There is, however, a difference between where the two words have the same case-endings and where they have different case-endings. That is now pointed out.

8. The two words expressive of the secondary and the primary have necessarily different case-endings. Where they have the same case-endings, both express substance.

[Where the two words have different case-endings, the relation of primary and secondary is directly expressed by the words. For instance, in *paṭasya śuklaḥ*, the two words express sub-

stance and quality respectively and their relation of primary and secondary is directly expressed by the words. The secondary word *paṭasya* expresses its meaning as something which serves that of the primary word *śuklaḥ* and so it takes the sixth case-ending which is expressive of what is secondary. The primary word, on the other hand, expresses its own meaning and does not serve something else and so takes the nominative case-ending. Thus, where the case-endings are different, each one has a fixed function. Where both the words have the same case-ending as in *Virāḥ puruṣaḥ*, both the words express substance (*dravya*). Each expresses its own meaning, irrespective of the other. If we ultimately understand that the two meanings, stand towards each other in the relation of primary and secondary, it is through implication. It is not *śābda*, directly expressed by the words, because both the words express substance.]

It is now stated that even if both the words denote substance and have the same case-ending, there can be relation between the two.

9. The word *kṛṣṇa*='black' denotes something with undetermined universal and the word *tila*='sesame' denotes something the colour of which is undetermined.

[Even when both the words having the same case-ending denote substance, they can be related. Taking *kṛṣṇāḥ tilāḥ*=black sesame seeds as the example, we find that the first word denotes substance through quality but it does not say what universal exists in that substance. The second word, on the other hand, also denotes substance but through a universal, but it does not say with which colour that universal co-exists in the substance. Thus the meanings of both the words require something else for their completion.]

10. As the generic meanings are mutually unconnected, the two words really denote the particular. But they cannot bring the particular to the mind (of the hearer) because of their common form.

[As long as the meanings of the two words require something else for their completion, they may be said to be of a generic nature. It is of the nature of substance. As they do not serve each other, there is no relation between them. But as the words together form one sentence, they become connected and then they denote the particular : the word *kṛṣṇa* denotes 'black' sesame and the word *tila* denotes sesame having black colour. In the mind of the speaker, the meanings of the two words were already connected. As for the hearer, when he hears the two words, he also connects them together and understands that *kṛṣṇa* means the colour black as co-existing with the universal *tilatva*=sesame-ness and that *tila* means the universal *tilatva* as co-existing with the quality blackness. The two meanings specify each other. They convey to the mind of the hearer a connection which already existed in the mind of the speaker.]

11. Thus the two words (at first incapable) of conveying the particular (ultimately) bring about differentiation and remove all doubt.

[When the two words come together in the same sentence, they specify each other's meaning and dispel the requirement and the sense of incompleteness which was felt before. The word *kṛṣṇa* now conveys the colour black but also the universal sesame-ness with which it co-exists and the word *tila* not only conveys the universal sesameness but also the colour black with which it coexists. In this way the meanings of the two words become related. See *M.bhā* on P.2.1.57.]

The relation between the two words is *sāmānādhikarāṇya* = the appositional relation. Something is now being said to elucidate it.

12. A thing, differentiated by its association with a quality, appears as one thing and because of its association with a universal, appears as a second thing as it were.

13. Because of connection with different attributes, an object appears to be like them and in this

way it appears to be more than one because of its different forms.

14. Where the two different forms are merged is a third condition of the object and it is the substratum of the other two conditions.

[The application of two words each having its own meaning to the same object is called *sāmānādhikarṇya*. It does not mean the fact of two words having the same meaning (*śabdayoḥ samānābhidheyatvam*) because they cannot then be related as qualifier and qualified (*viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*) because that presupposes difference. Nor can it be defined as fact of a quality and a universal differentiating the same thing, because being engaged in that, they cannot be related to each other. Each word brings a new specification in regard to the object and so seems to convey a new thing. The word *kṛṣṇa* conveys something characterised by the colour black and the word *tila* conveys something characterised by the universal *tilatva* and this appears to be a new thing. It is really the same thing with a new specification. The two things with two different attributes conveyed by the two words merge into a third thing which becomes the substratum of the two attributes.]

15. Through the intellect, one thing is divided into many and what is divided is unified. Conditions are differentiated through the intellect. It is that which creates things.

[Words express things as they figure in our cognition. Our cognition presents what is within as external. The two words *kṛṣṇāḥ* and *tilāḥ*, before they form a compound, convey two things having two different attributes. When they enter into a compound, the difference is obliterated and the compound conveys a thing having two attributes in an integrated manner. This kind of relationship is what is called *sāmānādhikarṇya* = appositional relation].

Kātyāyana is also of the opinion that it is the intellect which presents things as one or as many.

16. Even if there is only a part of a thing, to look upon it as fulfilling the condition (*vyapadeśivad ekasmin*), to look upon one thing as many through the intellect, in this way, a thing can be spoken of through fictional divisions.

[While explaining the *sūtra* : *ādyantavadekasmin* (P. 1.1.21.) = a grammatical operation taught in regard to the initial or the final phoneme of something will be applied even if it consists of one phoneme only, Kātyāyana suggests that the *sūtra* should be worded as *vyapadeśivad ekasmin*=One should treat a single (phoneme) as though it fulfilled the condition prescribed (namely, that it should be the initial or final.) To look upon an isolated phoneme which has nothing before it and nothing after it is an act of the intellect but that is often done in the Science of Grammar. For example, P. 6.1.1. teaches the reduplication of the first syllable (*prathama ekāc*) of a root. A group of sounds containing one vowel is *ekāc*. If, in a unit, there is only a vowel and no other sound, that is also looked upon as *ekāc* and its reduplication would take place when the *liṭ* suffix follows.]

17. When a stone etc. previously seen again and again as associated with various operations, is cognised in connection with a particular operation, this cognition is qualified by the previous cognitions.

[A grindstone, associated with various actions in the past is presented in the expression *idaṃ śilāputrakasya śarīram* as associated with a particular action or state. It is the same grindstone but it is now presented as something different. This is also an act of the mind.]

It is now stated that in a similar manner the root *i(ṇ)* is looked upon as *ekāc*=having one vowel.

18. Sometimes, something (a root) is said to be *ekāc*=having one vowel on the basis of identity and difference after having ascertained that roots can assume many forms because of diversity of usage.

[The word *ekāc* in P. 6.1.1. is understood as a *bahuvrīhi* compound. It means : (a root) having one vowel. But if a root consists of just one vowel, like the root *i* (*ṇ*)=to go, it cannot be called *ekāc*=‘having one vowel’, because it would be difficult to think of the *anyapadārtha* as distinct from the meaning of the constituent elements, the chief feature of a *bahuvrīhi* compound. But one sees the following forms, all derived from that root, actually used : *eti*=‘he goes’, *ayanam*=‘going’ *itaḥ*=‘they two go’, *etā*=‘one who goes’, *etaṇyam*=‘one must go’ and so on. In regard to these various forms, the root *i* (*ṇ*) is *ekāc*, because it is the one root vowel common to all these forms. That provides the *anyapadārtha*. In this way, the root gets reduplication according to P. 6.1.1. See *Kaiyaṭa Pradīpa* on this *sūtra*.]

Or it may be looked upon as follows—

19. By the method of agreement and difference it is thought of as meaningful. Apart from the meaning of the root, it is just looked upon as a single phoneme (*ekāc*).

[The root *i* (*ṇ*) can be seen in the different forms derived from it and the common meaning which runs through these forms may be said to be its meaning. That meaning is not understood if the other things like the suffix remain the same but another root comes in. Looking upon the meaning and the root as a group, one can say that a root consisting of one vowel and nothing more is *ekāc*, that is, it is a group of which a meaning and a single vowel are the two constituents. Being the only vowel, it is called the first by courtesy.]

It is now stated that appositional relation (*sāmānādhikaranyā*) can also be based on difference created by the mind.

20. Therefore, the tradition which has come down from the ancients is that (in such cases) there are three substances, figuring separately in the mind in the relation of *āśraya* and *āśrayin* (abode and that which rests on it.)

[What is called *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is based upon such a difference seen by the mind. In one indivisible thing (here *kṛṣṇāḥ tilāḥ* = black sesame seeds), the mind sees three things, one characterised by quality (the colour black), a second by the universal (*tilatva*) and a third in which the first two merge. The third becomes the *āśraya*, the substratum of the first two. That is how *sāmānādhikaraṇya* and *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* become possible.]

21. According to some, the appositional relation is between words and so is that of the qualifier and the qualified and that of the name and the named.

[So far, the appositional relation has been considered in connection with meanings. The two words in question may also be in apposition to each other. As the two words, meaning two different things, ultimately point to the same thing as possessing the two attributes in question, it is they which are *sāmānādhikaraṇa* towards each other. Similarly, the relation of the qualifier and the qualified (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*) would also be between words. In the present instance, the word *tila* denotes something qualified by its own meaning. It just brings the universal to the mind and no other attribute. Thus, it is something to be qualified. Thirdly, the relation called *saṃjñā-saṃjñi-bhāva* (the relation of the name and the named) would also be between words. Wherever in the *sūtras* of Pāṇini, the word *Vṛddhi* is found, it conveys the sounds *āt* and *aic* by superimposing its own form on them. That is what is called *so'yaṃ ityabhisambandhaḥ*, a process of identification on account of which the two words end in the same case-ending. One of the words is the name and the other is the named.]

The appositional relation between meanings is now explained differently.

22. According to some who hold that the word conveys substance (individual), the universal and the quality, inhering in the same thing, are found in an integrated manner in the sesame seeds.

[It can be shown in another way that the appositional relation is between meanings. The two words *kṛṣṇa* and *tila* unite to form one word and to convey one meaning. This is possible only if the two meanings, conveyed by the two words, stand towards each other in the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*. That does exist here, because the universal and quality co-exist in the same substance. That very thing, characterised by the universal denoted by the word *tila* and requiring completion, is further characterised by the word *kṛṣṇa*. The quality conveyed by it is the *viśeṣaṇa*. The word *kṛṣṇa* conveys more than quality. It conveys the substance also through quality. If it conveyed quality only, there would be no compound out of these two words. We would get the expression *tilasya kṛṣṇaḥ* and no compound would be possible. No compound can be formed with a word which denotes pure quality. Previously, the *viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya-bhāva* relation was explained according to the view that a word denotes substance. The same thing is now explained according to the view that the word denotes the universal. The two words *kṛṣṇa* and *tila* do not convey quality and universal without a substratum. Nor can they stand towards each other in the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*. Their main purpose is to delimit the substance in which they inhere. They do not directly enter into relation with each other. It is only through the substance in which they inhere that they become related by the *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* relation.]

It is now stated that where substance is not expressed, but only quality is expressed, there, even though the substance is implied, there is no relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*, there cannot be a compound of words in apposition.

23. Even though the meanings of the words *rūpa*=‘colour’, *rasa*=‘taste’, have a substratum, it is not

directly expressed. So they form a *dvandva* compound.

[Where words do not denote substance but denote pure quality, they cannot form a compound of words in apposition. No doubt the substance in which the quality inheres is understood by implication, but the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* cannot be there. Hence there cannot be a compound of such words. For example, there cannot be a *samānādhikarāṇasamāsa* = "a compound in which the constituent words are in apposition to each other," of the word *rūpa*, *rasa* and *gandha* because these words denote pure quality. They can only form a *dvandva* compound.]

It is now explained why a word which denotes substance through the universal is important as compared with a word which denotes substance through quality.

24. A word like *kṛṣṇa*, denoting substance (through quality) requires something for its completion. That does not exist in a word like *tila* because the basis for its application is always present.

[It might be said that the words *kṛṣṇa* and *tila* denote substance through something else, that is, quality and universal respectively. In both, the difference between quality and universal on the one hand, and the substance on the other is obliterated through *samavāya*. Both quality and universal enter into relation with action through substance. How is one to decide which is *viśeṣaṇa* and which is *viśeṣya*? If one cannot decide that, one cannot say which is *upasarjana* and so there would be doubt as to which word to put first in the compound. The M. Bhā. has declared that *dravya* = 'substance' is the important thing (*pradhāna*). But one has still to explain why a word which denotes substance through universal is *pradhāna*, but not a word which denotes substance through quality. The word *kṛṣṇa* denotes substance through the identification of *guṇa* and *guṇin*. A quality cannot directly enter into relation with action. It does so through substance. It is substance which is the substratum of all power. Therefore, quality depends upon substance for entering into relation with action. The relation between quality and subs-

tance is not invariable and compulsory. A quality can be presented by a word as apart from substance. It comes and goes. That is why the suffix *matuḥ* and the sixth case-ending are used for expressing a quality. The universal, on the other hand, is always associated with substance. Substance cannot be unless the universal inheres in it. Words like *tila* which denote substance through the universal do not depend upon anything else for entering into relation with action. Substance, with universal always inhering in it enters into direct relation with action. That is why it is the *viśeṣya* and *pradhāna* and quality is the *viśeṣaṇa*. Thus the two words expressive of these two things, stand towards each other in the sense of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*.]

25. Thus, substance characterised by the universal, being near to action, substance in which quality inheres has the attribute of quality and it serves to differentiate.

[As the word *tila* conveys substance characterised by the universal, it is that which is directly connected with action. The word *kṛṣṇa*, on the other hand, conveys substance characterised by quality, which has a subordinate character, being only indirectly connected with action. It is, therefore, only a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). In sentences like *nīlotpalam paśyati* = 'he sees the blue lotus', *svādu phalam āsvādayati* = 'he enjoys the sweet fruit', *surabhi kusumam ā jighrati* = 'he smells the fragrant flower', colour etc. are not directly connected with action like seeing. It is the substance (lotus etc.), qualified by its attributes, conveyed by the words themselves as being the object (*karma*) of the action which one understands as being connected with the action. Even in a sentence like *utpalasya rūpam paśyati* = 'he sees the colour of the lotus', it is through substance that the quality (colour) becomes connected with action, by means of *saṃyuktasamavāya* = conjunction-cum-inherence. That is, the eye is in conjunction with the lotus in which its colour inheres (*samavāya*). From the verbal point of view, in this sentence, the word *rūpa* presents colour as a thing, as a substance, something which can be referred to by a pronoun (*idaṃ taditi sarvanāmapratyavamarśayogyam*)]

It is now going to be said that even if a word does not convey substance through quality, it can become a qualifier.

26. Some are of the opinion that in complex formations (*vṛttiṣu*) (even substance—denoting) words convey quality only, as in the case of words like *ajāśva* where it is so because of the relation of conventional words with other such words.

[It has so far been shown how words like *kṛṣṇa* which denote substance through quality become qualifiers. Some hold that they can become so in a compound even if they do not denote substance. In a sentence, the word *kṛṣṇa* may denote substance through quality. But in a compound, it denotes pure quality, because the word *tila* has already conveyed the substance through the universal. There is no need now for the word *kṛṣṇa* also to denote substance. So it expresses quality only and this qualifies the substance conveyed by the word *tila*. From the word, as a whole, a substance qualified by a quality is understood. The quality is the qualifier. It is like the compound *rājapuruṣa* where, even though the sixth-case-ending is absent, the meaning of the first term *rājā* qualifies that of the second. In other compounds also one can see sometimes substance-words denoting quality. For example, in the expression *ajāśvo devadattaḥ*, if the two terms of the compound *ajāśva* are understood in their conventional sense (*rūḍhi*), they would mean two different kinds of animals (substance) and there would be no connection between them. Therefore *ajā* is understood as denoting pure quality, 'something which has no birth' and then there would be connection between the two words. In the same way, in the compound *kṛṣṇatila*, the term *kṛṣṇa* is taken as denoting pure quality.]

It is now shown in another way that the word *kṛṣṇa*, expressive of colour is a qualifier.

27. Or one can say that the substance *tila* is first understood and to that the word ending in *matuṣ* is joined. The relation (which is the meaning of

matuṣ) is merged in the compound. Because of this (relation understood from the compound) it is the quality which differentiates (*viśeṣaṇam*.)

[First, the meaning of the word *tila*, characterised by the universal is understood in a general way. Then the word *kṛṣṇa* comes in to bring some differentiation to it. The *matuṣ* suffix at the end of the word is elided by vā. 3 on P. 5.2.94. But the relation which is the meaning of this *matuṣ* becomes part of the meaning of the compound. In this way, the term *kṛṣṇa* becomes *viśeṣana*. It is not that the word *kṛṣṇa* denotes substance through quality and that the word *tila*, through the universal, brings a specification to it. Because the universal is nearer to the substance than quality.]

Thus complex formations in which the constituents are in apposition to each other have been considered.

The *vṛttis* called *dvandva* and *ekaśeṣa* are now to be considered.

28. When there takes place a cognition of the whole permeated by the parts, it is called 'the desire to express together' and it exists in the *dvandva* and *ekaśeṣa*.

[When things are conceived together in order to be connected with an action and are expressed together for that purpose, we get the formations called *dvandva* and *ekaśeṣa*. Here there is a grouping of things but the group is not different from the constituents of the group. In the cognition of the group which results, the parts also figure. That is why the dual and the plural number also occur in these formations. In other compounds, the meaning of one of the constituents is the important one and it is qualified by that of the other. That is not the case here. The meaning of the compound is the group in which the parts also figure, because the cognition is of that nature. Where the group is totally different from the parts, there is a separate word altogether for it. For instance, *vanam* = 'forest', *yātham* =

‘herd’. That is not the case in *dvandva*. Here there takes place *sahavivakṣā*=the desire to give simultaneous expression to many things. So there is the cognition of a group in which the parts figure.]

The desire to give expression to many things at the same time is common to *itaretarayogadvandva* and the *samāhāradvandva*. Their difference is now pointed out.

29. A *dvandva* of mutual conjunction (*itaretarayoga*) takes place of words which convey the group (*samūha*) in which the parts figure. And this group is contained in each member of the group.

[The desire to give expression to many things exists in the *itaretarayogadvandva*=‘*dvandva* compound of mutual conjunction’ as well as in the *samāhāradvandva*=*dvandva* ‘of the group’. What then is the difference? Where there is a cognition of unity in which plurality also figures, there are two possibilities : either the unity is more important or the plurality is. In the *itaretaradvandva*, the plurality is more important and in the *samāhāradvandva* the unity or the *saṅgha* is more important. Another feature of the former is that the group is expressed by each constituent of the compound. And yet the other constituents are not useless. This importance of the parts in this kind of *dvandva* is made known by the words themselves.]

An illustration of this principle of the whole being manifested by each part is now given.

30. Just as the whole set of activities exists like the Universal in each part like the placing of the vessel on the fire (*adhiśrayaṇam*), so is the case with the constituents of *dvandva* compound.

[It is not only here that the whole appears in each part. This is true of action also. The action called ‘cooking’ which is the name of a series of little acts is felt to be present in each act in that series. The whole is superimposed on the parts. It is

a kind of *adhyāsa*. When somebody is just lighting the fire, we say : 'he is cooking'. It is like the universal (*jāti*) which is present in each individual. Similarly, the group which is the meaning of the whole compound is expressed by each constituent of it.]

An illustration is now given.

31. The expressions *śaundā*, *ardharca*, *puroḍāśa*, *chattrin* as well as "those *Viṣṇumitras*" are illustrations of words denoting different associates also.

[In P. 2.1.40, the word '*śaundāiḥ*' is used in the plural number and so is the word '*ardharcāḥ*' in P. 2.4.31. That is because these words stand not only for themselves but also for the other words included in the groups of which they are the first words. These other words are identified with them, so to speak. Similarly, the word *puroḍāśāḥ*='sacrificial offerings' are put in the plural because the offering stands for itself as well as for the associated materials like *karambha*, *parivāpa* and so on. Similarly, the words *chattriṇaḥ* in the expression *chattriṇo yānti*='the umbrella bearers are going' stands also for those who do not carry umbrellas but are going with them. The same thing applies to the word *viṣṇumitrāḥ* in *te viṣṇumitrāḥ*'. It stands for the associates also. In the same way, the dual and the plural numbers in the *dvandva* and *ekaśeṣa* words, where each constituent denotes more than one object. They are connected with the same action or quality and so assume the form of one another (*paraspararūpāpatteḥ*)]

This is now further explained.

32. In the same way, (in *dvandvas*) words which denote one thing express other things also. The two objects by means of which one constituent (of a *dvandva*) becomes polysemic are the very ones by which the other constituent also becomes polysemic

[In a *dvandva* compound like *dhavakhadirau*, each constituent assumes the form of the other and denotes its meaning in addi-

tion to expressing its own meaning. The total number of things denoted by the two words remains two, even though each word denotes both of them. That is why the plural number is not used. This fact of each constituent denoting both the objects which are really the meaning of the compound as a whole is what is called *Yugapadadhikaravacanatā*=the fact of each constituent denoting at the same time the group of two things which is the meaning of the compound as a whole. This is really the view of Kātyāyana who expresses it as follows in his 2 ṇḍ *vārttika* on P. 2.2.29. 'siddham tu Yugapadadhikaraṇe dvandvavacanāt="but it is alright because the *dvandva* compound has been taught when each constituent denotes both at the same time."

Kātyāyana has adopted this interpretation in order to explain the dual and the plural numbers in a *dvandva* compound. It has also been stated that it is only in a *dvandva* compound that a word can denote the meaning of its associated word. The same word in a sentence cannot do so. It is only in a compound that there is a close association between two words which lend each other their strength and together convey the same thing like two labourers lifting a load together. But Patañjali has declared this *Yugapadadhikaravacanatā* to be difficult to understand and difficult to prove.]

Why Patañjali has done so is now stated

33. Therefore, the group (expressed by the compound as a whole) being quite different, such a meaning (of each constituent) is not known in the world nor is it seen in the *śāstra* by the method of agreement and difference.

[The meaning attributed by Kātyāyana to each constituent in a *dvandva* compound is not known in the world nor can one obtain it for the purpose of the *śāstra* by means of analysis based on the method of agreement and difference. In the compound *plakṣaṇyagrodhau*, the two things come to the mind from the compound as a whole and not from each of the constituents, words do not always have their etymological meaning. Nobody would

call the *nyagrodha* tree *plakṣa* merely because it has also the property called *prakṣaraṇa*=oozing milk or resin. Meanings are conventional. From each one of the two words in the compound, only one meaning is understood, namely, its own. The two ideas come from the compound as a whole. Where both the words are actually used as in a *dvandva*, it is simpler to assume that the two ideas come from their respective words and that the group is understood from the compound as a whole. In *ekaśeṣa*, where only one of the words is used, it is different. All the objects must be understood from that one word. The dual and plural numbers are used after the whole compound and not after the second constituent only. Just to explain the dual and the plural, it is not necessary to assume that each word denotes both things. In fact, only the compound as a whole can denote the two things. The compound is really indivisible, but divisions are postulated for the sake of explanation. These divisions look like other independent words in the language and, therefore, can only have meanings similar to those independent words. In the process of division, the words may depend upon one another and yet each word can convey its meaning only. On account of this mutual dependence, the group results. The group cannot be understood from any single word. It is true that the words in a *dvandva* do not stand toward each other in the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* but that does not mean that they cannot be united. They are all connected with action and they get united because they are dependent upon action. Because of the mutual connection of the constituents, the group becomes qualified by duality or plurality and the dual or plural number comes after the compound.]

34. Therefore, this simultaneous expression of both by each (*Yugapadvācitā*) has been declared to be difficult to understand and difficult to prove in the *Bhāṣya* but it has been adopted for practical purposes.

[For the reasons given above, the idea that each constituent of a *dvandva* conveys the meanings of the others also has been

declared in the *Bhāṣya* to be difficult to understand and difficult to explain to others. But it has been accepted for practical purposes.]

The reason for this acceptance is now stated.

35. When there is a desire to express both at the same time (*tasyām*), the compound word is used keeping the group (*samudāya*) in mind. Therefore, in the analytic statement, it is presented as expressive of both.

[We have to explain such compound words as *plakṣanyagrodhau dhava khadirapalāsāḥ*. It is done by analysing it into parts. The parts must be shown to have as much meaning as the group. Each constituent like *plakṣa* is not confined to the conveying of its meaning only. As it was used keeping the group in mind, it is already connected with the other constituent. So each constituent conveys its meaning as connected with that of the other constituent. That is why the analytic sentence (*apoddhāravākyaṃ*) would take the form : “*plakṣau ca nyagrodhau ca iti plakṣanyagrodhau*. The meaning of words depends upon the speaker's intention and here the intention of the speaker from the very beginning is to convey both at the same time. Really speaking, the compound is indivisible and as such it conveys the whole meaning together. In the sentence used in the world each word does not convey more than its own meaning. A *dvandva* is not like other compounds. In the other compounds like *ta'puruṣa*, the secondary word is connected with the verb expressive of action through the primary word. Not so in a *dvandva* where both the words are of equal importance. There one has to accept that each constituent expresses the meaning of the whole. In that way, they would become mutually connected and the whole would convey the group in which the parts also figure (*udbhūtābhedasya samudāyasyābhidhānāt*) and that would explain the use of the dual and plural suffixes after the compound. It is well known that the expressive power of words is not the same in a sentence and in a compound. A word may not be able to express the meaning of

another in a sentence but it can do so in a compound. It is this difference which is pointed out in the *vārttika*.

Tadviṣayaṃ ca (vā. 12 on P. 2.2.29.) which says that it is in a *dvandva* that one sees one constituent conveying its own meaning as well as that of the other. Thus it has been shown that this *Tugapadadhikaraṇavacanatā* exists in a *dvandva* and in the *ekaśeṣa*.

36. Some characteristics are restricted to the sentence, others to the compound while others still are common to both. But they have been mentioned without distinction in connection with semantic connection.

[Many grammatical operations take place when there is semantic connection (*sāmarthya*) between words. Some characteristics are found in a sentence where the semantic connection between words is *vyapekṣā*=mutual interdependence. Others are found in a complex formation (*ṛtī*) like a compound word when the semantic connection is called *ekārthibhāva*=‘integration of meaning.’ Others are found in both. But they have not been shown separately in the *śāstra*. One *sūtra*, namely P. 2.1.1. covers all of them and they have to be distinguished according to the circumstances.]

An illustration is now given.

37. A word like *śyāmā* in a compound involving comparison is given as an illustration of a word which in a sentence (*bhede*) stands for a universal property as it stands for the particular in a compound.

[P. 2.1.55 runs as follows “*upamānāni sāmānyavacanaiḥ*=“words expressive of the standard of comparison are compounded with words expressive of the common property,” *Śastrīśyāmā*=‘dark like a dagger’ is given as the example. It has been objected that the word *śyāmā* here refers either to the standard

of comparison, the dagger or to the object of comparison (*upameya*) say, a person like Devadatta. Both are particular objects. How can it then be said to be *sāmānyavacana*, expressive of a common property? To this, the answer given is that before entering the compound, that is, in a sentence like *śastrīva śyāmā*, it was expressive of a common property. As the *Bhāṣya* puts it:—

Prāg abhisambandhād yaḥ sāmānyavacanaḥ = 'What was expressive of the common property before the joining of the two words'.

Before the formation of the compound, that is, in the sentence, the word *śyāmā* stands for *śyāmatva* = 'darkness', the common property found in both the standard and the object of comparison.]

Another illustration is now given.

38. Standing for the meaning of another word (*anyapadārtha* which takes place in a *bahuvrīhi* compound) is impossible in a sentence. Similarly words which form the constituents of a *dvandva* cannot express the meaning of 'ca' in a sentence.

[When two or more words combine to form a *bahuvrīhi* compound, the latter expresses the meaning of a word which is not part of the compound. In the sentence which analyses this compound, the same words cannot do that, because that other word itself is present in it. Similarly, *dvandva* compound expresses the meaning of *ca* which is not part of the compound. But its constituents in the analytic sentence cannot do that because the word *ca* itself is present in it.]

39. In a sentence *niḥ* etc. cannot express the idea of 'going out' etc. nor can the words *gaura* and *khara* etc. denote objects having a particular universal before they enter into a compound.

[The compound *niṣkauśāmbiḥ* means 'one who has gone out of kauśāmbī. It means that here *niḥ* means 'one who has gone out' (*niṣkrāntaḥ*). But in a sentence it cannot do that. There

one has to say *niṣkrāntaḥ kauśāmbhāḥ*. The words *gaurakhara* = 'a wild monkey', *kṛṣṇasarpa* = 'a black cobra' can denote these animals having a particular universal only as long as they are compounds and not when they are separate words in a sentence. *gaurāḥ kharāḥ* cannot mean *gaurakhara*.]

40. (That is why it has been said by the Bhāṣyakāra that) as the idea of play and means of livelihood cannot be understood from the sentence, the use of the word *nityam* = 'compulsorily' (in P. 2. 2. 17) is not right, just as it is not right (in P. 3. 1. 23.) where the suffix *yañ* is taught as expressive of crookedness in walking.

[The Bhāṣyakāra points out on some occasions that the meaning which a compound word or other complex formation (*vytti*) can convey cannot be conveyed by the same words in a sentence. That is why he considers unnecessary the word *nityam* = 'compulsorily', 'always' in P. 3.1.23. The formation with the suffix *yañ* is essential if the particular meaning is to be understood. *Kuṣīlaṃ krāmatī* cannot mean what *caṣkramyate* means, nor can *lolupyate* mean the same thing as *garhitāṃ lumpati*. The word *dantalekhakaḥ* = 'tooth-artist, can denote a trade but not the sentence *dantasya lekhaḥ*. The word *nityam* in P. 2.2.17 is therefore unnecessary because only the compound can denote a play or a means of livelihood.]

41. As the relation between words expressive of selection on merit (*nirdhāraṇa*) etc. is only interdependence (*vyapekṣā*), there is no purpose in prohibiting the formation of a compound in such cases.

[In *gavāṃ kṛṣṇā sampannakṣīratamā* "among cows, the black is the best milk-giver", the black cow is picked out as the best on merits. There is, therefore, *nirdhāraṇa* = selection on merit. P. 2.2. 10 prohibits the compounding of a word ending in the sixth case-affix (*ṣaṣṭhī*) added in the sense of *nirdhāraṇa*. One cannot

say *gokṛṣṇā saṃpannakṣīratamā*. It is here pointed out that the prohibition is unnecessary, because the compound cannot convey the idea of selection. Only the sentence can do it.]

It is now stated that the *śāstra* only states the natural variety in the power of words.

42. By prescriptions and prohibitions, only the natural interdependence of meanings (*bheda*) and integration of meanings are pointed out. It is like the teaching that a *dvandva* denotes the group (*saṅgha*) when it takes the singular number.

[When P. 2.4.2. says that a *dvandva* compound made up of words expressive of limbs of living beings or of musicians or of the personnel of an army stands for the group, it is only stating what the word does naturally. Similarly, when P. 2.4.14 says that a *dvandva* of words denoting curds, milk etc. does not stand for the group, that is also a statement of a fact of the language. Where the rule says that the compound denotes the group or its parts optionally, that is also the statement of a natural fact. No prescription can give to a word a power which it has not.]

43. Semantic connection (*sāmarthyā*) is mentioned in a general way (in the *śāstra*) but students who know usage have made a distinction within it for a compound and for a sentence according to what is seen in the world.

[P. 2.1.1. says that rules relating to finished words apply when there is semantic connection. Scholars who know usage and the natural power of words have decided that this semantic connection is of the nature of interdependence (*vyapekṣā*) in a sentence and of integration (*ekārthibhāva*) in complex formations like a compound. That is why this rule applies even in connection with the change of *s* into *ṣ* as there can be *vyapekṣā* there.]

How is this distinction made within what is stated in a general manner?

44. The elision (of the case-endings, is not improper considering that this meaning is not there. That is why the name 'compound' is taught when there is integration of meaning.

[Compounding has been thought of as taking place in two ways : (1) by the giving up of its meaning by the secondary word (*jahatsvārthā vṛtti*) (2) by its not doing so. In the first way, the meaning of the secondary word is not there at all. In the second way, even if the secondary word does not give up its meaning, it is mixed up with that of the primary word and so has no separate existence and so no relation based on difference is possible. Nor is any particular number understood from it. It is, therefore, natural that the case-ending should be considered to have disappeared because of that. That is why integration of meaning is supposed to take place in a compound. In a sentence, on the other hand, where each word exists separately, a particular number is understood and so the case-ending is retained. It is seen that the sentence and the compound have each its own scope. They are not exactly alternate ways of saying the same thing. That is why giving option between the two has been declared to be improper.]

45. Others think that option based on delimitation of scope within semantic connection in general has been given as follows : — the sentence to be used where there is interdependence and the compound elsewhere (that is, in integration of meaning.)

[Others think that Pāṇini himself allows option. He teaches the use of the sentence where the relation between the words is interdependence of meaning and of the compound where the relation is integration of meaning. In giving this option, he follows the natural power of words. Kātyāyana, on the other hand, does not think it necessary to give any option as the sentence

and the compound are two different things and would naturally be used on different occasions.]

46. Even if secondary words like *rājan* are looked upon as identical with words like *rājan* (occurring in a sentence) because of similarity of sounds, still while it is part of a compound it can have no connection with a qualifier (outside the compound) as it would then be incapable of conveying the intended meaning.

[One consequence of the fact that in a compound integration of meaning takes place is as follows—If we take the compound *rājapuruṣaḥ*, the two words *rājan* and *puruṣa* seem to be the same as in the sentence *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*. But there is a difference. We can say *ṛddhasya rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ* = 'the prosperous king's man' but we cannot say *ṛddhasya rājapuruṣaḥ*. The secondary word in a compound cannot be qualified by a word outside the compound, because the secondary word is linked to the primary word of the compound (*puruṣa*). It is not independent. That is not the case in a sentence. There the word *rājan* is independent. The word *rāja* in the compound looks like the other word and we identify them. But they are not the same. That is why the secondary word in the compound cannot be qualified by a word outside the compound. If it does, the intended meaning would not be conveyed.]

It is now stated that where the intended meaning is conveyed, the secondary word can be connected with an outside qualifier.

47. A related word, when used, always requires some other idea for its completion. Even when it enters a compound, this requirement, like its own meaning, is not lost.

[Where the intended meaning would be conveyed, the

secondary word can be connected with a qualifier outside the compound. For example, if it is a *sambandhiśabd* = 'a related word', that is, a word always expressive of an idea requiring another idea for its completion, it can have a *viśeṣaṇa* = qualifier. There is the compound *gurukulam* = 'the Guru's institution'. Here 'guru' is the secondary word. Now the idea of *guru* is a relative idea. Nobody is a *guru* except in relation to somebody else who is a *śiṣya* = disciple. The meaning of the word *guru* requires the idea of disciple for its completion. The two ideas are always related, even when the word enters into a compound like *gurukulam*. Therefore, a qualifier which is not a part of the compound can be used in connection with it. We can say *devadattasya gurukulam* = 'Devadatta's *guru's* institution'. The intended meaning would be conveyed.]

48. Even if the qualifiers are connected with the compound as a whole like *gurukula*, it is only after being connected with the secondary parts of it that they are connected with the whole.

[Some argue that in such cases, the qualifier is connected with the meaning of the whole compound and not with that of the secondary word. Even then, it becomes connected with the meaning of the whole only indirectly. It is first connected with the meaning of the secondary word. Thus, ultimately, there is no difference in meaning in the two ways of explaining the compound.]

How can there be a difference between the sentence and the compound, considering that the latter comes in place of the former ?

49. Many methods are adopted in order to make the ignorant understand. Being different sets of words, the sentence and the compound are quite different from each other.

[Compounds like *rājapuruṣa* denote a whole, a qualified whole. They are really indivisible. But they are artificially divided for the purposes of grammar. These divisions are like the drawing of an animal. It helps us to understand the real animal. But the drawing is, after all, different from the real object. To identify the two is really a mistake. Similarly the sentence which explains the meaning of a compound is really different from a compound. The relation between its words is *vyapekṣā* whereas in a compound, it is *ekārthībhāva*. Where the meaning is different, the word is also different, in spite of resemblance in the sounds of the words. Even this resemblance is reduced when ends of compounds undergo change (*saṁāsānta*).]

If case-endings, seen in a sentence are elided in a compound, why is the elision of words like *yukta* also not taught ?

50. In the case of compounds like *goratha*, words like *yukta* are not seen in the sentence nor in the compound. That is why its elision is not taught in the *śāstra*.

[In a compound, the elision of case-endings is taught in P. 2.4.71 so that we may obtain the correct form. The case-endings actually exist in the sentence. Only the elision of those things are taught which actually existed in the sentence before the compound was formed. *Goratha* is not a compound derived from the sentence *goyukto rathaḥ*. It is formed out of *gavāṁ rathaḥ*, in which the word *yukta* does not exist. There can, therefore, be no question of its elision being taught. The sixth case-ending stands for the relation of *vāhya*=‘what is to be drawn’ and *vāhana*=‘that which draws’ between *go* and *ratha* which is not possible unless some such action as is denoted by the root *yuj* is understood by us. But the *śāstra* does not teach the elision of all that is understood. If it did, there would be no end to what would have to be taught.]

In connection with the compounds *goratha*, *dadhyodana* and *dadhighaṭa*, one does see the sentences *goyukto rathaḥ*, *dadhyupasikta odanaḥ*, and *dadhipūrṇo ghaṭaḥ* actually used. Similarly, in con-

nection with the compound *prapaṇa*, one does see the sentence *pragalapaṇa* or *prapatītaṇa* actually used. Therefore, the *śāstra* should have taught the elision of the elements *yukta*, *upasikta*, *pūrṇa*, *gata* etc. This objection is answered as follows—

51. Sometimes in a sentence *yukta* etc. are used and so is the word *gata* used in connection with the compounds *prapaṇa* and *prapalāśa*. That is because they are quite different words altogether.

[Sentences are of two kinds : (1) those which are used in the world, (2) those that are used in the *śāstra* to explain the grammatical process (*prakriyāvākyam*). These latter are not used in the world. They are like drawings of animals. In these latter kind of sentences, words like *yukta* are not found. They are found in the sentences actually used in the world. These sentences used in the world are alternative ways of saying what the compounds say. They are like synonyms. They may also vary from speaker to speaker. Grammar cannot teach the elision of what is found in such sentences.]

Others look at it differently.

52. Others, by identifying the means (with the end, that is, what is to be explained) think that in both the compound and the sentence, there is the relation of qualifier and the qualified and that they have a common basis.

[The compound is really indivisible. As it is difficult to grammatically explain the indivisible, it is analysed into sentences resembling those used in the world. The ignorant think that compounds and such analytic sentences have the same meaning. For instance, in the sentence *nīlam utpalam* = 'a blue lotus', there is the relation of apposition (*sāmānādhikarāṇya*) between *nīla* and *utpala*. They are also related as *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*. Therefore they argue that the same holds good for the

compound *nīlotpalam*. The same thing can be said about the sentence *rājāḥ puruṣaḥ* and the compound *rājapuruṣaḥ*. In both, there is a relation different from apposition between the two words and they also stand as *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* to each other. In other words, according to these scholars, there is *vyapekṣā* = 'interdependence of meaning' in both the sentence and the compound. They hold that words are effects (*kārya*) and so, even in a compound, the relation between words is *vyapekṣā*, because the compound is taught as an alternative to the sentence. It must therefore, have the same meaning. It is true that in a compound the elision of the case-ending is taught but that does not mean that its sense is absent. The stem itself can express it according to the view that the stem can denote five things, namely, *jāti*, *dravya*, *saṃkhyā*, *liṅga* and *kāraka*. Thus the sentence and the compound are synonymous. There is no such thing as *ekārthibhāva* = "integration of meaning", that would bring about a difference in a compound. Everywhere, *vyapekṣā* is the relation.]

The above view is now refuted.

53. Just as the word *vykṣa* conveys a single particular meaning, in the same way compounds like *nīlotpala* are without divisions.

[It has been shown before that a word like *vykṣa* has no parts really and that its meaning is also indivisible. Similarly, compounds like *rājapuruṣa*, *nīlotpala* have no parts and they denote a single meaning, cognised by a single act of cognition. Parts in a compound are just postulations and they form sentences not far removed from the compound in meaning. In a sentence, the meanings of the different words remain separate. Hence the case-endings connecting them are necessary. Not so in compounds where the meanings merge into each other and become one and so their mutual relation disappears and so do the case-endings which express it. Nor is any particular number understood. What is understood is *abhedaikatvasaṃkhyā* = "the undifferentiated singular number". (See Bhartṛhari p. 384 ff.). As the meaning of the secondary word is mixed up with that of the primary words, the former cannot be connected with a qualifier outside

the compound. In a *dvandva*, if the word *ca* is not used it is because the group is more important than the constituents severally. That, in a compound, integration of meaning takes place is the finally accepted view.]

It is now stated that, in some cases, there is not even the usual resemblance between the complex formations and the corresponding sentence.

54. Nor is there any resemblance in the case of *śrotriya* and *kṣetriya* as one finds in the case of *Vāsiṣṭha* and *Gārgya*. As there is no similarity of form, one sees difference in the world.

[In order to explain the complex *taddhita* formation *vāsiṣṭha* and *Gārgya* one postulates stems *Vasiṣṭha* and *Garga* and the suffixes *aṇ* and *yaṇ* (P. 4.1.114 and 4.1.105) respectively which do resemble, the *taddhita* derivatives. But what about *Śrotriya*? According to P.5.2. 84, it is supposed to be formed from the stem *chandas* by the addition of the suffix *ghaṇ*, in the sense of the sentence *chando'adhite*. Here there is no resemblance at all between the derived word and the corresponding sentence. The same is true of *kṣetriya* formed according to P. 5.2.92.)

55. In a compound, sometimes there is no difference as there is in the case of the compound *saptaparṇa*. The distinction between purely conventional words and others is made only for the sake of explanation

[The compound *saptaparṇa* is usually analysed as : *parvaṇi parvaṇi sapta parṇāṇy asya* = 'that which has seven leaves at every joint.' The word *parvan* is not found in the compound at all, though the repetition of it in the analytic sentence shows that it is an important element in the meaning. It is because of this that such a compound is said to be a *rūḍhi*, a mere conventional word whereas compounds like *rājapuruṣa* are said to be *yauḡika* words, that is words having meaningful parts. The conclusion from

all this is that compounds are indivisible units. They are artificially analysed into parts for the sake of explanation. They are quite different from the corresponding sentences.]

It is now stated why in a *bahuvrīhi* comprising more than two constituents, intermediate compounding of two constituents does not take place.

56. Neither compounding by the general rule (that is, *sup supā*) nor the one taught by the special rule (P. 2. 1. 57) would operate because of the word *bahulam* (in P. 2. 1. 57.)

57. If in the case of the compound *susūkṣmajaṭā-keśa*, intermediate compounding takes place first, its accent, would set aside (the *bahuvrīhi*) accent, having been caused by internal circumstances (*antara-ṅgatvāt*).

[In a *bahuvrīhi* compound, it is possible to have more than two words. There are as many as four in *susūkṣmajaṭākeśa* = one having hair made up of very thin tresses'. It might be asked whether, before the *bahuvrīhi* is made up, intermediate compounding according to P. 2.1.4. or 2.1.57 takes place of two constituents at a time? The answer given is that it does not. Because, if it does, it would have the accent on the final syllable and that would conflict with the *bahuvrīhi* accent taught in P. 6.2.1. which is the desired one.]

Why not say that intermediate compounding does not take place because of the general option given in P. 2.1.11.? Why attribute it to the force of *bahulam* in P. 2.1.57.?

58. If a compound is made of all the constituents, there cannot be option as far as compounding of parts is concerned. The reserved scope of the general option given in P. 2. 1. 11. is the sentence (*bheda*).

[The intermediate compounding does not take place because of the word *bahulam* in P. 2.1.57 and not because of P. 2.1.11. The latter rule only means that where integration of meaning is meant, there compounding is compulsory and where interdependence of meaning is meant, there would be no compounding. In a *bahuvrīhi* which is made in the sense of an outside word, the constituents are necessarily connected with one another and integration would result and so compounding should take place, including intermediate compounding. But the latter is made optional by the word *bahulam* in P. 2.1.57. Intermediate compounding does take place in the case of the *bahuvrīhi* compounds : *pañcagavadhana* and *vāktvacapriya*.]

59. As integration of meaning is not the scope of the general option, if it does not apply there, it does not become scopeless. When integration of meaning (*abheda*) is meant, then differentiation would be completely excluded.

[The option not to have compounding allowed by P. 2.1.11 is restricted to where there is interdependence of meaning. That is its scope. If it is not applied where there is integration of meaning, it does not become scopeless. To detach two words out of the four to be made up into a *bahuvrīhi* implies differentiation. But all differentiation is excluded where integration is meant. That is why intermediate compounding done by detaching two words is set aside by the word *bahulam*. It is the *bahuvrīhi* accent taught in P. 6.2.1. which is desired here.]

It is now stated that where there is no conflict between the accent of the intermediate compound and that of the final one, the former would take place.

60. In the compounding of three words as in *mahākaṣṭaśritaḥ*, there is no difference because the substitution of the final of the constituent by *ā* is not prohibited.

[When the three words *mahat kaṣṭam śritaḥ* are made into a compound, we get the form *mahākaṣṭaśritaḥ* as follows—*mahat* and *kaṣṭam* will be compounded first according to P. 2.1.61. The final of *mahat* will be replaced by 'ā' according to P. 6.3.46. We get *mahākaṣṭam* with the accent as marked according to P. 6.1.223. Then *mahākaṣṭam* is compounded with *śrita* by P. 2.1.24. We get *mahākaṣṭaśrita*, with the accent remaining the same according to P. 6.2.47. Thus, when there is no conflict in accent, intermediate compounding is allowed. See Dr. S. D. Joshi-Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya—Samarthāhnikā*. p. 23.]

Sometimes, however, there is conflict in accent.

61. In *mahāraṇyātīta* formed out of three words, there is difference in accent, because the accent of the intermediate compound, being occasioned by internal factors, sets aside the accent of the final compound.

[In compounding the three words *mahad aranyam atītaḥ*, we begin, with the intermediate compound *mahāraṇyam* which will get the accent on the final syllable by P. 6.1.223. Then we make the three-word compound *mahāraṇyātīta* which should get its accent on the final *ta* by P. 6.2.144. But the accent of the intermediate compound will prevail because it is *antaraṅga* and that is not desired.]

62. As the *satīṣiṣṭa* accent is stronger, it will come in the final two-word compound. Therefore here the three words are not simultaneously made into a single compound.

[First *mahad* and *aranyam* are compounded into *mahāraṇyam* by P. 2.1.61. and it would have the accent on the final syllable by P. 6.1.223. Then *mahāraṇyam* and *atīta* are compounded by P. 2.1.24. and we would get *mahāraṇyātīta* with the accent on the final *ta* by P. 6.2.144. As this accent comes in when the previous

accent is already there, it is said to be *saśiṣṭa* which is considered to be stronger. On this point, see the *Siddhāntakaumudī* on P. 6.1.158. Thus there is conflict between the accent of the middle word and that of the final word in this three-word compound and so it is not formed.]

63. According to those who hold that if *kaṣṭa* is connected with what follows, it would cease to be 'exalted' (*pūjyamāna*), there would be no relation of qualifier and qualified either according to them.

[In regard to the three words *mahat kaṣṭam śritaḥ*, if the word *kaṣṭa* is linked with the word *śrita* which follows, it would have no connection with the word *mahat* which precedes, nor could it be called *pūjyamāna* = 'exalted', a condition for compounding *mahat* and *kaṣṭam* according to P.2.1.61. If there is no connection between the two words, there cannot be the relation of qualifier and qualified either.]

The subject of difference between the sentence and the compound is further considered.

64. Even if a qualifier of the primary or the secondary object is mentioned in the sentence, it is never so in the compound, because they are totally different expressions.

[In the sentence *ṛddhasya rājñah puruṣaḥ* = 'the prosperous king's man', a qualifier of the secondary word *rājñah* is mentioned. But not so in the compound *rājapuruṣaḥ*. This can be explained only according to the view that the sentence and the compound are totally different expressions. If the compound is held to be derived from the sentence, the properties of the latter should be seen in the former. Similarly, in a *bahuvrīhi* compound, the *anyapadārtha*, the meaning of the outside word is included only in a very general way whereas in a sentence like *citrā gāvo yaśya*

Devadattasya, it is specified by the word *Devadatta* which cannot form part of the compound *citraṅgulī*.]

In view of the previous statement that the secondary word in a compound cannot be connected with a qualifier outside it, the expression *kṛtapūrvī kaṭam* is now going to be considered.

65. Even though the connection with a particular action is conveyed by the words *kṛta* etc. (in a sentence), in the compound, it is another word *kṛta* which is found, not connected in meaning with any particular object.

[The expression *kṛtapūrvī kaṭam* is explained by the sentence *kṛtaḥ pūrvam kṛto'nena* = "a mat has been made by him previously". In this sentence, the fact that the *kaṭa* is the grammatical object (*karma*) of the action of making is conveyed by the suffix *kta* in *kṛtaḥ* and that is why there is no second case-ending expressive of *karma* after the word *kaṭa*. In the compound *kṛtapūrvī*, the meaning of *kṛta* is mixed up with that of the main word *pūrvī* and so loses its independence and is not in apposition with *kaṭam*.]

66. The word ending in the suffix *kta* being thus intransitive, it expresses mere action. Therefore, the agent who is already connected with action (in *kṛta-pūrvī*) becomes further connected with the object of action (like *kaṭam*)

[In the sentence, the word *kṛta* is connected with a particular object but that object cannot enter into the compound *kṛta-pūrvī*. So here *kṛta* has no connection with a particular object. That is why it is said to be intransitive (*akarmaka*) and therefore, expressive of mere action (*bhāvābhidhāyi*). If at all, it expresses the object in a very general way. A verb which expresses the object in a general way is also *akarmaka* as in the sentence : *Dikṣito na*

dadāti. Here *dadāti* is *akarmaka*. In *kṛtapūrvī*, the agent expressed by the *taddhita* suffix is qualified by mere action. Such an agent can be connected with an object conveyed by a word outside the compound, in the present case by the word *kaṣam*

67. Just as the action expressed by the word *gata* and the like is indistinct (*avigrahā*) and is connected with an object like *grāma* so is the case in *kṛtapūrvī* and the like.

[In *kṛtapūrvī*, the action of making is understood as one with the agent and not as distinct from it and yet it becomes connected with an object expressed by an outside word. It is as in the sentence : *grāmaṃ gato devadattaḥ* = "Devadatta has gone to the village". In *gataḥ*, the suffix expresses the agent and the action of going is not understood as distinct from it. It is, therefore, *avigrahā* = indistinct, having no separate form. And yet it is connected with the object expressed by another word in the sentence namely, *grāmam*. That is what happens in *kṛtapūrvī kaṣam*. Everywhere action is understood as connected with some accessory or other and it is expressed by the stem or the root to which is added the suffix which expresses the accessory as in *gataḥ* or *gacchati*.]

How to explain the fact that expressions like *muṇḍayati*, *sūtrayati* can be connected with an outside word expressive of an object ?

68. *Muṇḍi*, *sūtri* etc. appear to have parts which are really non-existent. They are divided into parts which are fictitious. They are roots like *kuṭṭi*, *carci*.

[*Muṇḍayati*, *sūtrayati* etc. are not in the same position as *kṛtapūrvī*. They express special actions and can, therefore, be connected with their respective objects like *māṇavaka* or *vyākaraṇa* directly in sentences like : *māṇavakaṃ muṇḍayati* = 'he shaves the student's head', *vyākaraṇam sūtrayati* = 'he writes grammar in *sūtra* form'. To explain *muṇḍayati* as *muṇḍam karoti*, that is, to

divide it into parts is only a technical means of explaining it. In reality, it has no parts. Therefore, the objection that *muṇḍa* does not express action at all and, therefore, how can it be connected with an external word expressive of an object like *māṇavaka* does not hold good. It is *muṇḍayati* which is directly connected with *māṇavaka* and not *muṇḍa* which is fictitious.]

69. In the word *putrīyati*, there is no part like *putra*. It expresses a special desire which relates to a son even though the word *putra* is not to be understood as a part of it.

[In other complex formations also, artificial divisions are made. There is no word *putra* in *putrīyati* though it is analysed as : *putram ātmāna icchati*. The word merely expresses a particular desire, the desire for a son.]

Why is *putrīyati* not connected with another word in the sentence expressive of a particular object ?

70. It is like the root *dhāri* having *prāṇa* as the object in the verb *jīvati*. Really speaking, there is no *dhāri* in it nor *prāṇa*. The word *jīvati* expresses a particular action.

[Even though the word *putrīyati* expresses the desire for a son, it is not connected in the sentence with a word standing for a particular son. It is like the word *jīvati* which is not connected in the sentence with a *karma*. It is usually explained as *prāṇān dhārayati* but this is only an explanation. It has no parts like *dhāri* or *prāṇa*. The whole word expresses the action of living.]

71. Similarly, from the word *putrīyati* that is, in (*putrīya*) a particular action is understood without the help of parts like *iṣi* and *putra*. For the purpose

of grammatical derivation, meaningful parts similar to independent words are postulated.

[To explain *putriyati* by bringing in the root *i* and its object *putra* is only for the sake of grammatical derivation. They do not exist.]

72. By the use of the suffix *kyac* expressive of another idea, the idea in question would be set aside. Therefore, even though the suffix *kyac* expressive of desire has an object, it is used only in a sentence.

An illustration is now given.

73. The word formed with the suffix *ṭañ* (P. 3.1.23.) being reserved for the well-known idea of disapproval of the action, such a word is not used to express repetition, because the form would be the same (and so there might be misunderstanding).

[The expressions *lolupyate*, *caṅkramyate* *jaṅgamyate*, formed with *ṭañ* (P. 3. 1. 23 and 24) express the idea of disapproval of conduct or crookedness of the gait. That is why, even though the same suffix is taught in the sense of the repetition of the action, it is not used in that sense as there is a possibility of misunderstanding. To express the idea of repetition, the sentence is used; *punaḥ punaḥ krāmati* and not the complex formation (*vr̥tti*) *caṅkramyate*.]

74. In whatever way words are divided into apparent parts according to one's choice, so they are grammatically derived. The *śāstra* is really far from the reality.

[The division of words is only for the sake of grammatical derivation. The word is really indivisible. There are different ways of splitting the same word. There is no fixity about it. Different systems of grammar may do it differently. The result is that the Science of Grammar is very far from the reality.]

75. It is after seeing the persistence of some common meaning that the word is abstracted from the sentence, the root from the word, and a part from the root as in the case of *muṇḍi*.

[It is the sentence which is stable because it is the indivisible sentence which is expressive. From the particularised sentence-meaning, generalised meanings are abstracted and the verbal elements expressive of them are called 'words' and they are grammatically derived. The indivisible sentence cannot be so derived. The abstracted word, with its general meaning, is the same in all the sentences and it can, therefore, be grammatically derived. But the general meaning is abstracted from the particularised sentence-meaning and not that the latter emerges when the general meanings come together. Both the individual word and its meaning are fictions. The word is also artificially divided into parts like root, stem, suffix etc. The process has to stop at the phoneme. The division of the phoneme would not have even a practical value.]

76. As far as the correct form is concerned, there is no diversity in usage. It is the method of grammatical derivation which is not fixed. One should not look upon as real the means of derivation adopted for the benefit of students.

[Even though methods of grammatical derivation may differ, the correct word remains the same. There is no variation there. The divisions made for explanation disappear after the work is done and the indivisible word is understood. The divisions represent *avidyā* and they are only a means to an end which is *vidyā*. Everywhere *avidyā* is the means to *vidyā*. What is described in the *śāstra* is *avidyā*.]

77. *Ḍayati* in *Dittha* is similar to *pacati* in *pācaka*. Both *ḍayati* and *paci* are unknown in the world.

[In the matter of the fictitiousness of the parts, there is no difference between *Yadyecchā śabda* = 'arbitrary words' like *Ḍittha* and those based on reason like *pācaka*. It is from the whole word that the meaning is understood in the world. Deriving *Ḍittha* from the root *ḍayati* which is meaningless is the same process as deriving *pācaka* from the root *pac* which has a meaning.]

78. The cultured infer stem and suffix from the word and the word from them and from the indicatory letters (*anubandha*), accent etc. The *śāstra* is not meant for them.

[From the indivisible, divisions are fictitiously made by the cultured in order to teach the ignorant. It is the cultured who are the authority in the matter of words. They see the truth and accept as correct whatever leads to merit and accordingly split words into stems and suffixes. From them, the students understand the whole word. Words like *Ḍittha* are taught as wholes directly (*pratyakṣakalpana*). Stems and suffixes are inferred. In the case of words like *pacati*, stems and suffixes are taught and the whole has to be formed (inferred) from them. Thus words are taught in two ways : Through *nipātana* and *vidhi*. As for the cultured (*śiṣṭas*) whose knowledge is without any limitation and who are evolutes from *pratibhā* = pure knowledge, they see the truth of everything and do not depend upon the teaching of others. The very fact that they do not depend upon these artificial divisions for understanding the indivisible whole shows that these divisions are unreal. From their use of the correct forms taught in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, we know that they are cultured.]

79. One who relies entirely on *śāstra* incurs sin when doubts arise in the understanding of *sāstra*. The *sāstra* is the eye of those who do not see the correct words used by the cultured.

[The *śāstra* contains words like *bahulam*, *anyatarasyām*, *ekeṣām*

etc. and so the exact scope of some rules is not clearly understood. In such cases, if one does not see how the cultured use the correct words but relies entirely on *śāstra* one is likely to use incorrect words and incur sin. Merit and demerit depend upon use. One must, therefore, be guided by the usage of the cultured. One can infer who the cultured are by seeing them use correct words even without studying the *śāstra*. By watching their use of words, one can remove doubts which arise when one studies the *śāstra*.]

If *śāstra* is the eye of those who cannot see the usage of the cultured, why is it sometimes declared unnecessary ?

80. As there is the possibility of another meaning being understood, the order of words in *rājadanta*, *āhitāgni* etc. and *rājāśva* etc. is not altered.

[Even though the *śāstra* is the eye, it is sometimes discarded as unnecessary when, even without it, the right form would be used, as otherwise, some other meaning could be conveyed. For example, if one says *dantarāja* instead of *rājadanta*, some other meaning would be conveyed. So one is bound to say *rājadanta*. Where no wrong use is ever heard, there is no use in having *śāstra*. Where the same meaning would be understood no matter what the order of the constituents is, there also there is no need to have *śāstra*, as, for example, in *āhitāgni*. *Agnyāhita* would mean the same thing.]

If *śāstra* is unnecessary where incorrect use of a word does not take place, why is elision of the suffix taught in *gargāḥ* ?

81. In the case of words like *gargāḥ* which, without the suffix (expressive of progeny, *apatya*) convey a meaning in addition to that of the stem, the elision is taught so that their correctness may be understood.

[The words *gargāḥ*, *vatsāḥ* have no *apatya* suffix at the end and yet express the meaning of *apatya*. The grammatical tradition is that, a bare stem, without a suffix, is incorrect and should

not be used. The *sūtra* P. 2. 4. 64. teaches elision of the *apatya* suffix *yañ* and *añ* in the plural in order that such words may not be considered incorrect.]

82. If it is said that because of the relation of identity words like *babhru* would be used without the suffix, then elision should be considered as meant for restriction to progeny.

[The teaching of the elision of the suffix expressive of descendants in *gargāḥ* etc. can be explained in another way. The elision is taught in order that the meaning of progeny may be understood and not some other meaning like 'disciples'. If the ancestor and the progeny are identified (*so'yam ityabhisambandhaḥ*), then the word *gargāḥ*, even without the suffix, can denote progeny but it can denote disciples also. In order that it may denote progeny only, the elision of the suffix expressive of it is taught.]

83. Even if there is the relation of identity, without an element expressive of gender, a word like *praṣṭha* would not necessarily convey the idea of wife.

[According to P. 4. 1. 48, the word *praṣṭhī* is formed in the sense of 'wife of *praṣṭha*' = 'leader about to go forth'. Merely by the relation of identity, the word *praṣṭha* cannot be applied to a woman connected with *praṣṭha*. Because of the word *ākhyāyām*, the feminine suffix can be added to the word *praṣṭha* expressive of the man. If we first add a *taddhita* suffix in the sense of 'belonging to' (*tasyedam*. P. 4. 3. 120) to get the meaning of wife, we would get *prāṣṭha* and to that the feminine suffix cannot be added because *prāṣṭha* is never applied to 'the leader about to go forth,' and so the condition mentioned in *ākhyāyām* is not fulfilled. And so the suffix is added to *praṣṭha* and we get *praṣṭhī* which can mean only wife because it is she who normally makes the necessary arrangements when the husband is about to go forth on some business.]

84. Once the relation of measure and measured

is accepted, there would be incorrectness in words like *prastha* if a *taddhita* suffix is not added (by P. 5.1.57).

85. Optionally, the *taddhita* suffix would be added by *Yogavibhāga*-splitting of the rule or there would be a sentence. But the first case-ending is taught when the stem denotes measure as an additional idea (in P. 2.3.46).

[We have the expression *prastho vrīhiḥ* = "paddy measuring one *prastha*". The word *prastha* stands for a measure and here it means 'paddy measuring one *prastha*'. Even if one assumes the relation of identity here, the relation of measure and measured would not necessarily be understood. Relations like proximity are also possible. In order that the relation of measure and measured may be understood, either a *taddhita* suffix would have to be added by P. 5. 1. 57 in which case we would get the form *prāsthika* or a whole sentence would have to be used : *prasthaḥ parimāṇam eṣaṃ vrīhiṇām*. By especially mentioning *parimāṇa* = 'measure' in P. 2. 3. 46., we have been told that the first case-ending expresses that idea. The *taddhita* suffix is not wanted. The first case-ending would do.]

86. That is an indication that the extra-meaning (that is, the relation of measure and measured) is correct. The word thus expressive of the extra-meaning is connected with words ending in all the other case-endings.

[The fact that the first case-ending is taught in the sense of measure is an indication that the extra meaning, namely, the relation of measure and measured is to be expressed. This extra meaning is an inner meaning and the first case-ending expresses it. But it is superseded by the other case-endings when the action denoted by the sentence brings in the *kāraka* relation like *karma*. That is why we say : *prasthaṃ pacati*, *prasthena kṛitam* etc.]

Why is the elision of the *matuṣ* suffix taught after words expressive of quality ?

87. As expressions in which the two are presented separately are available, there is elision of *matuṣ* in a word like *śuklaḥ* in order that there may be no incorrectness. Words like *śukla* are correct like *bidāḥ* and similar words.

[Words sometimes express the qualified and the qualifier as separate things as in *paṭasya śuklaḥ* = 'The white (colour) of the cloth.' Here the two words have different case-endings. But in *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ* = 'white cloth', they have the same case-ending because the object and its quality are not presented as separate things. But then, the *matuṣ* suffix should have come after the word *śukla* (by P. 5. 2. 94) to indicate that the colour belongs to the object. Otherwise, the word could be considered incorrect. In order that it may not be so considered, the elision of the *matuṣ* is taught. Though the suffix is not there, the word is still a *vṛtti*, a complex formation because it denotes a thing as qualified by a quality. It is like the word *gargāḥ* which means the descendants of *garga* even though the *apatya* suffix *yañ* has been elided. It is not because of the relation of identity between the quality and the qualified that the word *śukla* is correct, but because elision of *matuṣ* has been taught.]

The author now resumes consideration of the relation of the qualifier and the qualified in a *vṛtti* (complex formation or integration of meaning).

88. Some declare that integration of meaning (*vṛtti*) takes place when after the (cognition of the) qualifier, it is added on to the qualified and then it disappears.

[To the objection that, as, in a *vṛtti*, there is integration of meaning, how can there be the relation of qualifier and qualified which presupposes difference, some give the following

answer. If both the *viśeṣaṇa* and the *viśeṣya* are understood in one act of cognition, they cannot have anything to do with each other and so there cannot be the relation of qualifier and qualified. But they cannot be grasped in one verbal cognition because the two words came in a sequence and so the two meanings also must be understood in a sequence. So the qualifier is understood first and it is added to the qualified which is grasped next. After that, when the two are unified, the qualifier as such does not exist. After qualifying the *viśeṣya*, it disappears. So all that remains is the qualified *viśeṣya* and that is understood from the compound.]

89. The previous cognition of the *nimitta* (*viśeṣaṇa*) does not affect the *nimittin* (*viśeṣya*) nor is the cognition of the latter coloured by that of the *nimitta*.

90. Nor are the two connected by remembrance caused by the knowledge of the latter accompanied by the impression of the former.

[This explanation is not satisfactory. The previous cognition of the *viśeṣaṇa* does not affect the *viśeṣya* because the latter does not then exist. When the *viśeṣya* is grasped, it is not grasped as qualified by the *viśeṣaṇa* which had disappeared without qualifying the *viśeṣaṇa*. Each one has been grasped in its own form and not as *viśeṣaṇa* or *viśeṣya*. Therefore this relation of qualifier and qualified has not been grasped. Nor can one argue that the cognition of the *viśeṣya* is coloured by the impression of the cognition of the *viśeṣaṇa* and that the impression produces a remembrance which brings about the relation of qualifier and qualified. Remembrance only follows previous experience and it cannot unite the two by the relation of qualifier and qualified. Nor does one get over the difficulty by saying that the relation is brought about by an inner power of the experiencer, because, in that case, it would be the creation of the experiencer and not real.]

91. If it is all the work of the mind, it is useless to postulate the existence of the external object.

Therefore, either is either no service or the object perceived is not such.

[If the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* is the work of the mind of the experiencer, why not say that everything is really the mind appearing as external? Why postulate the existence of the external object? Why say that the relation of qualifier and qualified is something which exists in the external object?]

92. Because everything is mixed up the cognition also takes place as something combined (*anusyūteva*.) Those who explain analyse it and present it differentiated.

93. In something the essence of which is indivisible, by resorting to separate cognition (that is, analysis) one sees divisions as it were between the qualifier and the qualified.

[After having shown that the relation of qualifier and qualified cannot be explained on the basis of separate cognitions of the two, the author now sets forth his own view based on the idea that the two are grasped in one cognition. Cognitions take place according to the nature of objects. Objects are combined unities and so are cognitions. The object, as qualified by universal, quality etc. enters into cognition as one. It is not that objects are first cognised separately and then combined. Our cognition is one and is intertwined with all the elements like the universal, quality etc. In reality, objects are not combinations of separately existing elements. The two things, substance and quality, in a thing like a blue lotus appear in one single cognition and there is no relation of qualifier and qualified between them based on difference. But one cannot communicate such complex indivisible unities to others. So at the time of communication, the complex unity is analysed into its elements and they are communicated separately. The listeners also understand them in that way. The relation of qualifier and qualified does exist in the external object and it is analysed separately for the purpose of communication. The elements analysed such as subs-

tance, quality, universal, the relation of inherence are all real. By the method of analysis, the complex unity is communicated. In this analysis, the relation of qualifier and qualified also comes out. The analysis and communication take place in sentences, but the impressions of the sentence-stage persist and so the relation of qualifier and qualified is understood in the *vytti* also. Really speaking, the *vytti* itself is indivisible. Thus, there is difference between the sentence and the *vytti*.]

The author now explains another view mentioned in the *Bhāṣya*.

94. Some, while explaining complex formations for the benefit of the ignorant, declare that the conveying of the meaning of another, involves both abandonment (*tyāga*) of one's own meaning and addition (*abhyuccaya*) to the meaning of the primary word.

[Some look upon the compound word (*vytti*) as made out of the sentence which is eternal. The compound is thus an effect and the effect may have properties which the cause did not have. In this case, the extra property is *parāṛthābhidhānam* = "the conveying of the meaning of another word." The secondary word (*upasarjana*) in the compound expresses the meaning of the primary word. In *rājapuruṣaḥ*, *rāja* expresses the meaning of *puruṣa*. Some think that it gives up its own meaning before expressing the meaning of another, just as a carpenter, engaged to do some royal business, gives up his own work. Others think that it does not give up its own meaning and yet expresses an additional meaning. Thus there are two possibilities: *jahatsvārthā vyttiḥ* = compounding by giving up one's meaning and *ajahatsvārthā vyttiḥ* = compounding by not giving up one's own meaning. The meaning of *rājā* qualifies that of *puruṣa*. Thus both the meanings do come in the compound. This does not, however, bring in the dual number because the compound expresses one integrated meaning and not two separate meanings. In a compound, the secondary word gives up its own meaning only after having qualified the meaning of the main word. In other words, in *parāṛthābhidhāna*, there are both *tyāga* and *abhyuccaya*.]

95. The meaning of the secondary word is understood because its traces persist or that part which is opposed to the meaning of the main word is abandoned. Some also declare the secondary word to have a double meaning.

[About the role of the secondary word in a compound there are several views. Some say that some trace of its meaning is left even if it is abandoned, just as the changed colour of an object due to heat persists even after the heat has been removed. Another view is that only that part of the meaning of the secondary word disappears which is opposed to the meaning of the main word. So much for *jahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ*. Some hold that the secondary word keeps its meaning and also expresses that of the main word. It qualifies with its meaning the meaning of the main word. Thus it is *dvārtha*. There are also those who hold that the secondary word completely gives up its meaning and that the meaning of the main word alone is understood from the compound. Thus the main word and the compound become synonyms.]

In what sense there is *jahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ* is now explained.

96. The splitting-up is only a means, the compound is one whole. Difference and connection can be understood either as alternatives or together.

[Even though a qualified meaning is understood from a compound as from a sentence, still there is *jahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ*. The meaning of the secondary word abandons its primary character and becomes a mere qualifier of the meaning of the main word. But the compound does express one qualified meaning and the compound is also one single word. While explaining it, it is split up into parts but that is only a means to an end. The meaning of the sentence, namely, difference and connection, are found in the compound also either as alternatives or together in the relation of primary and secondary.]

97. Those who explain complex formations in order to instruct the ignorant adopt different and variable methods of explanation.

[Those who think that the sentence and the compound have the same meaning consider that the secondary word does not give up its meaning (*ajahatsvārthā*). Those who think that they have different meanings adopt the *jahatsvārthā* view. As means of explaining indivisible words will always differ according to taste, difference of opinion is natural.]

Now something is going to be said about the number of the secondary word in a compound.

98. In a sentence, the suffixes are either expressive or indicative of different numbers. But in a compound where a part resembles them, differentiation in number disappears.

[According to the view that the meaning of the stem is the triad (*trika*), namely, *jāti*, *vyakti* and *liṅga*, the suffix is expressive (*vācaka*) of number. According to the view that the stem denotes five things (*pañcaka*), namely, *jāti*, *vyakti*, *liṅga*, *saṃkhyā* and *kāraka*, the suffix is only indicative of number. In sentences like *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*, *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ* and *rājñāṃ puruṣaḥ*, the case-ending of the first word expresses a particular number. In the compounds corresponding to these sentences, the first constituent would correspond to the first word in the sentences. It should therefore, have the same case-ending. But the elision of the case-endings of the constituents is taught by P. 2. 4. 71. As to the particular number denoted by the case-ending which is elided, what happens is that the meaning of the secondary constituent *rājan* gets mixed up with that of the primary constituent *puruṣa* and so the particular number disappears and with it the particular case-ending expressive of it. Thus the meaning of the compound is not the same as that of the corresponding sentence. They only resemble each other. In a sentence, a particular number is understood whereas in a compound, it is not.]

Thus some hold the view that the secondary constituent does not express a particular number. Others hold a different view.

99. In such cases, the undifferentiated singular number, a totally different thing, arises. It is a combination of all numbers but without any inner differentiation.

[The secondary constituent of a compound expresses *sattva* = substance (something concrete) and so it must have a number. But no particular number is understood from it. So one infers that it expresses number in general, from which, according to necessity, any required number can be understood. This is what is called *abhedaikatvasaṁkhyā* = the undifferentiated singular number.]

100. That number is said to be like honey in which the flavours of different plants have been deposited and exist in an undifferentiated form.

[It is like the flavour of honey which is an undifferentiated combination of the flavours of many flowers. The properties of the honey depend upon the properties of the flowers whose flavours have made it up. As any required number can be understood from the secondary constituent of a compound, one infers that all numbers exist in an undifferentiated state in *abhedaikatvasaṁkhyā*. It is really not a number at all. One cannot count anything with it. But it is called *saṁkhyā*, because a particular number, according to need, can be understood from it.]

Another way of looking at it is as follows—

101. It is the essence of number (*saṁkhyātmā*) because it excludes all particular numbers. It exists by the operation of the universal aspect and by ignoring the particular aspect.

[Just as the singular number excludes duality and plurality

and duality excludes plurality etc. in the same way the *abhedaikatva* excludes all particulars like singularity. Thus it has the common property of all number and so it is called *saṃkhyā*. Depending on circumstances, one can understand a particular number from it. Before it was looked upon as an amalgam of all particulars. Now it is looked upon as having the common property of all numbers, namely, the exclusion of other numbers (*bhedāpoha*). In other words it is looked upon as a kind of universal.]

It might be said that it cannot be a universal. Universals like 'cow-ness' (*gotva*) are postulated on the basis of their effect, namely, uniformity of cognition. But *abhedaikatva* cannot have any effect, because all grammatical operations take place on particular numbers. So how can one postulate the existence of *abhedaikatva*? This objection is answered as follows—

102. Just as an object is cognised (from a distance) as having some undifferentiated colour, its particular colour like white being not cognised.

103. In the same way, when a particular number is not meant to be conveyed through the secondary constituent, if anything connected with it is revealed, it is taken as the basis by the *śāstra* for the teaching of a form.

[Even if, from a distance, we cannot see the exact colour of an object, we know that it has some colour. In the same way, we know that the meaning of the secondary constituent, being *sattva*, must have some number, though we do not know which particular one. This is the effect of *abhedaikatva*. When any circumstance in connection with it is revealed, it is made use of by the *śāstra* to teach a particular form. As for instance, the substitution of *yusmad* and *asmad* by *tavaka* and *mamaka* is made use of by the *śāstra* to derive the forms *tāvakīna* and *māmakīna* in the singular by P. 4.3.3.]

104. Through the words whose powers are restricted even though meaning has many powers, that part (that is, the meaning of the first constituent) is understood as meaning in general.

[The meaning of the secondary constituent of a compound being in the nature of *sattva*, it is potentially capable of being associated with all numbers but it is not actually linked with any particular number. Words have a limited scope and do not always denote all their possible meanings.]

105. It is fit to be called undifferentiated and so it is midway between the property of indeclinables and of words having different case-endings.

[Indeclinables express a meaning which is not of the nature of *sattva* and has, therefore, no gender and number. Words having different case-endings express a meaning having a particular gender and number. Such is the nature of these two kinds of words. The secondary constituent of a compound comes midway between the two. It expresses undifferentiated number. Here is where a sentence and a compound differ.]

106. Undifferentiated singular number, being there, 'becoming like one' (*ekavadbhāva*) is not taught in connection with compounds with unelided case-endings (*alukṣamāsa*). Even with another particular number (the plural) it (the undifferentiated singular) exists in compounds like *goṣucara*.

[It is because the secondary constituent conveys undifferentiated number that 'becoming like one' (*ekavadbhāva*) is not taught in connection with compounds having unelided case-endings. The plural number which one sees in compounds like *goṣucara*, *varṣāsuja* and *apsuyoni* is not the one which expresses the plurality of individuals. It expresses the singular number of the universal according to P. 1. 2. 58.]

107. As the dual number does not express the universal, it does not exist in the compound. If the *sūtra* teaching plural number to express the universal is discarded, then, in words like *goṣucara*, it would denote the plurality of individuals.

[The dual number has not been taught in the sense of the universal but the plural number has been. Therefore, duality is never conveyed by the compound which also shows that the secondary constituent conveys undifferentiated number. If P. 1. 2. 58 is discarded, then in expressions like *brāhmaṇāḥ namaskartavyāḥ*, the plural number would convey the plurality of the individuals.]

It is now stated that this is not correct.

108. By adopting differentiation of number (in *goṣucara*), there would be connection with all particular numbers. Nor is the view that it expresses plurality of individuals adopted (in the *M. Bhā.*) on P. 1. 2. 58.

109. (If the word denotes the universal) all individuals can be understood from it and retention of one (*ekaśeṣa*) is set aside. Otherwise, if P. 1. 2. 58. is discarded, one would understand plurality of individuals (in a compound like *goṣucara* which is wrong).

[This view is not correct. To say that the plural number in *goṣucara* denotes plurality of individuals would amount to accepting that particular numbers are conveyed by the 'secondary constituent in a compound. The name *goṣucara* would become applicable to the insect called *indrogopa* even if it is found only in one or two cows. So this plural number does not denote plurality of individuals, but the universal according to P. 1. 2. 58. In the *M. Bhā.*, the view that the plural number expresses plurality of individuals has not been adopted. Otherwise, *ekaśeṣa*

would have become necessary. As it is, it has been set aside. But not P. 1. 2. 58. If this had been set aside, the plural cannot be used for expressing the universal because it would denote plurality of individuals and in *goṣucara* that is what one would have to understand which is against facts. The conclusion is that in *goṣucara* the plural expresses the universal according to P. 1. 2. 58 and not undifferentiated number though this is also recognised.]

110. If the secondary constituent conveys the undifferentiated singular number, one cannot get the form *godau grāmaḥ* according to the extension of gender and number (*yuktavadbhāva*) of the stem *varaṇa* etc. (P. 4. 2. 82.) to the meaning of the elided *taddhita* suffix (taught in P. 1. 2. 51.).

[If the meaning of the secondary constituent is considered to include the undifferentiated singular number, a difficulty would arise where the gender and number of the stem are extended to the meaning of the *taddhita* suffix which is elided. For example, P. 4. 2. 82 says that the *taddhita* suffix expressive of a *cāturarthika* meaning except that of country of residence is elided after *varaṇa* etc. and P. 1. 2. 51. extends the gender and number of the stem to the meaning of the elided suffix. How can the number be extended if the secondary word in the *ṽṛtti* is to convey *abhedaikatva*? If it cannot be extended, we cannot get the form *godau grāmaḥ*. Here in *godau*, *goda* is the secondary constituent of the *taddhita* *ṽṛtti*. Before it entered the *ṽṛtti*, its number was the dual and it has been extended. That is why we get the form *godau* as a *taddhita* derivative.]

111. If the view is that the gender and number of the word before it enters into the *ṽṛtti* are extended, then the sixth case-ending also would be extended. But as, in a *ṽṛtti*, particular numbers are abandoned, anything based on difference (like the sixth case-ending) cannot come in.

[If it is maintained that it is the gender and number of the word before it entered into the *ṽṛtti* which are extended,

then the sixth case-ending also would have to be extended because it also expresses number. But the *M. Bhā.* has declared that it is number in general which is extended and not a particular number. Secondly, the sixth case-ending is based on difference and in a *vr̥tti*, the meanings of the constituents become one and so there is no difference. Hence there cannot be any question of the sixth case-ending coming in. Really speaking, it is the gender and number of word after it has entered into the *vr̥tti* which are extended and not what there was before.]

If that is so, the undifferentiated singular would come in as that is what the secondary constituent has after the word has entered the *vr̥tti* and the form *godau grāmaḥ* would not be realised. So the original objection still stands. This is now answered.

112. Some declare that the undifferentiated number which comes into being in a *vr̥tti*, when the different numbers are there, is a different kind of number which includes all of them (*upagrāhi*).

[According to some, the undifferentiated singular (*abhedai-katva*) includes within itself all the particular numbers, it is an amalgamation of all of them and that is what comes into being in a *vr̥tti*.]

As it includes all the numbers, forms like *godau grāmaḥ* become possible.

113. Sometimes it functions through the particular numbers, its parts, and sometimes its own form, irrespective of differentiation, becomes the basis of use.

[As it includes all the particular numbers within itself, sometimes, that is, when there is occasion for a particular number to be conveyed, it functions through it. Sometimes, however, it functions in an undifferentiated form.¹

An illustration is now given.

114. *Dāsyāḥpatiḥ* is a clear case and there is also the form *godau*. Thus diversity of function of this number (*abhedaikatva*) is established.

[The following are illustrations. In *dāsyāḥpatiḥ* which is a compound, the secondary constituent has the singular number. It is a clear case of *abhedaikatva* functioning in its own form. Abuse of the husband is understood because of association with *dāsi*. It is immaterial, therefore, in what case-ending that word is used. In *godau grāmaḥ*, proximity to *two godas* is meant and, therefore, the word is in the dual number and not in the singular due to *yuktavadbhāva* (extension of the gender and number of the qualified to the qualifier by P. 1.2.51.) The dual number which is included in *abhedaikatva* comes out in this case. Elsewhere also we see how a number is included in another, though, speaking generally, a number cannot have another number. In the question *kati bhavataḥ putrāḥ* = 'how many sons have you?', the word *kati* which is a word expressive of number includes all numbers. That is why, the answer to this question can be any number. In the same way, all particular numbers are included in *abhedaikatva*.]

If the secondary constituent expresses its meaning as qualified by the undifferentiated singular, how do we understand duality in words like *dviputra* = 'the son of two'?

115. In compounds like *dviputra*, the external differentiation such as *two* etc. expressed by the case-ending disappears but the reason for using the stem (in the sense of two) remains, being its own meaning.

[How is the number two understood from the secondary constituent in *dviputraḥ*, a compound formed in the sense of *dvayoḥ putraḥ* = 'the son of two'. The dual number expressed by the case-ending in *dvayoḥ* disappears when the word enters into

the compound but not the idea of two expressed by the stem. Even according to the *jahatsvārthā* view, the meaning of the secondary constituent does not disappear completely.]

116. The word *dvi* expresses the meaning of the whole to which duality, its own meaning is subordinate because of the identification of the parts and the whole (*so'yam ityabhisambandhaḥ*). The word *ubha* is not in the same position.

[Even though the meaning of the secondary constituent *dvi* continues, it is subordinate to that of the main word and so *abhedaikatva* also comes into being. The word *ubha* does not behave in the same way. Its meaning would not become subordinate to that of the primary word and that is why it does not enter into a compound. Though *ubha* also means the same thing as *dvi*, it does not behave in the same manner. Such is the nature of words.]

117. The word *ubhaya*, similar in meaning to it, is always used in complex formations (*vr̥tti*). That is why in P. 5. 2. 44 (*ubhādudātto nityam*), the word *nitya* is used.

[As the word *ubha* cannot enter into a compound, the word *ubhaya*, having a similar meaning, is always used in a *vr̥tti* as in *ubhayaputraḥ*, *ubhayathā*, *ubhayataḥ* and so on. *Ubhaya* can express the meaning of the whole with its own meaning subordinate to it. *Ubha* expresses duality with emphasis on differentiation whereas *ubhaya* expresses it with emphasis on the whole.]

118. When *āp* or *ka* follows, there is no subordination to the meaning of another and so no identification takes place. Therefore the word *ubha*, with the suffix added in the meaning of the stem itself and resting on differentiation is used.

[The word *ubha* is used only when *lāp* and the suffix of the dual or the suffix *ka* are used. Seevā. 8 and 9 on P. 1.1.27. The feminine suffix and *ka* are added to a stem in its own meaning (*svārthe*). So there is no question of the meaning of the stem becoming subordinate to that of the suffix and so *abheda* does not come to be. In such a case, the word which stands for *bheda* can be used and we get the forms *ubhe* and *ubhaka*. When the suffix has its own meaning or when the primary word of the compound follows, the meaning of the secondary constituent becomes subordinate to that of the primary word, so *ubha* cannot be used. *Ubhaya* is used instead.]

119. Even according to the view that it is the suffix which expresses the feminine gender, there is, as a result of the nature of words, a reversal of the relation of qualifier and qualified. As there is no subordination of the meaning of *ubha* to something else, differentiation (which is part of its meaning) does not disappear.

[Even if one takes the view that it is the suffix which expresses the feminine gender and not that it is added to the stem in the latter's own meaning which includes the feminine gender one has to accept that there is a reversal here of the ordinary relation of qualifier and qualified as seen in words like *Gārgya* where the meaning of the stem is the qualifier and that of the suffix is the qualified. Here it is the meaning of the suffix which is the qualifier because a word in the feminine gender denotes a substance as qualified by the feminine gender which is the meaning of the suffix. Here again, the reversal is due to *śabdaśakti*.]

120. Therefore *ubhaya* is found elsewhere than when the suffix of the dual and the feminine suffix follow, except when the suffix *tayap* follows. There is no *ubha* when the second constituent of a compound follows.

[Thus the word *ubha* is used when both the feminine suffix and the suffix of the dual number follow. When some other suffix or the second constituent of a compound follows, there is *ubhaya*. Of course, for the formation of *ubhaya* itself, *tayap* is added to *ubha* according to P. 5.2.44.]

A doubt is now raised in regard to the compound *Kumāryagāram* which is answered as follows.

121. (In *Kumāryagāram*), the name *pragrhya* would not come through the continuance of the effect of a suffix even after it is elided (*pratyayalakṣaṇa*, taught in P. 1. 1. 62.). There is no compound here of a word ending in the dual.

[If one wants to make a compound word of *kumāryoh agāram*, the sixth case-ending in the dual would be elided and one would get *Kumārī+agāram*. Here by P. 1.1.62 the word *Kumārī* would be looked upon as ending in the dual and so P.1.1.11. would apply and the final *ī* cannot be joined with the initial *a* and so we would not get the required form. To this objection, the answer is that P. 1.1.62 does not apply in the case of the name *pragrhya* (see Vā. 4 and 5 on P.1.1.11 and the M. Bhā. thereon.) In any case, as the secondary constituent of a compound has *abhedaikatva*, it does not end in the dual at all. So nothing prevents the joining of the final *ī* with the initial *a* and the formation of the compound.]

Some objections are now raised against the idea of *abhedaikatva*.

122. The optional elision of *yañ* etc in the singular and the dual numbers (taught in P. 2. 4. 64) would be inexplicable and, as there is no differentiation (according to *abhedaikatva*), the forms *yausmāka* and *tāvaka* could not be formed.

[*Abhedaikatva* goes against the *vārttika* no. 1. on P. 2.4.64. according to which in a *tatpuruṣa* compound where the first constituent formed with the suffix *yañ* ends in the singular or dual number, the *yañ* is optionally elided, giving the alternative forms *gargakulam* and *gārgyakulam*. If there is *abhedaikatva*, how does Kātyāyana speak about the compounding of a word ending in the singular. Similarly, P.4.3.3. teaches the substitutes *taṇaka* and *mamaka* in the singular number for *yusmad* and *asmad* which means that *yusmāka* and *asmāka* in *yauṣmākīṇaḥ* and *āsmākīṇaḥ*, or *yauṣmākaḥ* and *āsmākaḥ* stand for two and more than two and that goes against *abhedaikatva*.]

123. In *gārgyatara* and *gargatarāḥ* one sees differentiation and it is on that basis that in regard to *yusmatpitā* and *tvatpitā*, substitutes are regulated.

[Moreover, P. 2.4.64 teaches the elision of the *apatya* suffix *yañ* and *añ* in the plural. That means that where there is no elision, the singular and the dual numbers would be understood as in *gārgyatara* and the plural must be understood in *gargatarāḥ* where *yañ* has been elided. If a particular number is understood, how can there be *abhedaikatva*. Similarly, when followed by a suffix or the second constituent of a compound, *tva* and *ma* take the place of *yusma* and *asma* of *yusmad* and *asmad* in the singular. Thus we get *tvadiya* and *madiya*, *tvattaraḥ*, *mattaraḥ*, *tvatputraḥ* and *matputraḥ*. In the dual and plural, we have *yusmadiya*, *asmadiya* etc. All this means that in these words, the first element expresses a particular number and not *abhedaikatva*.]

The above objections are answered as follows—

124. The conditioning number which exists in the meaning of the stem is understood either from the substitutes or from the name without the help of the case-ending.

[The Unity based on the absence of differentiation which

is brought about when a word enters into a complex formation (*vytti*) includes all particular numbers. Where a favourable circumstance exists, there a particular number is understood. In *Kumāryagāram*, the application of the name *pragṛhya* is the circumstance which enables one to understand the particular number two. Similarly in *tāvaka* and *tvatpitā*, the fact that the substitutes are taught when a particular number, the singular, is to be expressed is the favourable circumstance. In *yusmatpitā*, the dual or the plural number would be understood from the context. Similarly in *gārgyakula*.]

125. In the words *śaurpika* and *māsajāta*, the measure is differentiated on the basis of the conditioning number.

[In *śaurpika* (formed by P. 5.1.26 and 37.) and *māsajāta* (formed by P. 2.2.5.) if a particular number included in *abhed-aikatva* is not understood, the meaning meant to be conveyed, namely, the particular price to be paid for the purchase in the case of *śaurpika* and the period of time which has elapsed after birth in the case of *māsajāta* would not be conveyed. So one does understand that one *śūrpa* is the price and that one month has elapsed after birth.]

126. Without differentiation (specification) of the number, the desired determination of what has age or what is bought would not take place and the use of the words expressive of measure would be useless.

[The exact determination of what is bought and what is born would be impossible without the understanding of the number one. The very use of the words expressive of measure (*śūrpa* and *māsa*) would be useless. Unless the measure is specified, what is measured would not be specified either. Therefore, in these two words the meaning of the secondary constituent is understood as qualified by the number one.]

127. The suffix *śas* is taught after words like *prastha* because they denote the singular number of the individual and have, therefore, that property but it does not come after words like *ghaṭa* because they express the unity (of the universal).

According to P.5.4.53, the suffix *śas* is taught after a word expressive of something qualified by the particular number one and not by number one in general which belongs to the universal. Words expressive of measure are of this type. They express their meaning (a particular measure) as qualified by the number one. So we get forms like *prasthaśaḥ*, *khārīśaḥ*. Words expressive of the universal are not usually expressive of the particular number one but of the one-ness of the universal. Where, however, they do express the singular number of the individual, there the suffix *śas* can be added to them as in—

Yo vā imāṃ vācaṃ varnaśaḥ padaśaḥ akṣvraśo vā vidādhāti, sa ārtvijīno bhavati = "he who utters every phoneme, every word and every syllable of this speech correctly becomes fit to be an officiating priest (or to have an officiating priest) (M. Bhā. I. p. 3. l. 12.)

Though *varṇa* denotes the universal, yet here the singular number of the individual qualifies it. Hence the suffix *śaḥ* has been added.]

128. Where the verbal element (expressive of a particular number) is heard, there it is understood as distinct and where it is not heard, there that particular number does not exist.

[According to the other view also, namely, that *abhedaikatva* means one-ness in which particular numbers are completely obliterated, the apparent contradiction can be explained. Where, in a sentence, the verbal element expressive of a particular number is actually heard, there the particular number is understood as

distinct from the others. Where, as in a *vytti*, it is not heard, it is because that particular number does not exist.]

129. The not-coming-into being of a suffix is its not being heard at all and the operation based upon its existence comes into being through *śāstra* (P. 1. 1. 62.). What is seen in the sentence is totally absent in complex formations.

[In a *vytti*, the meaning of the case-ending does not exist and so it does not come to be. This not coming into being at all is called *adarśana*=not being seen or heard. In order that the grammatical operation based on its existence may take place, P.1.1.62. is given. But the substitutes (*tavaka* and *mamaka*) and the name *pragrhya* can come only in the presence of the suffix (*kañ* and *añ* and the dual case-ending) and as it does not exist in the *vytti*, it is shown in the technical analysis. In the *vytti*, there is no case-ending, because its meaning is not there and not because it has been destroyed (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*.)]

If the case-endings do not come to be at all, how can operations depending upon their existence take place even by P.1.1.62. ?

130. In order to determine the scope of the name 'elision, (*lopa*), it has been defined as the non-perception of what would otherwise come to be. But an element expressive of a particular number is actually heard (in the analytical sentence, *prakriyāvākya*.)

[The case-ending is heard in the sentences actually used in life, but as its meaning does not exist in the *vytti*, the case-ending does not come to be. If it does not come to be at all, how is it *prasakta*, something that is due to come to be? It is the non-perception of what is due to come to be which is called elision (*prasaktasyādarśanam lopaḥ*). The very fact that elision (*luk*) is

taught (P. 2. 4. 71.) shows that it was due. That it was due is shown in the analytical sentence which is similar to what is actually used in life and is the source (*prakṛti*) of the complex formation. In this analytical sentence, the case-endings are actually present and they stand for particular numbers and they are elided by P. 2. 4. 71. In spite of the elision, the effect of the case-ending can be seen in the compound which is formed. One effect of the case-ending is the understanding of a particular number from the complex formation and that is what happens in *tāvaka*, *kumāryagāra* etc. Thus it has been shown that even according to the view that in *abhedaikatva*, particular numbers are not merged but completely disappear, a particular number is sometimes understood from the *vr̥tti* through its own expressive element.]

But this view is defective.

131. Where there is absence of elision or where something having a positive form (as the substitute *tavaka*) is taught, there the particular condition mentioned would be absent and, therefore, the form of the *vr̥tti* would be incorrect.

[If the elision is of case-ending seen in the analytical sentence, the dual and the plural case-endings should also be seen where there is no elision by P. 6. 3. 2. but only the singular number is correct. One-ness is understood from the compound *stokānmuk-taḥ*. Similarly, when the substitute *tavaka* is taught (P. 4. 3. 3.), there also the singular number is understood. But if the secondary constituent in a *vr̥tti* stands for one-ness in which all differentiation is obliterated (*bhedāpohalakṣaṇābhedaikatva*), then the singular number as distinct from the dual and the plural would have to be abandoned and then *tāvakīna* would be incorrect.]

132. The understanding of a particular number in a sentence has been explained as the difference between a sentence and a *vr̥tti*. But the difference is not always like that.

[The correct position is this. There is infinite variety in the use of words and rules cannot cover all of it. So some general rules are made. Thus *ekārthībhāva* is shown as the particular feature of a *vytti*, as distinct from a sentence. One-ness in general is understood from a *vytti* while a particular number is understood from a sentence. But it is not that a particular number is never understood from a *vytti*. In *śaurpika* and *māsajāta*, it is understood. The *vaiśeṣika* definition of *dravya* does not apply to *ākāśa* but it is enough to distinguish it from *guṇa*. Similarly, even if sometimes a particular number is understood from *vytti*, it is different from a sentence where it is always understood. So the general definition of *vytti* is not affected. Like the particular number, sometimes a particular gender is also not understood from a *vytti* as in *kukkuṭāṇḍam*.]

133. As the universal is the cause of the exclusion (of other universals), the meaning of the main word is not qualified by gender in compounds like *mṛgadugdha* but this is not the case in *gārgīputra*.

[In *kukkuṭāṇḍa*, *chāgamāṃsa* etc. the secondary constituent is chiefly expressive of the universal (*jāti*) which is meant to qualify the meaning of the main word by the exclusion of other universals. So gender is unimportant. Thus words like *kukkuṭi* get their masculine form according to P. 6. 3. 42. But in *gārgīputra*, *chāgalīmūtra* etc., the intention is not to exclude other universals and so the secondary constituent has the feminine form].

134. When, due to association with undifferentiated gender and number, there is the possibility of the form *śuklaṃ paṭāḥ* being used, a rule has been made (P. 1.2.52.) in order that the correct gender and number may come to be.

[When the formation of a word does not take into account the other words in the sentence (*padāvadhikam anvākhyānam*), the word *śukla* gets the form *śuklam*, the neuter being the common.

gender and the singular the common number. When the word enters into a sentence and becomes the adjective of a word like *paṭāḥ*, it would not give up its neuter gender and singular number already acquired due to inner factors (*antaraṅga*). Thus one would get the expression *śuklaṃ paṭāḥ*, which is wrong. Therefore, P. 1.2.52 says that the adjective gets the gender and number of the word which it qualifies.]

135. In the *sūtra* concerned (P. 1.2.52.) by the word *viśeṣaṇa*, a word expressive of quality which exists for something else and is a secondary constituent in a *ṛtti* is meant.

[In P. 1. 2. 52 by *viśeṣaṇa*, that which is dependent on something else is meant. It is a quality which is meant here and quality rests on a substance and is, therefore, dependent. The *matuṣ* suffix is elided after a word expressive of quality but it stands in a *general manner* for that which has the quality. When it is associated with a word expressive of a particular object having that quality, it becomes its adjective.]

136. The words being separated from one another, in sentences, particular genders and numbers are heard. Even though that is so, a *ṛtti* being in the nature of absence of differentiation, it does not exist as expressive of them, that is, the particulars.

[If the view that the formation of a word takes into account the other words in a sentence is adopted, then we would get *śuklo guṇo'sya paṭasya* where the word *śukla* has a particular gender and number. For bringing that about P. 1. 2. 52 is not necessary. But this view is not correct. The word *śukla* in this sentence is different from the word *śuklaḥ* in *śuklaḥ paṭāḥ* where the *matuṣ* suffix has been elided. It is a *ṛtti* whereas the former word *śukla* is not. What can happen in a sentence cannot happen in a *ṛtti*. In a *ṛtti*, the word *śukla* is of a very general

nature and cannot have the gender and number of the word with which it might become associated in a sentence. For that, special provision has to be made and that has been done in P. 1. 2. 52.]

137. As, from the form of the word, it is understood that its formation has the general as the basis. Therefore, the gender and number of the general would result.

138. And so the word with its gender and number would be connected with the word expressive of substance and the two words would have different genders and numbers.

[It might be said that, as the particular has to be expressed, it would become the basis of the formation of the word even if it is found in an external word. The fact is that only that becomes the basis of the formation of a word which is actually understood from the word and from a complex formation (*vr̥tti*) it is gender and number in general which are understood and they would be the basis of the word-formation. Once the word is formed, gender and number in general cannot be given up.]

139. Therefore, the gender and number of the coming external word expressive of the substratum are prescribed for the words expressive of quality by the *sūtra* (P. 1.2.52.)

[The other word in the sentence, expressive of substance, is *bahiraṅga* and it cannot be the basis for the formation of the word in question. To achieve that, a special provision has to be made and that has been done in P. 1. 2. 52.]

140. Even if some particular is meant, it is not understood because of absence of difference in form

and, therefore, no operation based on particularisation can take place.

[Even though some particularisation may be intended, the *vytti* being common to all particulars, there is no specification and therefore, an unspecified particular cannot be the basis of word-formation.]

141. The general is as good as a particular because it differs from the particulars. When absence of differentiation is resorted to, it keeps out the particulars.

[Nor would a particular be understood merely because the general implies the particular. The general would keep the particulars out as a particular would keep the other particulars out. The general, when especially meant to be conveyed becomes as good as a *viśeṣa* and keeps the particulars out. See M. Bhā. I. p. 422. l. 5.]

142. Whatever is actually adopted keeps other things out. Differentiation or the absence of it is not thought of in connection with the general.

[The fact is that it is right to speak about the general as differentiation or absence of differentiation. Whatever is adopted will naturally keep other things out. Just as a word like *gauḥ* formed on the basis of its real meaning, is applied to a *vāhika* by attributing *gotva* to the latter, in the same way, words like *śukla*, formed on the basis of something general, are connected in the sentence with other words expressive of the particular and then there might be difference of gender and number which is undesirable. To prevent this, P. 1. 2. 52. is given.]

143. The analysis of that meaning which is helpful (in understanding the meaning of the sentence)

results in something general. It is based on its cause and it is understood as having its own characteristic.

[All this discussion has taken the general meaning of the individual word as the basis. But the meaning of a word is not like an external object which has a persistent form. What is this general meaning then? The fact is that it is the indivisible sentence expressive of a particularised meaning which is expressive. When, for practical purposes, it is analysed into words, then the meaning of these words is found to be of a general nature and it helps in the understanding of meaning of the sentence. It is based on its own cause, namely, mutual requirement and it is understood with its own characteristic, that is, absence of differentiation.]

144. The divisions which are abstracted being not fully particularised are called by the name of the general on the basis of the causes (of the analysis).

[As the analysed words are parts of a sentence expressive of a particularised meaning, this meaning must also be the particular. How can it be the general? The fact is that individual words cannot denote the real particular. When abstracted from the sentence a word is not connected with any other particular word and so it cannot denote the real particular and so its meaning is said to be the general. As the individual word denotes the universal of quality or action, so, in a sense, it denotes the differentiated thing, but it is called the general, because it is not fully particularised through connection with the meaning of other words in the sentence. In that sense, it is not real but only a means of understanding the meaning of the sentence.]

145. When the gender and number of a word are declared to be natural, then the correct form (of a word) is determined considering the other words which are to be used in a sentence.

[So far P. 1. 2. 52 has been explained and justified. But Pāṇini himself has declared it to be unnecessary (P. 1. 2. 53). In other words, he has declared it to be natural that adjectives should take the gender and number of the word which they qualify. A word gets its gender and number in view of the other word in the sentence with which it is going to be connected. This is the essence of the *vākyāvadhiḥ* *anvākyānam*. The formation of a word takes into account the other words in the sentence and no distinction is made between *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga* factors, because from the very beginning the speaker knows with what other word a word is going to be connected and forms it accordingly.]

146. The use of quality words with those expressive of their substratum is variable. The universal, on the other hand, is always associated with the object which is its substratum.

[The elision of the suffix *matuḥ* after words expressive of a quality is taught but not after words expressive of a universal because an object is never without the universal whereas its association with a quality is subject to variation.]

147. The word *gauḥ* does not denote the fact of being a cow (*gotva*) of *śābaleya* separately but the word *śukla* used as an adjective of *bāhuleya* does denote it separately.

[Even though the universal and quality both inhere, in the same object, they are differently expressed by words. The word *gauḥ* expresses the universal (*gotva*) as identical with the object. If it has to be expressed as something distinct from the object, the abstract suffix will have to be used as in *śābaleyasya gotvam*, but a quality can be expressed as something distinct without the use of the abstract suffix. That is why the elision of the *matuḥ* suffix is taught when it is intended to express quality and the object in apposition to each other, as in *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*.]

148. Thus when there is difference, the suffix *matuṣ* would be heard. That is why elision is taught. There is no elision after words like *rasa*.

[Strictly speaking where quality is expressed as distinct, there should be *matuṣ* which is generally used where there is difference as in *gomān devadattaḥ*. But the form without *matuṣ* is the correct one and so its elision has been taught. Otherwise, in *paśasya śuklaḥ*, there would be *matuṣ*. After words like *rasa*, there is no elision.]

149. As a word like *rasa* does not denote that which has *rasa* without change of form merely through the relation of identity, like the word *śukla* no elision is taught after it.

[If it is held that in *śuklaḥ paśaḥ* the first word, though ordinarily expressive of a quality, here expresses an object, the teaching of the elision would be unnecessary because the purpose of the elision is that a quality-word, without changing its form should denote an object in which the quality exists. If the elision is taught, it is in order that the same form may be used even when the word expresses quality as distinct from the objects as in *paśasya śuklaḥ*. Words like *rasa* cannot, without the suffix *matuṣ*, denote that which has *rasa*.]

150. When a word is superimposed on or identified with another, it sometimes retains its gender and number as in the case of *mañca* but that is not the case in *praṣṭha* and the like.

[Even though P. 1. 2. 52. has been declared to be unnecessary, it has some use. When the name of one is superimposed on another, there are two possibilities : (1) it retains its own gender and number, (2) it takes the gender and number of the word on which it is superimposed. In the sentence *mañcān yuvatiḥ paśya*,

the word *mañca* is superimposed on what is on it, namely, the girls (*yuvatīḥ*) but it retains its gender. Similarly, in *girīn saritaḥ syandamānāḥ paśya*, the rivers are identified with the hills from which they flow but the word *girīn* retains its gender. When *praṣṭha* is identified with his wife, in other words, when the word *praṣṭha* is used in the sense of *praṣṭha's* wife, it does not keep its gender. In *khalatikam vanāni*, the word *khalatikam*, though in apposition to *vanāni*, keeps its number. In *viṃśatiḥ brāhmaṇāḥ*, *viṃśatiḥ* keeps both its gender and number.]

151. When, through the relation of identity the masculine word (*praṣṭha*) is expressive of the wife (of the *praṣṭha*), the fact that it gives up its gender is indicated by the fact that a feminine suffix is taught by the *śāstra* (P. 4.1.48.).

[When the word *praṣṭha*, by identification or superimposition, is used for the wife, then it gives up its gender. That is what is taught in P. 4. 1. 48. The force of the word *ākhyāyām* in that *sūtra* is that there should be a relation of identity (*abhedasambandha*) and not *bhedasambandha*, that is, the wife should be looked upon as *praṣṭha* and not merely as the wife of *praṣṭha* which is based on difference.]

152. The *sūtra* “*viśeṣaṇānām cājāteḥ*” = “qualifying words also, except those expressive of a universal (take the gender and number of the word whose *taddhita* suffix has been elided) establishes that the word expressive of what rests on a substratum has the gender and number of the word expressive of the substratum.

[Only words like *praṣṭha* do this and not others. When *mañca* is superimposed on *mañcastha*, it does not give up its gender. Similarly, when words like *śukla* stand for what has the quality of white, they may retain their gender and number and we would

get the form *śuklaṃ paṭaḥ*. In order that this may not happen, the *sūtra* P. 1. 2. 52. is given.]

153. The idea that, as the quality is found in the substratum, the properties of the words expressive of the distinguishing qualities should be found in the word expressive of the substratum is set aside (by P. 1.2.52.).

[When a word expressive of a *nimitta* such as quality is used to express what has quality, its gender and number may also come with it. In order that this may not happen, P. 1. 2. 52. is given.]

154. The use of the gender and number of the *nimitta* (the basis of the application of a word to an object) in expression like *godau grāmaḥ*, naturally current in the world, is made known by the *śāstra* (P. 1.2.51.).

[Where there is the relation of identity between the *nimitta* and the *nimitti*, should the gender and number of the former prevail or those of the latter? In *śuklāḥ paṭāḥ*, the latter prevails, in *pañcālāḥ janapadaḥ*, the former prevails. As the country where the *kṣattriyas* called *pañcālāḥ* live is called *pañcālāḥ*, the *kṣattriyās* are the *nimitta* for the application of the word to the country and as the *kṣattriyas* have the masculine gender and the plural number, the word *pañcālāḥ*, even when it means the country, has the same gender and number. This variation is due to the natural variation in the power of words. The *śāstra* only makes it known. It does not create it. According to P. 1.2.52, though ordinarily, the gender and number of the *nimitti* prevail, in some special cases, those of the *nimitta* prevail.]

155. In *haritakī* etc., it is the gender (of the *nimitta*), in *khalatika* etc., it is the number (of the *nimitta*) which prevail. As to the adjectives of the word in which

there is *lup* of the suffix *kan* taught when the word formed with it is intended to denote a human being, it is the gender and number of what is intended to be conveyed (*abhidheya*) which prevail.

[It is because gender and number are natural and only made known by *śāstra* that there is so much variation. In *harī-takyāḥ phalāni*, the gender of the *nimitta* prevails and the number of the *nimittī*. In *khalatikam* (the name of a hill) *vanāni*, the number of the *nimitta* prevails and the gender of the *nimitta*. When the word *cañcā* (effigy) is applied to a human being because of resemblance, there is *lup* of the suffix *kan* and its adjectives take the gender and number of the *nimittī*, namely, *manuṣya* and so we get the expression *cañcā abhīrūpaḥ, svākṛtiḥ darśanīyaḥ*.]

156. When the word expressive of the universal is used and the adjective is connected with it, then it would take the properties (gender and number) of the word expressive of the universal.

[According to P. 1. 2. 52, where the qualification is sought to be made through a word expressive of the universal, the adjectives take the gender and number of that word as in *varaṇā nagaram ramyopavanam śvacchodakam sugandhikusumam*.]

157. When the qualifying word, different from the word expressive of the universal, is used keeping in view the word in which the *lup* has taken place, it is formed according to the properties of the latter, because its meaning is the primary one.

[When, however, the qualifying word is used in apposition to the word in which the elision (*lup*) of the *taddhita* suffix has taken place, it takes the gender and number of the latter as in *pañcālā priyātithayaḥ spaṣṭābhīdhānāḥ vinītaveśāḥ bahvannāḥ janapadaḥ*. Here, though the word expressive of the universal, namely,

janapada, has been used, the adjectives have been used with *pañcālāḥ* and so they are in the masculine gender and plural number.

Why Pāṇini framed I. 2. 52 and himself discarded it in I. 2. 52 has been interpreted in several ways by grammarians.]

158. In compounds with the negative particle, *bahuvrīhi*, *dvandva*, feminine formations and words expressive of degree, special genders and numbers are now to be considered according to the *Bhāṣya*.

[Cases where the *sūtra* in question is useful according to the *Bhāṣya* and the *vārttikas* are now going to be considered. In these cases, the gender and number which would result because of the presence of their *nimitta* are set aside in favour of the gender and number of the substratum.]

Following the reverse order and also because not much has to be said about it, the author first says something about words expressive of degree, taught in P. 5. 3. 55.

159. If the suffixes *tamaḥ* etc. are added to a word ending in the sixth or second case-affix, expressive of what is inferior, then they would be expressive of what surpasses and then there would be discrepancy in gender as compared with that of the stem.

[P. 5. 3. 55 teaches the suffixes *tamaḥ* and *iṣṭhan* when the idea of something surpassing another has to be expressed. There is much discussion among grammarians as to how the word *atiśāyane* in the *sūtra* is to be interpreted, that is whether it expresses the agent (*kartā*), the instrument (*karana*) or the bare action (*bhāva*). If it is interpreted to mean that these two suffixes are added to words expressive of what is lesser in degree and having the second or the sixth case-ending, then the word *atiśāyane* would qualify the meaning of the suffix and then the

meanings of the stem and suffix being different from each other could have different genders.]

An illustration is now given.

160. When the superior is *kālī*, the suffix *tarap* would be added to the word *kāla* having the second case-ending ; when the superior is *kāla*, the suffix *tarap* would be added to the word *kālī* having the second case-ending, when the one who surpasses is *gārgya*, the suffix would be added to *gargāḥ*.

161. When those who surpass are the *gargāḥ*, the suffix would be added to *gārgyaḥ* and all this is not desired. If *tarap* is added in the meaning of the stem itself (*svārha*) there would be *nīp* (in *kumāritarā*) because the meaning of the stem would not be over and above (that of degree).

[When the suffix *tarap* is added in the sense of *kālam atīśete* *kālī*, we would get *kālatarā* whereas it should be *kālitarā*. When it is added in the sense of *kālīm atīśete* *kālaḥ*, we would get *kālitarah* whereas it should be *kālatarah*. In these illustrations we see difference in gender between the stem and the suffix when *atīśāyane* is interpreted as qualifying the meaning of the suffix (*pratya-yārtha viśeṣaṇapakṣa*). Difference of number also would result. From *gargān atīśete* *gārgyaḥ*, we would get *gargatara* whereas it should be *gārgyatara*. *gārgyam atīśerate* *gargāḥ* would yield *gārgyatarah* whereas it should be *gargatarāḥ*. All this is the result of the view that the meaning of the stem qualifies that of the suffix. Hence the *M. Bhā.* has adopted the view that it is the meaning of the stem which is qualified, not by the meaning of the suffix, but within itself. In other words the suffix is added in the meaning of the stem itself (*svārthe*) which is that of the agent. So we would get *kālitarā* from *kālī atīśete* and *kālatarah* from *kālaḥ atīśete*. In this way, there would be no discrepancy of gender between the stem and the word formed. (See *M. Bhā.* II p. 414,

1. 20). Similarly, if we form *gargyatara* from *gārgyaḥatiśete*, and *gargatarāḥ* from *gargā atiśerate*, there would not be any discrepancy in number either.

But there would be one difficulty here. *Kumārī atiśete* might yield *kumāritarī* (*ñīp*) whereas it should be *kumāritarā*. If *tarap* is added in the sense of the stem itself (*svārtha*), the meaning of the stem *kumārī* being the feminine conditioned by childhood (*vayasi prathame*), which is not apart from degree, the *ñīp* would be added again to express degree. It might be said that the *tarap* expresses degree in what is conveyed by the stem, namely, the feminine conditioned by childhood and, therefore, there is no need to add *ñīp* again to express degree. But in that way *ṭāp* also would become unnecessary. It might be said that *ṭāp* would come in the sense of the stem itself (*svārtha*) which is the feminine conditioned by childhood and having degree. But *ñīp* has been taught setting aside *ṭāp* and so that would come which is not desired.]

Thus a difficulty has been pointed out in the view that the suffix *tarap* is added in the sense of the stem itself. How the *Bhāṣya* meets this difficulty is now explained.

162. The suffix (*tarap*) is taught after a word ending in the sixth case-ending in the sense of an attribute causing degree and residing in its substratum or in the sense of an action inhering in what is superior.

[Before the word *atiśāyane* was taken in the sense of the agent. Now it is going to be interpreted in the sense of *karaṇa* and *bhāva*. If it is taken in the sense of *karaṇa*, it would mean a quality *by means of which* the object surpasses others. Through the quality which inheres in the object, a difference between the two is brought about. Thus, the stem which denotes the substratum takes the sixth case-ending and the suffix denotes the quality. *Śuklatara* would mean : 'having a quality which brings degree in the white which inheres in the object.' If the word *atiśāyane* is taken in the sense of *bhāva*, that is, *kriyā*, the *śuklatara* would mean *śuklasyātiśāvanam śuklataraḥ*. Whether the meaning of the suffix is *guṇa* or

kriyā, it is different from that of the stem, from that of *kumārī* in *kumāritarā*. The meaning of the stem qualifies the meaning of the suffix, that is, it becomes secondary and so there cannot be *nīp*.]

163. By the relation of identity (*so'yam ityabhisambandhaḥ*), the object (*dravya*) expressed by the stem is the substratum of the two (quality or action) and they are understood as one.

[In *śuklataraḥ*, the *guṇa* or action expressed by *tarāḥ* according to the previous stanza resides in the substratum expressed by the stem *śukla* and there is the relation of identity between the two. The use of the sixth case-ending indicative of difference was only for the sake of *prakriyā*. Really speaking, they are part of the meaning of the stem which refers to the particular substratum denoted by a word like *paṭa* found in the same sentence. Therefore, *śuklatara* would take the gender and number of the word *paṭa*]

164. Because of absence of differentiation in form, the bare object (*dravya*) is understood (from *śukla* and *śuklatara*) as requiring particularisation. And it is connected with different particulars as its substrata.

[The word *śukla* denotes substance to which quality is subordinate and *śuklatara* denotes the same thing with a higher degree of the quality. Neither the one nor the other denotes the particular substratum but that is required. It is expressed by another word in the sentence and that supplies the particular substratum.]

165. Whatever gender and number are found in the different particular substrata, with these the undifferentiated substance is ultimately connected.

[The undifferentiated substance which is expressed by the

quality-word (like *śukla* or *śuklatara*) takes on the gender and number of the particular substratum with which the latter is connected by P. 1. 2. 52.]

The above statement applies when the meaning of the suffix is quality. What follows applies when the meaning of the suffix is action.

166. The substratum in which action inheres determines the gender and number. Therefore the *Bhāṣya* has declared that the root *śī* is *kartṛsthabhāv ka* = 'the result of whose action is found in the agent'.

[If the meaning of the suffix (*tarap*) is taken to be action, then, as both agent and object (*kartā* and *karma*) are the substrata of an action the word *śuklatara* should take the dual suffix. Though normally intransitive, the root *śī* becomes transitive (*sakarmaka*) when united with a preposition and so it has an object too, not merely an agent. But this is not the right view. The root *śī* is really intransitive here because transitive verbs are either *karmasthabhāvaka* like *pac* or *karmasthakriya* like *bhid* but *śī* is *kartṛsthabhāvaka*. The meaning of *śī* here is to surpass and it inheres in the agent which is its substratum which is only one. So there will be only the singular number. It does not inhere in the object.]

167. If a mere occasion (*nimitta*) is looked upon as the substratum, then gender and number based upon the *karma* would come in.

[If by substratum, a mere occasion is also meant, then the *karma* is also the occasion of the act of surpassing. Nobody can surpass if there is nothing to be surpassed. Therefore, here the dual number, based upon both the agent and the object, would have to be used. That is the basis of the objection referred to in the *Bhāṣya*.]

So far, extension of gender and number taught in P. 1.2.51.

has been considered and in connection with that, the *Bhāṣya* on P. 5. 3. 55 has also been considered. Now in the same connection and following again the reverse order of the topics enumerated in stanza 158, the *vārttikas* and the *Bhāṣya* on P. 4. 1. 3. are going to be considered.

168. In the *śūtra*, the idea of the feminine analysed out of the whole word as a means of word derivation, is associated, according to one's wish, with the stem or with the suffix.

[The sentence and its meaning are the real units of speech. By abstraction, the word and its meaning are separated. They are also analysed into stem and suffix and their meanings and according to circumstances, the idea of the feminine is ascribed either to the stem itself as in *samit*, *dṛṣad* etc., or to the suffix as in *gaurī*, *kiśorī*.]

169. The word *strī*, being a quality-word (*guṇa-śabda*) is like the word white (*sita*) etc. It is either expressive of the quality only or it expresses the substratum in which the feminine (*saṁstyāna*) inheres.

[In regard to the interpretation of P. 4. 1. 3, there are three views, mentioned by Helārāja and by Kaiyaṭa in his explanation of the *Vārttikas* and the *Bhāṣya* on P. 4. 1. 3. They may be briefly stated as follows :—(1) If the word *strī* in the *sūtra* denotes only the attribute called feminine, then the *sūtra* would mean that the suffixes *ṭāp* etc. are to be added to a stem expressive of substance when the idea of the feminine is to be expressed. This is called the *pratyaयार्थapakṣa*=“the view that it is the suffix which expresses the feminine. But if the word *strī* in the *sūtra* stands for the substance associated with the feminine quality, then there are two possibilities : (2) The suffixes *ṭāp* etc. are to be added to a stem standing in apposition to the word *strī* and expressive of a substance merely associated with the feminine quality. This is called the *strīsamānādhikaraṇapakṣa*. (3) The

suffixes are added to a stem expressive of a substance *qualified* by the feminine quality. This is called the *prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa*. According to this last view, the suffixes are added in the sense of the stem itself (*svārthe*).]

170. If the meaning of the stem is substance and the meaning of the word *strī* is something having the feminine quality (*saṁstyāna*), then the latter would be merely associated with the substance.

[If the meaning of the word *striyām* in P. 4. 1. 3 is that the feminine suffix is to be added to a stem which is in apposition to the word *strī*, then the idea of the feminine would be the *upalakṣaṇa*, that is, an additional and extraneous feature of the substance which is the meaning of the stem and not an essential feature.]

171. The suffix would then come after a stem of which femininity is not accepted as the expressed meaning but which is in apposition to a word of which femininity is an extraneous meaning.

[The result would be that the suffix would be added to a stem which is in apposition to a word where femininity is *upalakṣaṇa* and *bahiraṅga*.]

172. When the word *bhūta* etc. and the numerals called *ṣaṭ* are in apposition to a word like *brāhmaṇī* which includes femininity (*stritva*) they would take the feminine suffix at the end.

[According to this view (that is, the *strīsamānādhikaraṇapakṣa*) when we have the expression *kumāraḥ strī* where *kumāraḥ* is in apposition to *strī*, the feminine suffix would come after *kumāra* and we would get *kumārī*. But in *bhūtam brāhmaṇī*, the word *bhūta*

is in apposition to the *strī* which is in *brāhmaṇī* and so it would become *bhūta* which is wrong in this particular sense. Similarly in *ṣaḍ brāhmaṇyaḥ*, *ṣaḍ* is in apposition to *brāhmaṇyaḥ* which expresses *strīva* and so it would get the feminine suffix which is wrong.]

173. It is the main things associated with femininity which cause the addition of the suffixes. Therefore, even when there is apposition, the suffixes *ṭāp* etc. would have to be added.

[In this view, it is not the direct expression of the feminine by the stem which is the cause of the feminine suffix but the main things having femininity are the occasion for it. The feminine is here subordinate to the substance and as such a feminine is understood. When the stem in question is in apposition to another word, the suffixes would have to be added and that is not desired.]

After having shown the defects of the *strīsamānādhikaraṇapakṣa*, the *prakṛtyartha viśeṣaṇapakṣa* is going to be considered.

174. If the word *strī* (in P. 4. 1. 3.) denotes the bare idea of femininity and it is part of the meaning of the stem, then the suffixes would be added in the sense of the stem itself.

[If the word *strī* means femininity only and it is part of the meaning of the stem as its qualifier, then the suffixes would be added to the stem expressive of the feminine. As no other meaning has been indicated for the suffixes, they would be added in the sense of the stem itself.]

175. The stems never denote the feminine quality only. They are, therefore, taken as standing for substance in which the feminine inheres.

[Even if the word *strī* in P. 4. 1. 3. stands for femininity only, as no stem can denote that only, one understands that the suffix is added to a stem which expresses substance as qualified by femininity.]

176. The suffixes *ṭāp* etc. are added to words where the feminine is required and useful as part of the expressed meaning but that is not what is meant to be expressed by the words *bhūtam* etc.

[Those words where femininity is also an expressed meaning and useful as such take the feminine suffixes. That is not the case with the word *bhūtam* in *bhūtaṃ brāhmaṇī*. Here the word *bhūtam* does not express the feminine which is only its *upalakṣaṇa*, something associated with it because of its being in apposition with the word *brāhmaṇī* which expresses substance as qualified by the feminine. So there is no *ṭāp* after the word *brāhmaṇī*.]

177. If bare femininity is taken as the meaning of the suffix, then the dual (and the plural) and the presence of more than one feminine suffix (in some words) cannot be explained.

[If bare femininity (*saṃstyāna*) is the meaning of the suffix, the dual and the plural endings in words like *kumāryau*, *kumāryaḥ* cannot be explained, because femininity is one and the singular number would do. Nor can one explain the presence of two feminine suffixes in words like *gārgyāyaṇī*, *kāriṣagandhyā* and *kālītārā*. In *gārgyāyaṇī*, there is *ṣpha* first by P. 4. 1. 17 and then *nīp* by P. 4. 1. 41 ; in *kāriṣagandhyā*, there is first *ṣyaṇī* after *karīṣa-gandhiḥ* by P. 4. 1. 78 and then *cāp* by P. 4. 1. 74. ; in *kālītārā*, there is first *nīṣ* after *kāla* by P. 4. 1. 42 and to the word *kālī* thus formed, *tarap* is added in the sense of higher degree and after *tarap* come *ṭāp* by P. 4. 1. 4.]

178. If the femininity (conveyed by the suffix) is a universal, then (that being the main meaning) the

differentiation found elsewhere (that is, in the individuals) is not meant to be conveyed. Therefore, the one universal is qualified by the multiple individuals.

[It might be said that femininity is a universal which presupposes a substratum and even though the suffix expresses the universal, the word takes a number according to the number of the substrata. But this is not right. It is the universal which is the meaning of the suffix and that being the main thing, the word should have the number of the universal, that is, the singular number.]

It is now stated that even by adopting the view that gender is the condition of the *guṇas*, the difficulty would not be overcome.

179. If femininity means the merging or dissolution of the qualities (*mātrāṇām*), its extent (*parimāṇam*) does not exist (that is, cannot be determined). One would always have the form *kumāryaḥ* because there can be infinite differentiation in *kumārī*.

[It might be said that, according to the view that gender is the condition of the *guṇas* the number of a word would depend upon the condition of the *guṇas*. But the difficulty is that in this view what is called femininity is the merging or dissolution of the qualities *rūpa*, *rasa* etc. and that number depends upon the changing condition. But it is impossible to determine the extent of the changes even in one thing and one would be compelled to have always the plural everywhere, because in what is constantly changing, there are always many changes. If, by ignoring all this multiplicity of changes, one looks upon the whole thing as one, then this view would not be different from that of the universal and there would always be the singular number. Thus *kumāryau*, *kumāryaḥ* would be inexplicable. Nor could a word like *kumārī* be in apposition to a word expressive of *dravya* or be connected with

a verb, because the feminine suffix would be expressive of a mere attribute, namely, femininity.]

The *vārttika* given in answer to this objection (Vā. 6, M. Bhā. II, p. 200, l. 1.) is now going to be explained.

180. Just as, through the universal, number and collection, actions are performed on the substance which is associated with them, even though their identity is understood.

181. In the same way, as one sees from things their identity with their attributes the relation of apposition and connection with the verb become explicable.

[In the expression *gaur duhyatām, brāhmaṇaśataṃ bhojyatām, pañcapūli samānīyatām*, though the verb is connected with a word expressive of the universal, a number and collection, the action denoted by the verb is done on the substance through these which are actually expressed by their words. They and their substrata, though different, are looked upon as one. In the same way, as objects and their attributes are looked upon as one, there can be the relation of apposition between a feminine word and a word expressive of substance and it can also be connected with a verb.]

182. If the relation of apposition is explained on the basis of the elision of the *matuṣ* suffix, there would be elision of the feminine suffix also according to P. 1. 2. 49. Where elision occurs, its meaning is included in something else.

[If the relation of apposition is sought to be explained by bringing in the elision of the *matuṣ* suffix taught in Vā. 3. on P. 5. 2. 94 (M. Bhā. II, p. 394, l. 7.) after words expressive of e

quality (*guṇa*) and femininity is looked upon as a *guṇa*, then there would be elision of the feminine suffix also according to P. 1. 2. 49. But the fact is that there is no place here for the *matuṣ* suffix at all. The word *kumārī* denotes substance as qualified by or as identical with *strītvā*. Even where elision of the *matuṣ* takes place as in *śukla*, the purpose is to show that the word denotes a substance (the meaning of the elided suffix) qualified by its own meaning and in that sense it becomes *upalakṣaṇa*, something included in something else.]

183. According to some, the feminine suffix *ṭāṣ* etc. are taught after words expressive of substances which are free from any difference and which have femininity, because they are understood as one.

[The relation of apposition is explained by others differently while still holding the *pratyayārthapakṣa* that is, the view that it is the suffix which expresses femininity. The feminine suffix expresses substance having femininity in general and the stem denotes a particular substance and the two become one without any contradiction. We do not understand two different substances, one from the stem and the other from the suffix. We separate them mentally for the purpose of *prakriyā* = grammatical derivation but they are really one.]

184. The substance in general, having become particularised, is connected with actions and through the particulars (denoted by the stem) it exists as parts.

[The substance in general conveyed by the suffix, is like the universal but is really not so, because the particularisation is done by the other element of the word, namely, the stem, and so one wouldn't rest on the substance in general conveyed by the suffix. Therefore, the word can be connected with the verb and there can be the relation of apposition. The fact is that the word, as a whole, conveys a particular substance. The division into stem-meaning and suffix-meaning is unreal.]

Thus it has been shown that, in the view that the feminine is the meaning of the suffix, the word gets its number from the number of the substratum of the feminine. An objection is now stated.

185. In *śukla* etc. the substance which is the substratum is expressed as the main thing. Here, on the other hand, it is femininity which is the object of the expressive power being the meaning of the suffix.

[Somebody might object that femininity is expressed by the suffix and that is, therefore, the main meaning of the word. The meaning of the stem can only be subordinate to it, that is, qualify it. Therefore, the word should have the gender and number of the meaning of the suffix.]

186. By the relation of identity, femininity is attached to its substratum. Or one might say that the relation of primary and secondary is reversed here due to the natural power of words.

[But this objection is not valid. The importance of the meaning of the suffix is only assumed in the process of grammatical derivation. In reality, femininity is subordinate to substance. The suffixes in a verb express the *sādhana* = accessory to action, but that is not the primary meaning of a verb. It is action which is so. Secondly, a kind of identity between the meanings of the two takes place and the suffix expresses the individual substance to which femininity is subordinate.]

187. Or one might understand that substance in general, being dependent on something else, is taught as a quality. It is a characteristic of the individuals, the basis of the cognition of their identity.

[Substance in general having femininity is conveyed by the

suffix and that is what is meant by *viśeṣaṇa* in P. 1. 2. 52. As it requires and is dependent upon the particular or individual substance conveyed by the stem, it has become a *guṇa*, something dependent on something else. The general and the particular, denoted by the suffix and the stem respectively, are really one. What is called *sāmānya* is that characteristic of the individual which causes the cognition of their identity.]

As the individual qualified by femininity is one, how can the two be looked upon as standing in the relation of the substratum and what exists on it? This is now explained.

188-189. That condition (the combination of the general and the particular) when divisions are made in the word and the individuals are looked upon as the substrata even when they are taken in isolation, takes the gender and number of the individuals after they are understood as feminine.

[The combination of the general and the particular gets the gender and number of the particular individuals. By the method of analysis, the word is divided into stem and suffix. Its meaning is also divided into parts which are ascribed to the parts of the word. The stem denotes the individuals and the suffix denotes femininity as qualifying substance in general. The former are looked upon as the substrata and as feminine and the word gets its gender and number accordingly. Thus how the word gets different genders and numbers considering that the femininity is one has been explained (see verse 177.). As to how a word sometimes gets two feminine suffixes, there is no difficulty in explaining it. If the feminine suffix is only indicative (*dyotaka*) and not expressive (*vācaka*), there is no difficulty in explaining it. It is well known in the world that sometimes more than one lamp is required to illuminate an object. So it is not surprising that sometimes two *dyotaka* suffixes are used to illuminate the feminine. See also *vā.* 8 M. Bhā. II. p. 208, l. 7.]

After having said something about gender and number of

words expressive of degree and of feminine formations, something is now going to be said, again following the reverse order of the topics, about gender and number in *dvandva* compounds.

190. The words which are going to make up a *dvandva* compound denote an undifferentiated meaning without the help of the word *ca* because of non-differentiation in form.

[The *dvandva* compound has been taught in P. 2. 2. 29 in the sense of *ca* = and. Now *ca* is only a particle and it has no gender, and number because it does not denote substance. So a compound formed in the sense of *ca* should also have no gender and number. And yet, the *dvandva* compound has gender and number. How this happens is now being considered.]

191. Words whose power has not been specified are restricted to the conveying of alternation, negation or accumulation by some indicatory word (*dyotaka*).

[In a sentence the expressive power of words which are to form a *dvandva* compound is not determined without the use of words like *ca* because there would remain a doubt. The use of *vā* would restrict this meaning to alternation, of *na* to negation and of *ca* to accumulation.]

192. In a compound, the word *ca* disappears because of its special form. Though there is difference in meaning, it is referred to as the meaning of *ca* because of resemblance.

[In a sentence, the word *ca* is used and so it denotes collection based on difference. In a *dvandva* compound, there is no *ca* and so it denotes collection in which difference is not manifest (*anudbhūta*). In both, the different things connected require one another for the purpose of action and that is all

that is meant by *cārtha*. The things meant by words are different from one another but on the basis of some slight resemblance they are regarded as one and used as the basis for the derivation of words.]

193. The meaning of *ca* is non-substance (*asattva*) and if that is resorted to, the *dvandva* compound would have the same attribute (as *ca*), because, in the case of *ca* etc., the attribute is the result of the meaning.

[The natural meaning of words matters and not necessarily what is mentioned in the *śāstra*. Otherwise, the *dvandva* compound which is taught in the sense of *ca* which is non-substance, would also become an indeclinable (*avyaya*) and get no gender and number like *ca* etc. That *ca* etc. have no gender and number is due to the nature of their meaning and if the *dvandva* is formed in the meaning of *ca*, it would also have no gender and number. Even if a *dvandva* is not called an *avyaya*, it would still have no gender and number if its meaning is that of *ca*, that is, *asattva*.]

194. The meaning of *ca* is conveyed differently somehow by words; *ca* etc., are indicative of it (*dyotaka*) whereas a *dvandva* compound of words having that meaning is expressive of it.

[Due to difference in the power of words, the word *samuccaya* denotes the meaning of *ca* as having gender and number even though *ca* has no gender and number. Similarly, the *dvandva* compound, supposed to be formed in the sense of *ca*, expresses a meaning conditioned by collection whereas *ca* etc. being dependent upon the meaning of the other words in the sentence, only indicate it. That one has no gender and number whereas the other has got it is due to the former being only indicative and the latter being expressive.]

195. It is something real and concrete (*sat*) which is conveyed (by the words *cārthe* in P. 2.2.29), as otherwise, *ca* etc. being merely indicative, the meaning of the words *vikalpa* etc. would not be conveyed in a different manner by them.

[*Vā* and other such words denote in another way the meaning denoted by words like *vikalpa*, *samuccaya* and *pratiṣedha*. This would be possible only if *cārtha* in P. 2.2.29 stands for something which is real and concrete (*sattvabhūta*). A *Dvandva* compound and *ca* have the same meaning but they do not convey it in the same way.]

196. Keeping in view the nature of words, gender has been declared to be natural. Words express the same meaning in different ways.

[The same thing is conveyed by words having different genders : *kāśyam*, *kraśimā*, and *kṛśatā*, three words in three different genders but having the same stem convey the same meaning. Similarly, *dvaidham* (P. 5. 3. 49.) has no gender and number but when the suffix *ḍa* is added to it, we can have *dvaidhāṇi*. The word now expresses the same thing in a different way.]

197. Meanings are elaborated out of the word, it is that which creates meanings. And there is no other means of inferring the speaker's intention than the word.

[It would not be right to attribute this variety in the way in which words express the same thing to the speaker's intention because, in the world, it is from the words that we infer the speaker's intention. *Āpaḥ* presents water as having plurality and *udaka* presents the same thing as a whole, having the singular number. *Dārāḥ* presents the idea of a wife with the masculine gender and plural number and the word *bhāryā* presents the same

thing as feminine and singular. All this is due to the natural power of words.]

Others hold a different view as follows—

198. The meaning of a *dvandva* compound may be the objects collected with collection as subordinate to them or it may be the collection with the collected objects as subordinate to it.

199. When the collected objects constitute the main meaning (of a *dvandva* compound) then its gender and number are natural. When the collection is the main meaning, it is the *śāstra* which prescribes both.

[When the collected objects which are concrete things constitute the main meaning of a *dvandva*, then the gender and number of the word are natural, that is, not laid down by the *śāstra*. When it is considered that the *śāstra* prescribes the meaning and that meaning is the collection, then gender and number are also laid down by the *śāstra*, namely, P. 1.2.52. This rule becomes applicable because it lays down the gender and number of a *viśeṣaṇa* and even where the collection is the main thing, the collected are looked upon as a kind of *viśeṣaṇa*.]

Some think that even when the collected objects constitute the main meaning, the *śāstra* lays down the law.

200. Others think (that *śāstra* is useful even when the collected constitute the main meaning as otherwise) their gender and number would not prevail because the word would follow the *nimitta* (the collection).

[The *nimitta*, that is, the collection overpowers and hides the collected whose gender and number do not, therefore, prevail. So the *śāstra* says that they should be followed.]

It is now stated that this is not the right view.

201. If the idea of collection were the basis (*nimitta*) (for the formation of a *dvandva*) it would be right to follow it. But by the method of agreement and difference, the meaning of *ca* is the basis of the formation of a *dvandva*.

[The meaning of a *dvandva* is what has been determined by the method of agreement and difference and that is the meaning of *ca* as stated in P. 2.2.29. The meaning of *ca* is a collection of objects all equally connected with action and susceptible of being an accessory to action. It is a mistake to think of *samuccaya* as the basis for the formation of a *dvandva*.]

202. Whether the objects collected are the basis (*nimitta*) for the formation of the *dvandva* compound or whether the meaning of *ca* (collection, *samuccaya*) is absent, gender and number in a *dvandva* are due to the natural power of words.

[The real position is this. If the 'collected' are the basis for the formation of *dvandva*, it is natural that their gender and number should prevail. It is a mistake to think of a collection at all in connection with a *dvandva*. The mistake arises because, in grammar, some meaning or other is taken as the basis for word-formation on the strength of some resemblance or other. Really speaking, the meaning of a *dvandva* is, by its very nature, substance (*sattvabhūta*.)]

203. Being only indicative (*dyotaka*) of the meaning of another word, a particle is not endowed with gender and number. A *dvandva*, on the other hand, is expressive of concrete substance.

[Even though the external object remains the same, the

meanings of words expressive of it differ according to difference in their expressive power. As a *dvandva* expresses substance (*sattva*) the meaning of *ca* which is *asattva* is said to disappear in it. This is an instance of the difference between what is expressive (*vācaka*) and what is only indicative (*dyotaka*) and it has already been pointed out (See verses 194 and 195.)

204. If the supposed basis (*nimitta*) is followed, the attribute of the substances would be disregarded (*anapekṣaṇāt*) and it would not be possible to connect them with action primarily or secondarily.

[There is another reason why a *dvandva* should be considered to denote the objects collected rather than the collection. If it stood for the collection primarily, the collected would be overshadowed and their power would not be clearly grasped and so they cannot enter into relation with action either primarily or secondarily. The collection itself being *asattva*, cannot enter into relation with action. To be connected with action as its *karaṇa* or *sampradāna* etc. is to be connected secondarily; to be connected as *karma* is to be connected primarily.]

205. There is no word-meaning which is independent and unconnected with action. (If the meaning of a *dvandva* were so), its inclusion would be useless.

[There is no word-meaning which is quite independent and isolated and not connected with action at all. If the meaning of the *dvandva* is overshadowed by the *nimitta* (collection) and, therefore, unconnected with action, its inclusion among expressive words and its derivation by grammar would be quite useless.]

206. A word (like *samuccita*) expressive of that which has collection (as its attribute) does not

follow the basis (*nimitta*). And, therefore, its meaning is endowed with its own properties.

[An analogy is now given. It is not only the *dvandva* which does not follow the *nimitta*. The word *samuccita* is known to be expressive of a meaning of which *samuccaya* is the *upādhi* or *nimitta* (basis of formation) and yet it does not follow it as far as gender and number are concerned. A *dvandva* should do it still less, because it is an error to look upon *samuccaya* as its *nimitta*. One can say that the word *śukla* follows the *nimitta* because from it we understand the *nimittin* (a white object) hidden by the *nimitta*, the white colour. In *samuccita*, on the other hand, something which is merely qualified by an external *nimitta* is understood. That is the force of the suffix *matuṣ* in *samuccayavataḥ*. As the word *samuccita* does not follow the *nimitta* which is different from and external to it, it has the gender and number of its own meaning. This is what happens in *dvandva* also.]

207. A *dvandva* has no external substratum. Its two particular constituents are actually mentioned in it and they are the substratum of the collection and so it is formed according to their properties.

[The gender and number of a *dvandva* do not depend upon those of an outside word but on those of its constituents. When they have different genders, the compound takes the gender of the last constituent according to P. 2.4.26.]

208. The group which has two parts which appear to be different from each other takes on the properties of the parts.

[When one wants to speak of two or more things together without ignoring their difference one forms a *dvandva* compound. It gets its gender and number according to the parts. Though the compound is one word, the meanings of the parts are not to be ignored. In words like *vanam*, *yūtham* which denote a whole (forest, herd), the parts are completely ignored and the words

get the gender and number of the whole and not of the parts. A *dvandva* is in a different position.]

209. The meaning of a *dvandva* has a double character, consisting of difference and identity. It takes on the gender and number of the parts on which it rests.

[This whole or group has a double character. It is understood as identical with the parts and in that sense, it is differentiated (*bhinnah*). It is also the object of a single cognition and in that sense, it is *abhinna*, one and undifferentiated. What is conveyed by each word distinctly is the substratum and the whole takes the gender and number of the parts conveyed by the constituent words.]

Following the reverse order of the topics mentioned in verse 158, the use of the extension of gender and number taught in P. 1.2.51 and 1.2.53. for a *bahuvrīhi* compound is now going to be considered.

210. Just as the word *caitra* is not repeated if it has already been used to express its meaning in the same way, no word would be used in apposition to a *bahuvrīhi*.

[A *bahuvrīhi* compound is made in the sense of another word which is not part of the compound. That would mean, so it might be said, that the other word cannot be used in apposition to the *bahuvrīhi* which has already conveyed its meaning. But this is not so. The compound refers to the meaning of the other word only in a general way. The other word has to be used in apposition to it in order to particularise it.]

211. Just as the word *gauḥ* does not denote any particular cow such as a white one, in the same way,

from a *bahuvrīhi* (like *citraguḥ*) one only understands that somebody is connected with the cows as owner.

[From a *bahuvrīhi* like *citraguḥ* the particular person who is the owner of the cows is not understood, just as from the word *gauḥ* we do not understand whether it is white or black. To understand that, one has to use some such word as *śuklaḥ* or *kṛṣṇaḥ* with it. Similarly, to understand the particular owner from a *bahuvrīhi* one has to use some such word as *Caitraḥ* or *Maitraḥ* in apposition to *citraguḥ*.]

212. As in the case of the words *vajrapāṇi* and *tryakṣa*, no particular person connected as owner with the motley coloured cows is well-known.

[Where the particular object is well-known, there a word expressive of it need not be used in apposition to the compound. For example, after the words *vajrapāṇiḥ* and *tryakṣaḥ*, it is not necessary to use the words *Śakraḥ* and *Śivaḥ* respectively in apposition to them, because they would be understood even otherwise.]

213. Even though, being a different kind of expression, the particulars are mentioned in a sentence the compound is a different formation altogether and it expresses the generic idea.

[It has already been shown that the compound and the sentence are different from each other in form as well as in meaning. The sentence can express the particular but not the compound which can only denote the general and so requires a word in apposition to it to denote the particular.]

Though the *bahuvrīhi* expresses only the general, it still fulfils some purpose.

214. The *bahuvrīhi* excludes one who has no cows and one who has no motley-coloured cows

because of difference in form but because of identity of form, it does not denote the particular individuals who own motley-coloured cows.

[It is not that the *bahavrihi* compound is totally incapable of particularising. There is, at least, some negative particularisation. *Citragu*, for instance, excludes one who has no cows and one whose cows are not motley coloured. For complete particularisation, a word denoting one individual has to be used in apposition to it. Even if a general word is used in apposition to it, as in *Citragu tat Citragu Kiñcit, Citragu sarvam*, that would also particularise because it would exclude other particularisations.]

215. Just as, once the word *citragu* has been used, another word having the same meaning is not used, in the same way, if the general were also in the same position, a word expressive of it would not be used.

[This stanza answers the question: how can words like *tat, kiñcit, sarva* etc be like words expressive of the particular? Once the word *Citragu* has been used another word having the same meaning is not used, because it is not required. If a general meaning such as what is conveyed by words like *sarva* were also not required, it would not be used. But it is sometimes required and so a word like *tat* is used.]

216. General words like *sarva* are also expressive of the particular and exclude other words expressive of the particular, just as words expressive of the particular exclude words denoting the general and other words expressive of the particular.

[When words like *sarva* and *viśva* are used, even though they express a general meaning, they exclude words expressive of the particular. Thus they also perform the function of exclusion and become, in a sense, words expressive of the particular.]

The *bahuvrīhi* has been taught in the meaning of a word not included in it (*anyapadārthe*). That meaning is a combination of the meaning of a stem and of a suffix. If the compound is formed in this combined meaning, how the use of a word expressive of the particular in apposition to it is necessary has been explained so far. But the *Bhāṣya* has also put forward the view that the *bahuvrīhi* compound is formed in the meaning of the case-ending of the word not included in the compound. The use of a word in apposition to it even according to this view is now stated to be necessary.

217. As the *bahuvrīhi* expresses the meaning of the case-ending, the latter is not used in apposition to it. As it does not express the particular individual, a word expressive of it is used in apposition to it.

[If the *bahuvrīhi* expresses the meaning of the case-ending, it means that it stands for some relation or other. The particular relation is indicated by the word which comes at the end of the sentence which analyses the meaning of a *bahuvrīhi*. For example, the sentence *citrā gāvo'sya* corresponding to the compound *Citraguḥ*. It is the sixth case-ending which is found in the last word of this sentence. This word ending in the sixth case-affix expresses primarily the relation (of owner and owned), the meaning of the case-ending to which the meaning of the stem is subordinate. This is the *anyapadārtha* to denote which the compound is formed. We obtain this by following the power called *abhidhā* of words.]

If the *bahuvrīhi* expresses the meaning of a case-ending, that is, some relation, it being *asattva*, how to explain the gender and number of the compound? This difficulty is now stated.

218. If it is maintained that the *bahuvrīhi* is in apposition to the external word expressive of *sattva* by the elision of the *matuṣ* suffix (as in the case of

words like *śukla*, there would be regressus ad infinitum because the *matuṣ* also expresses relation.

[To say that the *bahuvrīhi* expresses the meaning of a case-ending is to say that it expresses a relation. It has been taught in the sense of *matuṣ* (See M. Bhā. I. p. 424, l. 17-18,) which also expresses a relation. Unless the compound denotes the related, it cannot take its gender and number. If it is held that the *matuṣ* expresses the related (*sambandhin*) then the *bahuvrīhi* also would do the same and then the view that it expresses the meaning of a case-ending would have to be given up.]

In *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*, *śuklaḥ* means not merely the quality white but a 'white object' because the suffix *matuṣ* is supposed to have been elided there. We cannot say the same thing about *citraguḥ* because the *matuṣ* suffix is not added to it at all, as the compound itself denotes the meaning of *matuṣ*.]

If the *bahuvrīhi* is said to be formed in the sense of a case-ending and if *matuṣ* is added to it, another difficulty would arise which is now stated.

219. The other relation would become the related (*sambandhin*) of the first relation. Moreover, if the meaning of the case-ending is predominant, it would not be possible to connect it with an action.

[If the *bahuvrīhi*, formed in the sense of a case-ending, denotes a relation and the *matuṣ* which is added to it also denotes a relation, then the latter relation would be determined or qualified by the former and would thus cease to be a relation at all, but become the related (*sambandhin*). A *sambandhin* is just what is determined by something else. Moreover, if the meaning of the case-ending (say, the sixth-case ending) is predominant, how can it be connected with action as in the sentence *citragur āñīyatām*. A relation, being *asattva*, is not susceptible to become the *Kāraka* of an action.]

It is now stated that expressions like *tataḥ paśya*, *tatra paśya* cannot be given as examples where a word which denotes the meaning of a case-ending predominantly is connected with action.

220. In expressions like *tataḥ* and *tatra*, actions like seeing do not bring out the agent, object etc. because in them, it is the meaning of their own case-ending which is predominant.

[In expressions like *tataḥ* and *tatra* it is the notion of starting-point (*apādāna*) or that of location (*adhikaraṇa*) which is predominant and it is they which are manifested by actions like seeing and not the notions of agent and object. In other words, the action of seeing is connected, not with a bare relation, but with a concrete substance.]

221. Where the relation is expressed as the predominant meaning, how can it be included in the meaning (of the stem) ? How can the meaning of the stem be of such a nature ?

[If the meaning of the case-ending is the main one, we would get the expression: *citrāgur devadattasya*. It would not do to say that the meaning of the sixth case-ending has been included in that of the stem and so the first case-ending should come after the stem. It is only when the relation is subordinate to the related that it becomes part of the meaning of the stem. For instance, in *rājāpuruṣa*, the relation for which the word *rājān* stands is subordinate to the meaning of the word *puruṣa* which is predominant. So that relation becomes part of the meaning of the stem *rājāpuruṣa*. That is not the case in *citrāguḥ*.]

How a *bahuvrīhi* becomes connected with a verb expressive of action is now stated.

222. As in the case of actions relating to the universal, number, and collection, an action which cannot be performed on a relation could be performed on what is connected with it.

[In the expressions, *gām ālabheta*, *brāhmaṇānām śatam ānaya*, and *pañcapūli badhyatām*, the action which is enjoined on the universal, number and collection respectively by the words used cannot be performed on them. So it is performed on the substance which is invariably associated with it. In the same way, the action enjoined in the sentence *citrāgur ānīyatām*, namely, that of 'bringing' is done on the 'related' (*sambandhin*) which is always invariably associated with the relation on which action cannot be performed.]

223. Because of relation of identity, the gender and number of the words expressive of the particular substrata would result because of teaching to that effect (P. 1.2.52.) as in the case of words like *śukla*.

[There is the relation of identity between the relation and the related. Therefore even if the *bahuvrīhi* is taught only in the sense of a relation which is the meaning of the case-ending, it denotes the related also because of the nature of the power of words and according to P. 1. 2. 52, it would get the gender and number of the word expressive of the related.]

224. If the relation is meant to be expressed as distinct (from the related) or if the related in general is expressed, the whole of the meaning of the other word with its gender and number would not be expressed.

[If the *bahuvrīhi* denotes relation, the meaning of the case-ending, as distinct from the related, then it would not get the

gender and number of the latter and so the whole meaning of the other word would not be expressed. If, through the relation of identity, it denotes the related, it can do so in a general way and then it would get only the common gender, the neuter and the common number, the singular. The gender and number of the particular related would not result and so again the whole meaning of the other word would not be expressed. So it is better to abandon the *vibhakyarthābhidhānapakṣa* = the view that the *bahuvrīhi* compound is formed in order to convey the meaning of a case-ending and to adopt the *dravyābhidhānapakṣa* = the view that the compound expresses the individual substance.]

How this is so is now explained.

225. A (*bahuvrīhi*) compound is not seen to be correct if expressive of the meaning of a case-ending only. It is correct if it is expressive of the whole meaning of the other word (*anyapadārtha*). That is why the word *artha* has been used (in P. 2. 2 24.)

[A *bahuvrīhi* is never formed in the sense of a case-ending only. In the meaning of the other word (*anyapadārtha*), the notion of substance is the predominant element. That is why the word *artha* is used in P. 2.2.24. As the word *pada* qualifies the word *artha* in this *sūtra*, the whole meaning of the *pada*, neither more (that is, not sentence-meaning) nor less (that is, not the meaning of the case-ending only) is meant. Therefore, *anyapadārtha* means : *liṅgasamkhyāvat padārthabhūtaṃ dravyam* = substance having gender and number and constituting the meaning of the whole word. Hence, the use of a word expressive of the related in apposition to the compound is justified.]

226. When the *bahuvrīhi* denotes substance through the relation of identity, then it is declared to be correct with the gender and number of the substance.

[According to the view that the *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the sense of the case-ending, even though it may denote substance in general with which the relation, its main meaning, has been identified, it would get the gender and number of the individual substance only through P. 1.2.52. But according to the other view, that the compound is formed in the whole meaning of the other word, the gender and number of the latter would result naturally. There would be no need for P. 1.2.52.]

227. Just as the sixth case-ending is not used (in a *bahuvrīhi*) because of its meaning (relation) being part of the meaning of the compound, in the same way, suffixes expressive of gender and number also would not be heard.

[This is a reference to an objection mentioned in the M. Bhā. I. p.422, l. 27-28. that if the *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the whole meaning of the external word with its gender and number, one would not add suffixes expressive of them to it as the compound itself expresses them. Thus one would not get the required form.]

228. A *bahuvrīhi* would thus be similar to an indeclinable (*avyaya*), being devoid of the completeness (*saṃskāra*) which results from the presence of suffixes expressive of gender and number.

[If no suffix expressive of gender and number is added to a *bahuvrīhi* on the ground that these two notions are already included in its meaning, it would be like an indeclinable which is also devoid of gender and number.]

229. Moreover, words like *caitra* would be heard without any case-ending because of their connection with what is actually used (without case-ending). The connection (of what is devoid of case-ending) would be with what is devoid of case-ending.

[If the *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the sense of substance in general and has no gender and case-affix, it would be used in apposition to a word like *Caitra* expressive of a particular substance, but also devoid of gender and number. Thus we would not get the desired form.]

The difficulty thus pointed out in the view that the *bahuvrīhi* denotes the whole meaning of the other word is answered as follows—

230. Even if number is already expressed (by the compound itself) it does not give up its nature. If the meaning of the sixth case-ending is already expressed, then it has become part of the (*bahuvrīhi*) stem-meaning.

[As far as the suffix expressive of gender (like *īāp*) is concerned, it can be added to a *bahuvrīhi* as it can be added to other stems, even if its meaning is included in that of the *bahuvrīhi*, because it has already been stated that the feminine suffix is only indicative (*dyotaka*) of the notion of the feminine already included in the meaning of the stem. It does not bring anything new. As to case-endings expressive of number, the present stanza answers the objection. Even if number is already expressed by the *bahuvrīhi*-stem itself, case-endings expressive of number would be added to it. It is like the words *ekaḥ*, *dvau*, *bahavaḥ*. In all these words, the stem itself expresses number and yet a case-ending has been added to them. When the compound expresses the *Kāraka* relations also, its number would qualify them and so a case-ending like the second one would have to be added to express that number which qualifies the *Kāraka* relation as in *citragum ānaya*. Even the first case-ending may have to be added sometimes in order that the bare-stem (*kevala prakṛtiḥ*) may not be used. Here the *bahuvrīhi* is not like an indeclinable, because the elision of the feminine suffix and the case-endings after the latter is specially prescribed by P. 2.4.82. The sixth case-ending, however, cannot be added because it has become merged in the meaning of the *bahuvrīhi* stem itself.]

It is now stated that others have stated another view on this matter.

231. "The view that the *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the sense of the case-ending was not put forward in order to justify the use of a word in apposition to it but as another fact (*vaṣṭvantaram*) (regarding the formation of the *bahuvrīhi*)" so some declare.

[It has so far been stated that if the *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the meaning of another word, there would be no point in using that word in apposition to it. So it was proposed that it is formed only in the sense of a case-ending. How, in that case, it can be used in apposition to the word expressive of another object and how it can be connected with a verb was also explained. But in the end, it was concluded that, in view of the use of the word *artha* in P. 2. 2. 24, the *bahuvrīhi* must be deemed to be formed in the sense of the *whole* meaning of the other word. But here it is stated that some do not accept this position. According to them, the *vibhaktiyarthābhidhānapakṣa* has not been put forward, just by the way to meet an objection but as a legitimate way of explaining the formation of the *bahuvrīhi*. From the way Patañjali says *etaccātra yuktam, atra hi sarvapaścāt padam vartate*. (M. Bhā. I. p. 422, l. 8-9.) he seems to look upon this as a better view. But the ultimate conclusion is in favour of the view that the *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the *whole* sense of the other word. In this view, it gets its gender and number naturally, whereas in the other view it gets them by P. 1. 2. 52.]

232. It is the relations determined by the constituent terms which form the basis (of the formation of the *bahuvrīhi*) or it is the related, determined by the relations, which form the basis.

[In the *vibhaktiyarthābhidhānapakṣa*, it is the relations, determined by the related conveyed by the constituent terms, that

form the basis of the *bahuvrīhi*. Though relation is one, it is spoken of as many, because of the great variety that is found in these compounds. In the *padārthābhīdhānapakṣa*, it is the related, determined by the relations, which form the basis of the *bahuvrīhi*.]

Those who uphold the *padārthābhīdhānapakṣa* put forward the analogy of the *matvartha* formations as follows—

233. Some hold that the possessive (*matvartha*) suffixes come after the word *daṇḍa* qualified by the relation of contact (*saṃyoga*) and after the word *viśāṇa*, qualified by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) in the sense of one who has the one or the other (*tadvati*) and that is what happens in the case of the *bahuvrīhi* compound.

[Those who hold the *padārthābhīdhānapakṣa* point out that the *bahuvrīhi* is like a word formed with a possessive suffix (*matvarthīya*). In *daṇḍin* and *viśāṇin*, for instance, formed by P. 5.2.115., the suffix *ini* is added to the words *daṇḍa* and *viśāṇa* in the sense of that which has *daṇḍa* by the relation of *saṃyoga* and that which has *viśāṇa* by the relation of *samavāya*. In other words, a substance qualified by a relation is the basis of the formations *daṇḍin* and *viśāṇin*. Similarly, the related, that is, the meanings of the constituent terms, qualified by some relation to the meaning of the external word, are the basis of the *bahuvrīhi* compound.]

The other view is as follows—

234. Others, on the other hand, consider that it is the relation, different with the different related, that is the basis (of the *matvartha* formation.) Similarly, it is the meaning of the case-ending (that is, a relation) which is expressed by the compound.

[Others think that, in a *matvartha* formation, it is some relation, or other, depending on the relatum conveyed by the stem, which is the basis. In fact, from the words *daṇḍin* and *viṣāṇin*, we understand something in which both the relatum and the relation figure. Similarly, the *bahuvrīhi* compound conveys a relation, the meaning of a case-ending, as determined by some particular relatum.]

The two views are conclusively stated as follows—

235. The relation, determined by the relata which are subordinate to it, is an occasion for its formation and is important because it is the meaning of the other word. Or it may be looked upon as the expressed meaning as it is referred to right at the end.

[The *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the sense of another word which is not its constituent. The relation is only an occasion for its formation. Once it is formed, it expresses the related. This is the first view. The other view is that the relation is the main thing and that the compound expresses that. The relation is determined by the relata conveyed by the constituent words. It is that which is referred to at the end of the analytic sentence. See, M. Bhā. I. p. 422, l. 9.]

An objection is now anticipated and answered.

236. Even though, in the sentence, it is seen that the owner is subordinated (*vyatirekaḥ*) the *bahuvrīhi* compound is desired only when his pre-dominance is meant to be conveyed.

[It might be objected that in the *bahuvrīhi* compound *citraguḥ*, it is the idea of the motley-coloured cows, qualified by their owner, which is the main meaning and not the related qualified by the relation nor the relation qualified by the related. But this is not

right. In the sentence *citrā gāvo yasya*, the motley-coloured cows, qualified by the separately expressed and subordinate owner, may be the predominant meaning. But the compound and the sentence are two different things and so their meanings are also different. In the sentence, the meaning of *yasya*, that is, the owner, is subordinate but in a compound, that is the main meaning.]

237. When the owner (*tadvān*) is presented as the qualifier of the cows in the form “his they are” (*asyaitāḥ*), in that sense the compound is not taught.

[When the sentence is “his are the motley-coloured cows” (*asyaitāḥ citrā gāvaḥ*) ‘his’ comes as a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the cows, as something subordinate. Such a sentence does not express the full meaning of the compound.]

Which sentence then is more in accordance with the compound is now shown.

238. When the cognition is in the form: “the owner of those cows” (*tāsāṃ svāmī gavām*), then the relation with the cows becomes the basis of the formation of the compound.

[When one wants to know: “Who is the owner of the motley-coloured cows?”, such cows become a means of understanding a particular owner. The meaning of the constituent words is connected with the meaning of the outside word and that connection becomes the basis of the formation of the compound. Thus one gets a sentence like this: *citrā gāvo yasya so’yaṃ citraguḥ*, in which the meaning of the outside word is the main one.]

239. If, in order to prevent the compound from becoming a mere conventional word, the relation is resorted to as the basis, as the basis would produce

its effect (*anuvīdhāyivāt*), the compound would have its properties.

[If the relation is resorted to as the basis of the compound which denotes the relata through the relation, then the meaning of the compound would have the properties of the relation. Relation not being substance and so devoid of gender and number, the meaning of the compound would also be devoid of gender and number. Unless the relation is brought in to explain the compound, the latter would become a mere conventional word with no meaningful parts. But one does see meaningful parts in *citrāgu*.]

An illustration is now given.

240. Just as in the word *nānācitrāḥ* = "different motley-coloured objects", the word *nānā* = 'different, varied', would retain the basis of its formation, even though now used to denote objects which are different (or such varied), such would be the case of the *bahuvrīhi* compound.

[An example is now given. The word *nanā*, formed by P. 4. 2.27. from the negative particle *nañ* by adding the suffix *nañ* in the sense of separation, not being together (*asahārthe*) is an indeclinable. If, on that basis, it is applied to an object, even then it would retain its character of denoting *asattva*, non-substance. Such is the case with the *bahuvrīhi* compound. From a thing in which the *nimitta* exists, a cognition similar to the *nimitta* would arise. The pure *nimittin* would not figure in the cognition and so grammatical operations would not be according to that but according to the *nimitta*.]

241. If the relata are the basis of the formation, the property of individual substance is not interfered with. It is having no gender at all which is opposed to having gender.

[According to the view that the relation is the basis of the formation and that the expressed meaning is the relatum susceptible to take gender and number, there would be need for the extension of gender and number by P. 1.2.52. In this view, even if the basis of the formation (*nimitta*) persists, it would do no harm to the property of substance, namely, susceptibility to gender and number, because the *nimitta* also is so susceptible. Even though the gender and number of the *nimitta* in *citraḡuḥ* (feminine and plural) are different from those of the meaning of the other word *Devadattaḥ* (masculine and singular), the former would not eclipse the latter. So the latter would have its own gender and number. If bare relation were the basis of formation, it would convey the relatum without giving up its own form. So the relatum would be eclipsed by the relation and would not get its own gender and number. To have no gender at all is opposed to having a gender and not having a different gender.]

242. The meaning of the other word with its gender and number, is equal in properties to the basis of formation. Being a substance, it is near to it and so it does not conflict with its properties.

[When the relatum is the basis of formation and is also the meaning of the constituent words which are also in the nature of substance and is the expressed meaning, its properties are not eclipsed and so its gender and number naturally result.]

If, in the *vibhaktiyartha* view also, the compound conveys the relatum through the relation of identity, what is the difference between that and the *padārthābhīdhānapakṣa*? This is now answered.

243. Substance is presented in two ways: (1) as conditioned by the relation which is the meaning of the case-ending, (2) in a pure form. The properties of the pure substance would not result if it is eclipsed by the properties of something else.

[In the *vibhaktyartha* view substance, identified with the relation conveyed by the sixth case-affix, is the expressed meaning. In the *padārthābhīdhānapakṣa*, the pure unconditioned substance is the expressed meaning. These two different views result because of the two different ways in which substance is presented. The gender and number of pure substance do not result if it is conditioned by the relation. Therefore, their extension has to be provided for by P. 1. 2. 52. When pure substance becomes qualified substance, it is said to be *sadravyaḥ*. Though relation is the predominant meaning at the word level, at the meaning level, substance is predominant.]

244. In the earlier part of the text (of the *M. Bhā.* on P. 2. 2. 24.) where pure substance is mentioned, this distinction is not meant to be conveyed. But it is pointed out in the later (second) part.

[In the earlier part of the *M. Bhā.* on P. 2. 2. 24. where pure substance is stated to be the meaning of the *bahuvrīhi* and the difficulty regarding the use of a word in apposition to it is raised and answered, this view, namely, that substance is conditioned by relation is not mentioned. But in the later part, it is mentioned. Even here, substance is declared to be the meaning, though conditioned by the relation. If substance is not conveyed, gender and number would not exist at all and where is the question of their extension by P. 1. 2. 52. ? All that is meant is that relation is the predominant meaning.]

If relation is the predominant meaning and it hides the substance, how has it been stated that the whole meaning of the word including substance, gender and number, is conveyed? (*M. Bhā.* I. p. 422, l. 27.) This is now explained.

245. Substance is mentioned here as qualifying gender and number. They rest on substance and not on anything else.

[Even though gender and number usually qualify substance, here substance should be understood as qualifying gender and number. Gender and number here are not connected with something else like quality, They inhere in substance. Though, in this view, relation is the expressed meaning, the expression *sadravyaḥ* (including substance) is used in order that gender and number may also result. Relation being expressed here as identical with the meaning of the other word susceptible to gender and number, the two are equal to each other in their attributes. Both are in the nature of substance. They are not distant from each other as when bare relation is the basis of formation. The relatum which is the expressed meaning would have its own gender and number. In some complex formations, the resulting form has the property of the *nimitta* and not of the *nimittin* as one would expect. For instance, in *harītakyaḥ phalāni* = the fruits of the *harītakī* tree (the yellow Myrobalan). Here *harītakyaḥ* stands for the fruits and so should have the neuter gender to agree with *phalāni* but by P. 4. 4. 167 and 1. 2. 51 it retains the feminine gender which it had when it was the name of the tree.]

246. The compound conveys substance in general determined by the relation qualified by the relata and is followed by a word expressive of individual substance.

[According to the *vibhakyarthābhīdhānapakṣa*, the *bahuvrīhi* is expressive of the relatum, namely, substance in general, determined by the relation qualified by the relata which are the meanings of the constituent words. By saying 'substance in general', it is shown that in this view also, the use of words expressive of individual substance in apposition to the *bahuvrīhi* is necessary and justified.]

247. Not being beyond gender and number, the properties of a substance, and being in apposition to what expresses the particular, it (the *bahuvrīhi*) takes

on the gender and number of the particular relatum which is going to be connected with it.

[As the *bahuvrihi* conveys substance in general, it is susceptible to gender and number, properties of substance. But it is not capable of taking on any particular gender and number belonging to an individual substance : Therefore, by P. 1. 2. 52. it takes on the gender and number of the individual substance conveyed by the word used in apposition to it.]

Here ends the consideration of the *bahuvrihi* compound.

Now the extension of gender and number to negative compounds is going to be considered.

248. Even though the methods of the *śāstra* may differ, that does not make any difference to the worldly meaning of the negative compound and that is why three alternative views in regard to it are discussed (in the *M. Bhā.* on P. 2.2.6.)

[Now begins a consideration of the extension of gender and number to negative compounds. The *M. Bhā.* on P. 2. 2. 6 discusses whether, in negative compounds, the meaning of first term is the main one or that of the second term or that of an outside word. Whatever may be the answer, it makes no difference to the meaning of a compound like *abrāhmaṇaḥ*. If it is formed in the sense of an outside word, then the second constituent, namely, *brāhmaṇa* would stand, not for the universal *brāhmaṇatva* but for an individual. If the meaning of the negative particle is the main one, it being non-existence, it cannot be connected with action and so one would understand from the compound something resembling a *brāhmaṇa*. If the meaning of the second term is the main one, one would understand from the compound somebody like a *kṣattriya* mistaken for a *brāhmaṇa*. Whichever way we take it, the ultimate meaning is the same.]

249. Even though it (the compound) is a different word, consideration proceeds on the basis of its identification (with the analytic sentence). In compounds like *abrāhmaṇa*, one does not see the use of the negative particle *na*.

[In the course of the grammatical derivation of a compound, it is assumed to be identical in meaning with the sentence which analyses it (*vigrahavākya*). In the sentence, one sees *na* and the *a* of the compound is identified with this *na*. So one sees the meaning of the sentence in the compound. Whatever inner distinction one sees in the meaning of a compound is based on the identification between the compound and the analytic sentence. As we understand the idea of non-existence or negation from the compound, we conclude that the *a* in it corresponds to the *na* of the sentence. In *adhika* and *āpanaya* also there is *a* but the idea of negation is not understood from it. Of course, in reality, the word *abrāhmaṇa* is indivisible.]

250. Before entering into the compound the negative particle indicates (*dyotyate*) the non-existence of things which had naturally ceased to be but which had not been noticed because of identity of form.

[In the sentence *na* stands for negation or non-existence. Negation is never self-sufficient, because it is always negation of something. A thing which actually exists cannot disappear merely by the use of *na*. *Na* can only make known the non-existence or disappearance of something due to other reasons. A word can denote something which does not exist because it has already been established that the meaning of a word is *śabdārtha* and not *vastvārtha*. The negative particle makes known the meaning of the word associated with it. That is why it is said to be *dyotaka*, indicative.]

251. There is no compounding of the negative particle which, in the sentence stage, is connected with the action denoted by the verb and which inheres in agents like *brāhmaṇa*.

(If the negative particle has no self-sufficient meaning, how can it be the main meaning as one of the three views envisages? If it has and if it is connected with that of the other constituent in the compound, the latter would lose its own nature and cannot be the main meaning. If the meanings of the two constituents are not connected, the meaning of the other word, determined by the connected meanings of the constituent words, cannot become the main meaning either. Thus all the three views seem to be incompatible. If the negative particle negates the action relating to the meaning of the second constituent, there cannot be a compound at all. The action which is negated is either expressed by a separate word or it is conveyed by the compound as a whole. The former is the case in sentences like *brāhmaṇo na bhuṅkte*. The action of eating, denoted by the verb exists in the *brāhmaṇa* and it is with that that the *na* is connected and not with the word *brāhmaṇa*. So, in this sense, there cannot be the compound *abrāhmaṇo bhuṅkte*. Therefore the question as to which is the main one cannot arise at all. But there can be a compound in the sense of *brāhmaṇo nāsti*. We can say *abrāhmaṇaḥ* because the connection of *na*, though outwardly with *asti*, is with *brāhmaṇaḥ* also, because *sattā* the meaning of *asti*, is inherent in the meaning of every word.]

252. If the action denoted by words like *pācaka* is connected with the negative particle, existence not being mentioned there, the three views cannot arise.

[Where there is connection between the negative particle and an action to be indicated by the second constituent, there can be a compound. We can say *apācakaḥ* in the sense of *na pācakaḥ*. Here, the action of cooking is subordinate to the idea

of agent in the word *pācaka*. The negative particle is connected with that subordinate action as something to be negated. The word *brāhmaṇa* as the second term does not convey even a subordinate action and so the negative particle is not connected with it and the three views cannot arise. All this difficulty arises because of adopting the view that in a compound the negative particle is indicative (*dyotaka*) and not expressive. Therefore one must adopt the view that in a compound, the negative particle is expressive (*vācaka*) and not merely indicative (*dyotaka*). As the negative particle denotes non-existence in general it can become connected with the second constituent expressive of a particular non-existence in any one of three ways according to the intention of the speaker. So in this interpretation, the three views can arise. In order that the three views may arise, it is necessary that it should have its own independent meaning and not that it merely indicates the meaning of something else.]

253. If everywhere it is with existence that connection (of the negative particle) is admitted, then, in the compound *asan* : another existence would have to be postulated.

[If everywhere the negative particle is considered to be connected with existence which is present in the meanings of all words and not with actions which come and go, then even in compounds like *asan*, one would have to postulate another existence than the one conveyed by *sat* for *na* to be connected with. But nobody understands two *sattās* from *asan*, but only one which is negated.]

254. In the negative compound ending in *ktvā* or *tumun*, no relation of qualifier and qualified with the negative particle expressive of non-existence is seen.

Though the text of this *kārikā* in my edition, as in other

editions has *nañā sattābhidhāyinā*, Helārāja had *nañāsattābhidhāyinā*. The translation is based on Helārāja's text.

[In the expressions *akṛtvā*, *akartum* the meaning which is conveyed as the main one is similar to that conveyed by a verb in the sense that it is a process and, therefore, susceptible of being connected with the suffix *kṛtvā*, expressive of repetition of action (P. 5.4.17.). There cannot be the relation of qualifier and qualified between such a meaning of the root *kṛ* and the negative particle expressive of non-existence (*asattābhidhāyinā*). Between the negative particle which denies existence and the meaning of the root *kṛ*, there cannot be any relation because negation can be connected only with what is to be negated. The meaning of the root *kṛ* is not in the nature of existence, being in the nature of a process. So it is not something to be negated. So how can it be connected with the negative particle? Therefore, if the negative particle is taken to mean non-existence, both these expressions would be inexplicable. The fact is that here, the negative particle expresses mere negation. Thus, in *asan*, it negates existence which is the meaning of *san* and so there is no question of postulating another existence to be connected with it. In *akṛtvā*, it negates the action denoted by *kṛ* and so the two can be connected. But in *abrāhmaṇa*, the connection between the negative particle and *brāhmaṇa* is inexplicable because existence is part of the meaning of *brāhmaṇa* and what exists cannot be negated. *Objection*. In *asan* and *akṛtvā* also, the meanings of *san* and *kṛtvā* are of a positive nature (*bhāvātmakeṇ*). How can they be negated? If that is so, one would have to assume that the negative particle, even in a compound, is only indicative (*dyotaka*) of what has disappeared by its own nature, as it is in a sentence. Here also, there are two possibilities : (i) either the negative particle should be understood as revealing an object which is the substratum of a particular action and which has disappeared by its own nature or (2) as revealing an object which is the substratum of action in general. In the first alternative, there cannot be a compound at all because of the absence of semantic connection. Even if there is connection the three views cannot arise. In the second alternative, as the negative particle indica-

tive of existence in general is connected only with action in general conveyed by the second term, there would be regressus ad infinitum (*anavasthā*). As there is no connection with a particular action in this view, the negative particle is not indicative (*dyotaka*) at all. Therefore, it should be looked upon as expressive (*vācaka*). In that way, the negative particle has an independent meaning which can be the primary or the secondary one according to circumstances and so the three views can arise and their consideration would naturally result.]

How, according to the view that the negative particle denotes non-existence in general, there is no need to postulate another existence and it can be connected with *kṛtvā* etc., is now going to be explained.

255. The negative particle relates to (that is, expresses) the negation of the substratum in general of the action(of existence). Therefore it is connected with particular substrata like *brāhmaṇa*.

[As the negative particle is here thought of as expressive of non-existence, the action in question here is that of existence. The negation which is the meaning of the particle is the negation of existence. Being intransitive, its accessory is the power of the agent. This power must have a substratum before it can become the agent. So a substratum in general is understood. The negative particle is expressive of that. What is meant is this : In a compound, the negative particle is expressive of the substratum in general, coloured by non-existence, of the action of existence. So the meaning of *nañ* amounts to *nāsti* = 'it does not exist.' What particular substratum does not exist is made known by the word with which the particle is connected. Thus in a compound like *abrāhmaṇa*, the negative particle conveys the non-existence of the substratum in general of the action of non-existence and the word *brāhmaṇa* conveys the particular substratum. The meanings of the two constituents of the compound stand in the relation of qualifier and qualified towards each other. The non-existent in general is combined with a particular non-

existent. Of the two meanings combined, which is the qualifier and which the qualified is a matter of the speaker's intention. When the idea of non-existence is the qualified and that of *brāhmaṇa* the qualifier, the former element, that is, the negative particle becomes the dominant one and there results *pūrvapadārthaprādhānya*. If the compound means *asan brāhmaṇaḥ*, the meaning of the second constituent is the qualified and that of the former the qualifier and so *uttarapadārthaprādhānya* results. In both of these, the meaning of the compound is confined to those of the constituent words. But if the meanings of the constituent words refer to the meaning of an outside word, that is one in whom the fact of being a *brāhmaṇa* is non-existent, somebody like a *kṣattriya*, then *anyapadārthaprādhānya* results. In this way, the three views are possible in the case of *apācaka* also. As the particle stands for negation of existence in general, we can have forms like *akṛtvā*, *akartum* where the root *kṛ* stands for a particular action in which existence (*sattā*) inheres. Thus, by adopting the view that *nañ* is expressive (*vācaka*) of non-existence in general, everything can be explained.]

How the negative particle which is indicative in a sentence becomes expressive in a compound is now explained by means of an analogy.

256. Just as *niḥ* etc. combine, in a compound, on the basis of meanings in the form of one who has gone etc. with substrata in the form of accessories (*sādhana*), such is the process in a negative compound.

[The compound *niṣkauśāmbiḥ* is formed in the sense of *niṣkrāntaḥ Kauśāmbyaḥ* = 'one who has come out of the city of Kauśāmbī. Here *niṣkrāntaḥ* expresses an action together with its agent. Such a word combines, in a compound, with a word like *Kauśāmbī*, which denotes the starting point (*apādāna*) of the action of coming out. It is *niḥ*, having the meaning *niṣkrāntaḥ* which actually combines with *Kauśāmbī* by P. 2. 2. 18, vā 4. Its meaning is the same as that of *niṣkrāntaḥ*.

In a compound *niḥ* does not denote mere *asattva*. If it were so, it could not combine with *Kauśāmbī* whose meaning is in the nature of *sattva*. So it denotes a substance to which the action of coming out is subordinate. In other words, primarily it denotes the agent of the action of coming out, though outside the compound, theoretically, it is supposed to convey *asattva*=non-substance. In the same way, in a negative compound, the negative particle is deemed to be expressive of non-existence in general as otherwise its connection with the meaning of the second constituent would remain inexplicable.]

257. Therefore, as the negative particle stands for non-existence in general, the relation of qualifier and qualified with *brāhmaṇa*. *kṣattriya* etc. is understood as in the case of *kubja* and *khañja*.

[As the negative particle stands for non-existence in general, the three views become possible, because it can be combined with words expressive of a particular non-existence like *brāhmaṇa* and the relation of qualifier and qualified between the two will depend upon the speaker's intention as in the case of the words *Kubja* and *Khañja* which can be compounded into *Kubja-Khañja*=‘hump-backed and lame’ or into *Khañja-Kubja*=‘lame and hump-backed’, according to one's wish, the relation of qualifier and qualified being different each time.]

258. Thus, there being option, the non-existence may be the main meaning and the others secondary or it may be that the others represent the main meaning.

[The relation of qualifier and qualified which implies the idea of primary and secondary, is a matter of the speaker's intention. So in *abrāhmaṇa*, all the three views are possible. When non-existence in general (*asatsāmānyam*) is meant to be the main meaning, then there is predominance of the meaning of

the first word, because that is the meaning of the negative particle. When the meanings of the second constituents are meant to be the main ones, then there is predominance of the meaning of the second constituent. Lastly, when the meanings of the two words refer to the meaning of an outside word, there is predominance of the meaning of the outside word (*anyapadārthaprādhānya*). In a sentence, the negative particle has no independent meaning. It is not expressive but only indicative. Therefore there is no option as far as the relation of qualifier and qualified is concerned and so the three views cannot arise. They can arise only when there is no fixity in the relation of qualifier and qualified, That is not the case in a sentence and that is why the negative particle has no gender and number in a sentence. It is not so in a compound where the negative particle is expressive of *sattva* = substance.]

Of the three views which can arise the predominance of the meaning of the second constituent is mentioned in the *Bhāṣya* first. It is now going to be considered.

259. The words *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣattriya* and the like, considered as the main ones, are used from the very beginning to denote a particular (non-existence) though they have the same form when they denote something positive.

[According to *uttarapadārthaprādhānya*, in the compound *abrāhmaṇa*, the negative particle is the qualifier and *brāhmaṇa* is the qualified. But how is this possible considering that *na* stands for non-existence and *brāhmaṇa* for something which has a positive existence. The fact is that *brāhmaṇa* here means someone in whom *brāhmaṇatva* does not exist. The word has the same form even when it means someone in whom *brāhmaṇatva* exists. The non-existence of *brāhmaṇatva*, already present in the meaning of the word, is made manifest by the negative particle. It means non-existence in general whereas the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for a particular non-existence. There can be the

relation of qualifier and qualified between the general and the particular.]

260. Just as words like '*gaura*' = 'fair' bring about specification, in the same way the negative particle expressive of non-existence makes manifest the unmanifested identity.

[An illustration is now given to show how the negative particle can be the qualifier. When we say *gaurāḥ brāhmaṇaḥ* = the fair *brāhmaṇa*, the word *gaurāḥ* makes explicit what was implicit. That is, any *brāhmaṇa* can be potentially *gaurāḥ* and the adjective *gaurāḥ* specifies that the *brāhmaṇa* in question is so. Similarly, non-existence, like other qualities, is implicit in all objects and the negative particle brings it out, specifies the object. So it becomes a qualifier.]

261. Just as, in order to justify the use of a word expressive of existence, a thing having secondary existence is postulated, in the same way, in order to explain the use of the negative particle expressive of non-existence, an indefinable thing is postulated.

[It does look odd that the negative particle should be considered to be qualifier, considering that it negates the very existence of what is denoted by the word with which it is connected. Ordinarily, adjectives bring out peculiarities present in an existent object. By negating the very existence of the object, the very use of the word seems to become unjustified. The position is this: From an uttered word, one understands a meaning, an object which is common to both existence and non-existence. The external object is not like that. That is based on existence only. If the object denoted by the word were also like that, the use of *san* in *san brāhmaṇa* would be inexplicable, because the external object is always associated with existence and there would be no point in saying *san*. But we do say *san brāhmaṇaḥ*, because the object conveyed by the

word can be associated with both existence and non-existence and *san* specifies which one is meant in a particular case. What is conveyed by a word has secondary existence (*upacārasattā*) and so it can be associated with both existence and non-existence. What has *mukhyasattā* is associated with existence only. The intellect conceives of a thing irrespective of its external existence or non-existence and such a thing is capable of being qualified by conforming or opposite attributes. A unified object like lotus is mentally divided into substance and attribute and we say *nīlam utpalam* by using two separate words. There is no such thing in the world as a bare lotus without colour which would later become associated with blue colour. Substance and colour are always found together. In *abrāhmaṇa*, secondary existence was wrongly thought of as primary existence and that is, therefore, negated.]

How something similar to what is negated is understood from a negative compound is now explained.

262. An idea based on some other Existence is first applied (by mistake) to *kṣattriya* and the like and (when the negative particle is used) it takes away the Existence based on one universal from something else to which it was wrongly applied.

[The negative compound is used when something is first mistaken for something else, and later, the mistake is discovered. The initial mistake and its later removal can be seen in expressions like *abrāhmaṇo' yaṃ kṣattriyaḥ*. Here the negative particle removes the idea of *brāhmaṇa* wrongly applied to a *kṣattriya* and says : this is not a *brāhmaṇa*, he was wrongly so understood, he is similar to a *brāhmaṇa*. Similar to a *brāhmaṇa* is necessarily the meaning of 'not a *abrāhmaṇa*. It cannot mean something totally different from a *brāhmaṇa* but that would not explain how the mistake took place.]

But how to explain the negative compound *abhāvaḥ*? Here nothing similar to the meaning of the second constituent word is understood. Its negation is understood.

263. When, in the compound, *abhāvaḥ* negation of Existence is intended, negation cannot be brought about except on the basis of something positive (*sopākhyā*).

[In order to delimit the object of negation, something positive is conceived by the mind and the word *bhāva* is used. That it is non-existent cannot be understood from that word only because the form of the word is the same in both cases. In order that it may be understood, the negative particle is used. What is *nirupākhyā* = indefinable, non-existent was wrongly thought of as definable and existent. To remove the error the negative particle is used.]

The whole thing is now explained in another way.

264. Words which stand for many attributes and denote their collection are sometimes normally (*svabhāvataḥ*) applied in the same form, to a part of them.

[So far the negative compound *abrāhmaṇa* was explained on the basis of *upacārasattā*. According to that, the negative compound amounts to this : the idea of *brāhmaṇa* is first mentally conceived (*upacārasattā*) and to deny the actual existence of *brāhmaṇatva* in a *kṣattriya* and others, the word *brāhmaṇa* is used in association with a negative particle.

It can be explained in another way. The negative particle in the compound reveals the non-existence of those qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* which are naturally absent in a *kṣattriya*. The existence of the other qualities is implied. In other words the negative particle reveals that in *abrāhmaṇa*, the word *brāhmaṇa* stands only for part of the qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* because the negative particle reveals the absence of the other part. The word *brāhmaṇa* is applied to one who is so in the full sense of the word as well as to one who has only some of the qualities of a

brāhmaṇa. But as the form of the word is the same in both cases, one does not see the difference. The negative particle helps us to see it.]

If the negative particle denotes the absence of the qualities not conveyed by the second constituent word, how does it become connected with it at all in order to form the compound?

265. Due to a part of it being done, the whole is said to be 'done' or 'not done'. Such is the process in the compound *abrāhmaṇa*.

[Here an analogy is given. When only a part of something is done, it is said to be both 'done' and 'not done' (*kṛtākṛta*). The quality of the part, that is, the fact of being done or not done, is attributed to the whole. The process is the same in the compound *abrāhmaṇa*.]

266. It might be said that, in this way, the same person would be both *brāhmaṇa* and *abrāhmaṇa*. But the compound in question is really not different from *kṛtākṛta* considering that in it the word 'done' is applied to what is not done.

[One might object that, according to this view, contradiction would result, because by identifying the existent part of the qualities with the totality, the name *brāhmaṇa* would be applied to somebody and by identifying the non-existent part with the totality, the same person would be called *abrāhmaṇa*. But the compound *abrāhmaṇa* can be explained on the analogy of *kṛtākṛta*. When something is not done but all the materials are present and there is a reasonable chance of its being done, one applies the word 'done' to it figuratively. Similarly, seeing some qualities similar to those of a *brāhmaṇa* in a *kṣattriya*, one identifies them with the totality of qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* and applies the name to him. Then the negative particle reveals that it is only figurative usage. Thus the compound is like *kṛtākṛta*.]

267. The negative particle, used as shown in the analysis by the *śāstra* in order to set aside primary usage where the usage is only secondary, is in the nature of a qualifier.

[The use of the word *brāhmaṇa* to one who has only some of the qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* is secondary usage but as the word is the same, one might mistake it for primary usage. The use of the negative particle makes the intention of the speaker clear. In this way, it becomes a qualifier.]

268. It is seen that a qualifier does not set aside the thing qualified. Therefore (in *abrāhmaṇa*) a part of the meaning of the word expressive of the universal is set aside.

[It is now clear why the *Bhāṣya* points out that, in the *uttarapadārthaprādhānya* view, on hearing '*abrāhmaṇam ānaya*' one would bring a *brāhmaṇa*. In a compound like *rājapuruṣa*, the first constituent qualifies the second one without setting it aside and so it can be a qualifier. Here the negative particle sets aside the meaning of the second constituent and, so, it cannot be a qualifier. It is as good as meaningless and so, on hearing *abrāhmaṇam ānaya*, one would bring just a *brāhmaṇa*. This, of course, is wrong. So the correct interpretation is that the negative particle negates the existence of a part of the attributes for which the universal-expressing word *brāhmaṇa* stands. The remaining attributes stand. In this way, the use of the negative particle has a purpose and it becomes a qualifier.]

A difficulty is now pointed out.

269. In every *brāhmaṇa* some attribute or other is always missing and so the negative particle is useless as it does not do anything new.

[Even so, the negative particle appears to be useless, because, in every *brāhmaṇa*, there is a deficiency of some required attribute and so in every case, the word is applied on the basis of a part of the qualities only. Even to one who has all of them the word is applied on the basis of birth. Thus, it is not due to the negative particle that the word is understood to stand for only a part of the qualities.]

270. (Moreover) the word (*brāhmaṇa*) qualified by the negative particle would become the synonym of the word not qualified by it. And the correctness (of the negative compound) would be understood from the fact of its being derived according to grammar.

[That being so, the words *brāhmaṇa* and *abrāhmaṇa* become synonyms because both would mean one in whom only a part of the qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* is present.]

The difficulty is met as follows—

271. It is true that a qualifier is a word which does not set aside the meaning of the main word. (Here also) the negative particle reveals the nature of the meaning of the word (*brāhmaṇa*) namely, that it has only secondary existence.

[The difficulty is removed as follows:—The word *brāhmaṇa* in the compound has not got its primary meaning, but only a secondary meaning, that is, one who is thought of as a *brāhmaṇa* though he has not all his qualities. It is this fact which the negative particle reveals and so it qualifies without setting aside the meaning of the word.]

272. As a thing exists in the objects qualified, so it is conveyed by the words which bring about differentiation.

[Other qualifiers besides the negative particle do the same thing. In *rājapuruṣa* or *nīlotpala*, the qualifying word refers to something which actually exists in the thing qualified. Similarly, in *abrāhmaṇa*, the negative particle reveals that the meaning of the second constituent has no external existence, that it is only conceived by the mind. Therefore, it is right to call it a qualifier. The M. Bhā. also says : *ihāpi tarhi nañ viśeṣakaḥ prayujyate* = "if so, (it may be said) that here also the negative particle is used as a qualifier" (M. Bhā. I. p. 411, l. 2.)]

An objection is now raised—

273. If the properties are absent how can a word standing for only a part be applied to them ? It is not right that a word should be applied without a basis (*nimitta*).

[To the question : What is the nature of the meaning qualified by the negative particle, the answer given is : *nivṛttapadārthakaḥ* = "something in which the attributes are absent". (Ibid, l. 3.) To this, it is objected that even when the meaning of the word is something fashioned by the mind, it should be based on something external. By identifying what figures in the mind with what is external, the meaning of the word appears to have external existence. If the word *brāhmaṇa* stands only for a part of the qualities, how can it be applied, without a basis, to a *kṣattriya*?, so that the negative particle may reveal that condition?]

274. If the same word can, like the word *ārāt*, be applied in its own right to opposite things, the use of the negative particle is useless.

[If it is argued that, just as the word *ārāt* means both far and near, in the same way, the word *brāhmaṇa* would mean both a *brāhmaṇa* and a *kṣattriya* in its own right. If that is so,

even without the negative particle, it would denote the *kṣattriya* from the context. What then is the use of the particle and what is the use of teaching the derivation of the negative compound? The meaning in a particular context, of a word having more than one meaning, does not necessarily depend upon the use of another specifying word. This is what the M. Bhā means by saying : *Yadi svābhāvikī nivṛttiḥ kim nañ prayujyamānaḥ karoti ?* (Vol, I, p. 411, l. 4-5).]

275. If even what is natural has to be explained by words, then, this being not well known, it must be proclaimed that objects are set aside by the negative particle.

[If it is maintained that the negative particle would not be useless because it would reveal the otherwise unintelligible natural meaning of a word, then it should be openly declared that the well-known natural meaning of a word disappears when the negative particle is used. But if it is the nature of a word sometimes to denote an opposite meaning without the help of another word, then the negative particle becomes useless.]

276. Even though the word may stand for both, the main one is understood. From the bare root *sthā* (*tiṣṭhati*), going away cannot be understood even though it is its meaning.

[After having rejected the view that the fact that a certain thing is not included in the meaning of a word is the result of the use of the negative particle, it is confirmed that exclusion of certain things from the meaning of a word is natural. The negative particle only makes it known, just as a lamp only makes known the presence of some objects in a dark place. It is well-known that the root *sthā* means staying. Even though it means going away also, it cannot express it without the preposition *pra*. Similarly, the word *brāhmaṇa* can mean

one who is not a *brāhmaṇa* also but not without the use of the negative particle. Going away is not the meaning of *pra* in *pratiṣṭhate*. It is the meaning of the root *sthā*. *Pra* only reveals it. That is what happens in *brāhmaṇa*.]

277. If the main meaning is possible why is the word *brāhmaṇa* considered to be expressive of something different from it.

[If the main meaning of the word *brāhmaṇa* is not applicable to a *kṣattriya*, how is it said to be expressive of a *kṣattriya*? And why is the word used at all in the compound? And why hold the view that the negative particle reveals that the word is used in a secondary meaning? As the *M. bhā* puts it: *Yadi punar ayam nivṛttapadārthakaḥ kimarthaṃ brāhmaṇaśabdaḥ prayujyate?* = "if its own meaning has disappeared, why is the word *brāhmaṇa* used at all? (*M. Bhā.* I. p. 411, l. 12-13)]

278. In order that one may understand that such and such a thing does not exist in a *kṣattriya* and the like, the word expressive of it is used.

[The question raised in the previous stanza is answered as follows—The word *brāhmaṇa* is used in the compound in order to indicate the main meaning of which word does not exist. Through ignorance or wrong instruction, the word *brāhmaṇa* is sometimes applied to a *kṣattriya* and the like. In order to show what is set aside by the negative particle, the word *brāhmaṇa* is used.]

279. In regard to what has been determined by the mind, one understands from a word its existence or non-existence (*pravṛttir va nivṛttir vā* - action or absention from action). It is the word which is connected with meaning.

[It is not only here but everywhere that one understands

from a word something which is created by the mind. It is that which is the basis of usage and it does not take into consideration whether something corresponding to it exists outside or not. Words convey something which may or may not exist, something which is common to both existence and non-existence. Therefore, a word may express a qualifier which is of a positive or negative nature.]

Something is now being said about a negative compound when the meaning of the second constituent is predominant.

280. Either through faulty instruction or through some cause of doubt, a word is applied to a wrong object. It is not applied to a clod of earth and the like because of the non-existence (of the above two circumstances).

[Either through wrong instruction or through mistake due to resemblance, a word is wrongly applied to an object. But it is always applied to something which resembles the real thing. Seeing some common properties, the word *brāhmaṇa* may be applied to a *kṣattriya* but never to a clod of earth because there is no resemblance at all. From the negative compound *abrāhmaṇa*, one understands that the main meaning of the word *brāhmaṇa* does not exist in the person concerned who is the substratum of a superimposition. The compound does not stop at conveying the negation. As the negative particle negates the actuality of the superimposition expressed by the second term, the latter is supposed to be predominant in the compound.]

Another point is now being made in connection with the predominance of the second constituent.

281. When there is predominance (of the second constituent) forms like *anekasmāt*, *asaḥ* become possible. Thus, in connection with the prescription of the

suffixes *tva* and *tal*, it is right to consider that it is the main word which is dependent.

[By adopting the view that in a negative compound, the second constituent is the main one, the compound *anekam* is explained. In this compound, the second constituent *eka* being the main one, the singular number is used and its being a pronoun (*sarvanāma*) is also preserved and so we get forms like *anekasmai*. Negative compounds like *asaḥ* where the rule *tyadādīnām aḥ* (P. 7. 2. 102) is applied would also be explained. When we have to make a compound in the sense of *na brāhmaṇasya bhāvaḥ*, the question arises whether *na* and *brāhmaṇa* should be compounded first and then the suffix *tva* should be added or *brāhmaṇa* should be joined with *tva* first and then the negative compound formed. After discussion in the *M. Bhā.* on P. 5. 1. 119, the conclusion reached is that *na* and *brāhmaṇa* should be compounded first and to the compound *abrāhmaṇa* thus formed, the suffix *tva* should be added. It is only thus that the compound *abrāhmaṇatva* will get the *udātta* accent on the last syllable which is desired. If the process is reversed, the negative particle would get it, which is not desired. These are the only two abstract suffixes which are added after the formation of the negative compound. The others are added before.]

282. The word *eka* being the main word (in *anekam*), even in the presence of the qualifying word (the negative particle) its main attribute (of being in the singular number) is not set aside and so the compound does not get any other number.

[If the second constituent of the compound *anekam* is the main word, even though it denotes other numbers, it takes the singular number, that is, the number of the main word.]

283. It is the meaning of *eka*, qualified by the negative particle, which is the main one here,

because it is to be qualified. Two and other numbers give up their own properties, being identified with one.

[This is said in answer to the objection that the numbers two etc. identified with one, are here the meaning of the compound and so when the negative particle sets aside the idea of one, two etc. are understood and so the compound should have one of those numbers and not the singular. The answer is that the numbers two etc. are coloured by the number one and identified with it and so lose their own attributes. Thus, the compound takes the singular number.]

284. Just as *kṣattriya* and the like are identified with a *brāhmaṇa* when the latter is associated with the negative particle, in the same way, unity (*ekatvam*) is superimposed on two etc. because of association with the negative particle.

[Just as the word *brāhmaṇa* in the compound stands for *kṣattriya* etc. because of association with the negative particle, in the same way, in *anekam*, *eka* stands for other numbers because of association with the negative particle. From *anekam*, a meaning similar to that of the second constituent is understood as in the case of *abrāhmaṇa*.]

285. After having superimposed unity, it is removed from two, etc. That word *eka* stands for them (two etc.) as the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for *kṣattriya*, etc.

[What the negative particle in *aneka* sets aside is the unity superimposed on two, etc. If the word *eka* were not there what would the negative particle set aside ?]

286. Just as the word *eka* with its fixed number is used in a sentence to denote other numbers, in the

same way, in a compound also, it being the main word, its own number is not set aside.

[To indicate the object of negation, the word *eka* is used and it follows its own properties both in the sentence and in the compound. In a sentence, the word *eka*, without giving up its own number, can stand for other numbers. Similarly, in the compound *aneka*, *eka* is the main word and it does not give up an its own number.]

287. According to the nature of the meaning to be set aside, a second constituent is used. If other numbers are used, that idea would not be understood.

[In order to indicate the object of the negation, the second constituent is used even though its meaning is not wanted. It is used in order to show what is superimposed. Unity is superimposed and that has to be set aside. Unless the second constituent is in the singular number, what is to be set aside would not be understood. If the dual and other numbers are used, the number one would not be understood as something to be set aside. So the use of the singular number is a means of understanding the number meant to be conveyed.

288. Just as from the word *aśukla* black or some other colour is understood, in the same way, from *aneka*, other numbers are understood.

[The negation in *aneka* can be understood either as *prasajya-pratiśedha* or as *paryudāsa*. The former would be simple negation amounting to 'not one'. So the latter is resorted to so that the other numbers may be understood.]

289. When, because of the action mentioned, all objects come to the mind and one is set aside by the

negative particle, the others which come to the mind are understood.

[A verb expressive of an action brings to the mind its accessories in general. When one says : *āsaya*, one naturally thinks of somebody as the object of the action of seating. But whether that somebody is to be one or many is not yet certain. Then one hears the word *anekam*. This excludes the number one and so one thinks of more than one person as the object of the action of seating: See . Bhā. I. p. 412, l. 4.]

290. If *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* is adopted, the mention of the action (would bring something to the mind). In *paryudāsa*, something else having some other number would be conveyed.

[If the negation in *anekam* is understood as *prasajyapraṭiṣedha*, then the mere negation of number one would be understood and the mention of the action, by its own power, would bring to the mind the accessories which are not prohibited. In the *paryudāsa* view, on the other hand, the word *aneka* itself would bring to the mind something similar to the meaning of the second constituent, that is, the numbers other than one.]

291. The meaning of a root in the nature of action, determined by its accessories, brings to the mind, at the very beginning, all the objects.

[When the meaning of a transitive verb, of a varied nature such as seating etc. and determined by such things as the promoter and the agent, is first mentioned, then, being of a varied nature, it cannot be accomplished by the same accessory and so many are suggested at the very beginning and when it is set aside, the others are understood.]

292. Where the negative compound *anekaḥ* is first mentioned in relation to an action (*ākhyāte*) the

substratum of the power of the accessory of which is known and then the verb *tiṣṭhati* is added.

293. There the action, being something to be accomplished (*sādhya*tvāt) is brought to the mind by the substance which is an accomplished thing (*siddhena dravyeṇa*). The substance is already mentioned and so the action is qualified by what is mentioned first.

[The above two stanzas relate to what is said in M. Bhā. I. p. 412, l. 5-6. In the previous stanzas, those cases were considered where the actions are mentioned first and the negative compound next. Now those cases are considered where the negative compound comes first and then the verb, as, for instance, in *anekas tiṣṭhati*. Here, for some reason or other, the substance which is the substratum of the power of the accessory is thought of as one, but this number is set aside as being unsuitable to the action still to be expressed. Then the verb expressive of the action is mentioned. As the substance mentioned first is for the sake of something else (that is, for the action), it brings to the mind a suitable action. Thus, it differs from the previous cases where the action brings the substance to the mind. Here also, as the setting aside of the number one is in relation to the accessory which is understood, one understands the latter without the number one. Thus, even though, as in the previous case, the verb is not mentioned first, the sentence does not stop merely at the setting aside of the number one, because there is the requirement of an action. Therefore, when the number one is set aside, an accessory having another number is understood.]

* Now a reference is made to an illustration given in the M. Bhā. of the negation of the number one leading to the understanding of other numbers.

294. Even, in a sentence, the number one, when

set aside, requires some other number. Therefore, there is not the mere setting aside of the number one.

[The *M. Bhā.* gives an illustration to show that even where no action is meant to be conveyed, the setting aside of the number one results in the understanding of some other number. In a sentence like *na na ekam priyam* or *na na ekam sukhā*, uttered with the doubling of the negative particle by one who is bothered by the many happy events happening to an enemy (P. 8.1.10.) the setting aside of the number one by the negative particle results in the understanding of other numbers in connection with the *priya* and *sukha* happening to the enemy. When a particular thing is negated, it means that the others are allowed. If all are negated, there would be no point in saying 'one'. So some other number is understood. When this is the case in a sentence, what to say of a compound? There the negation of one does not stop there. It necessarily leads to the understanding of other numbers.]

Why, when the number one is negated some other member is understood and not something totally different is now explained.

295. When eating with oil is a possibility, its prohibition results in the determination (*avaccheda*) of the meal by some other fat, because that would be the nearest and not by some other wet substance (like curds or milk).

[When somebody says : 'have your meal with something else than oil' (*bhojanamatailam vidheyam*), one would naturally think of something of a similar nature like clarified butter but not of curds or milk. Similarly when the number one is negated, one would think of something similar, that is, of another number.]

The predominance of the meaning of the outside word in a negative compound is now referred to.

296. When the non-existent in general and the meaning of the word *brāhmaṇa* refer to the same object and denote an outside object like *kṣattriya* (then there is predominance of the meaning of the outside word).

[We see that these negative compounds denote something which is the opposite of what the second constituent denotes. If the view is that the second term denotes something on which the meaning of the second term is superimposed, then the meaning of the second form is predominant, as already explained. But if the view is that the negative particle stands for non-existence in general and it enters into the relation of qualifier and qualified with the meaning of the second constituent which is of a positive nature and together they denote something external, then this external thing is predominant. *Abrāhmaṇa*, for instance, would mean something of which the *brāhmaṇa* is not the substratum, that is, the universal *kṣattriya* which is external because it is not the meaning of any one of the two constituents.]

To show that even if the meaning of the outside word is predominant in a negative compound, it is not a *bahuvrīhi* but a *tatpuruṣa*, an illustration is given.

297. Just as in *śastrīva śyāmā kanyā*='the girl is dark like a dagger', something external is referred to, in the same way, the two words *asan* and *brāhmaṇa* convey outside objects like a *kṣattriya*.

Remark. Though all the manuscripts and the two previous editions have *śyāmeva śastrī kanyeti*, the correct reading should perhaps be *śastrīva śyāmā kanyeti* in the first *pāda* of this stanza.

[According to the view that it is the second constituent which is the predominant one, the meaning of the compound rests within the compound itself. But it may be looked upon

as being similar to the compound *śastrīyāmā* = 'dark like a dagger'. This compound refers to something outside itself like *kanyā* = girl. In that sense, though it is a *talpuruṣa*, it has been formed in the sense of something external. *Abrāhmaṇa* is in the same position.]

298. It is like the expression: 'a cow without a dewlap' which refers to a *gayal*, a different species altogether and not to a cow with dewlap missing.

[Another illustration is now given. The negative compound *aśāśnaḥ* refers to a 'gayal' because it means : 'that which has no dewlap'. It refers to something which has no dewlap but otherwise resembles a cow, an animal belonging to a different species. That is also what happens in *abrāhmaṇa* which means somebody who has not got the universal *brāhmaṇatva* but otherwise resembles a *brāhmaṇa*.]

299. It is like our understanding the *khadira*, which had been declared to be similar, as really belonging to another species than *kharjūra* because of its thorns.

[Another illustration. One first understands the *khadira* to be similar to a *kharjūra* and, later, because of its thorns, it is understood as belonging to a different species than *kharjūra*. Similarly, one first understands identity because of the presence of some of the qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* but when the expression *abrāhmaṇa* is heard, one understands that the person concerned belongs to a different caste though other properties are the same.]

300. Through the inclusion of a comparison, it (the negative compound *abrāhmaṇa*) conveys an outside object, similar to a *brāhmaṇa* in whom *brāhmaṇya* is absent.

[After giving the above illustrations, an application is made to the present case. The three compounds *sastrīśyāmā*, *asāśnaḥ* and *kaṇṭakavān* refer to an external object on the basis of comparison. Similarly, the compound *abrāhmaṇa* refers to an outside object like *kṣattriya* on the basis of resemblance: that is, except for the universal *brāhmaṇatva*, the other properties of a *brāhmaṇa* are present in the person in question. One does see other negative compounds also based on resemblance. For example : *avarṣā hemantaḥ* = "winter without rain". It means that there is resemblance between winter and the rainy season.]

301. Days when there is no rain but which are covered with mist and clouds are said to be 'rainless' (*avarṣāḥ*). Winter being such, it is identified with it.

[How the compound *avarṣā* is based on resemblance is now explained. When mist (or snow) is everywhere, the sky is covered with dark clouds but it is not actually raining, one can say that the days are *avarṣāḥ*. When the winter day is dark, it is like a rainless day in the rainy season. One can then say *avarṣā hemantaḥ*, on the basis of resemblance. The negative compound (*avarṣā*) applied to a winter day on the basis of resemblance refers to an outside object. In itself, it is a *tatpuruṣa* compound which stands for the meaning of its own constituents (*svapadārthe*) but as it involves comparison, it points to an outside object (*anya-padārtha*). If it were treated as a *bahuvrīhi*, the *ā* of *varṣā* would become short because it would be an *upasarjana* word. (P. 1. 2. 48.). Some, therefore, think that, in the compound *abrāhmaṇa* also, the meaning of the outside word is predominant, because of the comparison which it involves.]

302. Others declare that the negative particle is compounded with words like *brāhmaṇa* expressive of the universal when the compound expresses an outside individual object.

[Some explain in another way, how a negative compound like *abrāhmaṇa* denotes an outside object. All words denote

the universal. So does the word *brāhmaṇa* in the compound *abrāhmaṇa*. But the compound as a whole denotes the individual, something different from what the constituent word denotes. In other words, it denotes an outside individual object. Of course, the compound cannot denote an individual in which the universal *brāhmaṇatva* exists, because of the negative particle. So it denotes an individual *kṣatriya* or somebody else.]

303. A *bahuvrīhi* compound having this scope does not exist. *Agur aśvaḥ* is a *bahuvrīhi* whose scope is not encroached upon by the negative compound.

[In this way, the difference between a *bahuvrīhi* and a negative compound also becomes clear. The *bahuvrīhi* is taught in the sense of *matup*. Like the negative compound it does not denote an outside individual characterised by a particular universal. In the expression *agaur aśvaḥ*, the negative compound *agauḥ* means 'not a cow,' 'not having cowness' and it qualifies 'horse'. The *bahuvrīhi* would be *agur aśvaḥ*. Here the *bahuvrīhi* *agauḥ* means: 'not having the cow.' The idea of possession, one of the meaning of the suffix *matup* is expressed here. Thus, the difference between the two is clear.]

Though the meaning of the negative compound can somehow be explained according to the view that it denotes an outside object, the *M. Bhā.* points out a technical defect in it which is now explained.

304. Since the gender of the second constituent is restricted to a *dvandva* and to an *ekadeśīsamāsa* (P. 2.2.1.), the desired gender and number would not result in the compound *avarṣāḥ*.

[The technical defect pointed out is that in *avarṣāḥ heman-taḥ*, the negative compound *avarṣāḥ* would get the masculine gender and singular number as it would be looked upon as the

qualifier of *hemantaḥ* whereas the feminine gender and the plural number are desired. Nor can the desired gender result from P. 2. 4. 26, because vā. 7. on it restricts it to *ekadeśisamāsa* formed by P. 2. 2. 1. and so it does not apply to a negative compound.]

The *anyapadārtha* view being thus defective, something is now going to be said about the view that it is the meaning of the first constituent, that is, the negative particle, which is predominant.

305. When a word like *brāhmaṇa* is a qualifier of non-existence, the meaning of the negative particle, connected with an action, then the non-existence is understood as specified by its object.

[The first constituent, the negative particle, means non-existence. When it is the main meaning, it is that which is naturally connected with action. It is determined, specified, qualified by the meaning of the second constituent *brāhmaṇa*. This is the position according to this view.]

How the non-existent is connected with action is now explained.

306. As it is non-existent as a *brāhmaṇa*, it is said to be non-existent; even though non-existent, it exists in another way. It is the existence (as a *brāhmaṇa*) of what exists (as a *akṣattriya*) which is negated.

There is no contradiction in the non-existent being connected with action. That which exists as a *kṣattriya* does not exist as a *brāhmaṇa*. Thus the negative particle expresses non-existence as connected with a particular thing and not total non-existence. Therefore, it can be connected with action. It also explains how we understand something similar to what is negated. Non-existence, not specified by something positive, cannot enter

into verbal usage and so something which exists in one way is denied existence in some other way. Thus, as it involves something positive also, it is connected with action.]

307. As the compound follows its basis, it would denote substance in general and so it cannot have gender and number or it would have only a common attribute (that is, general gender and number.)

[If the meaning of the first term is predominant, that being an indeclinable, the whole compound would become indeclinable too and we cannot have forms like *abrāhmaṇau* and *abrāhmaṇāḥ*. In a sentence, the negative particle means non-existence in general and not substance. In a compound also, it means the same thing, qualified, of course, by the meaning of the second term. Therefore, the compound cannot have gender and number. Even if it is held that the compound denotes substance and not *asattva*, it would be generic substance and, therefore, there can only be singular number and neuter gender and we could only have the form *abrāhmaṇam*.]

308. Before (entering the compound) it (the negative particle) expresses non-substance (*asattva*) but in a compound, it denotes substance. Following up of the basis (*nimittānuvidhānam*) does not take place everywhere, because that is the nature of words.

[The above objection is answered by reference to the natural power of words. Though compounds are supposed to be formed in the meaning of the corresponding uncompounded words, still there is a difference in the meaning of the two. In a sentence, the negative particle has some independence. It denotes negation apart from what is negated and that being *asattva*, it has no gender and number. In a compound, the negative particle denotes what is negated to which the negation is subordinate. What is negated is predominant and so the compound

has gender and number. This difference is based on the natural power of words. See. *M. Bha.* I. p. 410, l. 18.]

309. If the basis is followed up, there would be no connection with an action. Being thus unfit for verbal usage (*avyapadeśyatvāt*,) its inclusion in grammar would be useless.

[The basis (*nimitta*) referred to is the idea of non-existence, non-substance, the meaning of the negative particle. If this is followed up in the compound, the meaning of the latter would not only be incapable of having gender and number, but it could not be connected with action either. There would be no point in teaching a nominal form the meaning of which cannot become the accessory of an action. It would thus become unfit to be grammatically formed. But we do see that negative compounds are connected with verbs expressive of action in a sentence as, for instance, in *abrāhmaṇam ānaya*, and *abrāhmaṇam paśya*. The conclusion is that a negative compound denotes substance and can have gender and number because, in it, the basis (*nimitta*) is not followed up.]

So far the possibility of gender and number in general in a negative compound has been stated as due to the natural power of words. How it acquires a particular gender and number is now explained.

310. That which denotes non-existence in general is specified by the particular substrata which are mentioned and so takes their gender and number.

[Non-existence or negation in general, qualified by the meaning of the second constituent, is the meaning of the negative compound in the *pūrvapadārthapradhānapakṣa*. In order to specify it, words expressive of the particular are used and the compound is qualified by it and becomes fit for use. It is right that it should take the gender and number of the particular. Objects

are different from one another and so something like *kṣattriya* is the substratum of the absence of *brāhmaṇatva* and so the compound should take the gender and number of the word *kṣattriya*. Moreover, objects can have any gender but the word expressive of it restricts it to one of them. The same object can be referred to by words having different genders. *Kṣattriya* and *kṣattram* refer to the same thing, though they have different genders. Similarly, the masculine word *abrāhmaṇa* can also refer to the same thing as the neuter word *kṣattram*. It is nature which regulates gender and number just as it is the natural power of words which regulates that a compound should denote a substance and not *asattva*.]

311. From the very beginning, the particular substratum is implied in the general but when it is actually mentioned, it is brought out, as it were, from the general.

[Even though the general implies the particular, it does not specify which of the many possible particulars is meant but when it is actually mentioned, it is brought out, as it were, from the general.]

312. In the compound, its own meaning is heard and, as a result, some substratum having that (non-existence) is understood. The non-existence in general implies some substance having gender and number.

[Before it was said that in a compound, the negative particle denotes something concrete (and not *asattva* as in a sentence) and so can take gender and number. It implies substance in general qualified by non-existence. Now it is pointed out that a negative compound conveys its own meaning (and not that of an outside word) so that a *kṣattriya* or the like is understood as qualified by the non-existence (of *brāhmaṇatva*) and as its substratum.]

How the negative compound conveys *svapadārtha* (something belonging to its own constituents) or *anyapadārtha* (something belonging to an outside word) is now explained.

313. In it (the negative compound) the two words which stand for two different things together stand for one thing. The non-existence implies all the particulars.

[Before the formation of the compound, the negative particle in the sentence means negation and the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for something in which real *brāhmaṇatva* is denied. Thus the two words stand for two different things. The compound, on the other hand, stands for one thing, namely, the meaning of the negative compound as qualified by that of the second constituent, whatever it may be. The second constituent does no more than specify the particular thing which is negated. All possible things are implied in the negation itself. Its meaning is, therefore, predominant and the compound conveys *svapadārtha*.]

314. Because of not fully understanding the meaning of the negative particle, those objects which are conveyed by words like *kṣattriya* or by pronouns become, as it were, meanings of an outside word.

[Those who hold that the negative compound denotes an external object do so under a misapprehension. When a word like *kṣattriya* or *vaiśya* is used in apposition to *abrāhmaṇa*, it makes explicit what is implicit. If it is not used, what is implied would not become clear. The word *kṣattriya* does not bring in something which is not already included in *abrāhmaṇa*. In that sense, it is not an outside meaning. But this meaning of the negative particle is not understood by some. Non-existence in general, qualified by that of the meaning of the second constituent and specified by a particular substratum like *kṣattriya*, this is the meaning of the negative particle. But this is not understood by

some and so they think that the compound stands for the meaning of an outside word.]

315. If a word expressive of the particular is not used, the required gender and number would not result. There would be difficulty in *avarṣāḥ* etc. because *hemantaḥ* (different from *varṣā*) is here the substratum.

[Extension of gender and number becomes necessary according to the view that it is the first constituent which is predominant in a negative compound. If the compound means non-existence in general, qualified by the meaning of the second term, when words like *kṣattriya* are used in apposition to it, it is natural that the compound should have the gender and number of these words. But when they are not used, the compound would take the common neuter gender and the common singular number. Nor could we get forms like *avarṣā hemantaḥ*, *anāpaḥ pṛthivī*, because in *avarṣā hemantaḥ*, the gender of *hemantaḥ* would prevail. But this view (*pṛvāpadārthaprādhānya*) is also wrong, because, according to it, there should be a short vowel at the end of *avarṣāḥ* which would be wrong. The accepted view is that, in a negative compound, it is the second constituent which is predominant. Therefore, the compound would get the gender and number of the second constituent and there would be no need for the extension of gender and number. A negative compound is not like a qualifier or a *bahuvrīhi* compound which are based on difference between their own meaning and that of the outside word and which, therefore, take the gender and number of the word which they qualify. So we can have expressions like *abrāhmaṇaḥ kṣattram*, *abrāhmaṇaḥ kṣattriyaḥ* etc. where the gender of the negative compound is according to that of the second constituent. So is number. That is why they are said to be natural. In *asaḥ* and *asarvasmai*, we see that *tad* and *sarva* are treated as *sarvanāma* because the two terms of the compound are in apposition to each other. It is only when the two terms are not in apposition to each other (*vyadhikaraṇa*) that the *sarvanāma* becomes *upasarjana* and loses that name as in *atisarvāya* where *sarva* is not treated like a *sarvanāma*. It is because *varṣāḥ*

does not become *upasarjana* that its final vowel is not shortened in *avarṣāḥ*. According to what has been said above, if the first term of the negative compound is the predominant one, extension of gender and number is necessary.

Now gender and number in connection with words expressive of the Universal (*jāti*) are going to be considered.

316. When the universal is understood as the expressed meaning of all words, that being one it is right that only one word should be used.

[On the ground that all words denote the universal which is One, the teaching of *ekaśeṣa* has been declared unnecessary. The use of several words would be necessary only if the things denoted are many. Where *ekaśeṣa* is taught, there the different words denote the same universal and so the use of just one word would result naturally. Thus there is no need to prescribe the retention of one.]

317. There would be a fixed gender as when one refers to a herd of cattle and though the individuals may be many, the universal being one, the singular number would be used.

[*Ākr̥ti* is said to be *āviṣṭaliṅgā*, that is, it has a fixed gender. What it means is that even though all genders are everywhere a word has a particular gender and so it presents its meaning, the universal, as having that particular gender. That is what happens when one refers to a herd of cattle by the expression '*gāva imāḥ*'. Here the feminine gender is used even though there may be males in the herd. But when one refers to a herd of calves, one uses the masculine gender, even though there may be females in the herd, as in the expression '*vatsā ime*'. That is the meaning of P. 1. 2. 73.]

How is the universal said to have a fixed gender (*āviṣṭaliṅga-
t ā*) if it is presented by words having different genders?

318. The universal is connected with the fixed gender of their substrata. Therefore, the prohibition relating to universals in connection with qualities taking the gender and number of what they are connected with is unnecessary.

[Thus the universal is expressed by means of words having different genders. And yet one speaks of it as being *āviṣṭa-liṅgā*=having a fixed gender. All the three words *vṛkṣa*, *pādapa* and *taru* mean 'tree' and have the masculine gender. But names of particular trees like *śiṃśapā* are feminine or neuter like *panasa*. Some words have two genders and others like *taṭa* have all the three. This is what is meant by *āviṣṭaliṅgatā* of the universal, namely, that it is conveyed by words having a fixed gender. That is why the prohibition *ajāteḥ* in P. 1.2.52. is unnecessary because words expressive of the universal do not take the gender of the word in which the *taddhita* suffix has been elided (*lup*).]

319. If the worldly conception of gender were adopted, everything in the world would have to be designated by a word having a fixed gender and as that would result in contradiction, it has not been adopted.

[This characteristic of the universal, namely, that it has a fixed gender would not be possible if what is called gender were identical with sex. That is why grammarians have their own conception of gender. According to this conception, words like *dārāḥ* (masculine plural) and *kalatram* (neuter singular) can denote a wife and three words having three different genders can denote the same thing as in the case of the three words : *artha*, *vyakti* and *vastu*.]

320. The worldly conception of gender cannot apply to what is denoted by words like *sāmānya*, *ākṛti*, *bhāva* and *jāti*. Therefore, another has been adopted.

[These four words have different genders but they all denote the same thing to which the worldly conception of gender cannot apply. So the *śāstra* has adopted another conception of gender.]

What it is has been stated as follows—

321. The general characteristic of gender is said to be activity (*pravṛtti*) and it is diversified into appearance, disappearance and stay.

What the grammarian's conception of gender is has been set forth in the *M.Bhā.* on P. 1.2.64. and 4.1.3. The qualities of things are constantly changing and change in general, irrespective of any particularity in the change, is called *pravṛtti* and that is gender. This change may be *āvirbhāva*=coming into being or *tirobhāva*=disappearance or *sthiti*=staying as it is. These are the three different genders. By qualities *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *sparsa* and *śabda* are meant and they are based on the more fundamental *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the three qualities of primordial matter *prakṛti*. When *rajas* is active, some of the five qualities come into being and that is *āvirbhāva*, the masculine gender. When some of the five qualities are submerged, that is *tirobhāva*, the feminine gender. For more details on the grammarian's conception of gender, see my *Bhartṛhari*, pp. 359-370.]

322. All objects are active and they are never devoid of the three kinds of activities and it is such objects that words express.

[As the *M.Bhā.* says : All objects are always endowed with *saṁstyāna* and *prasava* that is, disappearance (*tirobhāva*) and coming into being (*āvirbhāva*). It is such objects that words express. They become capable of being expressed by words only when they assume a definite form due to the constant change. In that way, they become connected with gender according to their natural power.]

323. As to the entity which is devoid of all activity and is understood as consciousness it seems to follow, as it were, the multiple activities of others.

[One can understand that *prakṛti* and its evolutes should be constantly active, because of the *rajas* element in thm. But the Self is free from *rajas* and yet it is referred to by three words having three different genders, namely. *ātmā*, *citi* and *caitanya*. The definition of gender, namely, *pravṛtti*, does not exist in the Self but the three words which express it have gender. The explanation is that experience results when the light of the Self is reflected on the mirror of the Intellect and it is that reflection, coloured by the objects experienced, which comes into worldly usage. It is that which comes within the range of speech. It follows, as it were, the infinite activities of the things to be experienced. Thus, the gender of the manifested objects (*ābhāsa*) is attributed to that which is not a manifestation (*nirābhāsa*).]

324. That is how the form and the time of the consciousness of the experiencer is diversified. It has no diversity of form of its own.

[The consciousness of the Experiencer is diversified by the objects mirrored in the Intellect. It appears as distinct with each object experienced. In other words, knowledge differs with the object known. Consciousness appears to have spatial and temporal distinctions, on the basis of such distinctions belonging to the objects. Really speaking, the Experiencer who is pure Consciousness has no inner diversity nor any based on time and space. Consciousness is not different from the Experiencer because the latter is pure consciousness. Those who do not know the distinction between consciousness and the objects mix the two up in their transactions.]

325. That which is projected on the insentient forms of the Intellect as a reflection, it is that which is the basis of the use of words.

[The Intellect, because of the predominance of its *sattva*, has a certain transparency and so the light of the Self is reflected on it when the object is also mirrored on it. It is such a reflection which comes within the range of words. That is how it seems to have gender. The pure consciousness does not come within the range of verbal usage.]

326. There is no condition of an object which is not associated with a gender. Sometimes, when it is not taken seriously, it is only for the sake of the correctness of the word.

[It has been shown how the Experiencer and the experienced get gender distinctions. There is nothing over and above these two. The universal would also come within these two and that would also get gender distinctions. Objects do not go beyond the three conditions mentioned, namely, *āvirbhāva*, *tirobhāva* and *sthiti*. This is true of the eternal universal also. It means that all the three genders are present in everything and which gender a word should express is a question of *vivakṣā*. See *M.Bhā.* I. p. 245, l. 18.]

327. The definition of gender adopted in the *śāstra*, namely, that it is the condition of the *guṇas* does not go against the things denoted by the words ending in the primary and secondary suffixes. Therefore, the universal (of activity) is gender.

[The object expressed by a primary suffix (*kṛt*), when it differs according to the condition of the *guṇas*, gets different genders and is expressed by words having different genders. For example *pākaḥ*, *paktiḥ*, *pacanam*. The same is true of objects expressed by words ending in secondary suffixes (*taddhita*). For example, *garimā*, *gurutā*, *gurutvam*. Anyone of the three conditions can be constantly changing and so expressed by words having different genders. For example: *saṁstyānam*, *saṁstyāyaḥ* and *saṁstyā*. Therefore, the definition of gender accepted in the *śāstra* is the right one, namely, that it is the condition of the

guṇas. In other words, the universal of change or activity is gender.]

328. There is no difference in the conception of gender even in the view that all words denote substance (*dravya*, as distinct from *jāti*). The seven possibilities which have been mentioned (*liṅga samuddeśa* 3.) constitute what is meant here by fixity of gender.

[It has been shown that the definition of gender adopted in the *śāstra* agrees with the view that all words denote the universal. It also agrees with the view that all words denote the substance or the concrete individual. The individuals, devoid of their peculiarities, would amount to the universal. So the definition of gender, adopted in the *śāstra* would apply to both views.]

329. Since the use of number in regard to substance (individual) is regulated by the *śāstra*, the latter can be differently explained even if the universal is considered to be the meaning of words.

[The *sūtra*—*bahuṣu bahuvacanam* (P. 1. 4. 21.) and the like regulate the use of number according to the view that words denote substance (individual). That *sūtra* can be explained even according to the view that universal is the meaning of words.]

How that is done is now stated.

330. When that which inheres in many and is characterised by its many substrata is meant to be conveyed in its diversity, the *śāstra* teaches the use of number (the plural).

[When the different individuals in which the universal inheres are emphasised, then the plural number is used. Similarly a word ending in the dual number, conveys the universal inhering in individuals characterised by the number two. This applies to words ending in the singular number also.]

331. When the universal is understood as diversified because of the diversity of its substrata, then there would be no difference from the *dravya* view (that is, the view that words convey the substance, the individual).

[When the universal which is one is looked upon as many because of the many substrata where it inheres, then the use of the plural number would result. Then as many words as there are substrata would have to be used and, as that is not desired, the retention of one (*ekaśeṣa*) would have to be taught. So ultimately, there would be no practical difference between the *jātipakṣa* and the *dravyapakṣa*. But this way of looking at the matter is not approved by the *M.Bhā.* which has declared the teaching of the retention of one (P. 1. 2. 64.) to be unnecessary.]

332. As there is non-differentiation (of the universal), the use of one word and the use of different numbers through the *śāstra* would result. Therefore, the retention of one need not be taught.

[The universal is expressed by words having different numbers because of the diversity of its substrata, following P. 1.4.21. But the main meaning, the universal, is one and one word would naturally be used. So the retention of one need not be taught.]

333. If the individual is not the expressed meaning of a word, how can a service, based on its existence, be rendered to the universal, the individual being non-existent ?

[Here a question arises. If the universal is the meaning of words and not the individual, how can gender and number based on the individual result? The grammatical form of a word is based upon its meaning. That meaning which is not expressed by the word is as good as non-existent as far as its grammatical form is concerned.]

This doubt is answered as follows---

334. In the *śāstra* in question (P. 1. 4. 21.) no statement has been made on the basis of the expressed meaning. What is called *dravya* has not been ruled out.

[In P. 1.4.21., there is no statement (*vyapadeśa*) that numbers are based on the substrata of that which is expressed. It is understood in a general way. Therefore, the universal with its different substrata, takes on different numbers. To one who considers the universal to be the meaning of a word, it is not that the individual is not so and vice versa. So the word which expresses the universal which is connected with different substrata takes on different numbers. See *M.Bhā.* I p. 246, l. 14.]

335. Substance is not thought of as the secondary expressed meaning. But it is useful (to the universal) and, therefore, secondary. Such is the interpretation.

[To the upholder of the universal, that is the expressed primary meaning of the word. Though substance is not the expressed meaning, it renders service to the universal and so is subordinate to it. It is as in the world where what serves another is considered to be secondary and subordinate to it.]

336. Unless the word is considered to be expressive of the non-substance, substance would not become subordinate. That is why the universal has been shown to be the predominant meaning.

[Substance (or individual) is not the secondary expressed meaning. It is subordinate to the universal to which it renders service. If the substance is considered to be the expressed meaning, the universal would specify it and in that case, substance would become the predominant meaning and the universal the secondary one. What is secondary cannot take on the gender of the main thing. If, on the other hand, substance is not the

expressed meaning, it would specify or differentiate the universal and become subordinate to it and render it service by lending it its gender and number.]

337. Some think that there is the relation of primary and secondary (between the universal and substance) as in the case of the two elements of a noun or a verb and not as in the case of a compound word where what is meant for something else is subordinate.

[Some think that the substance and the universal can stand towards each other in the relation of primary and secondary even if both are the expressed meanings of words. They give as examples words like *pācakaḥ* and *pacati*. Here both action and accessory (*sādhana*) are the expressed meanings of the two elements of the words. The noun *pācaka* denotes primarily the substratum of the power called *sādhana* and the meaning of the root qualifies that of the suffix. The meaning of the root, namely, action is here secondary, because it is not understood as a process. Even though secondary, it is understood as something distinct. The verb *pacati* on the other hand denotes action, helped by a particular accessory, as the main thing. Action is here presented as a process and it is qualified by the accessory which is active even though it is qualified by the suffix. The accessory, though secondary, is understood as something distinct. That is why words can be used in apposition to the accessory as in *devadattaḥ pacati*. With its number it renders help to the action as in *pacataḥ*, *pacanti*. Applying all this to the subject under discussion, to the upholder of the universal, that is the main meaning of the word. To the upholder of substance, that is the main meaning and the universal the secondary one. There is a difference between compounds on the one hand and words like *pācaka* and *pacati* on the other. In a compound, the meaning of the *upasarjana* word gets merged in that of the main word and is not understood distinctly and does not become the cause of the form of the compound. That is why a qualifier of the *upasarjana* cannot be used outside the

compound in apposition to it. In *pācakaḥ* and *pacati*, the two elements related as *kāraka* and *kriyā* to each other are distinctly perceived. Similarly, the universal and the substance, both expressed meanings, can be related to each other, as primary and secondary.]

338. What is subordinate being multiple, it is the universal which is the cause of the use of one word only. Because of the connection with the multiplicity of the substance, the use of different numbers is explained.

[If substance also is an expressed meaning, a difficulty would arise. As the plural number results because of the multiplicity of the substance (individuals), in the same way, as many words as there are individuals would have to be used and as that is not desired, the need for the *śāstra* which teaches retention of one (*ekaśeṣa*) becomes clear. And so, it should not have been declared unnecessary. According to the upholders of the universal, substance being secondary, the use of many words based on the multiplicity of substance (individuals) would not be right. The universal is one and so only one word should be used even if the individuals are many. The plural number can, however, be rightly used because of the individuals which are also part of the expressed meaning. The number of words to be used is based upon what is primary. What is secondary can, however, help the primary by being the cause of the number.]

339. Just as in verbs the accessories which are secondary diversify action, in the same way, substance (the individual) diversifies the universal expressed by the same word.

[In a verb, the action, expressed by the root, is the predominant meaning and yet it gets its number on the basis of the accessory which is secondary in a verb. Similarly, in a noun it is the universal, the primary meaning, which is the cause of

the use of one word and the substance, secondarily expressed by the same word, is the cause of number. The secondary substance lends its number to the primary universal. It is because something renders help to another that it is called *guṇa*. So the relation between the universal and the substance is more like the one between action and accessory in a noun or in a verb than the one between primary and secondary in a compound word.]

340. The words, in the matter of conveying the meaning, being identical, because of similarity of form and there being an understanding of a meaning (the substance, individual) qualified by the universal.

341. Because of the relation of identity of the universal with their substrata even though they are not conveyed by the same word, the required gender and number result.

[So far the question has been considered according to the view that both the substance and the universal are the expressed meanings of the word. How the required gender and number result according to the view that only the universal is the expressed meaning is now stated. The universal is superimposed on that, in which it inheres. So the word denotes substance as identified with the universal. The universal is identified with the substance (individuals) as one with it. And so substance is also understood as it has the universal in it and its gender and number are followed. Substance is understood as identical with the universal and words follow understanding ultimately, the words, though expressive of the universal only, reach as far as the substance. In the former view, the universal and the substance are the primary and secondary meanings of the word. In this view, both are understood because of identification. The ultimate result, namely, that the word gets the gender and number of the substance is the same.]

342. Before connection with the universal, a thing can be referred to only by a pronoun. *Tyad* etc. are used to denote just a thing, in a very general way.

[As long as the universal is not superimposed on the substance (individual), the latter is formless. It is the universal which gives it a form and brings it within the range of verbal usage. As long as a thing is not specified by its universal and its own word, no special word can be used in regard to it. It can only be referred to by a pronoun and it would stand for something very general. In order to specify it, the universal has to be superimposed on it and it should be identified with the universal. It is only that it can be referred to by a word expressive of the universal like *gauḥ*. Because of this identification of the substance with the universal, the former is also expressed primarily and the word gets its gender and number accordingly.]

343. Some consider the substratum to be the differentiating agent though not mentioned as in *pākau*, *pākāḥ*. This is the attribute of words expressive of qualities.

[Another view is now stated. The word *pāka* denotes an action and not the substratum of the action. And yet the substratum plays a part by giving the word its number. So we say *pākau*, *pākāḥ*. The action of cooking is known to reside in the thing cooked and according to the diversity in the things cooked, the word takes different numbers. Words expressive of quality take the gender and number of this substrata though they do not express them. Similarly, words expressive of the universal, though not expressive of the substance, take its gender and number.

But this is not the correct view. An action differs with its substratum and ultimately the number becomes that of the action itself. Quality words become identified with their

substrata and they are given as analogy in the *M.Bhā.* I.p. 246, l. 18. The universal, like a quality, inheres in the substratum.]

344. If the view is that the substratum is not expressed and that the (word expressive of the) universal gets its attributes (that is, gender and number), then it has been considered before.

[The view which is being considered now is that the word expresses only the universal and that it gets the attributes, namely, gender and number of the substance because of identification.]

345. Words expressive of the universal first convey the universal and through a relation which does not come within the range of the word, the individual is also understood.

[The word is first applied to the universal which is the basis. As the universal must have a substratum, the latter is also understood through their invariable association even though the relation does not come within the range of the word.]

346. The substance is conceived as having the attribute of the universal through their identification and the differentiation which exists in it (the substance) is attributed to the universal.

[Because of the superimposition of identity, the substance is considered to be the universal. So the word, originally expressive of the universal, is applied to the substance (individual) identified with the universal. The substance is mixed up with the universal and so the word expressive of the latter is applied to the former which lends its number to the word. It is not that the substance is directly expressed by the word. The word denotes the basis (*nimitta*) that is, the universal and as the latter is present in the *nimittin* (substance, individual) the word conveys the latter also. The universal cannot be seen apart from the individual. From the word, a unified object with

the universal in it is understood. Afterwards, we analyse our cognition and see different elements in it. The word does not convey its meaning in stages.]

347. Just as the word cradle (*mañca*) while continuing to denote that object, expresses by identification what is on it, so does a word expressive of the universal, denote the substance (individuals).

[In the expression *mañcāḥ krośanti* = 'the cradles are crying', one understands by cradles the children on them, and connects the action of crying with them. In the same way on hearing the sentence 'bring the cows,' one brings individual cows as the universal cow cannot be brought by itself.]

348. That is why the word is said to be expressive of the universal. The universal, devoid of any gender, is superimposed on the substance.

[In spite of what has been said before the accepted doctrine is that the word denotes the universal, because, even if the word brings the substance to the mind, it does so as identical with the universal. It might be said that it would bring all the individuals as one to the mind. Considering that they are all identified with one and the same universal and so diversity of number would not result and yet that is desired. The fact is that the universal with which the substance (individual) is identified has neither gender nor number and, therefore, the gender and number of the substrata, that is, the individuals would result.]

349. When a word denotes something either through the relation of possession or through identification, on the basis of the property of another, that is said to be the expressed meaning.

[Words expressive of quality denote that which has quality either through the elision of the *matuṣ* suffix or through

identification. Words expressive of the universal denote the substratum of the universal through identification. There is no need to bring in any *matup*-elision here because the universal is never perceived apart from the individual.]

350. The primary thing has no form till it has been determined by the mind. Then the substance is perceived as identical with the attribute.

[The object in the nature of substance, though fit to be connected with an action, does not enter into worldly or verbal usage in its pure form. It is only as determined by the mind that it enters into usage. It is as coloured by or as mixed up with some attribute that it is determined by the mind. The attribute may be a quality like white or the universal. It becomes identified with such an attribute and then enters into usage. In other words, the *nimittin* is identified with the *nimitta*.]

351. When an attribute is presented as distinct (from other things), it is the primary thing. The word which is based on connection (of an attribute with a thing) does not express the thing directly.

[When substance is meant to be conveyed as the primary thing, it is expressed as determined or conditioned by the universal. When a quality is presented as the main thing and as something different from other things, then it is conveyed as one with its own universal. When the universal is meant to be conveyed as the main thing, then it is conveyed as one with the form on the word itself. The fact is that words do not convey the pure thing, but convey it as determined, specified by some property or other. That is why a word is called *saṃsargaśruti* in this stanza, that which denotes connection with an attribute (*saṃsarga*). The pure thing cannot be grasped by the mind and so cannot come within the range of words which are based on determination by the mind.]

352. When a word, after expressing the universal denotes the substance also, then the universal alone is not accepted as the expressed meaning.

[When a word, primarily expressive of the universal, denotes substance also as qualified by the universal, then the latter alone is not the expressed meaning of the word.]

353. The application (to substance) of words already applied (to the universal) is described (in the *śāstra*) on the basis of identity. What are merely means of understanding do not follow the truth.

[Words do not convey their different meanings with intervals. They do not convey the universal first and then the substance. To explain the process by saying that words convey the universal primarily and the substance through identification based on resemblance is only a method. The fact is that from a word, a unified qualified object is understood and it is by analysis that we see different elements in them. These methods of explanation do not follow the truth. In the end, they are abandoned. The truth is that both the universal and the substance are understood at the same time without any interval in between.]

354. If the universal is emphasised even though substance, not conveyed by a separate word, may be touched upon, the universal is the meaning of the word.

[Even according to the view that the word conveys both the universal and the substance, the emphasis may be on one more than on the other. In the sentences : *brāhmāḥ śuśrūṣayitavyāḥ*, *yo'yaṃ pāṇiyaṃ pibati sa gauḥ padā na spraṣṭavyaḥ*, *gaur anubandhyaḥ*, the emphasis is on the universal. So the number of the word should not be taken seriously.]

355. When the substance is touched upon and it

is the expressed meaning of the word, then that is the main meaning.

[In the sentence, *brāhmaṇam imaṃ bhojaya*, it is the substance which is mainly connected with the action, the universal only qualifies it and so the word has substance as the main meaning. That is pointed out in the *M. Bhā.* I. p. 246, l. 15.]

356. When, though conveyed by the same word, the universal, like relation in a compound, does no more than qualify, then also substance is the main meaning.

[Though both are conveyed by the same word, Vyāḍi and others look upon substance as the main meaning because it is capable of being connected with action. The function of the universal is only to specify the substance (individual). It is like the function of relation in a *talpuruṣa* compound like *rājapuruṣa*. The second constituent is the main one here and the relation which is the meaning of the compound as a whole, only serves to specify the thing related. Words like *gauḥ* convey the unified specified object and not the universal and the substance one after another with an interval. That is what the compound *rājapuruṣa* also does: it conveys a specified thing. But in *gargālī* which is also a complex formation (*vytti-taddhita*), an interval exists between the understanding of the meaning of the stem and that of the *taddhita* suffix, namely the idea of offspring.

357. The two words, which convey totally different things, namely the universal and the substance, become expressive of both when what is not the expressed meaning is looked upon as being helpful to the other.

[There was also the view that the word denotes either the universal only or the substance only. Where either is not conveyed by the word, it helps to qualify or modify what is

expressed by the word. This is the view of Pāṇini himself. That is why he has written the two *sūtras* 1. 2.58 and 1. 2.64, the former based on the view that the word expresses the universal and the latter based on the view that it conveys the substance.]

358. By accepting diversity of number on the basis of the substrata in which the universal inheres, it has been declared that, if the universal is the meaning of the word more than one word need not be used.

[If the word conveys the universal only, it gets its gender and number from the substrata of the universal. As the universal is only one, there is no need to use more than one word. So the *sūtra* which teaches *ekaśeṣa* (P.1. 2.64) is declared unnecessary. Even if the substance is part of the expressed meaning of the word, it can be so only secondarily and it cannot be the cause of the use of more than one word.]

Thus has come to an end the consideration of how qualifying words take the gender and number of the words expressive of their substrata, a point which arose while considering the nature of complex formations (*vṛtti*).

Now begins the consideration of compounds involving comparison taught in P. 2.1.55. A comparison involves a standard of comparison (*upamāna*) an object of comparison (*upameya*) and a common quality (*samānadharma*). The *M. Bhā.* definition of *upamāna* is going to be stated in the following stanzas.

359. That by which what is not specifically known is specifically known is called 'measure' (*māna*) like a *prastha*. Through it what is to be measured is fully known.

[A measure is that by which what is generally known is

made known in a specific way. It is of three kinds: *parimāṇa* = measure of capacity volume like *prastha*, *pramāṇa* = linear measure like '*diṣṭi*' and *unmāṇa* = measurement of weight, like *pala*.]

360. The well-known object by means of which the less-known is understood to resemble it is called a secondary measure (*upamāṇa*) because one does not know a thing completely through it.

[The well-known thing by means of which the less-known is understood to resemble it is called a secondary measure (*upamāṇa*), because it only helps to get some idea of it and not a complete knowledge of it. It is based on resemblance. Because it can help only in giving some knowledge of an object, scholars are not agreed as to whether it should be recognised as a separate means of valid knowledge at all.]

361. A compound word is formed of words expressive of the standard of comparison with words expressive of the common quality of the standard and the object of comparison.

[Once *upamāṇa* is defined, the *upameya* also stands defined. So the present stanza begins the explanation of the common quality. That attribute due to which two objects are related to each other as the standard and the object of comparison is the common quality. P.2.1.55 means that words expressive of the standard of comparison are combined with words expressive of the common quality. The example given in the *M. Bhā.* is *śastrīsyāmā* (devadattā) = dagger-dark Devadattā.]

362. The difference which results in the darkness (*śyāmatva*) because of difference in the substratum is not meant to be conveyed. The quality is understood as one though it exists in different substrata.

[Even though the common quality conveyed by the word *śyāmā* differs with each substratum, that difference is ignored in the *sūtra* P. 2.1.55. The common point is emphasised.]

363. The quality (as existing in the two substrata) is distinct and yet, it is the same because of the universal. If it is exactly the same or totally different, there could be no comparison.

[If two objects are absolutely identical, there cannot be any resemblance between them, because resemblance is based on difference. Nor can there be any resemblance if they are totally different from each other. So the common attribute is different in each substratum and yet, it is the same because of the universal which runs through both. All things conveyed by words are of this nature, that is, they stand for the universal and not for the extreme particular.]

364. If the universal alone were adopted, there could be no comparison. The quality of being dark (*śyāmatva*) exists in the attribute as found in the two substrata.

[If only the quality of being dark, without any reference to any variation due to the difference in the substratum, is meant to be conveyed, then one would see the same thing in two different places. One would not cognise one thing as resembling the other.]

365. That cause by virtue of which the dagger (*śastrī*) is called dark (*śyāmā*) does not differ from the one by which Devadattā is so called.

[The quality by virtue of which the *śastrī* is called *śyāmā* is exactly the same as that by virtue of which Devadattā is so called. To understand this does not involve any comparison. As Helārāja puts it: *ubhayor śyāmatvamityeva pratītir nopamārthaḥ kaścīd atra* = The cognition takes the form: 'both have the quality of being dark' (*śyāmatvam*). There is no comparison here.]

366. It is due to the difference in the attribute caused by the substratum and the identity caused by the universal that the substance (that is, the *upamāna* = standard of comparison) performs the function of determining (*śavyāpārah*) the object of comparison).

Remark. In the first line of the stanza, the text should be *cāviśiṣṭatā* and not *ca viśiṣṭatā* as printed.

[*Dravyātmā śavyāpārah* = the standard of comparison performs the function of measuring or determining, to a certain extent, the object of comparison. Where there is absolute identity or absolute difference, this cannot take place.]

367. This usage involving resemblance is based upon difference and unity. It rests on a combination of the ideas of unity and diversity.

[Where there is identity, the cognition takes the form: 'it is the same thing.' Where there is difference, it takes the form: 'it is something quite different.' Where there are both, the cognition takes the form: 'it is like the other.']

368. If only the universal were meant to be conveyed, the word *śyāmā* would have been used by itself. There is no use of mentioning words like *śastrī*.

[If only the universal *śyāmatva* was meant to be the qualifier of the word *Devadattā*, there was no need to add the word *śastrī*. *Śyāmā* by itself can convey the bare universal.]

369. The peculiarity which does not exist in darkness in general but only in some dark objects and for which there is no special word is what is required here (for effecting comparison).

Remark. For the above translation, I have changed the *sa* of the first line of the stanza into *na*, found in I and P.

[The quality of darkness, with some peculiarity, due to the difference in the two substrata, becomes the object of comparison. The particular substratum, therefore, becomes important. From the very compound *śastrīśyāmā* = 'dagger-dark', one understands the dark colour as existing in the particular standard of comparison and the object of comparison and not as existing anywhere. Any dark object does not serve as the standard of comparison.]

370. In some dark objects, there is a common peculiarity and in all dark objects, there is something in common and there can be a peculiarity in the darkness of one particular object.

[The darkness of certain things has a common peculiarity and that can be the basis of comparison. All dark objects have something in common but that cannot be the basis of comparison. There can be a peculiarity in the darkness of one particular object and that can also be the basis of comparison. For example, it is the peculiarity in the brightness of the moon which makes it the standard of comparison for the brightness of the beloved's face.]

371. Where there is fragrance, it is a distinguishing factor as in the case of the *jāti* (jasmine) and *utpala* (lotus) flowers. Resemblance is also seen between fragrances which differ from one another.

[Flowers like jasmine and lotus have not only got smell in general but also a fragrance which distinguish them from other flowers having no fragrance. Thus, fragrance is the peculiarity of the smell of some flowers. There can also be a resemblance between the fragrances of the fragrant flowers. That would then be a common peculiarity, not so comprehensive and yet a common property (*aparasāmānya* = less comprehensive common property). What is true of smell is also true of colour.]

372. Peculiarity in qualities arises from difference in the substratum or from within themselves or from

some indefinable circumstance or through combination (with the qualities of other objects).

[How does a peculiarity arise in qualities? It can arise from some peculiarity in the substratum. The darkness of a lotus is not the same as that of *tamāla*. Here the difference is due to the difference in the substratum. Sometimes, the peculiarity arises from the quality itself spontaneously. Sometimes, it arises due to indefinable causes as in the case of wine etc. which acquire a special taste and fragrance due to passage of time or maturity (*pariṇāmaviśeṣa*). Sometimes, a peculiarity is brought about by mixture. For example, wine mixed with the fragrance of mango or oil mixed with the fragrance of *mālatī* flowers. Thus common peculiarities arise in qualities and so compound words can be formed by combining words expressive of the standard of comparison with words expressive of a common peculiarity.]

373. Everywhere, the standard of comparison is what is known as superior in quality. As far as the object of comparison is concerned, nothing is debarred from being so whether it be superior or equal in quality.

[That which is superior in quality, really or known to be so, becomes the standard of comparison. The face of the beloved is inferior in quality to the moon, but due to poetic tradition, poets make it the standard of comparison for the moon. Only what is thought of as superior in quality becomes the *upamāna*. There is no such restriction as far as the *upameya* is concerned.]

It is now stated that others understand the *M.Bhā.* which defines *māna* differently.

374. Others declare the universal etc. to be the measure (*māna*) of the object to be defined (*bhedya*). Because, it is through that that the unknown is measured.

[Others look upon the *M.Bhā* definition of *māna* differently.

Substance, unless determined by something, cannot enter into cognition. So the universal or quality or action is resorted to in order to determine it, to specify it, to measure it, so to speak. So they become the measure (*māna*).]

375. A well-known substratum of some attribute (that is, universal etc.) measured by its own measure, proceeds (is used) to measure some other substratum through its own attribute.

376. That which, with its attribute, proceeds to measure other objects having different attributes, is called the *upamāna*, the standard of comparison.

[A substratum, that is, an object which has already been measured by its own measure, that is, by the universal, quality or action, is used to measure some other object through its own measure, even though that object has other attributes. Then it is called an *upamāna*—‘a standard of comparison.’ The fact of one thing being used, to measure another is what is meant by the word *saṃsparśa* in the stanza 376. Helārāja explains the word as *sambandha*=relation, that is, the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya*. Darkness, which exists in both *śastrī* and *Devadattā*, is the basis of the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* in the expression: *śastrīśyāmā* (*Devadattā*).]

377. An attribute like darkness, common to the standard and the object of comparison, when thought of as the main thing, is qualified by some other quality.

[An attribute like darkness, which ordinarily determines the relation of standard and object of comparison, may be thought of primarily as the object of comparison. Then it would be like a substance and would have to be qualified by some attribute which exists in it and that attribute would bring about the relation of standard and object of comparison.]

An illustration is now given.

378. When the darkness of *śastrī* and *kumārī* is seen to be similar, some cause, existing in the two

attributes, due to which it is said to be so, becomes clear.

[The darkness of *śastrī* and *kumārī* is said to be similar due to the presence of some attribute like brightness in the darkness of both. When this brightness becomes, in its turn, the main thing, then some other common attribute would have to be sought for the sake of comparison.]

379. When those that have the common property become one, as it were, with it, then the standard and the object of comparison are mentioned as different.

[When the standard and the object of comparison, having the common attribute, become one, as it were, with it because of the identification of the quality and the qualified with each other, then their separate mention is based on difference. In order to indicate their mutual relation, the word *iva* is used and then the comparison becomes complete. In *gaur iva gavayaḥ* etc. the standard and the object of comparison are presented as one with the common attribute. Their relation has become part of their meaning. The *iva* brings out this relation. Because of the use of words expressive of the standard of comparison, the object of comparison and the comparison itself, the comparison is said to be complete.]

380. The cases where identification is intended and difference disappears are said to be those of hidden comparison, because of being covered by the common attribute.

[In sentences like *gaur vāhikaḥ*, *siṃho māṇavakaḥ*, two objects are identified, as it were. Their difference is obliterated. They are not presented as *upamāna* and *upameya*. In these sentences, a word is applied to an object other than its own. From this effect, its cause, namely, the presence of a common attribute is postulated. For this reason, Yāska and others consider these as examples where the comparison is hidden because of identi-

fication. The comparison is hidden because the common attribute is hidden and not openly mentioned.]

381. The darkness of the dagger (*śastrī*), being well-known, is a measure (*māna*) and it is measured by it. The other darkness (that of Devadattā) is similar to it and is not fully measured by it.

[That which fully determines a thing is called a measure. That is what the darkness of *śastrī* is. It is well-known as a determinant. Even though Devadattā is also dark, her darkness is not well-known. It is, therefore, measured by that of the dagger. But not fully. Nothing is fully measured through perception of resemblance to something else.]

382. One calls the *śastrī* which, because of the completeness of its quality, measures another substratum whose quality is incomplete, a secondary measure (*upamāna*).

[The *śastrī*, which through its full darkness, determines another substratum, namely, Devadattā, whose darkness is incomplete, is called a secondary measure (*upamāna*).]

The attribute is usually mentioned as existing in the *upamāna* or in the *upameya*, but not in both. How is it then the common property?

383. The attribute, actually mentioned as existing in the object of comparison is inferred as related to the other. Similarly, what is mentioned as existing in the standard of comparison is inferred as existing in the object of comparison.

[The relation of the standard and the object of comparison is based on a common property. 'It cannot be presented as existing in both at the same time through a compound word. In *śastrīśyāmā devadattā*, the relation is with the quality of darkness actually mentioned. Even if the power of the word is

exhausted after referring it to one of the two, it is inferred as existing in the other also. Thus, it becomes the common attribute.]

384. It is seen that in the sentence the *kṣattriyas* study like the *brāhmaṇa*, the plural number relates to the object of comparison (*kṣattriya*) which is multiple.

[In the sentence *adhīyate brāhmaṇavat kṣattriyāḥ*, the objects of comparison, the *kṣattriyas* are many and the plural number in *kṣattriyāḥ* and *adhīyate* presents the common attribute, namely, 'study' (*adhyayana*) as existing in the objects of comparison. But by implication, it is understood as connected with the *Brāhmaṇas*, the standard of comparison.]

385. In the *sūtra* (P. 2. 1. 56.) that word is said to be expressive of the common attribute which presents an attribute existing in one thing as common to another.

[A word is said to be expressive of a common attribute even if it does not present it as existing in both the standard and the object of comparison. Even though the word may denote darkness as existing in one thing only, it is inferred as existing in the other also and thus the word becomes expressive of the common attribute.]

According to what has been said above, the common attribute amounts to the universal of the quality (*guṇajāti*). Even if it is understood as standing for the quality itself, the word expressive of it can be called *sāmānyavacana*. That is what is explained in the following.

386. An attribute existing in two things is presented neither in its identity nor in its peculiar aspect. Of the two attributes, one is mentioned and the other is understood.

[The attribute common to the standard and the object of comparison is never presented by the word as identical. It is presented as determined either by the standard of comparison or by the object of comparison and so not as an identical attribute. Nor is it presented in the particular form in which it exists in one of the things. Words never convey the absolutely peculiar feature of an object. They convey the universal. An attribute, as existing in one particular thing only, is not useful for comparison. So the word *śyāma* denotes the quality, not in its peculiarity and yet as existing in one of the things. It is, however, understood by implication as existing in the other thing also. In this way, the word becomes *sāmānyavacana*, a word expressive of the common attribute.]

So far the intention of the *M. Bhā.* I, p. 397, ll. 9-10. has been explained. It is now shown that this explanation is based on the text itself.

387. Since the secondary measure being based on the common property, does not measure a thing completely, the object of comparison is understood as being near it.

[That which determines or measures a thing fully is a measure (*māna*). Measures like *prastha* and universals etc. are examples. That which is near the object of comparison is a secondary measure (*upamāna*). Nearness is based on similarity of attributes. The secondary measure can determine a thing only through resemblance and so it does so incompletely. *Śaṣṭrī* can determine Devadattā only as being dark. It does not say anything more about her, it does not refer to the feminine and the like in her. So it is an incomplete measure. It does no more than go near the object of comparison. *Tatsamīpe yan nāty-antāya mimīte tad upamānam*, as the *M. Bhā.* passage says.]

This *M. Bhā.* sentence is now differently explained.

388. Or it is proximity to the primary measure because of resemblance which is understood. The

primary and the secondary measures resemble each other because both are determinants.

[In the previous stanza, the word *tat* in *tatsamīpe* etc. of the *M. Bhā.* on P. 2. 1. 55. was taken as referring to the object of comparison. It can be taken as referring to the primary measure. The secondary measure is that which is near the primary measure. The latter determines an object and so does the former. The only difference is that the former does it incompletely and the latter does it completely.]

In *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, ll. 5-6, a question is asked whether the standard and the object of comparison are the same thing or whether they are two different things. The purport of this question is now explained.

389. When the common universal is taken into consideration, the two are understood as the same. When the difference is taken into consideration, they are understood as different.

[When the individual differences of the standard and the object of comparison are ignored and their common attribute, namely, the universal of quality is kept in mind, then they are understood as identical. When, on the other hand, their peculiar features which distinguish them from other objects are kept in mind, then they are understood as different. The meaning of the question is whether absolute identity is relevant to the state of being a standard of comparison or whether absolute difference is so.]

Considering that in the word *upamāna*, the suffix *lyuṭ* has been added in the sense of *Karaṇa* and in the word *upameya*, the suffix *yat* has been added in the sense of *Karma*, their difference is very obvious. How can the question of their identity arise?

390. Inasmuch as the quality of being *Karaṇa* (instrument) and that of being object (*karma*) are taken as being different from each other, there cannot be any doubt here based on their identity.

[As the two words are formed with suffixes having different meanings, there cannot be complete identity between them. That is admitted. But there is nothing to prevent a doubt regarding identity arising on the basis of a common attribute of two admittedly different things.]

An illustration is now given.

391. Even where there is difference one sees the expression “those rice-grains”, because of resemblance and what are different are spoken of as the same because of the same universal.

[Due to common attributes, difference is ignored and a different rice is referred to as the same. Similarly, we use such expressions as ‘the same clothes are being worn’. Understanding of same-ness is due not only to the existence of a common property, but also to the same universal, as in the expression: ‘let four brahmins bring the water pot’. The individual differences of the brahmins are ignored and they are all referred to by the same word, because of their common *jāti*. Similarly, here also due to proximity arising from a common attribute or a common universal, the question of the identity of the standard and the object of comparison can arise.]

It is now stated that the question of their difference can also arise.

392. It has been said: “how can something totally different be a part (*avayava*) of another? Where there is absolute difference, there is separation and not identity.

[This is a reference to *M. Bhā.* on P. 1.2.10—*Halantācca*. Taking the word *anta* in the *sūtra* to mean final part, somebody raises the objection: *Katham hi iko nāma hal antaḥ syāt, anyasyānyaḥ*? = how can a consonant (*hal*) be the final part of a root ending in a vowel included in *ik*, a part of something totally different? The question presupposes that the whole and the

part are totally different things. Similarly, here also, even though, on the basis of a common attribute or the universal, the *upamāna* and the *upameya* may be thought of as one, that is ignored and the question of their total difference from each other is raised.]

393. When identity is meant to be conveyed, the collection and the things collected are one. Two things belonging to a group are not identical with each other and so they are declared to be different.

[One can think and speak about a collection of things as one or as many. When we say 'a forest,' we think of the trees as one and ignore their difference. When we say 'trees,' we are more conscious of their difference. We never think of the trees as identical with one another. Similarly, the phonemes that go to make up a word are different from one another. That is why the *M. Bhā.* says: *anyasyānyaḥ*. Thus difference and identity can be pure or mixed. Here they are thought of as mixed. That is why the question raised by the *M. Bhā.* relates to both difference and identity. The question is: what is known as the *Upamāna* and the *upameya* in the world, are they the same or are they different? Worldly usage is taken up for consideration?]

394. If the common property of two things is resorted to, there would be no comparison. That which is the cause of one cow being perceived as a cow exists in the other cow also.

[When the well-known attribute of something is used to describe a less-well-known thing, there is comparison. It would be pointless for anybody to say: 'the cow is like a cow'. There would be no comparison in such a statement, nor would it say something not known before.]

395. If one thinks of absolutely differentiating properties, it would be of no use in going from one idea (that of the standard of comparison) to another (that of the object of comparison).

[This and the previous stanza relate to *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, ll. 6-8. where the purpose of comparing two identical objects like two cows or two totally different objects like a cow and horse is raised.]

The answer to the above question is given in the following.

396. When there is a common attribute and differences also (there can be comparison). In all cows there is the common attribute, cow-ness and also differences like being motley-coloured etc.

[This refers to *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 8. Comparison between two things is possible only when there is resemblance as well as difference between them.]

397. It is darkness etc. which is the common attribute and it is common to two things and that is also the difference between the two, being well-known in one and not well-known in the other.

[In the *M. Bhā.* on P. 2.1.55, it has been said that *sāmānya* does not stand for the universal which inheres in a very large number of individuals but other less pervasive attributes. That which exists in two things only is also *sāmānya*. See *M. Bhā.* I. p. 398, ll. 16-17. Darkness exists in *śastrī* as well as in *Devadattā* and so it is *sāmānya*. In the former it is well-known and in the latter, it is not. That is the difference.]

398. According to others, darkness is the common attribute which exists in both. It is called the distinguishing feature because it is complete in one as compared with the other.

[Darkness exists in two things and is different in each but the difference, being too subtle, is not noticed and so it is looked upon as the common feature. In one, it is complete and in the other it is not. Completeness or otherwise is the basis of difference.

Before, being well-known or otherwise was mentioned as the difference.]

399. If the universal is the common attribute, its peculiarities found in some places (substrata) are understood and they are resorted to here.

[The universal can also be the basis of comparison. Some peculiarities co-exist, in the substratum with the universal and when they are looked upon as modifying the universal, the latter becomes the basis of the relation of the standard of comparison and the object of comparison, provided that the words present it so. The universal which exists in the two darknesses that exist in the *śāstrī* and *Devadattā* becomes differentiated by the peculiarities of the substrata and produces the cognition of resemblance. In *gaur iva gaur*, even though the substratum differentiates the universal, that is not understood from the words and so there is no comparison. In *śāstrīśyāmā Devadattā*, the difference is understood because of the difference in the substrata.]

After explaining the *M. Bhā.* text, the conclusion is now stated.

400. When the universal is thus one and yet differentiated, it is said to be resemblance. Through that, something is sometimes said to be similar to another.

[When the universal is thus one and yet differentiated, it is called resemblance. Through this resemblance, something is sometimes said to be similar to another, not everything. That is why attributes like mere existence (*sattva*) or the mere fact of being known (*jñeyatva*) which are common to all objects in the world do not constitute resemblance. Through them, one never gets the cognition that one thing is similar to another.]

In order to delimit the scope of the cognition of resemblance, what is different from it is now explained.

401. That object in regard to which the perception of identity never varies is said to be one because of the absence of differentiation.

[That object in regard to which the cognition of one-ness never alternates with that of difference, which may pass through many states and yet the resultant difference is never perceived, is said to be the object of the cognition of unity or one-ness.]

402. Where, even when the object has variations, it is recognised to be the same, it is the universal element which functions there, so they declare.

[This stanza explains recognition as distinct from the cognition of resemblance. When, in the midst of its variations, an object is recognised as the same, it is said to be due to the functioning of the universal in it. In the cognition of resemblance, the universal does not play a part.]

403. Cognition of identity is based on the universal aspect of an object and the perception of difference on its individual object.

[This explains how cognition grasps an object as the same or as different. It is said that this is due to the universal or the individual aspect of an object.]

Now the cognition of resemblance is going to be explained.

404. The common attribute (*nimitta*) involving identity and difference, found in one object is observed in another object as being somewhat different.

405. It first relates to its substrata and then extends to the objects where the latter are found. Such is the scope of resemblance, so say others.

[The quality of darkness (*śyāmatva*) which exists in the dark colour of *śastrī* is observed to exist in Devadattā's dark colour also, but as something slightly different because of its different substratum. It is also perceived as being the same. It is the same and yet not the same: *bhedābhedasamanvitam*. The darkness exists in the dark colour and the latter exists in the object which is dark. The darkness first causes the perception of resemblance in the two dark colours and then in the two objects which are their substrata. The relation between darkness and the dark colour is *samavāya* and that between the object and darkness is *samavetasamavāya*. The relation of standard and object of comparison is between the two objects, the substrata of the dark colour. Thus, resemblance, consisting of difference and identity, is different from the universal which is entirely identity. Before, it was said that two substrata become *upamāna* and *upameya*, if they are partly alike and partly different. Now it is stated that two substances become standard and object of comparison through resemblance of their common attribute. The resemblance of the common attribute ends in the resemblance of the substrata.]

406. Just as the name 'cause' is applied to something in respect of something else, in the same way, they call something secondary measure (*upamāna*) in respect of something else.

[It is now stated that there is no fixity about what is *upamāna* and what is *upameya*. This is explained by means of an example. The name 'cause' is applied to something in regard to something else, namely, the effect. Similarly, what is well-known is a secondary measure (*upamāna*) in regard to something else which is less-known and, therefore, the *upameya*.]

407. Like the notions of teacher, pupil, father, son, action, time etc., that of (the standard of) comparison is also relative.

[Now other examples are given. Nobody is a teacher in regard to a teacher, nor a pupil in regard to a pupil, nor a son

in regard to his son, nor a father in regard to his father. An action is so called in regard to its accessories (*sādhana*) and not in regard to another action. An action with a fixed and well-known dimension can be a measure of other actions and thus called Time. Like the above conceptions, that of qualifier and qualified is also relative. A 'gayal' can be a secondary measure (*upamāna*) to a forest-dweller to whom it is well-known, but to a town-dweller, it would be an *upameya*. To a lover, the beloved's face can be *upamāna* in regard to the moon, but to others, it would be just the other way. Thus all these notions are relative.]

Now *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 13-14 in which an example of P. 2.1.55 is given is going to be discussed.

408. If in the compound (*śaṣṭrīśyāmā*) the word *śyāmā*='dark' is taken as referring to the standard of comparison (*upamāna*=*śaṣṭrī*) then the object of comparison (*upameya*) an outside object, would be conveyed by the compound as a whole.

[In the *M. Bhā.* passage referred to above, the example given of a compound formed by P. 2.1.55 is *śaṣṭrīśyāmā*='dagger-dark'. If, in this compound, both the constituents refer to the *śaṣṭrī*, that is, the standard of comparison, the object of comparison would be understood from the compound as a whole. That would mean that this compound has been formed in the sense of something different from the meanings of the two constituents. In other words, it is formed *anyapadārthe*, though it is a *tatpuruṣa*. But it is the *bahuvrīhi* which has been taught in P.2.2.24 in the sense of an outside word. It is true, but sometimes other compounds like *tatpuruṣa* and *avyayībhāva* are also formed in the sense of an outside word. That is how one can explain the discussion in the *M. Bhā.* I. p. 410, ll. 8 ff: Whether a negative compound is *pūrvapadārthapradhāna*, *uttara-padārthapradhāna* or *anyapadārthapradhāna*. This discussion itself shows that, according to the *M. Bhā.* a compound other than the *bahuvrīhi* can be formed in the sense of an outside word. Therefore, there is no need to suspect *śaṣṭrīśyāmā* to be a *bahuvrīhi*. It cannot be so as

it is formed by a *sūtra* which precedes P. 2.2.23 from where the topic of *bahubrihi* begins.]

Now *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 9-10 is going to be explained.

409. The word *śyāmā* would continue to end in the suffix *ṭāp* even when the compound refers to a word like *caitra*. As, in the *sūtra* concerned, the word *sāmānyavacanaiḥ* does not end in the first case-affix, a word like *śyāmā* is not the *upasarjana* (by P. 1. 2. 43).

[If the word *śyāmā* in the compound refers to *śastrī*, it would be in the feminine gender and when the compound as a whole refers to an object of comparison (*upameya*) expressed by a masculine word, the compound would not get the required masculine gender. Instead of that we would get the expression *śastrīśyāmā caitraḥ* which is not desired. If, on the other hand, *śyāmā* refers, not to *śastrī* but to the *upameya*, the compound would get the desired gender.]

410. Even if it is maintained that the word *śyāmā* is *upasarjana* because it remains in the same case-ending (*ekavibhakti* P. 1. 2. 44) or because it is subordinate, there would be the difficulty that in the compound *tittirikalmāṣṭ*, the desired feminine suffix would not result.

[This stanza refers to *M. Bhā.* I, p. 397, ll. 15-17. It might be said that *śyāmā* in the compound under discussion is *upasarjana* by P. 1.2.44. because, in the analytic sentence, (*vigrahavākya*) it remains in the same case-ending. Or that it is *upasarjana* because it refers to the *upamāna* and is, therefore, subordinate to the *upameya*, conveyed by the compound as a whole. In the world, what is subordinate to something else is called *upasarjana*. It is true that the word *upasarjana* has a technical meaning which must be preferred to its worldly sense. But the *śāstra* does not completely ignore the worldly sense. The technical meaning of

the word is resorted to where a word expressive of the primary (not subordinate) has to be put first in the compound. Ordinarily, it is what is subordinate which is put first. In the compound *puruṣavyāghraḥ* = 'man-tiger', the first word stands for what is primary in the worldly sense but technically, by P. 1.2.43, the word is *upasarjana* because it stands for what is put in the first case-affix in the rule teaching this compound, that is, P. 2.1.56. Its technical status gets priority and the word *puruṣa* is put first in the compound. The same is true of the first word in the compounds *pācakaṇḍārikā*, (P. 2.1.62) *pūrvakāyaḥ* (P. 2.2.1.) and *ardhapīpalī* (P. 2.2.2.). The worldly and the technical meanings have each their own scope. Sometimes, they coincide in the same case. For example, in the compound *niṣkauśāmbiḥ*, the word *kauśāmbi* stands for what is subordinate in the worldly sense and it is also *upasarjana* in the technical sense because it remains in the same case-ending in the analytical sentences while the full form of *niḥ* appears in different case-affixes in those sentences: *nirgataḥ kauśāmbiḥ*, *nirgataṃ kauśāmbiḥ*, *nirgatena kauśāmbiḥ* and so on. It has been made *upasarjana* technically by P. 1.2.44 in order that it may not be put first in the compound. In *niṣkauśāmbiḥ*, *niḥ* is *upasarjana* by P. 1.2.43 and 2.2.18 and *kauśāmbi* is *upasarjana* by P. 1.2.44. In other words, both are *upasarjana* technically but what is so by P. 1.2.44 cannot be put first. In the case under discussion, *śyāmā* can be looked upon as *upasarjana* only in the worldly sense. But if the worldly sense of *upasarjana* is resorted to everywhere it would lead to other difficulties. For example, in *tittirikalmāṣī*, there is *nīṣ*, only because, technically, *kalmāṣa* is not *upasarjana* and so *nīṣ* has been added by P. 4.1.14 and 4.1.40. If the worldly sense of *upasarjana* is resorted to here, *kalmāṣa* would become so and P. 4.1.14 would not operate and so P. 4.1.40 cannot be applied, so we would get *tittirikalmāṣa* by P. 4.1.4 and that is not desired. On these technical points, see Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya*, *kāma-dhārayāhnikā*, edited with translation and explanatory notes by Dr. S. D. Joshi and Dr. J. A. F. Roodbergen, pp. 107-108.]

411. As the accent which comes at a later stage is stronger, even if the feminine suffix *nīṣ* is added

after the formation of the compound, the *upamāna* accent (P. 6.2.2) would not result. Therefore, the second constituent, already ending in the feminine suffix, is combined.

[It was pointed out above that if the word *upasarjana* is taken in the worldly sense, there would be difficulty in regard to the feminine suffix *nīṣ*. To get over the difficulty, it is suggested that the *nīṣ* is added after the compound is formed. But it is shown that it would lead to a difficulty in regard to accent. Taking *tittirikalmāṣī* as an illustration, here the first term *tittiri* is masculine. If the second term refers to the same object as the first term, it would also be in the masculine gender. One would then say *tittirir iva kalmāṣaḥ* before the compound is formed. Here there is no feminine suffix at all. When the compound is made, the second term would be *upasarjana* in the worldly sense and so P. 4.1.14 would prevent the addition of *nīṣ* taught in P. 4.1.40. Even if it is added on the ground that the whole compound is not *upasarjana* even if the second term may be so then the accent of *nīṣ*, which comes at a later stage would be retained, being *saṭiṣiṣṭa* and, therefore, stronger and the accent of the first term, expressive of the standard of comparison, taught in P. 6.2.2., would be set aside. But that is not desired. If the accent of the *upamāna* is to prevail, the feminine suffix must be added before the compound is formed and not as the last grammatical operation.]

All this difficulty arises according to the view that the word expressive of the common property refers to the standard of comparison.]

412. If the common attribute refers to the standard of comparison, the main thing would not depend on it and so it would not be possible to see a clue in the mention of *vyāghra* etc.

[There is another reason for concluding that the word expressive of the common property does not refer to the standard of comparison. In the sentence *puruṣo 'yaṁ vyāghra*

iva *śūrah*, there cannot be a compound of *puruṣa* and *vyāghra* because the word expressive of the common property (*śūra*) is mentioned in the sentence and P. 2.1.56 prohibits the formation of a compound in such cases. Where both the *upamāna* and the *upameya* are mentioned, the former is always the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the latter the *viśeṣya* (qualified). Here *puruṣa* is, therefore, the *viśeṣya*, *vyāghra* is *upasarjana* in the worldly sense but not technically because in P. 2.1.56. the word *vyāghrādibhiḥ* is in the third case-affix. Really speaking, in this sentence, the syntactic connection (*sāmānyā*) is between *puruṣa* and *śūra* and not between *puruṣa* and *vyāghra*. For that reason there cannot be a compound of *puruṣa* and *vyāghra*. There was no need to prohibit it by saying *sāmānyāprayoge* = 'when the word expressive of the common quality is not used', and yet it has been done. That gives a clue that when the main word in the worldly sense is connected with a word outside the compound, the latter can still be formed. This can be understood as a clue only in the view that the word expressive of the common property (*śyāmā*) refers to the object of comparison (*upameya*).

413. Even though it may be subordinate (according to the analysis in question) it is the main thing (according to another analysis). It is not such a thing which is meant to be *upasarjana* in the *śāstra*.

[The analysis in question of the compound *śāstrīśyāmā* (Devadattā) is: *Yathā śāstrī śyāmā* (*tadvad iyaṁ Devadattā*). The other analysis envisaged is: *śāstrīva śyāmā* (*Devadattā*). In this analysis, *śyāmā* refers to the *upameya* and, therefore, it is not subordinate, but predominant (*pradhāna*).]

Thus it has been shown that in *śāstrīśyāmā* the word *śyāmā* cannot refer to the standard of comparison. So it is proposed that it should be taken as referring to the object of comparison, namely, Devadattā. Then the analysis would be *śāstrīva śyāmā* (Devadattā) = 'Dark Devadattā is like a dagger'. The difficulty here is that it is not stated in what respect dark Devadattā is

like a dagger. In other words, no common property is mentioned. An object, like dagger, has many attributes but it is not stated which of them is the common one. This analysis of the compound would explain its gender and would also confirm that in the compound the second constituent is predominant. But, as said above, the common quality, the basis of the comparison, is not mentioned. This difficulty is sought to be removed by *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 19. where it is stated that even what is not actually mentioned is understood by the hearers. The following stanza refers to this passage.

414. The quality 'dark', as existing in the object of comparison is actually mentioned. Though not presented as existing in the standard of comparison, it is so understood.

[The quality 'dark' existing in the object of comparison, is conveyed by the word *śyāmā*. The word cannot do anything more. As no property is presented as common to both, what is actually mentioned as existing in the object of comparison, is understood as existing in the standard of comparison also.

An illustration is now given.

415. Though only two substances the moon and the face may be mentioned, a particular quality existing in the moon is understood and not the others like spots (*upaplava*).

[*M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 20 gives an illustration. When one says: *candramukhī Devadattā* = 'Devadattā, the moon-faced,' one hears only two substances, the moon and the face, mentioned. No quality is mentioned. And yet people do understand the quality of being pleasant to look at as existing in both the substances and as being the basis of a comparison between the two. When this is the case when no quality is mentioned at all, what to say of a case like *śaśtrīśyāmā* where a quality is actually mentioned as existing in the object of comparison the hearer would have no difficulty at all in understanding

that quality as existing in the standard of comparison also and as the basis of the comparison between the two objects.]

416. Due to the persisting impression (*bhāvanā*) of diversity, it is attributed to the compound also. (In reality), the compound is a totally different word and denotes an object qualified by a quality differentiated (by the standard of comparison).

[Thus the view that the word expressive of the common property refers to the standard of comparison has been considered in many ways. If we take it as referring to the standard of comparison, we get one kind of analytic sentence. If we take it, as referring to the object of comparison, we get another analytic sentence. The impression of this diversity in the analytic sentence persists and one thinks that the analytic sentence and the compound have the same meaning and attributes this diversity to the compound also. In reality, the compound is a different kind of word altogether. It is indivisible and denotes the object of comparison, qualified by darkness as distinguished by the standard of comparison.]

Now *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 22-23, is going to be explained.

417. If a compound is formed of words referring to two different objects, on the basis of special injunction there would be no masculine form of the first term when a compound is formed of *mṛgiva capalā*.

[The *sūtra* P. 2.1.55 is found in a context where compounds of words with others in opposition to them (*samānādhikaraṇa*) are taught. If *śyāmā* refers to Devadattā (the *upameya*) and *śastrī* to the *upamāna*, it means that they do not refer to the same object, that they are not *samānādhikaraṇa*. How then can they be compounded at all? If it is held that they can be compounded because of the special injunction (*vacana*) namely P. 2.1.55, even then another difficulty would arise, namely, that when we make a compound of *mṛgiva capalā* we cannot get the

form *mṛgacapalā* with the first term in the masculine form by P. 6.3.42, because that is also conditioned *sāmānādhikaranyā*.]

A possible way of getting out of this difficulty is now referred to.

418. The masculine form would result because the first term is not in the feminine gender as in the compound *mṛgadugdha* = 'deer's milk', unless the meaning of female is meant to be conveyed.

[A way of getting over this difficulty has been suggested elsewhere, that is, in vā. 2 and 3 on P. 6.3.42. To explain how, in the compound *mṛgakṣīram* = 'deer's milk', the first term is in the masculine gender whereas it should be feminine, considering that milk comes from the female, it is pointed out that the purpose of the word is only to exclude some other kind of animal. For that, even a masculine word would do. The same is true in *mṛgacapalā* = 'quick like a deer'. It is only the *cāpalya* (quickness) of the deer that is meant, as distinguished from that of other animals. There is no intention to refer directly to the quickness of the female deer. The compound should, therefore, be analysed as *mṛga iva capalā* and not as *mṛgīva capalā*. If the *cāpalya* of the female is meant to be conveyed, then the analytic sentence would be *mṛgīva capalā* and then of course, the masculine form would result only through some rule.]

Now *M. Bhā.* I.p. 397, l. 23, which states the view which is free from defect is explained.

419. The word *śāstrī*, which means *śāstrīva* and the word *śyāmā*, both refer to Devadattā. That is why it has been said that in the *śāstraic* analysis, both refer to the same thing.

[It was said before that if the word expressive of the common property refers to the standard of comparison, then the object of comparison would be conveyed by the compound as a whole.

But in the accepted view, both the constituents of the compound refer to the object of comparison. The first term *śāstrī* would mean not 'dagger' but figuratively, something which is like it: *śāstrīva*. That is, it would refer to the object of comparison. Thus both the terms would denote the same object, namely, Devadattā the object of comparison. In this way, *sāmānādhikarāṇya* results and the masculine form in *mṛgacapalā* also would come to be by P. 6.3.42. The context of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* would also be respected. *Śāstrī* would stand for the *upamāna*. There would be superimposition of identity between the two, resemblance or comparison or the meaning of *iva* would be implied as when one says *siṃho māṇavakaḥ* or *siṃham adhyāpaya*. In the same way, here, *śāstrī* refers to Devadattā. This is what the *M. Bhā.* means by saying: *tasyām evobhayaṃ varttate*. But of course, the compound is indivisible and it is only in the *śāstra* that it is analysed in different ways.]

The view that both the terms in *śāstrīśyāmā* refer to the *upameya* is the correct one according to the *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 24. This is now going to be stated.

420. As, in order to make the masculine form possible or to bring in the desired feminine suffix, one would have to supply much, it has been stated that both the terms refer to the same thing (that is, the *upameya*).

[The view given in the *M. Bhā.* passage referred to above is the correct one. If any of the other two views is adopted, one would have to supply much to get over the difficulties that would arise. If the word *śyāmā* is taken as referring to the *upameya* and the compound is analysed as *śāstrīva śyāmā Devadattā* then the two terms would refer to two different objects, there would be no *sāmānādhikarāṇya* and so no compound can be formed at all. To make the formation possible, one would have to say that P. 2.1.55 allows the formation on its own strength even if there is no *sāmānādhikarāṇya*. But then one could not explain the masculine form in *mṛgacapalā* because that is also conditioned by the presence of *sāmānādhikarāṇya*. One would

then have to say that the first term in *mṛgacapālā* is not meant to be a feminine word but one expressive of the universal only as in *mṛgakṣīram*. But this restriction of what is meant (*vivakṣāni-yama*) is not based on the actual words and so causes delay in understanding. The procedure becomes complicated because one has to supply much. If one takes the view that *śyāmā* refers to the standard of comparison and the compound is analysed as: *yathā śāstrī śyāmā tadvad iyaṃ Devadattā*, then the required feminine suffix would not result in *tittirikalmāṣī*. In order to make it possible, one would have to say that it is the whole compound which expresses a particular colour and not the second term only and that the term *upasarjana* should not be taken in its worldly sense. In any case, there would be difficulty in regard to the accent. Thus here also the procedure would become complicated and one would have to supply much. That is why the *M. Bhā.* has declared that both the terms refer to the same object.]

The idea that one would have to supply much (*bahvapekṣyam*) is now explained differently.

421. *Śyāmā śāstrī yathā, śyāmā śāstrīkalpā*, so are the analytical sentences put. In them, the adjective *śyāmā* is to be supplied for the *upamāna* and the *upameya* respectively.

[If the word *śyāmā* in the compound refers to the *upameya*, the analytic sentence would be: *śyāmā śāstrī yathā*. The *M. Bhā.* puts it as: *śāstrīva śyāmā (Devadattā)*. In this case, another word *śyāmā* would have to be supplied to qualify *śāstrī*. If the word *śyāmā* in the compound refers to the *upamāna*, the analytic sentence would be: *śyāmā śāstrī kalpā*. The *M. Bhā* puts it as: *yathā śāstrī śyāmā tadvad iyaṃ Devadattā*. In this case another word *śyāmā* would have to be supplied to qualify *Devadattā*. Because, when a quality is mentioned as related to one, it has to be understood as related to the other also, because comparison between two things is based upon the existence of a common property. This necessity of having to infer what is mentioned as related to one as related to the other also is what is meant by *bahvapekṣyam*.]

An attempt is made to meet this difficulty as follows—

422. If one says *śāstriśyāmeveyaṃ śyāmā* 'She is dark as the dagger is dark', one understands only as much as from *śāstri yathā iyaṃ śyāmā* 'She is dark like a dagger.'

[The analytic sentence is usually similar to the sentence used in the world and in them, the word *śyāmā* may be used with both the *upamāna* and the *upameya*. In a compound, on the other hand, one of them is implied and need not be used. So where is the defect of having to supply much ?]

423. If the mention of a quality is merely for stating a fact, then even if it is mentioned separately as related to both, it would not convey what is intended (that is, comparison).

[If a quality is mentioned only to state a fact, that is, to characterise something, then even if it is mentioned more than once, the idea of comparison would not be conveyed. The dagger mentioned as dark, may determine (*paricchedikā*) dark Devadattā through some other quality. Mere mention more than once would not achieve the desired object.]

424. If the qualities perform the function of determining the object of comparison which is the meaning of the compound, then even if they are mentioned only once, they would convey the whole.

[If the quality is mentioned, not merely to state a fact but to determine the object of comparison through its relation with the standard of comparison and to convey its special feature, then even if it is mentioned only once in connection with the *upameya*, it would be as good as describing the *upamāna* also and so there is no need to mention it twice. The quality is, after all, mentioned to determine the relation between the two on the basis of resemblance. Thus if it is mentioned as related to one, its relation with the other also would be required and this is what is meant by *bahvapekṣyam*. That is why the *Bhāṣyakāra*

has come to the conclusion that both the terms relate to the same object.]

A difficulty mentioned in vā.1. *M. Bhā.* I. p. 398, l. 6. is now referred to.

425. When a word, due to difference in form or substratum, at the time of connection with another word, refers to the particular, how can it be said to be a word expressive of the common property?

[The author of the *vārttikas* has raised a difficulty in looking upon *śyāmā* as expressive of the common property on the ground that it denotes the particular. When an attribute is presented as existing in the standard or object of comparison, how can it be said to be a common attribute? If it were presented as such, apart from any substratum, it can be said to be a common attribute. But then it can become involved in a comparison only on the basis of some other attribute which exists in it. When there is superimposition of identity, on the basis of a common property, then the word expressive of the latter is not used at all. A *sāmānādhikaraṇa* compound is formed when the words expressive of the substance and quality are in apposition to each other. A word is said to be *sāmānyavacana* when it denotes the common property as well as the object which has it. When a common property is found in a particular substratum, it becomes modified by it or by another property existing in it. Even though it has been said that what is mentioned in regard to one is understood in regard to the other also, it has to be understood through the expressive power (*abhidhā*) of the word. The word *śyāmā*, while it is expressive of a quality, becomes expressive of the particular if it is associated with the word expressive of the *upamāna* or the *upameya*. The compound is really an indivisible unit but when it is analysed into the first constituent and the second constituent, it must be done according to the division of the meaning. Then it is found that the word *śyāmā* denotes the particular. How then can it be said to be *sāmānyavacana* ?]

The above difficulty is removed as follows on the basis of vā. 2. *M. Bhā.* I. p. 398, l. 10-19.

426. By *sāmānya* (common property) some understand mere resemblance existing in two things. Or it is meant to be a quality looked upon as identical, though, as existing in two things, it has variation.

427. Or it is the function of the universal aspect of the quality in the two substances which is meant. Because of the (common) form it is said to be expressive of the common attribute. Or because it was so before it entered into the compound.

[The difficulty is sought to be removed as follows—By the word *sāmānya* what is meant here is resemblance existing in two things. Resemblance presupposes difference and identity—two things. Even though an attribute may be presented as existing in one thing, it brings the other to the mind, so that it is really by the expressive power of both that the attribute is understood as existing in both. Even though the attribute is modified by a particular form and substratum, it is meant to be understood as existing in both the *upamāna* and the *upameya* by the word *sāmānyavacana*. What is called resemblance is nothing more than an attribute presented as existing in more than one thing. As the *M. Bhā.* has said: A word can be said to be *sāmānyavacana* even if it presents an attribute as existing in two things only, not necessarily as existing in many things. Even though the universal of a quality, inhering in all substrata and, therefore, identical everywhere is not very useful for a comparison, still when it is coloured by the subtle peculiarities of the substrata, it becomes a minor universal (*avāntara-sāmānya*) and is then called resemblance and is useful for making comparisons. Thus the word *sāmānyavacana* is expressive of a quality like darkness, diversified from the universal and existing in both the standard and the object of comparison. A word like *śyāmā* becomes *sāmānyavacana* when it denotes a qua-

lity existing in both the *upamāna* and the *upameya* and considered to be identical because of resemblance. It is said to be expressive of substance because of identification of quality with substance.

Another way of removing the difficulty is stated in the *M. Bhā.* as follows. Every word, when associated with another in the sentence becomes particularised. So the word *sāmānya vacanaiḥ* in P. 2.1.55 means: "with words expressive of the common attribute before they enter the compound." In a compound the meanings of words are mixed up in an indivisible manner. In the sentence stage, the meanings of words are connected, but separate. In the compound, there is integration. Because of resemblance, they are identified. That is why the formation of a compound is explained with the help of meanings obtained by analysis. Even though the word *vyāmā* in the compound is mentioned in relation to the *upameya*, it is still said to be expressive of the common attribute as in the sentence, it was not related to any of the two in particular. It was expressive of the universal there. So, even though it denotes the particular in the compound it is still called *sāmānyavacana* on the basis of its previous state in the sentence.]

Now the points mentioned in the *M. Bhā.* on P. 2.1.56 are explained.

428. When the word *vyāghra* refers to the meaning of the word *puruṣa* because of the quality of courage (existing in both), then the formation of the compound becomes possible as the two constituents do not refer to two different objects.

[P. 2.1.56 teaches the formation of a compound of a word expressive of the object of comparison with one of the words in the group beginning with *vyāghra*, provided that the word expressive of the common attribute is not used. Thus in the sense of *puruṣo' yaṃ vyāghra iva śūraḥ* we cannot say *puruṣavyāghraḥ śūraḥ*. In *puruṣavyāghraḥ* the first constituent stands for the object of comparison and the second constituent for the standard

of comparison. Thus, the two words do not stand for the same object, they are not *samānādhikaraṇa* and yet the compound has been formed even though the rule is given in the section dealing with *samānādhikaraṇa* compounds. How? If the word *vyāghra* is understood as referring to the *puruṣa* due to superimposition based on common qualities, then both the words refer to the same object and the compound becomes possible.]

429. When the word *śūra* is used the word *vyāghra*, stands (for its own meaning), for a particular kind of animal. As then the two words would refer to two different things, there is no possibility of a compound.

[When the common attribute is expressed by its own word in the sentence, then the word *vyāghra* would denote only a particular kind of animal, the standard of comparison. It would not refer to the object of comparison at all. The two objects would be different from each other. The difference would be made clear by the word *iva* and there would be no superimposition at all. As the two words would not be *samānādhikaraṇa*, there would be no compounding in any case. Why then prohibit it by saying *sāmānyāprayoge* ?]

430. Even if both the words refer to the same object (*sāmānādhikaraṇye' pi*, as there is the possibility of alternative common properties, the word *śūra* may be used (for restriction) even when the compound is formed.

[This stanza says why the prohibition has been made even when the question of the formation of the compound would not arise in any case owing to the absence of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*. Even if the word *vyāghra* is taken as referring to the *puruṣa* due to superimposition based on a common attribute, the word *śūra* might be used merely to specify the common attribute. There are many properties in a tiger besides courage. For instance, it is cruel and strong also. To specify the common property

which is the basis of the identification, the word *śūra* would be used. That need not prevent the formation of the compound. But as the formation in such cases is not desired, the prohibition has been made.]

431. As the word which stands for praise and honour and those which stand for blame and disapproval may be based on different reasons, a particular one is mentioned for the sake of restriction.

[It might be argued that there is no need to use a word for specifying the common attribute because a word like *vyāghra* or *siṃha* is used in order to express praise and honour and one would naturally understand a quality like courage and not cruelty or something like that. That is true, but the qualities of a tiger that stand for praise and honour for the object of comparison are many and depend upon the context. They are not understood from the mere word *vyāghra*. A word like *śūra* has to be used to specify one of them, especially when the context does not help one to understand it. Then the formation of the compound would become possible, unless prohibited. As the formation is not desired, it is prohibited.

Really speaking when the word expressive of the common quality is used as in *puruṣo vyāghra iva śūraḥ*, there cannot be a compound of *puruṣa* and *vyāghra* because the word *puruṣa* is connected with the word *śūraḥ* which is outside the compound to be formed. It is *sāpekṣa* and so there is no *sāmarthyā* between *puruṣa* and *vyāghra* according to the principle : *sāpekṣam asamarthaṃ bhavati*. So they cannot be compounded, even if there were no prohibition. The prohibition has been made and that gives a clue that a compound can be formed if the main constituent is connected with an outside word and not if the subordinate constituent is so connected.]

432. Even if the formation of the compound is not possible, this (the use of the word *sāmānyapārayoge*) is still a clue just as the use of the 'acveḥ' (in P.3.1.12.)

is a clue, even in the absence of 'cvi' after the words belonging to the *bhṛśādi* group.

[The two words have no syntactic connection, not only because one of them is linked with a word which would not enter into the compound, but also because they do not refer to the same object. The main constituent can form a compound with the other even if it is connected with a word which would not enter into the compound. The secondary constituent is not in that position. It cannot form part of a compound if it is connected with an outside word. The use of the word *sāmānyāprayoge* in P. 2.1.56 is an indication (*jñāpaka*) that the main constituent, even if connected with a word outside the compound, can form a compound with the secondary constituent. It is like the word 'acveḥ' in P. 3.1.12. which is a clue that the suffix *kyan*, added to a word in *bhṛśādi* group, expresses the same meaning as 'cvi', namely the idea of something becoming what it was not before (*abhūtataadbhāva*) and so it cannot be added to a word ending in *cvi*. On the points mentioned in the stanzas 359-432, see Dr. S. D. Joshi and Dr. J. A. F. Roodbergen op. cit. pp. 87-136.]

Compounds are not the only complex formations (*vṛtti*) which can involve comparison. The *vṛtti* called *taddhita* can also involve comparison. Something is now going to be said about it.

433. The comparison which is understood from the sentence of which the word ending in the suffix *vati* is a part is conveyed by the suffix taught in the *sūtra* and the mode of its mention is now to be considered.

[In expressions like *brāhmaṇavad adhtte*, *kṣattriyavad yudhyate* of which a word ending in *vati* is a part, the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* is understood. Here the common property, namely, the action of studying or fighting, is mentioned as related to the object of comparison. But it is also understood as related to the standard of comparison. Thus comparison is understood from these expressions. The *sūtra* in question relates to a stem

and to a suffix. The comparison is based on action. If the action is presented as existing in the standard of comparison, it is also understood as related to the object of comparison and vice versa. That is because the relation of two objects as *upamāna* and *upameya* is based on a common property. Still, one has to determine with which of the two the action is really connected.]

434. Even though the word *kriyā* should be the qualifier of the meaning of the stem which is mentioned first, the stem cannot be expressive of action.

[In P. 5.1.115, there is, first of all, the word *tena*. It stands for the standard of comparison and the element which expresses it is the stem to which the suffix is to be added. The third case-affix indicates that the standard of comparison is subordinate to the object of comparison, that it is the meaning of the stem and is fit to be connected as the meaning of the suffix. The word *tulyam* stands for the meaning of the suffix *vati*. After that comes the word *kriyā*. It is a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). The question is : does it qualify the meaning of the stem or that of the suffix ? As the word *tena* comes first in the *sūtra*, one naturally thinks that it qualifies what it stands for, that is, the stem which denotes the standard of comparison. There is no reason to by-pass what comes first. It is as in the *sūtras* '*sāśya devatā* (P. 4.2.24.) and *tena raktaṃ rāgāt*' (P. 4.2.1.) where the words *devatā* and *rāgāt* qualify what comes first. Now the difficulty is that the third case-affix is added to a word expressive of *sattva* and not to a word expressive of action which is *sādhya*. How then can the word *kriyā* in the *sūtra* qualify the meaning of a word ending in the third case-affix ? This is the difficulty in the view which holds that the word *kriyā* qualifies the meaning of the stem (*prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa*.)]

435. A word expressive of *sattva* (substance) can take the third case-affix either in the sense of relation in general (*śeṣa*) or in the sense of an accessory (*sādhana*). As verbs express non-substance (*asattva*), they cannot take it in either sense.

[That in which the universal, quality and action inhere, that which can be referred to by a pronoun like this 'or that', is called substance (*sattva*). A stem which expresses that can take the third case-affix. The meaning of a stem, fit to render service to something else, is different from it and takes a case-ending which expresses that difference. That difference may be based on relation in general or on the relation of action and accessory. In the sentences *adhyayanena*, *vasati*, *dadhnā jaḍaḥ*, *tapasā kṛśaḥ*, *dhanena kulam*, this relation in general takes the form of causality (*hetuhetumadbhāva*). Where the difference is based on the relation of action and accessory, there also the third case-ending is used as in *dātṛeṇa lunāti*, *paraśunā chinatti*. These two cases of the use of the third case-ending cannot apply to verbs expressive of action. Action consists of the activities of accessories and has its parts spread out. It is something yet to be, a process and is different from a thing, a substance, which is already there (*siddha*). It cannot be the substratum of the powers (*sādhanaśakti*) which help in bringing about the process. Thus, the third case-ending cannot come after a verb. It is just to make clear that a word expressive of action (a verb) cannot take a case-ending that a verb has not been declared to be a *prātipadika*. From the nature of its meaning also, it becomes clear that it cannot take the third case-ending. As the suffix *vati* has been taught in the sense of resemblance (*tulyam*), one must presume that the third case-ending is based on relation in general and not on that of action and accessory.]

436. Words like *pāka* can take the third case-ending because their meaning has the attributes of substance and is not designated as action, as for example for the purpose of being connected with the suffix *kṛtvasuc*.

[It might be said that, even though a verb cannot take the third case-ending, there are words like *pāka* which denote an action and can take the third case-ending. The fact is that words like *pāka* ending in the suffix *ghañ* and the like express the action denoted by the root as a thing, as a substance. So such words are not really considered to be words expressive of

action. That is why it has been said that an action expressed by words ending in a *kṛt* suffix is like a thing or substance. They can take gender and number. Of course, their meaning is only *like* a thing, it does not fully become a thing. It is still referred to as action because it was so when a verbal suffix was added to the same root as in *pacati*. Once it becomes like a thing, it ceases to be a process. That is why suffixes expressive of the repetition of an action like *kṛtvasuc* cannot be used with words ending in *ghañ* etc. One cannot say *pañcakṛtvah pākaḥ*. So such words are not considered to be expressive of action.]

437. As for the indeclinable words ending in *kṛt* suffixes and expressive of a meaning having the attributes of an action, they denote non-substance and so do not differ from verbs.

[As for the *kṛt* suffixes which are used to form indeclinables (like *tumun*, *ktvā* etc.) words ending in such suffixes are like verbs because they denote a process and not a thing. Like verbs they cannot take case endings.]

438. As for the action expressed by words like *śayitavyam* in association with the suffix *kṛtvasuc*, there the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* is quite impossible.

[It might be said that an action expressed by a *kṛtya* suffix can be the means (*sādhana*) of another action and so a word ending in such a suffix can take the third case-ending. But the fact is that it is not such a word which is meant to be the stem to which the suffix *vati* is added by P. 5.1.115. It is true that the suffix *kṛtvasuc* can be used in connection with such a word. One can say *pañcakṛtvah śayitavyam*. So *śayitavya* is a word expressive of a process. But the suffix *vati* is used only, when the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* is understood. Here it is not understood. In *śayitavyam* there is the root *śī* and the suffix *tavya*. The former expresses the action of lying down. What action different from that does the suffix express? It is not added in the sense of the root itself (*svārthika*) because it has been taught in the sense of *bhāva* or *karma* by P. 3.4.70. The position is that

here the root expresses an action which was once a process, but not now. The suffix in *śayitavya* denotes the accessory and as the latter implies an action, it is also understood. In *pacati devadattaḥ*, the suffix in *pacati* denotes the agent and because of that, the root expresses action as a process. In *āsyate devadattena*, the verbal suffix in *āsyate* stands for *bhāvanā*, and because of association with it, the root expresses a process. The action denoted by the verbal suffix is different. Here also the verbal suffix expresses an action which is rightly different from what the root expresses.]

439. Neither pure substance nor pure quality nor that which has quality can be compared with the action denoted by such words as *śayitavyam*, because there is no basis for comparison.

[How the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* is not possible with the action denoted by words like *śayitavyam* is now explained. If a comparison is possible, it would be between the action expressed by *śayitavyam* and pure substance or pure quality or substance having quality. As there is no common attribute between these pairs, there cannot be comparison. All comparison is based upon the presence of common attributes.

440. Even when the bare substance without any attribute is mentioned, common attributes in the form of action or quality, based on convention are understood.

[It might be argued that no comparison is understood in these cases because no word expressive of the common attribute is used. But that is not the true position. In *candravan mukham*, no word expressive of the common attribute is used and yet one does understand something. In the same way, here also, we would understand some common attribute if there can be comparison between two things. If we do not understand it, it is because no comparison is possible between action and substance etc.]

Could there be comparison between action and what is nearest to it, namely, the agent ?

441. In the expression, the sacrificer (*hotā*) is like the act of sacrificing (*hotavya*), the idea of comparison is purposeless because of contradiction. Therefore, the substratum of action (the agent) cannot be compared with action.

[Even in expressions like *śayitavyena tulyaḥ śāyakaḥ*='One who lies down is like lying down', *hotavyena tulyaḥ hota*='the sacrificer is like the act of sacrificing', there is no purpose served by seeing any comparison. Action is a process to be accomplished (*sādhya*) whereas the agent is an object which is already there (*siddha*). The former cannot be the *upamāna* of the latter as they are two very different things. No purpose would be served by comparing them.]

Why not say then that the comparison is between two actions themselves ?

442. An action cannot be compared with another of the same kind because of their identity (*tadbhāvāt*). Nor when it is of a different kind as actions like cooking are really quite different from one another.

[When an action is compared to another, the latter is either of the same kind or of a different kind. If it is of the same kind, there would be no point in the comparison. It would be like saying that a cow is like a cow. Nor can there be comparison if the two actions are totally different from each other. Nobody would say : *vaktavyena sadṛśaṁ paṭhitavyam*, 'studying is like speaking'. Thus a comparison with action seems to be impossible from every point of view. It is true that such attributes as existence, knowability etc. are common to action, substance and quality, but they are too comprehensive and cannot form the basis of comparison.]

A difference is now pointed out between actions of the same kind.

443. When difference results on account of difference in substratum, there can be comparison as in: 'the studying of *vaiśyas* is like the studying of *Brāhmaṇas*'.

[The same action is different with a different substratum. An action, as existing in one substratum can be compared with the same action, as it exists in another substratum: A *vaiśya's* studying is like that of a *Brāhmaṇa*.]

444. When, through the meaning or through the context, what it depends upon is understood, the requirement having been fulfilled, the complex formation would result.

[The question arises whether, when a word expressive of action depends upon a substratum, it can take the suffix *vati*. It is maintained that if the substratum, even when not mentioned, can be understood from the context, the word ending in a *kr̥tya* suffix and expressive of action can take the suffix *vati*. There can be the relation of standard of comparison and object of comparison if a common property can be understood as in *sthātavyena tulyaṃ gamanaṃ*, *nṛttena tulyaṃ gamanaṃ* etc. A word ending in a *kr̥t* suffix usually conveys action as substance or as a thing but sometimes also as an action as in *bhoktuṃ pākāḥ* = 'cooking for eating', *boddhum pāṭhaḥ* = 'study for understanding', *kāraḥ gatiḥ* = 'going in order to do'. In these expressions, the suffixes *ṇvul* and *tumun*, added according to P. 3.3.10. which requires that a word expressive of action should be the neighbouring word when these two suffixes are added to the root. The first two examples show that the word *pākāḥ* and *pāṭhaḥ* are considered to be action-words, though they end in *ghañ*. When, however, the question is of adding the suffix *kr̥tvasuc* to a numeral in order to express the idea of the repetition of an action, *pākāḥ* is not considered to be an action-word. So we cannot say: *pañcakṛtvāḥ pākāḥ*. If some verb is

brought into the sentence, the suffix can be added as in *pañcakṛtvah pāko vartate*. Here *pāko vartate* is the verb and it presents the action as a process. So *kṛtvāsu* has been added to a numeral. In *odanasya pākah*, one can argue that *odana* is the object of the action denoted by the root in *pāka* and not of the action denoted by the suffix *ghañ* in it because that is a thing and not a process. One cannot use the same reasoning about *pañcakṛtvah pākah* and say that there is counting of the repetition of the action denoted by the root in *pāka*. That would involve contradiction.]

445. When one wants to say that cooking in clarified butter is like cooking in oil, the use of the suffix *vati* is possible like other grammatical operations based upon a word expressive of action.

[A word ending in a *kṛt* suffix expresses action as a substance, a thing and, therefore, undergoes grammatical operations like taking gender and number. Not only that. In association with it, another root can take the suffix *tumun* as in *bhoktum pākah*. It can take the suffix *vati* also according to P. 5.1.115. Thus one can say *tailapākavat ghṛtapākah*. As the word *tailapāka* denotes not only the action of cooking, but also its substratum or medium, namely, oil there is no external dependence (*sāpekṣatvam*) standing in the way of the addition of the suffix *vati*.]

446. Thus the mention of the word *atiñ* (P. 2.2.19.) is meant to prevent the compounding of expressions like *gamanam kārakasya* (P. 3.3.10.). As to the suffix *ñvul* taught elsewhere (P. 3.1.133), there is no possibility of compounding there.

[It is now shown that according to the author of the *vārttikas* also, the suffixes *tumun* and *ñvul* can be used in association with a word ending in a suffix like *ghañ*. When the purpose of the exclusion denoted by the word *atiñ* in P. 2.2.19. is questioned, considering that the two words *sup* and *supā* from previous sūtras are present in this sūtra, kātyāyana points out that the prohibition relates to nouns whose meaning is similar to that of verbs, in other words, to nouns which denote an action.

When the neighbouring connected word (*upapada*) is expressive of action, it cannot be compounded with what is connected with it semantically. That is why there cannot be a compound of the following pairs of words: *kāraṣya gatiḥ*, *kāraṣya gamanam*, *kāraṣya vrajyā*. In these expressions, the neighbouring words *gatiḥ*, *gamanam* and *vrajyā* express action and so they cannot be compounded with a word ending in the suffix *ṇvul*.

Thus it has been shown that words ending in a *krtya* suffix or in *ghaṇ* etc. can express action and can end in the third case-affix and thus support the *prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa*.]

If such words can express action and take the third case-affix, why does the author of the *M. Bhā.* first say that all words mean normally a combination of qualities but that sometimes they may stand for a part of them only. So a word like *brāhmaṇa* normally means a combination of the three qualities: austerity (*tapas*), learning (*śrutam*) and birth (*yonih*), but sometimes may stand only for just one quality like learning, or a particular mode of study. On this basis, the word *kriyā* in P.5.1.115 has been connected with the word *tena* in the same and interpreted to mean: "if the word ending in the third case-affix means action." In other words, the words *kriyā* has been interpreted as a qualifier of the meaning of the stem. Why this has been done is now stated.

447. The idea that words normally stand for a combination of qualities has been adopted in order to meet all objections. Otherwise, as it is possible to have a word expressive of pure action, the suffix could not be added to words like *brāhmaṇa*.

[It is in order to meet all objections that the author of the *M. Bhā.* has stated that words ordinarily stand for a combination of qualities. Otherwise, the suffix *vati* could not be added to a word like *brāhmaṇa* as in the expression *brāhmaṇavad adhīte kṣattriyaḥ*, because there are words like *śayitavya* which express pure action primarily and the suffix would be added to them

preferably. The word *brāhmaṇa* can stand for action only secondarily as, primarily, it stands for a combination of qualities. If by P.5.1.115, the suffix *vati* is to be added to a stem expressive of action, it would preferably be added to a stem which does so primarily rather than to one which does so secondarily. Or the *Bhāṣyakāra* may mean that a word expressive of pure action cannot take the third case-affix.]

448. When it is meant to be the standard of comparison, the original nature of action disappears. Because, by merely hearing it, its nature as the standard of comparison is not completed.

[When the action denoted by words like *pāka* is thought of as the standard of comparison, it loses its original character of *asatva* = non-substance, that is, a process. Merely by hearing the word meant to be the standard of comparison, its nature of being the standard of comparison is not completed. That depends upon the common property also.]

Let it depend upon the common property. Why should that take away the original nature of action when it becomes the standard of comparison?

449. The third factor, the distinguishing attribute existing in the two things (*upamāna* and *upameya*) is active (*vyāpāravān*). The whole of one thing is not identical with the whole of the other.

[It is not on a functionless common property, the third factor in all comparison, the other two factors being *upamāna* and *upameya*, that there is dependence but on an active one (*vyāpāravān*). It inheres in the other two factors. As the common property inheres in the action it is active in making it the standard of comparison. Then it loses its character of being a process and becomes substance, a concrete thing. Because of the common property which inheres in it, it becomes capable of determining or measuring the object of comparison. If it were confined within itself, it could not perform the function of

determining something else. Thus, what is conveyed by the word *tailapāka* can be referred to by a pronoun and becomes the substratum of the common property and a substance. So is the case with what is conveyed by words like *hotavya*. When these words end in the third case-affix, they are not expressive of action. It is not objects of the external word which are here spoken of as action or as substance, but what is conveyed by words. Words can present one and the same thing like sound, for instance, as action quality or substance. It is with such things that grammar is concerned. So words ending in *kṛt* suffixes do not present action as a process but as substance, a thing. Why the common property is said to be active here is this: there is some common property but the whole of one thing is not absolutely identical with the whole of the other thing. Otherwise, there would be no difference and therefore, no resemblance, the basis of the relation of the standard and the object of comparison.]

450. Whether it be substance or action, resemblance (*sāmya*) would result only from the presence of its cause (*the common property*). As (*pure*) actions would be present, a complex formation (*vṛtti*) would not be possible (by adding the suffix *vati*) to words like *go*.

It cannot be said that substance, as a standard of comparison may require a common attribute which is the same and yet different, but not action as a standard of comparison. Whether the standard of comparison is an action or a concrete thing, it depends upon a common attribute for performing its function of determining or measuring the object of comparison. When action thus becomes like substance, it gives up its original nature and becomes substance. When it is presented as the main thing and as brought about by the activities of the accessories (*sādhana*), it is called action. But when it is presented irrespective of the activities of the accessories and as the substratum of some other attribute, it ceases to be action. It becomes as good as substance, something which can be referred to by a pronoun. If pure action, without the common attribute, can be the standard of comparison, then the

suffix *vati* would be preferably added by P. 5. 1. 115 to a word expressive of that and not to words like *go* or *brāhmaṇa* which can express action only secondarily.]

451. As pure action does not exist, that which has action is understood. If the main meaning is not applicable, the word *kriyā* would denote its secondary meaning.

[When, in interpreting P. 5.1.115, the word *kriyā* is connected with *tena* which comes first and is thus taken as a qualifier of the stem, then, as has been pointed out it becomes the substratum of the common property and loses its original nature and ceases to be pure action. Thus the word ending in the third case-affix would denote substance qualified by action, because the former is the substratum of the latter and they are always found together. In this way, a word like *brāhmaṇa*, standing only for a part of its meaning, would denote action and become the stem for the suffix *vati*. The same reasoning applies to words like *śayitavya*.]

452. Action-words, depending upon some common property (in the form of action) are used to render service to (that is, to measure) another action, just as one uses words like *brāhmaṇa*.

[In order to render service to, that is, to measure, through resemblance, an action like the studying of a *kṣattriya*, a standard of comparison like the action of studying of a *brāhmaṇa* is used, based on some action as a common property. It is like using a word like *brāhmaṇa*, expressive of substance, as the standard of comparison for determining or measuring a *kṣattriya*. Thus both action-words and words expressive of substance can stand for the standard of comparison and take the suffix *vati*.]

453. As everywhere degree has some other basis, in the same way, a word expressive of quality, like one expressive of substance depends upon such a basis.

[Substance, in itself does not admit of any degree. It is on the basis of some property in it that one can speak of difference of degree in it as when one says *śuklataraḥ paṭaḥ* = 'whiter cloth.' Here degree in cloth is expressed through the quality 'white' which exists in it. But when one wants to express degree in the white itself, then the white becomes a kind of substance and degree in it has to be expressed through some other quality like 'brightness' which exists in it, as when one says: *śuklataraṃ rūpam aśya* = 'its colour is whiter.' Here brightness (*bhāsvaratā*) understood, even though not mentioned, is the basis of difference of degree in the white.]

454. Whatever word is uttered is based on its form. Similarly, in comparisons also, dependence on some basis or other is never absent.

[Just as, for the expression of degree some quality or other is always postulated as the basis as long as words can express it or just as a form of the word is always postulated, in the same way, in the matter of comparison also, some common property or other is always postulated as the basis, so that three things are always involved in it, namely, the standard of comparison, the object of comparison and their common property. When one says *brāhmaṇavad kṣattriyo' dhīte* = the *kṣattriya* studies like a *brāhmaṇa*', the action of studying is the common property. When one says: *brāhmaṇādhyayanena tulyaṃ kṣattriyādhyayanam* = the *kṣattriya*'s action of studying is like the *brāhmaṇa*'s action of studying, a quality like excellence is the common property. And if the two excellences are compared, then some common property, existing in both, would have to be postulated. As the process would end somewhere, the defect of regressus ad infinitum would not result.]

455. As the word ending in the third case-affix cannot thus stand for (pure) action, the root *yuj*, the instrument of whose meaning, namely, propriety is well-known, has been used in the *Bhāṣya*.

[In the *M. Bhā.* passage, it is stated: *idam ayuktam vartate*= 'it is not endowed with it' (*M. Bhā.* II. p. 363. l. 11.). What it is not endowed with is not mentioned, because it is well-known. Whatever accessory (*sādhana*) can be easily understood by reflecting on the nature of the action in question is not mentioned, as in the use of words like 'arhan', 'varṣati' etc. whose *karman*, honour and water respectively, can be easily understood.]

456. If the instrument is included in the meaning of the root itself then it could not be separately mentioned in *nyāyenāyuktam* just as the object *prāṇān* cannot be used with the verb *jīvati*.

[The verb *jīvati* includes the object *prāṇān* in its own meaning and so one cannot say *jīvati prāṇān*. Similarly, the verb *asti* includes *ātmānam* as *karma* in its own meaning and so one cannot say *asti ātmānam*. *Jīvati* and *asti* are usually explained as *prāṇān dhārayati* and *ātmānam bibharti* respectively which means that *prāṇān* and *ātmānam* are already included in their meaning. If the instrument were included in the meaning of the root *yuj*, one could not say *nyāyenāyuktam*, where the instrument *nyāyena* is used separately. But one can say that, which shows that the instrument is not included in the meaning of the root *yuj*.

457. For the purposes of grammar, the word *ayuktam* is analysed into parts. Really speaking, it is a conventional word which means 'not right', 'not connected'.

[What the author of the *M. Bhā.* means here is that the word *ayuktam* is an indivisible word. There is no root in it denoting the action of uniting (*yujikriyā*), so that there is no point in looking for a *karaṇa* of that action. In the world, this indivisible word is used in the sense of 'not right', 'not connected', 'unjust' or 'not well-knit'. There is no root *yuj* in it denoting the action of uniting and so one should not look for that with which something is united. That is why the author of the *M. Bhā.* has not mentioned any *karaṇa* (instrument) here.]

458. How can the word expressive of the condition be in a case-ending different from that of the stem? If one were to change the case-ending, one would have to postulate some other scope for what is being changed.

[Why the *prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa* is not acceptable is now pointed out. According to this view, the stem ending in the third case-affix would be the thing to be qualified and, therefore, the main thing. How can the word *kriyā* which denotes action and ends in a different case-affix, namely, the first one be the condition (*upādhi*)? They are not in apposition to each other. Only that which is in apposition to another can be its *upādhi*. One sees this apposition in the case of the *upādhis* mentioned in P. 3.2.25; 4.2.24 and 4.2.57. Here on the other hand, the *upādhi*, namely, *kriyā* is in the first case-ending whereas that of which it is the *upādhi* is in the third case-ending which is not right. Nor can the difficulty be got over by changing the first case-ending to the third one at the time of interpretation, because the use of the first case-ending in the *sūtra* would become useless. One would have to postulate some scope for it elsewhere, which is not easy.

459. That which has a particular case-ending in one place may be inferred to have another case-ending in another context.

460. Because of resemblance, it would be recognised to be the same word...

[If the case-ending actually used in a particular place has already played its part there, it can be changed if necessary in another place to suit the new context. As the stem would remain the same, the word with the changed case-ending would be recognised as the same. But this change of case-ending is not allowed in the original place where it is taught. This process of change is called *ūha* by the Mīmāṃsakas in their *śāstra* and it takes place only in connection with *vikṛtiyāgas*. In Grammar also, it can take place in a similar manner. For ins-

tance, in P. 1.3.1., the word *dhātavaḥ* ends in the first case-ending and the *sūtra* is interpreted with that very case-ending. Thus, that case-ending has played its part in that *sūtra*. When the word *dhātu* is brought into the later *sūtras*, to complete their meaning, the first case-ending may not fit there. For instance, in P. 1.3.12. the word *dhātu* is brought in to complete the meaning but now the fifth case-ending is added to it. Sometimes, though rarely, the case-ending actually used may be actually meant to stand for others also. For instance, in P. 1.1.56., the word *analvidhau* is a compound in which the term *al-vidhi* has been deliberately used in the following senses: *alaḥ-parasya vidhiḥ* = *al-vidhiḥ*, *alo vidhiḥ* = *al-vidhiḥ*, *ali vidhiḥ* = *al-vidhiḥ*, *alā vidhiḥ* = *al-vidhiḥ*. But that is not the case here. Here the word *kriyā* must be interpreted with its first case-ending.]

461. If, from the word *tena*, the stem is understood as ending in the third case-affix, how can the word *kriyā* be in the first case-affix ?

[A change of case-ending has been shown to be impossible. How can there be any connection when there is difference in case-ending ?]

462. With the use of which word is one to postulate the form *kriyayā* ending in the third case-affix ? It has no connection with the word *tena* found in the *sūtra*.

[Even if the case-ending is changed, the word *kriyayā* thus obtained would not agree with the word *tena* found in the *sūtra* because of difference in gender. With which word to be used would the word *kriyayā* agree ?]

After having pointed out the difficulty in connecting the word *kriyā* in the *sūtra* with *tena*, it is now shown how it can be got over.

463. As the *sūtras* are meant to be completed (*sopaskāreṣu*), the required portion is brought into

the (explanatory) sentence. Thus one understands as follows : 'if what ends in the third case-affix is expressive of an action.'

[As usually there is no verb in the *sūtras*, it has to be supplied according to the requirements of the context. The word *cet* in the *sūtra* enables us to complete its sense as follows : *yat tatṭṛtīyāsamarthaṃ kriyā cet sō bhavati* = "if what ends in the third case-affix is (expressive of) an action." (M. Bhā. II, p. 363, l. 11.). In this way, a connection between *kriyā* and *tena* results. There is no need to change the case-ending in the *sūtra* itself. The change can be made in the sentence which explains the *sūtra*. The word *tena* in the *sūtra* only tells us that the stem for the suffix *vatī* ends in the third case-affix. The word *cet* enables us to change it in the explanation according to the word expressive of the condition (*upādhi*).]

It is now shown that the condition for the operation of a grammatical rule is not always indicated in the same way.

464. Sometimes the word expressive of the condition (*upādhi*) is actually used in the (explanatory) sentence. Sometimes, it is not mentioned but left to be understood.

[In P. 4.2.57, the words *tad asyām praharaṇam* is an imitation, in a general way, of sentences like : *daṇḍaḥ praharaṇam asyām kṛḍḍāyām* = 'a game in which a stick is the implement', *muṣṭiḥ praharaṇam asyām kṛḍḍāyām* = 'a game in which the fist is the implement.' In these sentences the words expressive of the implements are put in the same case-ending as the word *tat* in the *sūtra* and the word expressive of the game is put in the same case-ending as the word *asyām* in the *sūtra*. The implement and the game constitute the condition (*upādhi*). For the use of the suffix *ṇa* taught in this *sūtra* and found in the words *daṇḍā* and *muṣṭā* formed by this *sūtra*. The *upādhi* is put in the same case-ending in the *sūtra* as the one found in the explanatory sentences. The adoption of this parallelism (*samānaśabda*) is one way of indicating the *upādhi*. Another way of indicating it is not

to mention it at all in the explanatory sentence but to leave it to be understood. Nor to have an imitation of it in the *sūtra*. That is the case here in P. 5.1.115. In explaining the expression *brāhmaṇavad adhīte*, formed by this *sūtra*, one says: *brāhmaṇena tulyam adhīte (kṣattriyaḥ)* = 'the *kṣattriya* studies like a *brāhmaṇa*'. In this explanatory sentence, the action of studying is not presented as connected with *brāhmaṇa*. It is left to be understood. This is another legitimate way of indicating an *upādhi*. One cannot therefore object to the word *kriyā*, expressive of the *upādhi*, being put in the first case-affix, because connection can be shown by means of the completing sentence (*vākyādhyaḥāra*).]

An illustration of where the *upādhi* is left to be understood is now given.

465. In the sentence *nīlam utpalam*, no word expressive of the relation (*taddharma*) has been used either with the qualified or with the qualifier.

[In the sentence *nīlam utpalam*, which explains the compound *nīlotpalam*, one understands from the apposition of the words to each other, their relation of qualifier and qualified, though the words *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* have not been used in the sentence. These two words are used only in the *sūtra* P. 2.1.57.]

466. As it (the relation) is fully understood, no purpose is served by change of case-ending in the *sūtra* or in the explanatory sentence.

[As the relation of qualifier and qualified is implied and understood, there has been no change of the third case-ending found in the *sūtra* into the first case-ending in the explanatory sentence shown above. From the apposition of the two words to each other itself, it is understood. As the words *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* are not used in the sentence at all, these two words found in the *sūtra* are not imitations. Therefore, the third case-ending of the *sūtra* has not been changed into the first case-ending in

the sentence. In such cases, there is no question of change of case-ending.]

This analogy is now applied to the case under discussion.

467. In the explanatory sentence the word *kriyā* ending in the third case-affix is not used but in the other case, the words of *daṇḍaḥ praharaṇam* and *kriḍāyām* are seen.

[In the explanatory sentence: *brāhmaṇena tulyam adhīte kṣatt-riyaḥ*, the word *kriyayā* with its third case-ending is not used. The action (*adhīte*), mentioned as related to the object of comparison, is understood as related to the standard of comparison also. Otherwise, the relation, namely, *upamānopameya-bhāva*, would not result. So this is not a case of change of the third case-ending into the first case-ending in the *sūtra* because the third case-ending is not found in the sentence at all. All that has happened is that the *upādhi* (*kriyā*) is mentioned somehow in the *sūtra*. In the sentence: *daṇḍaḥ praharaṇam asyāṃ kriḍāyām*, on the other hand, the word *praharaṇam*, expressive of the *upādhi*, is actually used. Without it, one would not understand that the stick (*daṇḍaḥ*) is the implement in the game. The use of the word *praharaṇam* in P. 4. 2. 57. is, therefore, an imitation of it.]

A more appropriate illustration is now given.

468. In the *sūtra* which teaches the suffix *gha*, the word *saṃjñāyām* has been used but it is never found in actual usage.

[In P. 3. 3. 118 where the suffix *gha* is taught, the word *saṃjñāyām* is given in order to indicate the condition (*upādhi*). It means that the suffix *gha* is added provided that the word so formed is a name. But, in actual usage, it is never mentioned because it is understood without it. Similarly, the word *kriyayā* is not used in the explanatory sentence.]

469. If the words expressive of the condition, even without being mentioned in usage, can qualify the main meanings, they are used even with different case-endings.

[One cannot argue that the qualifier should follow the qualified and so the word *kriyā* in P. 5. 1. 115 should be changed to *kriyayā* to agree with *tena* which stands for the qualified. If, even without any such change, the qualifier can perform its function of rendering service to the qualified, there is no need to make any change. The only purpose of the qualifier is to exclude other things (*vyavaccheda*) and that can happen even if the case-ending is not changed. Secondly, even if the case-ending is changed, difference of gender would remain. The conclusion is that no matter how the condition is mentioned, it could perform its function.]

470. Words stand for a combination of associated qualities and that when neither option (*vikalpa*) nor addition (*samuccaya*) is meant.

[In order to explain how an action-word can end in the third case-affix, the *M. Bhā* (II. p. 363, l. 12. 13) states that a word like *brāhmaṇa* stands for a combination of qualities like fair colour, clean conduct, reddish-brown hair etc. associated with birth in a particular caste. Even though these qualities may not be invariably present, still they are expressed by the word which denotes that caste. The close association of these qualities with a caste is what is meant here. In this way, there would be no confusion. A word like *brāhmaṇa* denotes only qualities associated with a particular caste, even though it stands for a combination. What is meant by combination is that neither option (*vikalpa*) nor addition (*samuccaya*) is meant to be conveyed.]

471. In case adding up takes place when words stand for each item separately, then they would take a number depending upon multiplicity.

[Option may be opposed to combination but adding up amounts to the conveying of many meanings at the same time. Why should it be opposed to combination? What is meant is this: If the word can express each item of the combination separately, the combination would be conveyed by adding up the items. If all the items are conveyed as equals, they would be conveyed by being added up. Then, multiplicity being fully manifest, the word would take the plural number, like the word *vrkṣāḥ*. When the multiplicity is hidden, then the singular number would be used as in *vanam*. But then, there would be no adding up which is based on multiplicity. Similarly here, if the word stands for combination, it cannot stand for adding up.]

The difference between this view and the view that the meaning of a word is the substance qualified by the universal is now stated.

472. Cognitions of hearers take place which are qualified by all the associated things. Therefore they are all said to be the meaning of the word.

[In cognition, objects figure as characterised by the universal qualities and actions and as words convey objects as cognised, from them also objects are similarly cognised. That is why a combination of these things is said to be the meaning of a word. As purposive action is applied to substance, that is the main meaning of a word but as qualified by the universal etc. As the whole thing is one, the singular number is used. In the view that substance is the meaning of a word, what is meant is substance in which the universal inheres. As such a substance cannot be devoid of action and quality, these latter are also understood. In this view, on the other hand, they all come within the range of the word. That is the difference.]

473. In the cognitions, all the helpful things are connected with one another and so the word is expressive of all of them such as they figure in the cognition.

[The external object, in its very nature, is a qualified thing. Nobody speaks about it as a combination of separate things. But as such it does not come within the range of cognition. Due to our eternal predisposition, it is divided into parts, each being cognised separately. Thus it is in cognition that the elements universal, action, quality and substance figure separately and then join. This is what is meant by combination (*samudāya*) Words which convey what is cognised identify it with the external object. Thus words are said to be expressive of the combination of elements that figure in the cognition. As in the external object, in the cognition also, the different elements stand in the relation of primary and secondary to one another and so the word conveys substance as qualified by the universal, action and quality.]

474. The form of bare objects cannot be cognised and a word cannot express them if their form is not cognised.

[As expression through words is preceded by cognition and as the bare substance is not cognised in this view it is the substance as characterised by its properties that is expressed by the word. Words expressive of a combination can express one of the elements also. That is why *pūrve pañcālāḥ* = 'the eastern *Pañcāla*' is given as an illustration. The word *pañcālāḥ* means a country and a country being one, it cannot be qualified by the word *pūrve*. So here the word expressive of the whole is used for a part of it.]

475. As the word *pūrva* is used, the word does not cease to express combination nor does it express a part. Nowhere does a word abandon what is established.

[The relation between word and meaning being eternal, the word *pañcālāḥ* here does not give up its meaning because of the use of the word *pūrve*. Nor does it become expressive of a part. Giving up an established meaning and conveying a new meaning, this is not desired as far as words are concerned.]

476. If, while expressing the whole it qualifies the part, then difference of case-ending would result as in *pūrvakāya*.

[As a country is one, the word *pūva* cannot qualify it. And yet the two words are connected. If, in order to explain the connection, it is held that the word expressive of the whole qualifies a part, then it would take the sixth case-affix as in *pūvaṃ kāyasya*. Thus difference of case-ending would result. One would have to say *pañcālānāṃ pūvaḥ*. While the two words are in apposition to each other, the word *pañcālāḥ* cannot give up its meaning, namely, the whole country. It can denote a part only because the whole has been superimposed on the part.]

477. One does see the use of the *pañcālāḥ* for the whole or for the part. That is how the use of the adjective *sarva* (all, the whole) becomes explicable.

[If the word *pañcālāḥ* the name of a country, is looked upon as a derivable word (*vyutpanna*) on the basis of being a place of residence, then the whole of the country as well as a part of it can be the place of residence of its masters (*svāmiviśeṣāṇām*). A country is not a whole like the body, it is more like the whole called forest. The whole with all its parts cannot be seen at the same time. It becomes a place of residence through its parts and becomes connected with action also in the same way, as in *pañcālān praviṣṭaḥ*. So the word becomes applicable to the whole as well as to a part. If it is not a derivable word, then also it can be applied to both. So there is no question of abandoning or taking anything. Just because the word can denote both, the adjective *sarva* (all) is sometimes used with it in order to avoid ambiguity.]

The support of the author of the *M. Bhā.* for this view is now pointed out.

478. Thus, in the compound *ardhapippalī* which means *ardhaṃ ca pippalī ca*, the word *pippalī* stands for a part and serves to exclude other universals.

[The compound *ardhapippalī* (P. 2. 2. 2.) has been explained in the *M. Bhā.*, as *ardham ca sā pippalī cārdhapippalī* (*M. Bhā.* I. p. 479. l. 14.). That means that the word *pippalī* which normally stands for the whole has been used for a part. It is a word expressive of the universal and the universal exists in a part also irrespective of its size. Whether this compound is interpreted as formed out of words standing in apposition to each other as shown above or out of words not standing in apposition to each other as in *ardham pippalyāḥ = ardhapippalī*, the word *pippalī* stands for a particular universal and would therefore, exclude other universals.]

479. A part of the Pañcāla country is also different from other countries. So when the word is used to exclude other countries, the difference (between the whole and the part) is not cognised.

[Just as the whole of Pañcāla country is different from other countries, so is a part of it like a village. So when the word is used to exclude other countries, the difference between the whole and the part is not cognised.]

480. They are especially known as standing for the whole and it is through purpose (*artha*) context etc., that they are ascertained as denoting the part.

[Even though the whole and the part are conveyed by the word, a word like *pañcālaḥ* is known as standing for the whole and it is from the context that it is ascertained to stand for the part.]

481-482. Words like *brāhmaṇa* stand for that which manifests the universal (*brāhmaṇatva*), which is invariably associated with certain acts, which is understood, through established convention, to possess certain qualities, irrespective of whether it is a combination of them or only a part, without any difference.

[Similarly words like *brāhmaṇa* also denote a combination as well as a part. They denote that which manifests the universal (*brāhmaṇatva*) and is perfected by such ceremonies as *upana-yana* which is invariably associated with such acts as performing sacrifices and officiating at sacrifices, which is endowed with qualities like clean conduct, faith, learning, gentleness, truthfulness, freedom from rancour etc. In the first instance, because of established convention, they stand for a combination of all of them. But, when they are used to exclude other universals than *brāhmaṇatva*, the question of combination or part does not arise and so the word can stand for a part also. That it stands for a part is understood from the context and so it is a kind of secondary meaning.]

483. A word is found to be expressive of a part also, when, due to similarity of sound and form, it is identified with what stands for the combination.

[What the *M. Bhā.* means by saying that words expressive of the combination can denote a part also (*M. Bhā.* II. p. 363, l.17.) is that because of similarity of sound and form, the two are looked upon as one. It is not meant that a word gives up the meaning of combination and denotes a part. That would result in the non-eternality of meaning which is not accepted.]

The other example given in the *M. Bhā.* passage namely *tailaṃ bhuktam, ghṛtaṃ bhuktam* is now explained.

484. Here the word expressive of the universal is understood, by the very nature of things as standing for medicated or polluted oil etc., of a definite quantity.

[By the word *taila*-oil and *ghṛta*-clarified butter, what is meant here is a definite quantity of medicated oil or clarified butter. As this quantity consists of so many small units of measurement, it may be looked upon as a combination of them. Or it may mean a limited quantity of oil or clarified butter polluted by some animal like a dog. The word should not be taken to stand for the universal and therefore, capable of denoting the

whole or a part as the universal inheres in both. As it stands for medicated stuff, the dose taken everyday is felt to be the same and thus the word stands for a part also. The same applies to what is polluted.]

How this is the meaning of the *Bhāṣyakāra* is now shown.

485. In the case of universal and quality words, difference in the size of the object is not relevant. They are only based on the distinction resulting from their connection with the universal or quality.

[Words expressive of the universal or of a quality are applied to objects irrespective of their size or quantity. Their purpose is only to distinguish them from others on the basis of the universal or a quality. Measurement words like *droṇa*, on the other hand, stand for objects having a definite size or quantity. If words like *taila* merely stand for the universal they could denote both the whole and the part equally well. That is why the author of the *Bhāṣya* has used it in the sense of medicated or polluted oil.]

In the same context *śuklaḥ*, *nīlaḥ*, *kṛṣṇaḥ* are given as examples. That is now explained.

486. Epithets like black are applied when the quality (blackness) pervades all the parts. Sometimes, they are used as qualifiers of objects like a piece of cloth when the quality in question is found in a part only.

[It has already been stated that quality words can be applied to objects irrespective of their size. Normally, of course, an epithet like 'black' is applied to an object when all its parts are black. Sometimes, however, even when only a part of it is black, the whole is called black, especially to exclude objects which are not even partly black.]

487. When words like cloth are used for a part then like the words 'oil' etc. they are said to be words expressive of the universal.

[When a piece of cloth a part of which is black is said to be black, there are two possibilities : (1) What is wholly black is superimposed on the part that is black, (2) the word cloth itself stands only for a part and the word black denotes primarily the black part which is entirely black. The word cloth really stands for the whole but here it is used for a part only, especially when it is used to exclude other universals. The word *bhukta* should be understood here as used when the part is superimposed on the whole, if one can see that an action-word like *bhukta* has an object of limited quantity. When there is doubt as to whether the medicated or polluted oil has been eaten and when one says, in order to make sure that it has been eaten, 'the oil has been eaten,' there is no intention to emphasise the whole or the part and so the word expressive of the whole can denote the part. So the position is this: when the cloth is primarily meant, then the word 'white' denotes the part; when the white part is primarily meant, then the word cloth stands for the part. The same applies to the expression: 'the oil has been eaten.' Similarly, in a statement meant to exclude other countries, the use of the word *Pañcālāḥ* for a part is a case of primary usage.]

488. Words whose mention is for the sake of excluding others, the distinction (between whole or part) is irrelevant in their case, whether used for the whole or for the part, the quality word would exclude others.

[Where the purpose of the statement is the exclusion of others, there the difference between the whole and the part is irrelevant and a quality-word like black, whether it denotes the whole or a part, does exclude other things and such a use of it is primary use.]

489. The word *brāhmaṇa* stands for the act of studying of a *brāhmaṇa* and its resemblance to the act of studying of a *kṣattriya* and others can be seen.

[In this stanza, the application of the illustrations given to the present case is shown. In the expression: *brāhmaṇavad adhīte*

kṣattriyaḥ, the act of studying is mentioned in connection with the object of comparison (*upameya*) and that is why resemblance is understood. Therefore, here, the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes the act of studying only. As the word primarily stands for the combination of qualities like austerity, learning, birth etc. its application to the act of studying only is secondary usage. So the suffix *vati* is added to the word *brāhmaṇa* which denotes the act of studying and ends in the third case-affix.]

It is now stated that this view is not right.

490. If the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes only the act of studying of a *brāhmaṇa*, then one would have to say on the basis of which attribute there is resemblance between the two acts.

[If the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes the act of studying only, then the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* would be between the two acts of studying and not between the two persons who study. One would then have to state the common property like excellence of the two acts of studying. Once that is done, the act of studying would cease to be an action it would become a thing, capable of being referred to by a pronoun. Then the condition for the addition of the suffix *vati*, namely, that the stem should be expressive of action and end in the third case-affix would remain unfulfilled.]

The author now states his own view which is the accepted one.

491. When it is held that the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes one who studies, then the action which exists in such a person who studies, becomes the basis (of the comparison).

[As it is not possible to have a pure action-word ending in the third case-affix a word expressive of substance, qualified by action, is understood as the stem. The word *brāhmaṇa*, though expressive of a combination, is here understood as standing for substance (that is, a person) characterised by the act of studying, a part of that combination. So the suffix *vati* is added

to the word *brāhmaṇa* ending in the third case-affix and denoting a person qualified by the act of studying and we get the expression: *brāhmaṇavad adhīte (kṣattriyaḥ)* from which we understand the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* between *brāhmaṇa* and *kṣattriya* on the basis of the act of studying actually mentioned.]

Somebody points out the difficulty in another way.

492. When the word *caitra*, if it denotes courage only, is connected with the word *siṃha* it would take the sixth case-ending as when it is connected with words like *śaurya*.

[If the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes only the act of studying, a difficulty would arise. If the word *siṃha* = 'a lion' were to denote courage only, then when it is connected with a name like *Caitra*, the sixth case-ending would have to be added to the latter word and we would get the expression *Caitraśya siṃhaḥ*, which is not desired. It would be like saying *Caitraśya śauryam*. But if the word *siṃha* were to denote one who is courageous, then we could put the two words in apposition to each other and say *Caitraḥ siṃhaḥ*, the standard and the object of comparison being identified with each other.]

Another difficulty is now pointed out.

493. If the word (*brāhmaṇa*) stands for action only in expressions like : "One should give to a *vaiśya* as to a *Brāhmaṇa*" its association with the functions of Recipient (*Sampradāna*) etc. would be inexplicable.

[If it is held that the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes only the act of studying, then one cannot have expressions like: *brāhmaṇavad vaiśyāya dātavyam*, *brāhmaṇavad vaiśyād adhyetavyam*, *brāhmaṇavad vaiśye vartitavyam*, because a mere action cannot fulfil the functions of *saṃpradāna*, *apādāna* and *adhikarāṇa*. One cannot study from the *brāhmaṇa*'s act of studying. But if the word denotes a person who studies, all these expressions would be possible.]

It is now stated that this view is also opposed to the *Bhāṣya*.

494. If they denote pure action, it would not be necessary to include words ending in the suffix *vati* in the list of indeclinables.

[Words ending in the suffix *vati* have been included in the list of indeclinables referred to in P. 1.1.37. This cannot be justified, according to the *M. Bhā.* if, words like *brāhmaṇa* are taken to denote pure action, and the word *kriyā* in p. 5.1.115. is taken as a qualifier of the stem. It can be justified only in the view that the word *kriyā* qualifies the meaning of the suffix and that it means, not pure action, but one who acts.]

The author now concludes his view.

495. Therefore, while denoting a part, word does not abandon the universal or substance. As the word *kriyā* (action) is actually mentioned, the word stands for what has action.

[The difficulty which results if the word *brāhmaṇa* is taken to denote pure action has been pointed out. Even if it stands only for a part of the combination it does not abandon the universal or the substance. The universal comes in here as the standard of comparison. As the word *kriyā* is mentioned as a qualifier of the meaning of the stem, the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes substance qualified by action. The other associated attributes are ignored.]

496. Since the mention of the word *kriyā* here is to exclude that which is not action the word is understood to stand for that which is characterised by action.

[As a word expressive of pure action cannot end in the third case-affix the word *kriyā* mentioned here to exclude other things stands for that which has action. When the primary meaning of the word, namely, action, is not suitable, it would denote its secondary meaning, as one has seen the word *Gaṅgā* do.]

What about words like *hotavya* which denote pure action?

497. As in *hotavya* etc. another action has to be postulated just as in the case of the word *brāhmaṇa*, therefore, none of these words stands for pure action.

[Just as, when one says *brahmaṇavad*, some action has to be postulated as the common property, in the same way, in the expression: *brāhmaṇahotavyena sadṛśaṃ kṣattriyahotavyam* = 'the *kṣattriya*'s act of sacrificing is like the *brāhmaṇa*'s act of sacrificing, some other action has to be postulated as the common property. Thus words like *hotavya* are like *brāhmaṇa*, expressive of substance. If the action denoted by *hotavya* becomes the substratum of some other property, it ceases to be action and becomes a thing. So it is right to understand that which has action, if pure action is not suitable.]

498. Where a word is used for the combination or a part, it has been said to be expressive of the particular which is based on difference.

[Whether a word denotes the combination or only a part of it, it is said to be expressive of the particular. When it is used for a part, it excludes the other parts and thus it stands for the particular. When it is used for the combination, even then, it does not denote all the parts and thus again, it stands for the particular. So, from the word *brāhmaṇa* which really stands for the combination, a part only, namely, substance qualified by action is understood, why it cannot be pure action has already been explained. As the word denotes substance having action, through the latter, resemblance is understood.]

If, in any case, the word stands for the particular what is it that is *sāmānyavacana*, expressive of the common feature?

499. Whether it be accumulation, or alternation or all the parts taken together, they are said to be particulars and so is the undifferentiated generic feature.

[Whether all the parts are expressed one after another to be added up or in turn as alternatives, words are expressive of the particular. The different parts may be on the same level or they may be alternatives or they may be related as primary and secondary. These are the three possibilities. In all of them, some parts are excluded and so in all of them, the word stands for the particular. Even the very general, when presented as the main thing, is as good as the particular, as it excludes the particulars. This is what the *M. Bhā.* means by saying: *sāmānyam api yathā viśeṣas tadvat* = 'even the general is as good as the particular' (*M. Bhā.* I, p. 422, l. 5.)]

As it is through action or quality that something becomes the standard of comparison, what happens when the word is expressive of the combination?

500. The word *brāhmaṇa* does not refer to any part nor does it exclude any. So it denotes the combination.

[Unless the context tells us otherwise, the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for the combination. No part is excluded. Thus the word denotes action and quality also. They can therefore become the basis of the comparison. So even by being expressive of the combination, a word can stand for the standard of comparison.]

If a part is to be conveyed, some effort should be made for the purpose.

501. Where an action is resorted to, there that part is understood. If (other words are) not used, neither that nor any other nor all would be there.

[Where an action is the common property, there it becomes the expressed meaning of the word which stands for the combination. In the sentence *brāhmaṇena tulyam adhīte* = 'he studies like a *brāhmaṇa*, the act of studying is the common point. This is understood from the presence of the other words in the sentence. So the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes that part of the combination. If

other words are not used, neither that part, nor any other part nor all the parts would be understood. Therefore, in a comparison, it is through some effort like the use of other words in the sentence that a word which ordinarily stands for a combination denotes a part.]

502. The mention of the verb in relation to the object of comparison makes known that the standard of comparison is an action and thus the word becomes expressive of a part.

[In *brāhmaṇavad adhīte Kṣattriyaḥ* = the *Kṣattriya* studies like a *brāhmaṇa*, the action of studying, mentioned in relation to the *kṣattriya* indicates that the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for the act of studying. The relation of standard and object of comparison depends upon a common property and so here the action is common to both. Thus, the word expressive of the *upamāna* stands for a part. It is not that the verb mentioned in relation to the *upameya* expresses the action present in the *upamāna*, but from it we understand that the *upamāna* stands for an action.]

503. When resemblance of an action to another action is meant, then the suffix is added to a stem expressive of that which has action.

[In the sentence : *brāhmaṇādhyayanena tulyaṃ kṣattriyaādhyayanam* = 'the act of studying of a *kṣattriya* is like the act of studying of a *brāhmaṇa*, two actions are presented as resembling each other. Action becomes the substratum of a common property like excellence (*śauṣṭhava*). It is the meaning of the stem and is like a substance (*dravyāyamānā*). The suffix *vatī* is added to the stem expressive of substance qualified by action.]

504. When the resemblance of what has action to another thing having action is meant to be conveyed as in *adhyetā brāhmaṇa iva* = 'one who studies is like a *brāhmaṇa*, then the suffix is not inapplicable.

[Why words ending in *vati* are included in the list of indeclinables (*svarādi*) is now explained. When two substances qualified by action are related as *upamāna* and *upameya* as in *brāhmaṇena tulyo' adhyetā, brāhmaṇa ivāyaṃ kṣattriyo' adhyetā* = 'this, *kṣattriya* is one who studies like a *brāhmaṇa*, the suffix would not be inapplicable and so one would say *brāhmaṇavat*, which is an undesired form. The word thus formed being expressive of substance (*sattva*) it would be liable to take gender and number and so it has to be included in the list of indeclinables, as, otherwise, it cannot become one].

505. If the meaning is 'one who has action', one would use the masculine gender as in *adhīte tulyaḥ* = 'the one who resembles, studies'. If action is the meaning, the word *tulya* would be in the neuter gender.

[If *vati* is interpreted as having been taught when two substances qualified by action resemble each other, then they being *sattva*, the word *tulya* would take their gender as in *brāhmaṇena tulyo' dhīte kṣattriyaḥ* = 'the *kṣattriya* who resembles a *brāhmaṇa*, studies'. But then one would not necessarily understand that resemblance is based on action. One can also understand that the *kṣattriya*, resembling a *brāhmaṇa* in some other respect, studies. Thus, as resemblance between actions is not understood, the word would not take the suffix *vati*. But, if resemblance is due to action, then the suffix would be added. Then the word *tulya* would refer to action which is *asattva* and would take the common gender, namely, the neuter, as in *brāhmaṇena tulyam adhīte*, and one would necessarily understand that the resemblance is due to action and the suffix *vati* would be added. As the word so formed would have no special gender, it would naturally become an indeclinable without being included in the list.]

506. Even if the meaning of the stem is qualified (by the word *kriyā*), that of the suffix is not and so

a complex formation (*vṛtti*) by the addition of the suffix *vati* would become possible in the sense of *putreṇa tulyaḥ kapilaḥ*.

[Another difficulty in the *prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa*, pointed out in the *M. Bhā.* II, p. 63, l. 21, namely that the suffix *vati* could be added to a word in the third case-ending expressive of action in the sense of resemblance in some quality, is now explained. As the word *kriyā* is mentioned only once in the *sūtra*, after qualifying the stem, it becomes exhausted, and does not qualify the meaning of the suffix and so the suffix could be added to a word ending in the third case-affix when there is resemblance in respect of some quality. One would say *putravat kapilaḥ* in the sense of *putreṇa tulyaḥ kapilaḥ*. But this is not desired.]

But how is the word *putra* an action-word ?

507. To the word *putra*, the meaning of which is qualified by actions which are meant to be conveyed by the word in the world, the suffix could be added when there is resemblance in respect of some quality.

[In the world, one who obeys his father, continues the family line and behaves well is commonly called a 'son'. In other words, the word *putra*, like the word *brāhmaṇa*, stands for a combination of actions like obeying one's father and so on. To that word, expressive of a part of the combination and qualified by action, the suffix would be liable to be added. But that is not desired.]

508. Even though in pure conventional words, there may be a hidden basis of formation (*nimitta*), there are some actions, invariably associated with the word and accepted in the world like the meaning of the word itself.

[The word *putra* is usually explained as 'one who protects the parents from the hell called *put*.' Disregarding that, why is

it explained on the basis of actions like obeying the parents etc.? The fact is that the word is a pure conventional word (*rūḍhi*). Its etymological meaning, if any, is disregarded and the meaning associated with it in usage is taken into consideration. In worldly usage, nobody is called a son because he protects his parents from any kind of hell. It is on the basis of actions like obedience that the word is applied in the world.

[Thus the difficulty pointed out above remains.]

To meet the difficulty, another interpretation is proposed.

509. By disregarding sequence, the word (*kriyā*) would become the qualifier of the meaning of the suffix, because it would then serve what is dominant and because of the same-ness of the case-ending.

[In view of the difficulties pointed out, it is proposed that the word *kriyā* in the *sūtra* P. 5.1.115. should be taken as a qualifier of the meaning of the suffix referred to by the word *tulyam*. The word *tena* no doubt comes first in the *sūtra* but that consideration would come under the authority called *krama* (sequence). But stronger than that is direct statement which would include sameness of case-ending. *Tulyam* and *kriyā* are in the same case-ending (*samāna vibhakti*). Secondly, the meaning of the suffix is the dominant one. So it is better to take the word *kriyā* as a qualifier of *tulyam* which stands for the meaning of the suffix. This would also save one from the necessity of resorting to *adhyāhāra* = bringing in what is not mentioned in the *sūtra* to explain it. This is what one had to do in the *prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa*.]

It is now stated that in this new interpretation also the same difficulty would arise.

510. As the stem would not be qualified, an undesired form in the reverse order [would result, that is,] the suffix would be added to words expressive of

quality when the son etc. resemble in respect of some action.

[If the word *kriyā* qualifies the meaning of the suffix as proposed it would not qualify the meaning of the stem and so the *sūtra* would mean that to a word denoting quality (not action) the suffix *vati* can be added when the resemblance is based on action. We could say *sthūlavat putraḥ* in the sense of *sthūlena tulyaḥ putraḥ*. But this is not desired. See M. Bhā. 11. p. 363, l. 23-24.]

511. In *sthūlena tulyo yāti*, the mention of the action is external and so it is not the cause of the addition of *vati*. But *vati* is desired when the sentence is *tulyam yāti*.

[Some hold the view that no example is given in the M. Bhā itself for the second interpretation and that *sthūlena tulyaḥ putraḥ* is not a good example. Instead of that, they propose *sthūlena tulyo yāti* as the example. But this is not alright either, because the suffix cannot be added even here. Here *yāti* is in apposition to the masculine word *tulyaḥ*. Therefore resemblance due to action is not necessarily understood. The sentence *sthūlena tulyo yāti* can mean : 'One (say Devadatta), similar in fatness, goes. Once the first two words are connected, one is understood as similar in fatness and the occasion for adding the suffix *vati* has arisen. The action denoted by the verb which follows cannot be the occasion. It is understood from another word and is, therefore, something external (*bahiraṅga*) and cannot be the basis of comparison. Thus, there is no difference between *sthūlena tulyaḥ putraḥ* and *sthūlena tulyo yāti*. When the sentence is *sthūlena tulyam yāti*, the verb is in apposition to a neuter word and the action becomes the dominant meaning. It being *asattva*, the word *tulyam* is naturally in the neuter gender. Now the suffix *vati* can be added to the word *sthūla* and we can say *sthūlavat yāti*. Here at the very time that the words expressive of the stem and the suffix are connected, an action actually expressed by the word is understood. It is therefore, *antaraṅga* as in *brāhmaṇavad adhīte*.]

512. That which is mentioned as the qualifier of one would qualify both. The word *tulya* presupposes that the property in question exists in both.

[To remove this difficulty which has been shown to be the same in both the interpretations, *M. Bhā.* II, p. 364, l. 1-2, shows the following way :—

The word *kriyā*, though mentioned only as the qualifier in relation to one, would be understood as the qualifier of both the meaning of the stem and that of the suffix. The word *tulya* denotes resemblance which always presupposes two things. That word would make us understand that the qualifier exists in both.]

513. It is only when the standard and the object of comparison have the same property that one can explain the word *tulya* as that which has been compared (weighed) in the balance.

[It has been said in the *M. Bhā.* passage referred to above that what has been weighed, compared (*sammitam*) in the balance (*tulayā*) is *tulya*. The action of weighing or comparing is implied in the word *tulya*. Just as the balance determines or measures something, in the same way, the common attribute determines or compares something to another. So though the common attribute is mentioned only in regard to one, it is understood in regard to the other also. Even when it is mentioned as the qualifier of the meaning of the stem, it becomes the qualifier of the meaning of the suffix also. Nothing can be similar to an action except another action.]

514. What is mentioned in the *sūtra* is understood as existing in both identically. An action not actually mentioned is not understood (from the word *putra*) because it is a common word.

[Even though mentioned only in regard to one, the word *kriyā* is understood as related to both. Where no word expressive of action is mentioned at all, there the suffix *vati* cannot be added at all as in *putreṇa tulyaḥ sthūlaḥ*, *sthūlena tulyaḥ putraḥ*. The word *putra* cannot be looked upon as such a word, because it may denote one that has action or one that has not equally well. So it is a *sāmānyaśabda*, a common word.]

515. Well-known properties like obedience, not actually mentioned, are understood (in a general way) but not any particular one from words like *putra*.

[From the word *putra* actions like obeying the words of parents are understood because of being well-known in worldly usage. As there is no word directly expressive of them, they are understood only in a general way from the word *putra*. No particular action is understood and that is why the suffix *vati* cannot be added in such cases.]

516. Therefore, nothing that is devoid of action is similar to something which has action. It is only when action is actually mentioned that something having action is understood.

[As, in the two sentences given above (514) there is no verb, no particular common action is understood. Therefore, no relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* based on an action is understood. Hence the suffix *vati* cannot be used there.]

Even though the common difficulty which arises in the two interpretations has thus been removed, the *M. Bhā.* shows a distinct preference for the *pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa*.

517. As the difficulty in both has been removed the preferability of taking (the word *kriyā*) as a qualifier of the meaning of the suffix is stated on the ground that the suffix is invariably expressive of something which is non-substance.

[After having removed the difficulty which arises in both the interpretations it is stated that the second interpretation, namely, the *pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa* is preferable because according to it, the suffix necessarily expresses an action which is *asattva* and therefore, the word is devoid of gender and number, that is, an indeclinable. No special effort in the form of including it in the list of indeclinables need be made.]

This is further explained.

518. As the suffix denotes pure action which is non-substance, there is no need to take the word *kriyā* in a secondary sense.

[This is further explained : According to this view, the suffix denotes pure action and not substance having action. In the first view where the word *kriyā* is taken as the qualifier of the meaning of the stem, it is understood as standing for substance having action (not pure action) because otherwise there cannot be apposition to a word ending in the third case-affix (*tena*). Here it can denote pure action and so there is no need to resort to a secondary meaning when the primary meaning fits. So, as the suffix is expressive of pure action, it automatically becomes an indeclinable, without having to be included in any list.]

519. As, according to the view that it (the word *kriyā*) is the qualifier of the meaning of the stem, it is that which has action that is taken as the meaning of the stem, if the comparison is with pure action, it is established that the word is expressive of non-substance.

[According to the view that the word *kriyā* is the qualifier of the meaning of the stem, the latter is that which has action (and not pure action) and the object of comparison expressed by the suffix is action itself. Thus the word formed denotes a

meaning which is not pure substance and it therefore, becomes automatically an indeclinable.]

520. When two things having action resemble each other in action, then, that which has action being the expressed meaning of the word formed, it would naturally be expressive of substance.

[If the view is that the meaning of the suffix is that which has action, then the position would be this :—As in the *sūtra*, the word *tulyam* is used in the neuter gender, it is understood that it is action itself which resembles another. When an action measures another through some such quality as excellence then it is that we have the view that the meaning of the suffix is qualified. When what is compared is that which has action, there are two possibilities : Either that which is intertwined with action is predominant or that which is merely associated with it. If it is the former, then the word in question would naturally be an indeclinable. As the object of comparison is expressed by the verb and as the verb denotes something which is non-substance, it would naturally be indeclinable.]

521. In the other view, a word ending in *vati* would have to be included in the list of indeclinables and the suffix would result even if one wanted to say: *brāhmaṇena samo 'dhyetā* = 'a student similar to a *brāhmaṇa*'

[Words like *svaḥ* (P. 1. 1. 38) denote substance because their meaning can become *karma* or some other accessory according to the context. That is why such words are not included in the list beginning with *ca* which are expressive of non-substance. They are called indeclinables by being included in another list altogether. If a word ending in *vati* expresses substance, it can become indeclinable only by being included in a list. Otherwise, a word expressive of substance cannot be an indeclinable. In the opinion of the three munis, that which does not change its

form is indeclinable and if the word *kriyā* qualifies the meaning of the suffix, the word formed becomes an indeclinable without being included in any list. That is why the *pratyaṅārtha viśeṣaṇapakṣa* is superior. In the other view, it can become indeclinable only by being included in a list and secondly, the suffix would result even if one wanted to say : *brāhmaṇena tulyo'dhyetā* = 'a student similar to a *brāhmaṇa* student.']

522. Apposition (of the word *kriyā*) with the word *tulyam* expressive of the meaning of *vati* is actually stated. In the other view what is not stated would have to be supplied.

[It is implied in the *M. Bhā.* that the word *tulya* in P. 5.1.115. has the meaning of *vati*. A qualifier is used in order to determine or specify something which is well-known. So the *M. Bhā.* means that the word *kriyā* is in apposition to the word *tulya* which expresses the meaning of *vati*. This is, of course, the case in the *pratyaṅārthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa* according to which the *sūtra* is interpreted as : *yat tat tulyam kriyā cet sā bhavati*. Thus the apposition is stated in the *sūtra* itself. In the other view, some kind of apposition has to be brought by supplying what is not in the *sūtra*. One has to interpret as follows—*yat tat tṛtīyāsamarthanam kriyā cet sā bhavati*. In other words, the first case-ending has to be substituted for the third. This is a round-about way, compared to the previous view which is therefore, preferable.]

523. According to the view that it is the meaning of the suffix which is qualified, when the resemblance is between two persons who study as in : *adhyetrā sadṛśo' dhyetā* = 'the student is similar to the student' the suffix *vati* is not taught.

[Another advantage in this view is that the suffix *vati* would not have to be added when the agent is expressed and not action. As action has been qualified as being similar, the suffix would result only when the agent is intertwined with

action and not when he is predominantly substance. The suffix is added when the agent is presented through the verb which is expressive primarily of action as in *brāhmaṇena tulyam adhīte*. Thus, the second view, that is, the *pratya-yārthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa*, is better because in it, the apposition is stated in the *sūtra* itself, there is no need to include the word formed with *vati* in any list of indeclinables and the suffix would not result when the resemblance is between two persons who study.]

Something is now going to be said about the suffix *vati* taught in the sense of *iva* in P.5.1.116. The previous *sūtra* teaches *vati* in the sense of *tulya*. Though *iva* and *tulya* have the same meaning, the previous *sūtra* teaches *vati* after a word ending in the third case-affix and when the resemblance is between two actions and the present *sūtra* teaches it after a word ending in the seventh or sixth case-ending and when the resemblance is between substances or qualities. It would be argued that the previous *sūtra* covers the latter cases also. That argument is now stated.

524. The meaning of the third case-ending taught by P. 2.3.72. does not differ from that of all the other case-endings, even though there is difference in the case-ending itself.

[It is like this. The meaning of the third case-ending taught by P. 2.3.72. does not differ from the meanings of the different case-endings which are used in association with *iva*, even though the case-endings may not be the same. As in the word formed by either *sūtra*, the case-ending is elided, there cannot be any difference in meaning due to the difference in the case-ending. Because of the absence of any essential difference, one might argue that what the later *sūtra* does can be done by the previous *sūtra*.]

This idea is now explained by means of an illustration.

525. *Bhojyate brāhmaṇa iva* is equal to *brāhmaṇena (dvi-jātinā) tulyam bhuktam; paśyati brāhmaṇam iva* is equal to *tulyam vipreṇa paśyati*.

526. *brāhmaṇeneva vijñātam* is equal to *tulyaṃ jñātaṃ dvijātinā*; *dīyatām brāhmaṇāyeva* is equal to *tulyaṃ vipreṇa dīyatām*.

527. *brāhmaṇād iva vaiśyāt tvam adhīṣvādhyayanam bahu* is equal to *(vipreṇa tulyaṃ vaiśyāt tvam adhīṣvādhyayanam bahu*. In such examples, the third case-ending is not different from the other case-endings.

[The third case-ending is taught optionally in the sense of a *śeṣa* relation in P. 2.3.72. in association with words expressive of similarity. We can say *tulyo devadattena* or *tulyo devadattasya*. In association with the word *iva*, all the case-endings can be used in the sense of the different accessories (*sādhana*s). As the relation coming under *śeṣa* is the result of a previous *sādhana* relation, the third case-affix indirectly refers to all the *sādhana* relations. Thus there is no essential difference between the two kinds of usage. How what is conveyed by the third case-affix can be conveyed by the other case-endings in association with the word *iva* is seen in the three stanzas translated above. Examples of the sixth and seventh case-affixes are: *brāhmaṇasyeva vaiśyasya dhanam etad upasthitam* is equal to *vipreṇa tulyaṃ vaiśyasya dhanam etad upasthitam* : *guṇā vipra ivātraite kṣattriye bahavaḥ sthitāḥ* is equal to *vipreṇa tulyaṃ tiṣṭhanti kṣattriye bahavo guṇāḥ*.]

A difficulty is here pointed out.

528. In *tulyaṃ madhurayādhiye* = 'I study like Madhurā' and *mātrā tulyaṃ smarāmi tām* = 'I remember her like my mother', how can there be resemblance between Madhurā and mother, on the one hand and the actions mentioned on the other?

[All this was said in order to show that P. 5.1.116 is unnecessary because what it teaches is covered by the previous *sūtra*. But there is a difficulty. The present *sūtra* teaches the suffix *vati* in cases like this : *madhurāyām iva Pāṭaliputra*

adhīye = 'I study in Pāṭaliputra as I do in Madhurā = *madhurāvat Pāṭaliputre adhīye : mātur iva Devadattāyāḥ smarāmi* = I remember Devadattā like my mother = *mātrvat Devadattāyāḥ smarāmi*. If such cases are sought to be brought under the previous *sūtra*, the analysis would be : *madhurayā tulyam adhīye* = I study like Madhurā, *mātrā tulyam smarāmi* = I remember like mother. The resemblance would be between Madhurā and the action of studying, and the mother and the action of remembering. But we do not see in Madhurā and mother any action that resembles the act of studying or the action of remembering respectively. Even if it is maintained that the same action, existing in two different substrata, becomes differentiated and the differentiated actions resemble each other, their substrata would be agents and the suffix *vati* would come after words expressive of the agent and not of the abode or of the object (*karma*) as contemplated by P. 5.1.116. Thus the previous *sūtra* would not cover these cases.]

How these cases can be brought under the previous *sūtra* is now stated.

529. Studying in Mathurā and the remembering of the mother are respectively identified with Mathurā and mother.

[In *madhurayā tulyam adhīye* = 'I study like Madhurā, the act of studying is mentioned as related to the object of comparison but it is understood as related to the standard of comparison also, because a comparison is based on a common property. Such expressions are used when the location of an action is identified with the action. In the other example, the action of remembering is identified with the object of remembrance. Mother, the object of remembrance, stands for the action of remembrance. So *Madhurayā tulyam adhīye* would mean : my studying (in Pāṭaliputra) is similar to my studying in Madhurā. The other example would mean : my remembering of Devadattā is similar to my remembering of my mother. Even though technically mother is *śeṣa* here by P. 2.3.52, still, it is *karma* which has become *śeṣa*.]

530. Just as the word *uṣṭra*=camel stands only for the face of the camel (in the compound *uṣṭra-mukha*), in the same way, the word *madhurā*, stands for its palatial buildings which the houses (of *Pāṭali-putra*) resemble, (in the expression *madhurāvat pāṭali-putre grhāḥ*).

[While explaining the previous *sūtra*, it was pointed out that words sometimes stand only for a part of their meaning, as, for instance, the word *brāhmaṇa* which, though normally expressive of a combination of qualities, may sometimes denote only a part of them, such as the action of studying well. In the same way, according to the present *sūtra* also, the suffix *vati* is added to a word which stands for a part of its normal meaning. The word *Madhurā*, for instance, stands normally for all that that city contains but when one says : *Madhurāvat pāṭali-putre grhāḥ*=the houses in *Pāṭaliputra* are like those in *Madhurā*, the latter word stands for its palatial houses only, because it is only they which resemble the houses of *Pāṭaliputra*. This kind of thing happens elsewhere also. For instance, in the compound *uṣṭramukha*=‘one who has a camel face’, the word *uṣṭra* stands only for a part of its normal meaning, namely, its face.]

531. Just as the resemblance of the two acts of studying is presented as that of the students, in the same way, through the qualities (resemblance) of the actions, it is the substrata of the means which are conveyed.

[In *brāhmaṇavad adhīte kṣattriyaḥ*, the resemblance between the two actions of studying ends in the resemblance of the two students who accomplish the actions. It is through the act of studying that the two students stand in the relation of standard and object of comparison towards each other. So in *Madhurāvad. adhīte* and *mālīṇvat smarati*, through the resemblance of the two acts of studying and the two acts of remembering, it is the substrata of the means of the two actions which are conveyed. It is through the acts of studying and remembering that their

abode and object respectively stand in the relation of standard and object of comparison towards each other. It is not only the agents which become connected through action. Action is invariably concomitant with means. Thus, the suffix *vati* can be added in cases like : *madhurayā tulyam adhīte, mātṛā tulyaṁ smarati* by P. 5.1.115, and so there is no need for P. 5.1.116.]

532. Between what has been taught in regard to the meaning of *iva* and what has been taught in the previous *sūtra* (i.e. P. 5.1.115), there is no difference if an action-word is used.

[If one thinks that there is a difference between the two cases, it is answered as follows—where an action-word is used. P. 5.1.115 covers the scope of P. 5.1.116. So the latter is not necessary.]

533. Though elsewhere (in P. 3.2.25 for example), the condition (*upādhi*) is not mentioned, here, because of the absence of differentiation (that is, because it is mentioned in a general manner) the particular action is not understood from the suffix and so it has to be mentioned.

[In P. 3.2.25, the suffix 'in' is taught after the root *hr* = to carry, to wear when the latter governs the word *ḍṛti* or *nātha* expressive of the object (*karma*) when that which carries is an animal and so we get the expressions *ḍṛtīhariḥ* = 'that which carries a water-bag made of leather and *nāthahariḥ* = 'that which wears a nose rope'. Here the condition is that that which carries or wears should be an animal, though the word *paśu* is not found in the ready-made word *ḍṛtīhariḥ*, as the suffix expresses it. Here, on the other hand, the condition, namely, that the common property should be an action is mentioned in a very general way in the *sūtra* and so the particular action has to be separately mentioned.]

534. It is like the use of *vi*, *ut* and *pari* in the case of *pucch* or of *su dur* etc. (in the case of *manas*) because of absence of difference in the suffix even though all the meanings in question are included in that of the suffix.

[This is explained by means of an illustration. P. 3.1.20 teaches the suffix *ñi* after the words *pucch*, *bhāṇḍa* and *civara* in the sense of a particular action (*karāṇe*). After the word *pucch*, the particular action may be lifting or turning round, the suffix being capable of expressing both. In order to specify which, the preposition *ut* or *pari* is placed before *pucch* and thus we get *utpucchayate* and *paripucchayate*. Similarly, in P. 3.1.12, the suffix *kyan* is taught after the words *bhīṣa* etc. in the sense of something becoming what it was not (*abhūtatadbhāva*). In the list of words, one finds *abhimanas*, *su-manas* and *durmanas*. Here the suffix is really added to *manas* in the above sense which can have many shades within it. The preposition is prefixed to *manas* in order that it may manifest one of these shades. The suffix being the same, it cannot convey any one of the shades of meaning without the help of the preposition. Similarly, here also, *vati* is taught when action is the common property. To specify which action, a verb has to be used.]

535. Thus the suffix *vati* would come here also through the previous *sūtra*. Whether it be specification (of what is already mentioned in a general way) or fresh mention, there is no difference as far as the use of the verb is concerned.

When *vati* comes by P. 5.1.115 a verb has to be used in order to specify the particular action because the *sūtra* mentions action only in a general way. When it comes by P. 5.1.116, it expresses only resemblance. The word ending in *vati* does not express action even in a general way. So a verb has to be used. Thus in the matter of using a verb, there is no difference at all. Thus P. 5.1.116 is not necessary.]

536. The suffix *vati* is taught again when the resemblance is due to substance etc. When the resemblance is in action only, it would come by the previous *sūtra*.

[The purpose of this *sūtra* is now shown. P. 5.1.115 teaches *vati* when the resemblance is due to action. Therefore, one cannot say *govad gavayaḥ* in the sense of *gavā tulyo gavayaḥ* because the resemblance is not presented as due to action. P. 5.1.116 teaches *vati* in the sense of *iva* = 'resemblance'. Even if the resemblance is due to substance or quality, *vati* can be added by this *sūtra* which is, therefore, necessary.]

537. In cases like *Madhurāyām iva grhāḥ* = 'houses like those in Madhurā,' *brāhmaṇasyeva pāṇḍurāḥ* = white (teeth) like those of a *brāhmaṇa*, where the resemblance is in substance and quality, the suffix *vati* cannot come by the previous *sūtra* (P. 5.1.115).

[When one says that the houses in Pāṭaliputra are studded with precious stones like those in Mathurā, the resemblance is between two substances (houses). When one says that somebody's teeth are white like those of a *brāhmaṇa*, the resemblance is due to quality. In these two cases, the suffix *vati* cannot come by the previous *sūtra* which is restricted to resemblance in action.]

538. If it is held that P. 5.1.116 is for the purpose of excluding the suffix *vati* where the resemblance is due to action, even then it is not necessary. The purpose can be achieved by not mentioning the word *kriyā* = 'action' in the previous *sūtra*.

[If it is accepted that P. 5. 1. 116 is for the sake of teaching *vati* where the resemblance is due to substance or quality, even then it is not necessary. The purpose can be achieved by merely omitting the word *kriyā* in the previous *sūtra*. The

omission would make the teaching of *vati* very general and it could be added even when the resemblance is based on substance or quality.]

539. That the word *Madhurā* would stand for its parts has already been explained before. Similarly, the word *brāhmaṇa* would stand for the teeth which are part of a *brāhmaṇa*.

[It might be argued that P. 5. 1. 116 can be dispensed with only if the suffix can be added to the word *Madhurā* ending in the third case-affix. But it cannot be because the houses are not like *Madhurā*, but like the houses *in* *Madhurā*. So it has to be added to the word *Madhurā* ending in the seventh case-affix, and so a separate *sūtra* is necessary, as the previous *sūtra* contemplates the addition of the suffix ending in the third case-affix only. But this objection is not valid. As shown in verse 530, the word *Madhurā* here means the houses in *Madhurā* which are its parts. So the suffix can be added even when the word ends in the third case-affix.]

Now the need for the *sūtra* is going to be pointed out.

540. Except in relation to an outside word, the sixth case-affix is not taught in association with *iva*. Therefore, the suffix *vati* would come by the previous *sūtra*.

[If the word *kriyā* is not mentioned in the previous *sūtra*, then the suffix would have to be added even when one wishes to say : *gauriva gavayaḥ*. The sixth case-affix is not taught in association with *iva*, except in relation to a totally external word. The word *iva* is connected with a word ending in the first case-affix and not in the sixth case-affix.]

541. In association with the word *tulya*, difference (*ādhikya*) is implied. There the sixth or third case-

affix would result, because the word *tulya* is *vācaka* (expressive).

[But the previous *sūtra* takes *vati* after a word ending in the third case-affix. How can it then be added to a word ending in the first case-affix? The fact is that the word *tulya* denotes something independent and concrete and so when it is connected with a word expressive of substance, what it is connected with becomes something different. Therefore, by P. 2.3.72, the word expressive of it takes either the third or the sixth case-affix, both of which imply difference. But when the synonym *iva* is used, the position is different as follows—]

542. When the word *iva* is used, it is a manifestor (*dyotaka* and not *vācaka*) that is used and so there would be no difference (*ādhikya*) in the standard of comparison without an outside word.

[The word *iva* is used as related to the meaning of another word, it throws light on some peculiarity in it, it has no independent meaning of its own and therefore, does not bring about any difference. So when *iva*, a synonym of *tulya* is used to show resemblance, a case-ending implying difference cannot be used. If the word *kriyā* were not used in the previous *sūtra*, the suffix *vati* would come by that *sūtra* even when *iva* is used. In order that this may not happen, the word *kriyā* must be used in the previous *sūtra*. Thus the purpose of P. 5.1.116 would be to teach *vati* when the resemblance is not due to action. This *sūtra* would not allow *vati* after a word ending in the first case-affix, because the words *tatra* and *tasya* specify that it is to be added only after a word ending in the seventh or sixth case-affix.]

543. The difference which is understood when *iva* is used is due to *prāsāda* (mansion) etc. When *tulya* is used, on the other hand, difference based on its own meaning, is brought about.

[In *Madhurāyām iva pāṭaliputre prāsādāḥ* = the mansions in Pāṭaliputra are like those in Madhurā and in *Devadattasyeva Yajñadattasya dantāḥ* = Yajñadatta's teeth are like those of Devadatta : a difference is understood because of the seventh and sixth case-affixes. This difference is not dependent upon the meaning of *iva*. Irrespective of its meaning, the difference is understood because of the words *prāsāda* and *danta* which are necessarily different from Madhurā and Devadatta where they are found and which are external related objects. The suffix *vati* comes after a word ending in the seventh or the sixth case-affix. The *vati* which is taught in the sense of *tulya* by the previous *sūtra* is taught after a word ending in the third case-affix which implies difference not depending upon an external object but on the meaning of *tulya* itself. Thus there is a clear difference in the scope of the two *sūtras*.]

544. The suffix *vati* would be added when one wants to say; *gavayena samo'naḍvān* = 'the bullock is like a 'gayal' (*gavaya*)'. In *gaur iva*, no difference based on *iva* is understood.

[If the word *kriyā* is not mentioned in the previous *sūtra*, the suffix *vati* would be added even in cases like *gavayena tulyo'naḍvān* = 'the bullock is like a gayal (*gavayaḥ*)', where the resemblance is between two substances. Therefore, the word *kriyā* must be mentioned there. If that is done, then a separate *sūtra* becomes necessary if *vati* is to be used when the resemblance is based on substance or quality. Through the separate *sūtra*, there would be no *vati* in *gavayena tulyo'naḍvān*. As difference based on the meaning of *iva* is not possible and as it depends upon an external object and as there is no such thing here, *vati* cannot be added in this case. Nor can there be *vati* in *gaur iva gavayaḥ*, because difference based on the meaning of *iva* is not possible and there is no outside object here either. As there is no difference there is no sixth case-affix, but only the first case-affix. P. 5.1.116, does not teach *vati* after a word ending in the first case-affix. When there is an outside object as in *goriva gavayasya samsthānam* = 'the shape of a *gavaya* is like

that of a cow', then *vati* is added:—we can say *govat gavayasya samsthānam*.]

545. Before connection with the object of comparison, difference due to external words like *prāsāda* is understood and the case-affix (the seventh or the sixth) comes due to that and not due to the meaning of similarity.

[Once the need for the word *kriyā* in P. 5. 1.115 is established the need for the next rule is also established. The scope of the two rules can be delimited as follows :—In the examples of P. 5.1.116, before connection with the object of comparison (*upameya*) takes place, difference due to *prāsāda* (mansion) and *danta* (teeth) is understood and the case-affixes based on that, namely, the seventh and the sixth come into being and then only does the connection with the meaning of *iva* take place and with the object of comparison to express which the suffix *vati* is added. Thus the case-endings here are due to connection with the external word *prāsāda* and *danta*. They are said to be external because they are different from the words actually involved in the formation of the word. This is not what happens in the previous *sūtra*. There the difference is understood from the meaning of the word *tulya* which is not something external but is included in the word to be formed and the third case-ending is based on that and the suffix *vati* is added to the word ending in that. For the understanding of difference there is no need to resort to an external word. If the word *kriyā* is not mentioned in the previous *sūtra*, the suffix *vati* would come even if the resemblance is due to something else than action as in the sentence *brāhmaṇena tulyaḥ kṣattriyaḥ*. Thus P. 5.1.116 is necessary in order to cover cases where the resemblance is not due to action.]

546. In association with *iva*, the third case-affix is not taught and that is why, even though it is already under consideration, it has been abandoned and another case-affix adopted.

[In P. 5.1.116, the word *iva* indicates the meaning of the suffix. If the third case-affix were taught in the sense of *śeṣa* in association with *iva*, then the suffix *vati* would be added to a word ending in the third case-affix in the sense of *iva*. But P. 2.3.72. does not teach the third case-affix in the sense of *iva*. Because *iva* is only a manifestor (*dyotaka*) and is not expressive of the meaning of *tulya*. Thus when the connection is internal, the third case-affix does not come in association with *iva*. But a case-affix expressive of a *kāraka* relation can come according to the nature of the relation with action. The third case-affix, expressive of a *kāraka* relation does not cover all the case-affixes as the third case-affix expressive of a *śeṣa* relation does as shown before. Therefore, in P. 5.1.116, the third case-affix already mentioned in the previous *sūtra* is abandoned and the sixth and seventh case-affixes, based on a relation with an outside word, are taught. The word *tulya* cannot be connected with them. Therefore, another meaning of *vati* is here indicated through the word *iva*. Therefore, when the connection is internal the previous rule applies, and the present one applies when the connection is with something external. Thus, there is difference in the scope.]

547. The seventh case-affix is also not available in this case. It has been mentioned as a clue. It is desired in the sphere of relation in general, considering that case affixes are restricted to their proper spheres.

[The difference based on connection with an outside word is covered only by the sixth case affix. So the seventh, like the third, is not available here. So it should really not be mentioned. If *vati* is taught only after a word ending in the sixth case-affix, how can cases like *madhurāvat Pāṭaliputre prāsādāḥ* be explained? It is the meaning of the sixth case-affix which comes under *śeṣa*. The meaning of the seventh case-affix is abode (*ādhāra*) which comes under *sādhana*. *Sādhana* and *śeṣa* are opposites. It has been said that what is called *śeṣa* results when no *sādhana* is meant to be conveyed. One cannot

convey *sādhana* and *śeṣa* at the same time. Even if *vati* is added to a word ending in the sixth case-affix, as no particular case-affix is actually seen in a complex formation (*vytti*) and only the relation of standard and object of comparison is understood and as relation in general (*śeṣa*) includes all particular relations the object of comparison can end in the seventh case-affix. The word ending in *vati* denotes only resemblance and as, in ordinary worldly usage, it cannot denote the particular, in the *śāstra* also, it is understood similarly and so *vati* is taught after a word ending in the sixth case-affix expressive of relation in general. As all particulars are included in the general, when the word expressive of the object of comparison is put in the seventh case-affix, then it is meant to be the abode (*adhikaraṇa*) and so the standard of comparison is also the abode. The meaning of the stem, the standard of comparison is subordinate to that of the suffix *vati* and so the particular standard is understood from the object of comparison. That is why it has been declared that any doubt in regard to the standard is dispelled by the object of comparison. But according to this reasoning, the suffix *matuṣ* also need not be taught separately after a word ending in the seventh case-affix, because it would be understood in the way mentioned above. But it is taught separately. The reason is that the meaning of the sixth or the seventh case-affix is the main meaning of a word ending in *matuṣ*. Therefore, the fact of being the abode is understood from the word itself in an expression like *vrkṣavān parvataḥ* = 'a mountain with trees on it.' It is, therefore, natural that the rule teaching *matuṣ* should mention abode (the meaning of the seventh case-affix) separately. When *vati* is added, the meaning of the stem is subordinate and so only resemblance, the meaning of the suffix is understood as the main thing and so it has to be connected with the sixth case-affix which would cover the seventh also. The latter need not, therefore, be separately mentioned. If it is mentioned separately by the word *tatra* (in P. 5.1.116) it is only to serve as a clue (*jñāpaka*). Each case-affix has its own scope and does not encroach upon that of the others. Here the mention of *tatra* separately is a clue that, just as the sixth case-affix is used in connection with

iva, similarly, the seventh case-affix is also used on the basis of connection with an outside word.]

548. If, in such cases, the other case-endings could also be used because of difference (based on an outside word) the third case-affix itself would indicate this deviation (of the case-affixes from their proper sphere).

[The clue relates only to the seventh case-affix. It is only that one which can be used in association with *iva* in the sense of a *śeṣa* relation based upon an outside word. Not all the case-affixes can be so used. If they would be so used, that fact would have been made known through the third case-affix mentioned in P. 5.1.115 and which is already under discussion. The very fact that that has not been done and that the seventh case-affix has been brought in in the next *sūtra* is a proof that the others cannot be so used. That is why one cannot say *devair iva nāma* just as one can say *deveṣviva nāma*.]

549. If the third case-affix is continued, deviation would be certain without the mention of the seventh case-affix. But as the seventh case-affix is mentioned, it shows that the other case-endings are not covered.

550. The sixth case-affix would be set aside in this matter by the seventh which is meant to be a clue. So it is mentioned, so that it may be brought in again.

[Why has the sixth case-affix (*tasya*) been also mentioned in P. 5.1.116? The seventh case-affix (*tatra*) by itself would have been enough because the fact of being the subject-matter (*viśaya*) which is the meaning of the seventh would cover also the meaning of the sixth, so that the latter need not be separately mentioned. To remove this objection, the purpose of mentioning the sixth is now explained. Normally, the seventh case-affix is not used in association with *iva*. The very fact that

it is so taught here shows that normally it does not occur in that sense. If the sixth is not taught because it is covered by the seventh, then where the seventh is not possible, the sixth also would not be possible. But it is desired that the sixth should always be possible in association with *iva* and for that it is necessary to mention it separately in the *sūtra*. It might be argued that if the sixth is not mentioned separately but only the seventh is mentioned, the latter would be alright only as expressive of the abode (*adhikaraṇa*) on the basis of connection with an outside word and not as expressive of *śeṣa*. If the sixth case-affix were also there, one could decide that the seventh is expressive of *śeṣa* because of its association with the sixth. If the sixth is not mentioned at all, the mention of the seventh would not be a clue that it can also be used as expressive of *śeṣa* in association with *iva*. So there is no question of the seventh setting aside the sixth altogether if the latter is not mentioned. Though there is some truth in this argument, the real position is as follows :—The very fact that both the case-affixes are mentioned when one of them would have been enough to cover the other also shows that one of them is only meant to be a clue. It is the seventh which is meant to be a clue because the sixth cannot be used in the sense of the seventh. The suffix *vati* is desired to be added to a word ending in the sixth also. So, in its own sphere, the sixth cannot be set aside. It might be objected that if the mention of the seventh here is a clue, that the seventh here is in the sense of *śeṣa*, then the suffix *vati* cannot be added to a word ending in the seventh expressive of abode, as for instance in *madhurāyām iva pāṭalīputre prāsādāḥ*. If *vati* is added to a word ending in the seventh expressive of *śeṣa*, then the word expressive of the *upameya* cannot end in the seventh. We would have to say *pāṭalīputrasya prāsādāḥ*. Therefore, we have to take the word *tatra* twice in P. 5.1.116. One of them would teach *vati* after a word ending in the seventh expressive of the abode and the other would indicate that the seventh can be used in the sense of *śeṣa*. This is what the Bhāṣyakāra means. Others argue that the relation of abider and abode (*ādhārādheyabhāva*) can be covered by the sixth. So even if the *upameya* is put in the seventh case-affix, the suffix *vati* can be understood to have been

added to a word ending in the sixth. This *sūtra* does not prevent *vati* from being added to a word ending in the *adhikaraṇa-saptamī*. All that it does is to say that the seventh can be used in association with *iva* in the sense of *śeṣa*].

Now something is going to be said about P. 5.1.117.

551. The suffix *vati* in the sense of deserving is already taught by the two previous rules, provided that one adopts another explanatory sentence. One of them is given as an illustration.

[*Rājānam arhati vṛttam* = *rājavad vṛttam*. This has been given as an example of the suffix *vati* taught by P. 5.1.117. In this rule, the word *kriyā* has to be brought from P. 5.1.115. So the suffix *vati* is added to a word ending in the second case-affix in the sense of the agent of the action of deserving, when the agent also is an action. The suffix is added when the agent of the action of deserving, that is, of being worthy (*arhati*) is the action of behaving, that is, conducting oneself. *Rājānam arhati vṛttam* means behaving, conducting oneself, in a manner worthy of a king. This idea is understood even when *rājavad vṛttam* is explained as follows—*rājñā tulyam vartate* = he behaves like a king. If that is so, the suffix *vati* can be explained by P. 5.1.115. In expressions like *rājavad dhairyam* in the sense of *rājānam arhati dhairyam* or *brāhmaṇavad upāśamaḥ* in the sense of *brāhmaṇam arhaty upāśamaḥ*, the suffix *vati* can be explained by P. 5.1.116. As in these two expressions, the resemblance is not in action P. 5.1.115 cannot apply. To say that the courage (*dhairya*) of somebody is worthy of a king is equal to saying that his courage is *like* that of a king. The difference is only in the explanatory sentence and not in the facts. When the Bhāṣya says that the *vati* can be explained by P. 5.1.115, it is only an illustration. All that is meant is that the *vati* taught by P. 5.1.117 can come by other *sūtras* and P.5.1.115. is mentioned as an illustration. It can come by P. 5.1.116 also.]

552. The suffix *vati* of which an action is the qualifier can be added by P. 5.1.115. As to the expres-

sion *rājavad vartate rājā* = 'the king conducts himself as a king', here also it can come when the same thing is differentiated.

[The suffix *vati* of which an action is the qualifier by specifying the meaning of the suffix which has the meaning of *tulya* is already taught by P. 5.1.115. The fact is that *rājānam arhati vṛttam* = 'the conduct befits a king' is equal in meaning to *rājñā tulyam vartate* = 'he behaves like a king'.

But here a doubt may arise : Can the suffix *vati* come by P. 5.1.117 when one wants to say *rājavad vartate rājā* = 'the king conducts himself like a king?' It can come, when the same thing is thought of as two different things.]

How one thing can be thought of as two is now stated.

553. Kings from Pr̥thu to Yudhiṣṭhira, known as model kings are taken as standards of comparison for other kings.

[Ancient kings like Pr̥thu were perfect kings and they are taken as standards of comparison for later inferior kings and one says : *rājavad ayaṁ vartate* = 'this king behaves like a king', that is, the present king behaves like an ancient king. As a present king is capable of behaving in an unworthy manner, he is said to behave like a king when one wants to praise him. Thus differentiation has taken place and comparison is possible.]

554. The difference between the standard and the object of comparison is due to perfection and imperfection. Everywhere the imperfect is compared to the perfect.

[Everywhere the relation of standard and object of comparison is based upon perfection and imperfection. It has already been said that where there is total difference or complete identity there cannot be comparison. Due to clarity and

distinctness, a Brāhmaṇa's recitation is known to be perfect and it becomes the standard for the less perfect recitation of others. Similarly, the royalty of kings like Bharata who ruled over the whole earth was perfect. About any one of them, nobody would say that he behaves like a king. Only about an imperfect king would one say sometimes to praise him that he behaves like a king. Similarly an imperfect Brāhmaṇa would be compared to a perfect one like Vasiṣṭha.]

After having pointed out what is already taught by P. 5.1.115, what is already taught by P. 5.1.116 is now going to be stated.

555. When one wants to say something about the (present) king, one would get the form *rājavad rūpam asya* = 'his (the present) king's beauty is like that of an ancient king (like say, Bharata)' by the second rule which covers cases where the resemblance is not due to action.

[It has been established that P. 5.1.116 is for the purpose of teaching *vati* where the resemblance is not based on action but on substance or quality. Even the next rule cannot bring the suffix *vati* in such cases because it is meant for teaching *vati* when the agent of the action of deserving or being worthy is an action.]

556. When no comparison is meant, a property which acts as the agent of the act of deserving is used for restriction (that is, exclusion of others). For that, the suffix has to be taught again.

[When the word *rājan* is used in the sense of king in general, that is, in the sense of the universal, the relation of standard and object of comparison based on difference is not understood, as no particular is meant. What is meant to be conveyed is that the conduct befits a king and not anybody else. By excluding anything else, the main idea is confirmed.

That is what is conveyed by an expression like *rājavad idam vṛttam vartate* = 'This conduct befits that of a king'.]

557. The expression *kṛtahastavat* = 'as befits a practised hand', is used only in regard to well-known persons. Similarly, one says *rājavad* in regard to a person who is well-known as a model king.

[Even when one of the ancient model kings is mentioned, there need not be any idea of comparison. The word *kṛtahasta* means a practised hand. Arjuna and others are known to be such. About him, one can say: *ciccheda kṛtahastavat* = 'he cut like a practised hand.' Here no comparison is meant between Arjuna and somebody else. All that is meant to be conveyed is that he did the job in an excellent manner, worthy of his training. Similarly in *Pāṇḍor vidura ! rājavad pretakāryāṇi kāraya* = oh Vidura ! get the funerals of Pāṇḍu performed as befit a king'. There is no comparison of Pāṇḍu with anybody else. All that is meant is that the funerals should be performed as befit a king.]

The exact scope of P. 5.1.117 is now stated.

558. Those qualities which are absolutely impossible in one who is not a king, they are restricted to a king. Those which deviate are abandoned.

[When it is intended to emphasise those qualities which are found in a king only, then the suffix *vati* is used for the purpose of restriction. Restriction usually implies exclusion of others. There is a two-way restriction: (1) the conduct befits a king only. (2) only the conduct befits a king. The *Bhāṣya* further means that the agent of the act of deserving is an action, a mode of behaviour, a conduct. When such an agent is meant to be different from other agents then the suffix *vati* is added by this rule. That action or conduct befits the meaning of the word ending in the second case-affix. In *rājavad rūpam* = 'beauty like that of a king' *rājavad dhairyam* = 'courage like that of a king,' the suffix *vati* comes by the previous rule. It cannot come by this rule because this teaches *vati* when the agent of deserv-

ing is an action. So the conclusion is this: Where the difference is meant, the suffix comes by the previous rule. Where no difference is meant, no comparison is involved and the effect aimed at is restriction, the suffix comes by P. 5.1.117.]

559. When the agent of the action of befitting is an action, then the *vati* is desired and not when the agent is something else as in *rājānam arhati cchatram* = 'the umbrella befits the king'.

[By P. 5.1.117, the suffix can come only when the agent of the action of befitting is an action and not a substance. So we cannot have it in *rājānam arhaty etad vāsaḥ* = 'this dress befits a king', *rājānam arhaty eṣa kamaṇḍaluḥ* = 'this water-jug befits a king', because what is intended cannot be conveyed.]

560. The *Śāstra* explains the formation of words actually used. If this rule is meant to allow *vati* even when the agent is umbrella etc., the (former) rejection would become invalid.

[Grammar only teaches the forms which are actually used. The suffix *vati* is not used when the agent of the action of befitting is a substance because the intended meaning would not be conveyed. There is no point in explaining the formation of what is not used. Secondly, if the *vati* can come even when the agent is not an action but a substance, then the reason given before for rejecting this rule would become invalid.]

561. In other systems of grammar no rule corresponding to *tad arham* (P. 5.1.117) has been taught, because even here there can be comparison by artificially postulating difference.

[Those who follow the schools of Āpiśali and Kāśakṛtsna have no *sūtra* corresponding to P. 5.1.117. The author of the *Bhāṣya* often says in his own words what he has understood from other systems. What is not rejected in the other systems must be understood as approved. Why have the other Ācāryas

not included a rule corresponding to this in their systems? It is because, according to them, the *vati* can come in these cases also by the previous *sūtras*, as in these cases also there can be comparison by artificially postulating difference.]

562. When an action, to be done in a case, is thought of as having the same feature as one done previously and, therefore, well-known, a difference is mentally postulated.

[In *ciccheda kṛtahastavat* = 'you cut off, like a practised hand', the suffix *vati* can be explained by the previous *sūtras*. What it means is this:—Just as you cut off neatly in a previous fight because of practice, in the same way, on another occasion also, you would act in a similar manner. Here, though the agent is the same, he is thought of as two as he acts at two different times. The previous one, already known, becomes the standard and the later one, not yet known, becomes the object of comparison. In this explanation, the *vati* comes by P. 5.1.115. In the same way, in *rājavat pāṇḍoḥ pretakāryāṇi kāraya* = 'get the funerals of Pāṇḍu done as in the case of previous kings', what was done before and, therefore, well-known becomes the standard of comparison for what is yet to be done and, therefore, not done.]

563. If the rule is there, the suffix *vati* would come in such a case but association with the word *iva* is not possible (unless there is difference).

[It has to be understood in the manner stated above. The suffix *vati* may come as it is taught in a rule, but association with the word *iva* is not possible unless there is difference.]

564. In the hymn addressed to Indra, the expression *dasyuhā indra iva* = like Indra, the dasyu-killer, has been used when what is meant is: like the Indra whose action on a previous occasion is known.

[One sees elsewhere also the use of *iva* in connection with an artificial difference. In 'indra iva dasyuhā bhava' the word *iva* shows the relation of standard and object of comparison on the basis of artificial difference. In this sentence, the object of comparison is also Indra. What the sentence means is : as you destroyed *dasyus* before, become their slayer now also. Indra who is known to have done something on a previous occasion is desired to do the same thing on another occasion. The unknown Indra is compared to the known. Thus a difference within the same thing is brought about.]

565. One expresses oneself similarly when one says 'you are like yourself' by referring to a later age in relation to an earlier age.

[One sees a person of a mature age compared to the same person at a younger age in the expression—you are like yourself. A difference is assumed within the same person and the two are compared.]

566. Where a really different object is not available as standard of comparison, the object of comparison is itself used as the standard in order to bring out its incomparability. A well-known example is : *rāmarāvaṇayor yuddhaṃ rāmarāvaṇayor iva* = Rāma-Rāvaṇa fight is like Rāma-Rāvaṇa fight. The expression : *rājēva tvaṃ rājā* can be explained in this manner. If so, the *vati* would come by the previous rule and so the present rule (P. 5.1.117) is unnecessary.

567. Even, real difference depends upon the mind. So, in this matter, there is no difference or identity.

[It might be objected that when what is really different is available, why should what is only artificially so be made the

basis for the addition of the suffix ? The fact is that even real difference can do nothing unless it is grasped by the mind. In verbal usage, what the mind conceives is what really matters. Whether the difference is real or not is immaterial.]

It is now stated that on this point there is support from the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*.

568. On the basis of what figures in the mind, describing him through causes of differentiation like the wearing of armlets and ear-rings, Caitra has been said to be like that.

[While pointing out the difference between *upadeśa* (direct instruction) and *uddeśa* (indirect description), the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 1.3.2. describes distant Devadatta as “wearing armlets and ear-rings, broad-chested, having long reddish eyes and muscular arms, Devadatta is like that.” Here Devadatta is not said to be like somebody else. He is said to be like somebody who figures in the mind of the speaker as possessing these attributes. It is Devadatta himself who so figures in the mind. So it is clear that the relation of the standard and object of comparison is based on what figures in the mind.]

569. The object is understood as agreeing with the image produced in the mind by these words.

[What happens in this kind of description is this. The speaker wants to say : “Understand that object seen by you in the outside world to be Devadatta by seeing which there arises in your mind an image having the properties described by the words: ‘wearing armlets and ear-rings’ etc.” In this way, a kind of identification takes place between what figures in the mind and what is seen outside.]

570. Operations based on difference are understood through difference made by the mind. All meanings of words seem to be created by the intention of the speaker.

[It is now stated that everywhere it is artificial difference which is useful. In Grammar, whatever operation is based on difference is carried out on the basis of difference created by the mind. The treatment of something as a particular *kāraka* is based on the intention of the speaker. The fact is that words take their form on the basis of notions brought by the intention of the speaker irrespective of whether there is anything corresponding to it outside or not. Words mean what the speaker intends them to mean. Though *Kaṃsa* and others have been dead and gone, they acquire a kind of present existence when they are pictured in the mind and what is pictured in the mind is further thought of as the agent (*prayojaka*) and the object of action (*prayojya*), one gets expressions like : *Kaṃsaṃ ghātayati* = 'he is getting *Kaṃsa* killed', *Balim Bandhayati* = 'he is getting *Bali* bound'.]

571. Where cognitions are differentiated in regard to an external object, even existing resemblance in it is not perceived.

[In regard to objects which are grasped as different from one another, as long as some common property is not perceived, cognitions relate to differentiation and so even existing resemblance is ignored by the perceiver.]

572. Even when the object is totally different, as long as it is not cognised, recognition of it as the same is not prevented in the case of anybody.

[Even when the object is totally different, if it is not so cognised, only the common property is grasped and so the cognition of identity follows. When an object is seen in poor light or from a distance, distinctions are not perceived and one remembers only what had been seen before and so one identifies it. Even when the object is near and the light is good, former impressions are aroused quickly and one recognises the object as the one seen before.]

573. It is this difference which is shown separately by the *sūtra* (P. 5.1.117). Even though already

taught (by the previous rule), being difficult, the unintelligent understands (through this rule).

[As the relation of standard and object of comparison can be based on difference created by the mind, the *vati in rājavad vṛttam*, can be explained by the previous *sūtra*. So P. 5.1.117 has been given only for the benefit of the less intelligent. This rule tells us that this difference created by the mind is different from the real one. The *śāstra* has to serve everybody. The explanation of *rājavat* as *rājānam arhati* is for the benefit of the less intelligent.]

574. A grammarian does not always talk like a grammarian. Therefore, even he is told: 'Talk like a grammarian'.

[One does see the same thing becoming the standard as well as the object of comparison. So even the unintelligent should not have any difficulty in understanding. When a grammarian talks incorrectly like a villager, he is told : 'Talk like a grammarian', (*vaiyākaraṇavad brūṣva*). Here the same person is the standard as well as the object of comparison.]

575. Some men speak like women and some women speak like men. Where there is deviation, one's own norm is again asked to be followed.

[When somebody deviates from his norm, he is advised to observe the norm. A man who speaks like a woman is told to speak like a man and vice-versa. In this admonition to speak according to one's norm, the person spoken to is the object of comparison and the person like whom he is asked to speak, that is, the standard of comparison is also himself. So one and the same thing becomes both.]

576. When one says in the world, 'you are like yourself,' the possibility of another standard of comparison is excluded.

[The expression : *sadr̥śas tvam tava* = 'You are like yourself', is used when one wants to praise somebody by excluding other standards of comparison. Thus, everywhere, the same thing can become both. That is why there is no rule corresponding to P. 5.1.117 in the other systems of grammar. In the Pāṇinian system also, where comparison is meant, this rule is considered unnecessary. The two previous ones would do.]

577. The rule *tadarham* (P. 5.1.117) is taught when no comparison is meant, when the meaning meant to be conveyed (by *rājavat*) is : 'suitable, appropriate' to the king.

[This rule is not necessary if comparison is meant. But when suitability or appropriateness is meant to be conveyed, it is needed, and the absence of something corresponding to it in the other systems of grammar only shows their incompleteness. Even in *vaiyākaraṇavad brūhi*, if appropriateness, not comparison, is meant, the suffix can come by P. 5.1.117.]

578. The remaining teaching concerning *vati*, being connected with what was the subject-matter is now stated. Because of its connection with the standard of comparison, the suffix *vati* was considered in this section.

579. As a word is taken in its secondary sense if the primary sense is not suitable, when the suffix *vati* is taught after a preposition, the word *dhātu* clearly stands for the meaning of a *dhātu*.

[In P. 5.1.118, the word *dhātvarthe* is used. The necessity of the word *artha* is questioned, considering that even without it, its meaning would be understood, because no suffix can be added to express a root which is only a word and not a meaning.

580. In P. 5.1.118, the words *svam rūṣam* make known to us that, like the form, the meaning is

also to be taken. Therefore here (in P. 5.1.118), from the word *dhātu*, its meaning which is near to it would be understood.

[Why the meaning of a *dhātu* would be necessarily understood even if the bare word *dhātau* had been used in the rule is now explained. Like its form, its meaning is also very near to a word. This is clear by the use of the words *svam rūpam* in P. 1.1.68. Two things are very near to a word, its form and its meaning. Both are its *svam*. If the word *svam* only had been used, one could understand either from it. If it is intended to exclude meaning, it is necessary to use the word *rūpa* also, in order to specify what is meant.]

581. From this rule one understands that the means, as such, is made by the root, that is, it is brought about by the meaning of a root (that is, action.)

[Just as the word *rūpam* has been deliberately used in P. 1.1.68, in the same way, the word *artha* has been deliberately used in P. 5.1.118. In the compound *dhātvartha* of this rule, the word *kṛta* has been elided. *Dhātvartha* means *dhātukṛto' rthaḥ*. The word *kṛtaḥ* has been elided. The word *dhātu* means *kriyā*=action. *Dhātukṛto' rthaḥ* means something brought about by action. The elision of *kṛta* in the compound is according to P. 2.1.72. What is brought about by action is *sādhana*=the means. It is action which makes something a means. Nothing is a means except in relation to an action. If something becomes a means, it is due to the action in the accomplishment of which it plays a part. The conclusion is that P. 5.1.118 means that, in the Vedas, the suffix *vati* is added to a preposition in the sense of the means to an action.]

582. Where a word is not used because of its meaning being understood, one speaks of its elision (*lopa*) as it is not seen (heard) in its sphere.

[What is meant by elision of the second term (*kṛta*) is now explained. It is difficult to avoid the use of a word if its meaning has to be conveyed. But if its meaning is somehow understood, it is not used and then it is said to be elided. The word *dhātu* means an action. What is caused by action is also called *dhātu*. Thus what is caused by action becomes *dhātvartha*. It is the means (*sādhana*). Thus, by taking *dhātvartha* as a compound coming under the group *mayūravyaṁsakādi* (P. 2.1.72.), the word means *sādhana*. So P. 5.1.118 means : “the suffix *vati* is added in the Vedas to a preposition (having the meaning of *sādhana*) and is indicative of the meaning of the stem itself (*svārthe*). The compound *dhātvartha* can be taken as a *bahuvrihi*. It would then be analysed thus : *dhātuḥ kriyā arthaḥ prayojanaṁ yasya sa dhātvarthaḥ*, “that is called *dhātvartha* the purpose of which is to help in the accomplishment of the action”. This again amounts to *sādhana*.]

583. The suffix *vati* is taught in the same meaning (*svārthe*) as that of the preposition *pra* etc. which are expressive of action, means and substance.

[Because of the use of the word *artha*, one gets *sādhana* (means) as the meaning of the prepositions and consequently of the suffix *vati* which is added to them. Even though theoretically *sādhana* is only a power in grammar, and not a *sattva* and therefore, a word ending in *vati* can only be an indeclinable incapable of taking gender and number, in reality the word formed with this *vati* is not an indeclinable, because by *sādhana* what is meant is concrete substance (*dravya*) which is the substratum of power. Therefore, the word ending in *vati* which has the same meaning as the preposition to which it is added, namely, action, means and substance, is not an indeclinable and does take gender and number.

584. *Pra* etc. without the suffix (*vati*) is not used in that sense. When the word (formed with *vati*) is analysed, a division in the meaning is indicated.

It is true that ordinarily prepositions like *pra* when found in a sentence, are expressive of action with some peculiarity in it. In this matter, one has to follow the natural power of words according to which when *pra* etc. occur in a sentence, they cannot express substance but when they are part of a compound they are capable of doing so. *Ud-vataḥ* means *ud-gatāni* and *ni-vataḥ* means *nigatāni*. The stem *ud*, or *ni* means substance to which action and power are subordinate and the suffix *vati* stands for the same meaning (*svārthe*) as the stem. All this is made known by the use of the word *artha* in P. 5.1.118. If the *sūtra* had only *dhātau* in it, it would first convey action and then the power to accomplish it, always associated with it. But as the word used is *dhātvarthe*, it means substance which is identical with its power, whether we take it as a *tatpuruṣa* or as a *bahuvrīhi*.]

585. If power (*sādhana*) is understood as pure power and not associated with substance, then the word would be devoid of the case-endings like words ending in *tasīl* etc.

[If, by *sādhana*, only power were meant, the word ending in *vati* would express power only and so the different case-endings, all expressive of different powers, cannot be added to it, because power cannot be added to power. Secondly, the word would always end in the singular number. Thus the word would become an indeclinable which is not desired. Because of the use of the word *artha*, the meaning is not power only but substance to which action and power are subordinate. So the word ending in *vati* is expressive of concrete substance and is capable of taking all genders and numbers.]

586. Those who consider words ending in *vati* to be indeclinable because of their inclusion (in the *svarādi* group) would have to make special provision for the retention of case-endings in *udvataḥ*.

[It might be said that as words ending in *vati* are taught in the *svārādi* group, they must be looked upon as indeclinables. If that is so, then the case-endings expressive of gender and number would have to be elided but that is not desired. So provision would have to be made for the non-elision of the case-endings in *udvataḥ*.]

587. The suffixes *nañ* and *snañ* do not cover the meaning of *vati*, because the form *pumvat* is actually seen (in P. 6.3.34) This ready-made form (*nipātana*). sets aside the exception (taught in P. 4.1.80.)

[Now the addition of *vati* to the stems *strī* and *pumān* is explained. P. 4.1.87 says that the suffixes *nañ* and *snañ* should be added to the stems *strī* and *pumān* in all the meanings mentioned up to P. 5.2.1. The meaning in which *vati* is taught comes within this limit. So, after these two words, *vati* would be set aside by *nañ* and *snañ*. Then the forms *strīvat* and *pumvat* would remain unprovided for. So the *vārttika* says that *vati* should be allowed to be added to these two words. The *M. Bhā.* however, says that it is not necessary because the very fact that Pāṇini uses the word *pumvat* in P. 6.3.34 shows that *vati* sets aside *nañ* and *snañ* and not the other way.]

588. The suffix *nañ* and *snañ*, pass without touching it, the meaning of *vati*. If they were applicable, the original rule (P. 5.1.118) would be set aside.

[It has been established in the *śāstra* that ready-made forms (*nipātana*) given by Pāṇini in his rules, can set aside relevant rules. So *pumvat* in P. 6.3.34 sets aside P. 4.1.87.]

589. The indication (furnished by the use of the ready-made word *pumvat* (by Pāṇini) is interpreted to mean that the whole of the rule which teaches *nañ* and *snañ* does not cover the section which teaches *vati* (that is, three rules).

[How the form *strīvat* is also correct is now explained. P. 4.1.87 does not cover the meanings mentioned in P. 5.1.115, 116 and 117. The use of the word *puṇvat* by Pāṇini is an indication that the whole of P. 4.1.87 does not cover the meaning of *vati*. So *vati* is added to the stem *strī* also, as that is also included in P. 4.1.87.]

590. The standard of comparison, while remaining one, serves many objects of comparison, just as (in ritual) change of number of the standard of comparison is not done any more than that of the *aṅgas*.

[The suffix *vati* has been considered. Now another question is raised. When many objects of comparison are connected with one standard of comparison, does the latter also become many, following the number of the objects of comparison? The answer is that it does not. Remaining one, it serves all the objects of comparison. To strengthen this point, Bhartṛhari points out that in Vedic ritual, the number of the *aṅga*, mentioned in connection with the original (*prakṛti*) *yāga* is not changed for the *vikṛtiyāga*, because it is understood from the changed number of the *aṅgin*. Similarly, the number of the standard of comparison mentioned in connection with the *prakṛtiyāga* is not changed for the *vikṛtiyāga*.]

591. In connection with the offering (*caru*) consecrated with *gavedhu* grass, one sees the use of the singular number for the standard of comparison of the two objects of comparison, namely, *govikarta* and *akṣavāpa* in the sentence: "these two (killers of) animals are like Rudra.

[Another analogy is now given from Vedic ritual. In the Veda, in regard to the offering consecrated with the grass called *gavedhu*, it has been stated that *govikarta* and *akṣavāpa* are like Rudra. Here two objects of comparison are connected with one

standard of comparison, namely, Rudra. This also shows that one *upamāna* can serve many *upameyas*.]

592. If the standard of comparison becomes many, then the suffix *añ* would be expressive of the plural and then, even in the sense of images, there would be elision of the suffix *añ* in *Kāśyapa* (resulting in the form *Kāśyapāḥ*.)

[If the number of the standard of comparison follows that of the objects of comparison, there would be an undesirable consequence. According to P. 5.3.99,100, the form *Kāśyapaḥ* results in the sense of images of *Kāśyapa*, showing the elision (*lup*) of *kan* taught by P. 5.3.96. Here *Kāśyapa* is the standard of comparison and the images are the objects of comparison. If the standard of comparison is more than one because the images are many, then there would be elision of the suffix *añ* in *Kāśyapa* according to P. 2.4.64. and then we would get *Kāśyapāḥ* and not *kāśyapāḥ* in the sense of images of *Kāśyapa*. But *Kāśyapāḥ* is wrong. The correct form is *Kāśyapāḥ*. So the word *Kāśyapa* ending in *añ* and denoting the standard of comparison must be taken as ending in the singular number. In other words, the standard of comparison remains one even if the objects of comparison are many.]

593. In this way, there would be singular number according to the number of the stem (taught in P. 1.2.51). Perhaps when the word formed refers to a human being, the elision of the suffix (*lup*) is taught in order that only the gender of the stem is retained.

[Here it might be objected that if the suffix *kan* taught in P. 5.3.96. is elided by P. 5.3.99. (*lup*), then the resulting word should have the gender and number of the stem by P. 1.2.54, we should then get the form *Kāśyapaḥ* even when the images are many. That would, of course, be incorrect. The fact is that, according to the *Vārttikakāra*, the *lup* of the suffix expressive

of image is taught in order that the gender of the stem may be retained by P. 1.2.51 but not its number. The number of the image will prevail and not that of the stem, that is of the original. That is how we get *cañceva manuṣyau cañce*. Here we have the gender of the original and the number of the images.]

594. When the objects of comparison are many and one standard of comparison serves them all, then always the gender and number of the stem prevail.

[When P. 1.2.51 extends both the gender and number of the stem to the word where *luṣ* has taken place, how can gender alone be extended here? The position is this: when there are many images all of which are objects of comparison, there are two possibilities: either one standard of comparison serves all of them or there is a separate standard of comparison for each. If there is only one standard of comparison and the images are many, then P. 1.2.51, operates.]

595. When there is a separate standard of comparison for each object of comparison, there arise many words each ending in a *taddhita* suffix, because of the plurality of the external object.

[When there are many objects of comparison and a separate standard of comparison for each, then for each object of comparison, that is for each image, a separate word will be formed and that word will be *Kāśyapa*, with the *luṣ* (elision) of the suffix *kan* taught in P. 5.3.99. and with the gender and number according to P. 1.2.51, that is, masculine gender and singular number. The same process will take place for the second image, the third image and so on. Each time the word *Kāśyapa* will be formed. Thus, if there are, say, ten images, there will be ten words. Then P. 1.2.64 will operate and we will get the form *Kāśyapāḥ*, standing for all the ten images. At this stage P. 1.2.51, cannot apply because it has already been applied once. So there cannot be any singular number, based on the original singular number of the stem.]

596. Just as a word expressive of several *dvigu* words like *pañcapūli* gets the plural number (*pañcapūlyah*) in the same way, when there is a plurality of words ending in a *sup* suffix, there is plural number.

[Here it might be said that even when *ekaśeṣa* takes place according to P. 1.2.64 it is the meaning of the elided suffix (*kan*) which attains plurality and so P. 1.2.51 should apply. This is explained by means of an analogy. We have the expression *pañca pūlāḥ samāhṛtāḥ pañcapūli*=five bundles collected together are called *pañcapūli*. This is a *dvigu* compound and it is in the singular number according to P. 2.4.1. But when we want to refer to several such collections, we get the expression *pañcapūli ca pañcapūli ca pañcapūli ceti pañcapūlyah*, according to P. 1.2.64. This plural number cannot be set aside by P. 2.4.1. *Pañcapūli* is a *dvigu* but not *pañcapūlyah* which is *ekaśeṣa* of several *pañcapūli* words. An *ekaśeṣa* is different from *dvigu* and so P. 2.4.1. does not apply to the former. Similarly, an *ekaśeṣa* of several *lubanta* words is not a *lubanta* word. So P. 1.2.51 cannot apply to such an *ekaśeṣa*.]

597. When the collections are many, the total number of bundles is also many. Nor does one see any difference in meaning whether the words ending in *luṣ* (involve one *upamāna* or more).

[This analogy is questioned by some. From the word *pañcapūli*, the meaning of the *dvigu* compound is understood, namely the idea of collection of five bundles. It is not the same idea which is understood, from the word *pañcapūlyah*. From this word, the idea of collection of five quintuplets is not understood. From the former word, one understands an object qualified by the number five. From the latter, one understands at least three objects, each consisting of five items. The chief difference is that, from the latter, one does not understand a collection at all, because it is an *ekaśeṣa* and not a *dvigu* compound. While this can be said about the word *pañcapūlyah*, brought in for the sake of analogy the same thing cannot be said about the word *Kāśyapāḥ*.

which is the subject of discussion. Whether each object of comparison, the image, is compared to a separate standard of comparison and then an *ekaśeṣa* is made of all the words so formed or whether all the objects of comparison are compared to one single standard of comparison, the same meaning is understood in both cases. As there is no difference in meaning, the meaning of *luṇ* is present even when an *ekaśeṣa* is made of all the words made at first separately. Therefore P. 1.2.51 would apply and the resulting word would have the singular number of the stem, that is, the *yukta*. It might be said that there is a difference in meaning as follows—If each image is compared to a separate standard of comparison and the plural number comes through *ekaśeṣa*, then each image is compared to Kāśyapa. But if many images are compared to a single standard of comparison then one Kāśyapa would be the standard for all. It is true that there is this much difference. But it is the image which is the meaning of *luṇ* that attains plurality and not any other meaning, and so P. 1.2.51 should apply. If it is applied, there would be singular number. Therefore the form *Kāśyapāḥ* has to be justified in some other way.]

598. Where another word expressive of the object of comparison is not used, then, according to some, the plurality of the standard of comparison is desired.

[The other way is now explained. Where no word other than the one ending in *luṇ* and denoting the object of comparison, the image is used, there the standard of comparison *Kāśyapa* attains plurality, that is, there are many standards of comparison. If the word expressive of the object of comparison is used, the idea of plurality would be understood from that itself and one standard of comparison would serve all the objects of comparison. For example in *Kāśyapa iva Devadatta-Yajñadatta-Viṣṇumitrā imā pratikṛtayaḥ* = these images of Devadatta Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra are like Kāśyapa. But if the word expressive of the object of comparison is not used as when the mere word *Kāśyapa* is used, a doubt arises as to whether it is

the standard of comparison of one image or of more than one. If it is the standard of comparison of more than one, then its singular number can be justified by P. 1.2.51. Therefore, in order to indicate, the plurality of the objects of comparison, the word *Kāśyapa*, having become the standard of comparison attains plurality, and we can say *Kāśyapāḥ pratikṛtayaḥ*.]

599. It is like the use of the singular number when the things to be cooked are mentioned and the use of the dual and the plural numbers when they are not mentioned.

[An illustration is now given. *Guḍa-tila-taṇḍulānām pākāḥ*= the cooking of jaggery, sesame and rice, *tāmraḥ palāśeṣu babhūva rāgaḥ*= the colour of the *palāśa* leaves became red. In such sentences, even though because of the plurality of the things to be cooked, the cooking is also understood as being more than one, the word *pāka* is put in the singular number. When words indicative of the plurality of the things to be cooked or of the substrata of the red colour are not used and only the word *pāka* or *rāga* is used, a doubt arises as to whether the cooking relates to one thing only or to many and whether the colour has only one substratum or more than one. In order to resolve the doubt, one has to use the dual or the plural case endings.]

600. The diversity of what is connected is understood when words expressive of what is connected are used. That is why the diversity of the object of comparison (the image) is not understood.

[What is in itself one and not diversified becomes diversified when connected with diverse things and words expressive of them are used, just as cooking is when words denoting jaggery etc. are used. Where words expressive of connected things are not used, then the diversification of cooking etc. is not understood. Similarly, when words expressive of the images are

not used, then the diversification of the object of comparison is not understood. In that case, the standard of comparison has to be put in the plural, so that the plurality of the objects of comparison may be understood.]

601. In order to prevent it from becoming a common word, the diversity of the objects of comparison is seen in the standards of comparison.

[When the mere word *Kāśyapa* is used, the meaning understood may be 'offspring of *Kāśyapa*' and not necessarily 'the image of *Kāśyapa*'. Even if a connection with the standard of comparison is understood, one would understand an object of comparison which is common to one or more standards of comparison. So the word expressive of it would become a word expressive of a common characteristic. In order to prevent that and in order that the diversity of the object of comparison may be understood, the standard of comparison assumes diversity.]

602. Sometimes one standard of comparison is used for many objects of comparison and sometimes, each of the many objects of comparison is compared to a different standard of comparison.

[These are the two possibilities. The first one is now going to be illustrated.]

603. Where many elephants resemble one Garuḍa, then, in regard to the particular way of arraying them (*vyūha*) the word *Garuḍa* is used.

[A particular way of arranging many elephants is called *garuḍa*, the name of the bird used by Viṣṇu as his transport. Similarly, a particular disposition of horses is called *makara* (a crocodile). A particular disposition of bricks is called *śyena* (hawk). In these cases the things are many and yet the word

expressive of the disposition is put in the singular number. *Garuḍa* is the standard of comparison and it is not the elephants which are compared to it, but the way in which they are arrayed for battle. When one says : “these elephants are like *garuḍas*”, each elephant becomes the object of comparison and not the way of arraying them.]

604. The different images might be understood as similar to one *Kāśyapa*. Therefore, it (the standard of comparison) is connected with each object of comparison.

[*Kāśyapa iva imāḥ pratikṛtayaḥ Kāśyapāḥ* = these images are *Kāśyapāḥ* because they are like *Kāśyapa*. Here the singular number is used after the word expressive of the standard of comparison. One might, therefore, understand that, just as the elephants are similar to *Garuḍa* when arranged in his shape, in the same way, the many images are similar to *Kāśyapa* because of some shape or mode of being in him. One would not understand that for each image, *Kāśyapa* is the standard of comparison. In order that it may be understood, the word *Kāśyapa* must be connected with each image, the object of comparison, separately. Before, it was said that when the word expressive of the object of comparison is not used, the standard of comparison becomes diversified, in order that the diversity of the object of comparison may be understood. Here it is stated that, when the word expressive of the object of comparison is used, the standard of comparison, being separate in each case, it is presented as many from the very beginning, in order that one may understand that each object of comparison is compared to a separate standard of comparison.]

605. When one says : ‘the clouds are like a mountain’, they (the clouds) are jointly understood as resembling a single mountain. Each one is in a different position.

[A more well-known example of one standard of comparison serving several objects of comparison is now given. From the sentence : *Śaila ivāmi valāhakāḥ* = "These clouds are like a mountain" one understands that the clouds, taken together are like a mountain and not each one separately. Each cloud is not like a mountain, but taken together they are so. The word expressive of the standard of comparison is in the singular number and it serves several objects taken together. When the words expressive of the objects of comparison are actually used, there is not one combined object of comparison. In order that one may understand that each object of comparison is connected with a separate standard of comparison, *Kāśyapa*, the standard of comparison, assumes plurality, from the very beginning. That is why the word *Kāśyapāḥ* is put in the plural.]

606. As *cha* is taught by this very *sūtra*, it is not to *cha* that the word *tad* in P. 5.3.106 refers. In *kāka-tāliyam*, what is well-known determines something else.

[As the standard of comparison is the topic under discussion, something is going to be said about P. 5.3.106 which teaches the suffix *cha* after a compound expressive of the standard of comparison. The word *tad* in the *sūtra* cannot refer to the suffix *cha*. If it did, the *sūtra* would mean that the suffix *cha* comes after a compound which cannot be formed otherwise than for adding *cha*. This is what is meant by saying that the compound is *chaviṣaya*. But this interpretation is not right. It is this very *sūtra* which teaches *cha*. No previous *sūtra* has taught *cha* after a compound. So no *chaviṣaya* compound is available to which the suffix *cha* may be added. Secondly, if a compound is already *chaviṣaya*, there is no point in teaching *cha* after it.]

607. Whether a compound like *rājāśva* is within the scope of *cha* or some other is not clear. Therefore, before the suffix *cha* is taught, there is nothing which bears the name (*chaviṣaya*).

[If *tad* refers to the suffix *cha*, it is not clear which compound would be considered to be *chaviṣaya*, so that the suffix may be added to it. If a compound becomes *chaviṣaya* by merely becoming the stem for adding *cha*, then any compound would become so and there would be no point in teaching *cha*, after a compound which is *chaviṣaya*. So one has to understand that the word *tad* refers to something else than *cha*. *Tadviṣayāt* cannot mean *chaviṣayāt* merely because *cha* is the main thing here as it is taught by the *sūtra*. If *tad* cannot refer to the main thing, one must take it as referring to what is only secondary, in this case, the meaning of *cha*, that is the meaning of *iva*. But how can the *prakṛti* of the suffix *cha* be the *viṣaya* of the meaning of the suffix? This is possible only by postulating two functions for the meaning of *iva*. One function is to qualify the meaning of the *prakṛti* and the other function is to be the meaning of the suffix. The *sūtra* would then mean that the suffix *cha* having the meaning of *iva* is added to a compound formed in the sense of *iva*. But it might be said : if the compound is already qualified by the meaning of *iva*, how can the suffix having the meaning of *iva* be added to it? It cannot be added merely because there is a rule to that effect, because, then, it can be added to a compound like *śaṣṭrīṣyāmā* which also involves the meaning of *iva*.]

608. Both the meanings of *iva* are based on meaning. One of them is connected with the part and the other with the suffix *cha*.

[What the two functions of the meaning of *iva* are is now explained. In compounds like *kākatālīyam*, two meanings of *iva* are understood. One of them is connected with each term of the compound, namely, *kāka* and *tāla*. The compound conveys that and in that sense, it is *ivārthaviṣaya*. Or one might say that the compound which is the stem of the suffix *cha* can be looked upon as a part in relation to the full word formed with *cha*. That compound is connected with the meaning of the word *iva* through its parts and not directly. The suffix *cha* is connected with the other meaning of the word *iva*. In *śaṣṭrī-*

śyāmā, on the other hand, just as Devadattā is compared to a dagger whose darkness is well-known, so is another *upameya* and so the *upamāna*, namely, *śastrī*, does not depend upon a particular *upameya*. So there is only one meaning of *iva*.

609. The arrival of Caitra is like the arrival of the crow and the arrival of the bandit is like the falling of the *tāla* tree.

[The meaning of *iva* which is connected with the part is now explained. In *kākatālīyam*, the coming of the crow is the standard of comparison and that of *Caitra* the object of comparison. Similarly, the falling of the *tāla* is the standard and the arrival of the bandit the object of comparison. The common quality in both is the fact of happening unexpectedly. This is expressed by the compound to which *cha* is added.]

610. The suffix *cha* is intended to express that other action like murder etc. which is produced as the object of comparison when the two come in contact.

[The meaning of *iva* which is expressed by the suffix *cha* is now explained. When the crow and the *tāla* tree come in contact, some other event results, namely killing or breaking of limbs, cracking of bones or whatever else one might choose to say. With that event is compared the murder of Caitra by the bandit. In the second meaning of *iva* involving the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya*, the suffix *cha* is taught.]

611. The word expressive of substance denotes the action which inheres in it. The words *kāka* and *tāla* stand for the actions of coming and falling.

[The arrival of the crow is the standard of comparison for the arrival of Caitra, not mentioned in the compound. Similarly, the falling of the *tāla* tree is the standard for the coming of the bandit which is also not mentioned in the compound. In

other words *kāka* and *tālā* are not connected with each other at all. How can they then give rise to a compound meaning and if they cannot, no compound meaning can qualify the meaning of the suffix *cha*. The answer is that *kāka* means an action, the coming of the crow. Similarly, *tālā* means the falling of the *tālā* tree. As these two words do not stand for two substances only but for two actions there can be connection between the two. The connection is that the two actions can be standards of comparison to each other, the common property being unexpectedness. Once they are connected, they can qualify the meaning of the suffix *cha*. The two words can be compounded to express the *upamānopameyabhāva* between these two actions, and the other two actions, namely, the arrival of Devadatta and the coming of the bandit. The suffix expresses the same relation between the killing of the crow and that of Devadatta.]

612. Such a sentence (in which mutual fact of being the standard of comparison) is postulated merely for the purpose of word formation.

[It might be argued that it is useless to bring in the mutual *upamānatva* of *kākāgamana* and *tālapatana*. Why not compare directly the two unexpected killings? The answer is that this mutual *upamānatva* is only a stage in the process of word formation (*prakriyā*) and not real. It does not play any part in worldly usage in which *kākatālā* cannot be used without the suffix *cha*.]

613. It is accepted that the suffix *cha* comes after the stem in the form of a compound of *kāka* and *tālā*, standing as the standard of comparison for any two objects which come into contact by chance.

[The compound *kākatālā* is formed in the sense of *iva*. It means : the killing of the crow unexpectedly brought into contact with the falling tree. It is the stem for the suffix *cha* which means that the killing of Devadatta unexpectedly brought into contact with the bandit who arrived by chance.]

614. The *cha* is desired to be added in the sense of the other event, the object of comparison, namely, the killing by the bandit which is like the killing of the crow by the *tāla* tree.

[It is now stated in which sense the suffix *cha* is added. It has already been shown that the meaning of the compound stands for one meaning of *iva*, namely, that the coming into contact of Devadatta and the bandit is like (*iva*) the coming into contact of the crow and the *tāla* tree. The other meaning of *iva* is expressed by the suffix *cha*. Just as, by the accidental falling of the tree, the accidentally arrived crow is killed, in the same way, the accidentally arrived Devadatta is killed by the accidentally arrived bandit. The suffix *cha* expresses the wonderful coincidence. The *cha* is taught as expressive of another event which is like the accidental event (killing) of the crow due to its accidental contact with the tree. In other words, any accidental event, due to an accidental contact between two things can be called *kākatāliya*.]

615. Others have declared that the words *cañcatka* = 'like what is moving', *bṛhatka* = 'like what is big' refer, through resemblance, to a precious stone, or a frog or a fire-fly.

[As the meaning of *iva* is being considered in connection with the standard of comparison, another matter is now explained. P. 5.4.3. teaches the suffix *kan* after the words *sthūla* etc., when *prakāra* is to be expressed. In that connection, there is the *vārttika* : *cañcadbṛhatōr upasamkhyānam*, which means that *cañcat* and *bṛhat* must also be included among the words to which *kan* is to be added in the sense of *prakāra*. The words formed would be *cañcatka* and *bṛhatka*. What they mean is this: The word *prakāra* in the *sūtra* means resemblance. So the word *cañcatka* means: "moving like". That which is not moving but looks like moving is called *cañcatka*. Similarly, that which is

not big but looks like big is called *bṛhatka*. A precious stone in clear shaking water looks as though it shakes.]

616. A fire-fly is compared because of the brightening and dimming of its lustre, a frog because of its constant breathing in and out and a precious stone because of its scintillating lustre.

[The resemblance in these cases is now explained. The fire-fly, even though not moving, looks like moving, being enveloped in its own lustre. It is then called *cañcatka*. Its own lustre brightens and dims alternately in a continuous manner. So it looks like moving. Similarly, because of its constant breathing in and out, the frog looks moving even when it is not. A precious stone, because of its constantly scintillating lustre, looks moving even when it is not.]

617. The word *bṛhatka* is used for a precious stone, which, though small, is cognised as big when its lustre spreads all round.

[What *prakāra* means in connection with the word *bṛhatka* is now explained. A precious stone, though small, looks big because of its lustre spreading all round.]

618. Some think that *prakāra* always means resemblance. Others, on the other hand think that the word *prakāra* can be applied for variety (*bheda*) also.

[The different views on *prakāra* are now explained. The word *prakāra* occurs in P. 8.1.12., 5.4.3. and so on. Everywhere it means resemblance. The words *yathā* and *tathā*, when used together point to resemblance between two things. The word *paṭujātīya* (P. 5.3.69.) means primarily what is *paṭu*, that is, it also stands for resemblance. The expression *paṭupatuḥ* (P. 8.1.12.) also means resemblance subordinated to what is *paṭu* (clever), The

same is true of the expression *sthūlaka* = 'like who is fat'. Others think that *prakāra* means 'variety, class' everywhere. As two varieties of the same thing must resemble each other, resemblance is also understood even where variety is the meaning. If the variety and resemblance are understood everywhere one should be looked upon as the expressed meaning and the others as the implied meaning. In *paśuprakāro devadattaḥ*, Devadatta is not understood as a variety of *paśu*. Here *prakāra* can only mean resemblance. Even in *paśur devadattaḥ*, where identity is expressed, resemblance is understood. In neither of these two cases is variety understood.]

619. Some suffixes while expressing *prakāra* really denote that which has *prakāra* while others, after having expressed *prakāra* only, go beyond it (in association with something else).

[Another point to be considered is this : If the suffix *thāl*, taught after specific stems like *kim*, *sarvanāma* and *bahu* supersedes *jātiyar*, taught after any stem, how can the word *kim-jātiya* be formed ? If *thāl* itself expresses *prakāra*, how to explain the formation of *tathājātiya* where one finds both *thāl* and *jātiyar* ? The position is this. The suffixes *jātiyar* and *kan* and repetition are all taught in the sense of *prakāra*. They convey *prakāra* secondarily and *prakāravān* = 'that which has *prakāra*' primarily. *Thāl*, on the other hand, expresses *prakāra* only and not *prakāravān*. But, after having expressed *prakāra*, it can express *prakāravān* in association with *jātiyar*. It is not like the word *śukla* which straightaway expresses that which is white. Therefore, *thāl* and *jātiyar* have different scope and so do not go against each other. Thus, the expression *tathājātiyaḥ* can be explained. In the sentence *yathā devadattas tathā yajñadattaḥ*, the word ending in *thāl* does not by itself denote that which has *prakāra*. What happens is that some verb expressive of action is required here to complete the meaning of the sentence and the *prakāra* which is the meaning of the word ending in *thāl* becomes the *karaṇa* in regard to the action denoted by that verb.

Yena prakāreṇa devadatto vartate tena prakāreṇa yajñadatto 'pi, this is the full meaning of the sentence.]

620-621. The word *sādrśya* mentioned in the *sūtra* (P. 2.1.6) stands for *sadrśa*, (the *dharmī* and not for *dharma* only.) When an *avyayībhāva* is formed of two words expressive of two objects which resemble each other it is the word *saha* which is expressive of what is similar.

The indeclinable expressive of the meaning of *yathā* enters into the compound in the sense of repetition and resemblance and that has been shown separately.

[If *thāl*, taught in the sense of *prakāra* really means *sādrśya*, why is *sādrśya*, mentioned separately in P. 2.1.6 which teaches the formation of *avyayībhāva* compounds, considering that *yathā* has already been mentioned before. The reason is that there is really no repetition here, *sādrśya* here means *sadrśa*. The former is a *dharma* which presupposes the *dharmī*, its substratum. The example given is *sakhyā sadrśaḥ sasakhi*. In this *avyayībhāva*, the *avyaya* is *saha* which has become *sa* and stands for the *dharmī* and not *dharma* only. As the word so formed expresses the *sadrśa* which is something concrete, a substance, it should not really be an indeclinable, but being an *avyayībhāva*, it is indeclinable according to P. 1.1.41. The *avyayībhāva* formed in the sense of *vīpsā*, one of the four meanings of *yathā*, namely, *pratyartham* expresses *dharma* only. So, it can be an indeclinable. No compound of this kind can be formed in the sense of *sādrśya*, the fourth meaning of *yathā*. The *sūtra* P. 2.1.7. also makes this point clear.]

622. Some believe that the *yogyatā* which is expressed by *anu* is really resemblance whereas resemblance in concrete substances is expressed by *saha*.

[Another way of looking at this matter is now explained. The 'fitness' (*yogyatā*) which is conveyed by the word *anu* is resemblance (*sādrśya*) considered to be one of the meanings of *yathā*. In that sense, the compound can take place. One can say, for instance: *anurūpaṃ surūpo vahati* = 'the good-looking person wears what is similar to or in keeping with his ornaments.' Thus, *anurūpaṃ* is an *avyayībhāva* formed in the sense of resemblance (one of the meanings of *yathā*) to *rūpa* = ornamentation. The meaning of *yathā*, namely, fitness is connected with or based upon resemblance, which is a mere *guṇa*, quality. The resemblance which is found in objects, substances, and is due to particular shapes is expressed by *saha*, as in *sasakhi*. This kind of resemblance is referred to in the *sūtra* by the word *sādrśya*, whereas the word *yathā* in the rule refers to resemblance in qualities. Thus, they have different scopes. If, on the other hand, *yogyatā* is understood as something quite different from resemblance, that is, as fitness, then the former explanation for separate mention of *sādrśya* in the rule must be accepted.]

623. In the attainment of a particular condition also, there is resemblance based upon what figures in the mind. Here, in the cognition, it is only a bit of difference (not real difference) which is meant to be conveyed.

[The view that everywhere *prakāra* means resemblance has been questioned by some as follows—P. 2.3.21. teaches the third case-ending after a word expressive of a particular state of a thing (*prakāra*). Thus, we can say: *kamaṇḍalunā chātram* = 'student having a *kamaṇḍalu*'. Here the student having a particular condition is a variety of the genus 'man.' Thus, *prakāra* here obviously means variety and not resemblance, because there is nobody else to whom he is compared. But the view that *prakāra* everywhere means *sādrśya* is justified as follows:—Even in P. 2.3.21. the particular state or *prakāra* involves resemblance, because an expression like *kamaṇḍalunā chātram* is possible only if there is resemblance between the image created in the mind by the expression and the outside object to which

it refers. The correspondence between the mental image and the outside object is what is called *prakāra* here and it is a kind of resemblance. Similarly, in P. 5.3.42 also where the suffix *dhā* is taught after a numeral in the sense of *vidhā* or *prakāra*, a particular mode of action, resemblance is implied. When one says: *pañcadhā bhuñkte*, what is understood from the words corresponds to outside reality. The numeral stands for mode of action. *Pañcadhā bhuñkte* means: 'he eats in five modes'. The action of eating is one but it can be performed in different ways. The numeral stands for the number of ways. What figures in the mind resembles outside reality. Thus, here also, *prakāra* means resemblance.]

624. In the matter of repetition (taught in P. 8.1.12.), the sentence *gaur vāhikaḥ*='the *vāhika* is a cow', involving resemblance, is given as the counter example. As words like *śukla*, well-known as quality words (*guṇavacana*) are available, the word 'go' denoting *vāhika* is not repeated.

[The support of the *M. Bhā*, for the view that everywhere *prakāra* stands for resemblance is now shown. In P. 8.1.12. where repetition of a word expressive of quality is taught, *agnir māṇavakaḥ*='the student is fire', *gaur vāhikaḥ*='the *vāhika* is a cow' are given as counter examples. This can be justified only if the word *prakāra* occurring in the *sūtra* stands for resemblance. The *vāhika* cannot be looked upon as a variety (*bheda*) of *go* nor the student that of fire. This shows that elsewhere than in the matter of repetition also, *prakāra* means resemblance. In *gaur vāhikaḥ*, the word *gauḥ* is not repeated because it is not a word expressive of quality as the rule in question requires. It is true that the word *gauḥ* is applied to a *vāhikaḥ* because of identification based on common qualities. But it is not words like *go* which are meant by the word *guṇavacana* in the *sūtra*. It is words like *śukla*, *paṭu* which are so meant. The word *śukla* stands for the quality white and for someone who has that quality. The word 'go', on the other hand,

first means a universal (*gotva*). When it is applied to a *vāhika*, it is not a *guṇavacana* word, because primarily it denotes a universal. So P. 8.1.12. teaches the repetition of a word which denotes quality secondarily and substance primarily as in *śuklaśuklaḥ paṭaḥ* = 'a very white cloth', *paṭupatuḥ*—'very clever' or of a word which teaches quality only as in *śuklaśuklaṃ rūpam*—'very white colour'.]

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